与存

愚者遍历

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@ChinaMacroFacts @whyyoutouzhele https://t.co/Ya3OSMiVgO

[Lee1ng @lilaoshizuikeai]

再说一个大家不一定知道的情况
至少从两年前开始，警方内部通报里就基本每周都会有“涉左”人员被处理。
主要对象有高校学生，中学老师。涉及的事项包括“融工”，“发展同志”“建立读书会”等等。
眼下来说，你在大庭广众下Cosplay其实无人管你，但是你真想按理论搞实践，那就要遭铁拳了。

[OKTY @okatoyoismpls]

30超えたあたりからようやく人間としての理性の萌芽、みたいなものが芽生えたというくらい、おれの人生の半分以上は本当に頭がおかしく、他人に迷惑をかけまくっていたんだけど、

頭がおかしくて他人に迷惑をかけてる状態から見る世界というのは、ほとんど神聖なまでに輝いていた

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@MacroMargin 展期嘛 大家一起扛

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@laoyang945 我第一反应也是那个年代的人有权力玩模拟经营的兴奋劲了

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@yoginnnnnn 刻耳柏洛斯！

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@wallen97754394 这是好事儿啊

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@MacroMargin 压缩太厉害了 看不清

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@Noahpinion It's not that it's too expensive to buy, it's just trash that no one wants

[Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis]

The story told in this graph is important. If you set a GDP growth target and you cannot get consumption to grow faster than the target, then you also cannot allow investment to grow more slowly than the target except to the extent that a rising trade surplus takes up the slack.

By the late 2010s China was already worried about excess manufacturing capacity and the private sector was cutting back on manufacturing investment.

But the collapse in property investment after 2021 changed all of that. In order to keep overall investment from slowing, the authorities forced a massive increase in manufacturing investment whose purpose was not to satisfy unmet demand but rather to balance the decline in property investment.

The consequence shouldn't have been nearly as surprising as it was for many: excess manufacturing capacity exploded into the problem of involution. But as involution forces down the growth rate of manufacturing investment, even as the growth rate of consumption continues to lag, this leaves China with three possible outcomes:

1. Miss the GDP growth target, which is what has been happening in recent momths, but this is probably politically unacceptable.

2. Increase non-manufacturing investment, although with property investment still declining, this basically means more infrastructure investment. I expect this will happen in the second half of 2026, but given that China already so much excess capacity in infrastructure, it isn't east to find investment projects that aren't value-destroying in the aggregate. As one of my academic friends said jokingly last week, thank god for the terrible rainstorms.

3. Run ever larger trade surpluses.

The arithmetic is pretty easy to set out. China must get investment growth to slow sharply, perhaps even to go negative, if it has any hope of reining in debt, but there are only two ways this can happens.

One way is with a surge in consumption growth that balances the slowdown in investment growth by enough to meet its long-term 4% growth target, but this seems unlikely, at best. The other way is without a surge in consumption, which means allowing GDP growth to drop.

Until then, we can think of the growing trade surplus as effectively a residual consequence of the attempt to rein in debt (i.e. non-productive investment) without reducing GDP growth.

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

lol

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@Corsica267 安西教练，我想打螺丝…

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@NullOreo_ 价值理性衰退，人在工具理性的间隙，各种牛鬼蛇神就上身了

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@bkingfilm 哎 命运的彩票 摸奖摸奖

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@foxshuo 新世纪走私战士

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@Corsica267 严肃学习🫡

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@Corsica267 佩服自己还认得出来🥲

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@LeoYuen13 感谢分享 去学习一下他的经验

[NullOreo @NullOreo_]

油价并不是利率抬升的根因，伊朗不过是萨拉热窝的那枚子弹。

过去 30 年，全球利率之所以能一直降到 0 甚至负利率，全靠三个结构性红利。

而现在，这三个红利变成了成本扩张项，分别是供应链重构、人口老龄化与AI导致的巨量capex。

过去哪里的劳动力最便宜、哪里的工厂最有效率，产能就建在哪里（如中国制造），全球源源不断输出极其便宜的商品。而现在经历了供应链中断与地缘对抗后，西方国家推行“近岸外包/友岸外包”和产业回流。“安全”取代了“效率”。建重复的工厂、用更贵的本国工人，意味着全人类生产成本的被抬升了。

过去世界是享有人口红利的，婴儿潮一代处于黄金工作年龄，全球（特别是东亚与东欧）劳动力供给大爆发，且储蓄率极高，形成了“资金过剩（Savings Glut）”，所以无风险利率才会那么低。

现在全球主力经济体同步进入深度老龄化。老龄化不仅导致劳动力短缺（工资刚性上涨），更重要的是，老龄人口开始消耗储蓄而非提供储蓄。

当全球总储蓄减少，而投资需求（如 AI 基础设施、绿能转型）大增时，资金的“价格”（即实际利率）必然被推高。

低利率的底座已经被逐步瓦解。

[与存 @3MAN0N_44]

@jukan05 @LinQingV 韩国人跟杠杆这个词绑死了