Average Joe

I'm not a political scientist. Not a journalist. I'm just someone who reads too much and notices when the story doesn't add up.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

The deal specifically reopened the Strait under Iran's coordination/control as the primary/safe route — US signed off, ships resumed traffic.

Push 'deal creep' with uncoordinated alternate paths or bypassing Iran? Checks get sent. Classic enforcement in a choke point they dominate.

Early test indeed — durability depends on sticking to the agreed terms, not testing boundaries

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

I’d want to hear from the horses mouth before reading too much into this. China is very good at sitting on the fence diplomatically.

If the question was framed as “should countries charge tolls on international waterways?”, China can agree with that in principle while still leaving room to argue later that the Strait of Hormuz is territorial-water and thefore definition complications under international law due to the distance from shores, etc.

So it may sound like direct support, but the actual position could be far more conditional depending on how the question was asked and how the statement said.

[Mohamad Safa @mhdksafa]

The Iranian navy, which has been destroyed eight times, closed the Strait of Hormuz again, because the United States for the seventh time won the war that wasn’t a war, so the United States can open the Strait of Hormuz that was open before the not war.

The not war that started to get the uranium that was completely obliterated, so that the Iranians can’t build the nuclear bomb that they weren’t building for the not war that the United States started.

Then the United States which has nuclear weapons threatening to use nuclear weapons to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons because having nuclear weapons is dangerous.

If the United States saw what the United States is doing in the United States, the United States would invade the United States to liberate the United States from the tyranny of the United States.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

Question: Could BRICS nations pivot towards allowing the purchase of oil in any currency except the USD at a discount?

Wouldn't this would create an immediate incentive for countries to access cheaper oil, especially during the global crisis, where it becomes a necessity rather than a choice? That would reduce reliance on the USD, forcing the US to raise prices to counter the impact.

But if the USD oil continues to rise in prices, it would create an increasing gap that further incentives for countries to work around US blockades through the land routes and other supply chains.

[AJ Jaff @aj_geo_analysis]

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘁𝗼𝗽 𝗳𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝘀𝗰𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗼𝘀 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘄𝗵𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 #𝗨𝗔𝗘 𝗿��𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗹𝗲𝗳𝘁 — 𝗶𝗻 𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗳 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆.

𝗦𝗰𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗼 𝟭 — 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗰 𝗮𝘂𝘁𝗼𝗻𝗼𝗺𝘆 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗱𝘂𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗳𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗼𝗺. [𝗛𝗶𝗴𝗵𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆]

The UAE has been capped at roughly 3 million barrels per day while sitting on capacity above 4 million. #ADNOC is pushing toward 5 million barrels per day by 2027. Staying in #OPEC meant subordinating a $100+ billion infrastructure investment to #SaudiArabia's swing producer calculus.

Exiting OPEC means the UAE can pump freely toward its capacity ceiling — capturing market share at $110+ Brent while every competitor is constrained or shut in by the #Hormuz crisis.

𝗦𝗰𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗼 𝟮 — 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘆𝘂𝗮𝗻 𝗹𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗮𝗴𝗲 𝗽𝗹𝗮𝘆. [𝗩𝗲𝗿𝘆 𝗵𝗶𝗴𝗵 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 — 𝗺𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗿𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝗲𝗱]

Outside OPEC the UAE has no obligation to price production in any framework aligned with $dollar-denominated benchmarks. It can sell to #China in $yuan through existing mBridge infrastructure without creating a precedent that destabilizes the broader OPEC dollar architecture.

Pricing China's 35% share of UAE $crude in yuan would remove roughly $80 million per day in petrodollar Treasury demand — directional pressure on the dollar over months not days.

The yuan threat to #Washington was leverage to get a swap line.

The OPEC exit is the mechanism that makes the yuan option permanently available — without needing Washington's permission to exercise it.

𝗦𝗰𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗼 𝟯 — 𝗣𝘂𝗻𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗦𝗮𝘂𝗱𝗶 𝗔𝗿𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗮 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗚𝗖𝗖 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗱𝗲𝗾𝘂𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝘀𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗱𝗮𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆. [𝗠𝗼𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲-𝗵𝗶𝗴𝗵]

UAE diplomatic adviser Gargash stated publicly this week that #GCC countries "supported each other logistically but politically and #militarily their position was the weakest historically." He said he expected weakness from the #Arab League but not from the #GCC itself.

#Iran bombed UAE ports and infrastructure for weeks. #Saudi Arabia and the GCC watched. The UAE was the most targeted country in the war — by a fellow OPEC member — while OPEC sat silent.

Quitting OPEC is the UAE formally recording its verdict on that silence. It is a message to #Riyadh: we were bombed by your cartel partner and you offered logistics. That relationship has a different value than it did on February 27.

𝗦𝗰𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗼 𝟰 — 𝗔𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗧𝗿𝘂𝗺𝗽 𝗮𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗺𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝘃𝗮𝗹𝘂𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗽𝗼𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗹 𝗺𝗼𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁. [𝗛𝗶𝗴𝗵]

#Trump has accused OPEC of "ripping off the rest of the world" by inflating oil prices and linked #US military protection of #Gulf states explicitly to $oil pricing behavior.

The UAE just handed Trump his most concrete energy market win — a founding OPEC member breaking ranks to pump freely — at the exact moment he needs domestic wins before the midterms and a lower oil price to ease consumer pain.

This is not coincidence. #AbuDhabi bought #American political protection with a production decision. The $100 billion clean $energy partnership signed with Washington is the other half of that same transaction.

𝗦𝗰𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗼 𝟱 — 𝗛𝗲𝗱𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲𝘀 𝘀𝗶𝗺𝘂𝗹𝘁𝗮𝗻𝗲𝗼𝘂𝘀𝗹𝘆 — 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗲 𝗨𝗔𝗘 𝗱𝗼𝗰𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗲. [𝗖𝗲𝗿𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗻]

The UAE has been systematically limiting its dependence on any single bloc for a decade — replacing it with genuine strategic autonomy. From the Abraham Accords to exiting the #Yemen war to the Barakah nuclear plant to now OPEC — every move follows the same logic: never be so committed to one partner that you lose the ability to deal with their adversary.

24 deals with China on April 13. Yuan threat to Washington on April 14. $100 billion clean energy deal with Washington ongoing. OPEC exit on April 28.
The UAE is not choosing Washington over #Beijing. It is not choosing Beijing over Washington. It is choosing itself — with the maximum freedom to sell to whoever pays most, in whatever currency is most advantageous, under whatever geopolitical alignment best protects Abu Dhabi's interests at any given moment.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘅𝘁 𝗱𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗼.

#Iraq is the most consequential candidate. Chronic quota violator. #Economy entirely dependent on $oil revenue it cannot currently export through a closed Hormuz. Government fractured between pro-Iran and pro-Western factions. Budget crisis accelerating.

Iraq watched the UAE exit today and did the same calculation Abu Dhabi did — except Iraq's version is more desperate because its oil revenues have been physically cut off for 59 days.

When the most financially distressed OPEC member watches the most strategically sophisticated one exit — the permission structure changes.

OPEC is not dead.

But it just lost its third-largest producer in the middle of the biggest energy crisis since 1973 — to a country that spent the two weeks before the exit signing 24 deals with China and warning Washington about yuan oil pricing.

That is not a production quota dispute.

That is a sovereignty declaration.

And every remaining OPEC member is reading it as exactly that.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

@RealAdamFrost @circlethywagons @rebelliousdogra @SpokespersonCHN @MFA_China @XHNews @ChinaDaily @PDChina @chinaorgcn @RT_com @SputnikInt Thank you for playing.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

You keep trying to force this into a binary, like being critical of one system automatically means supporting another. That’s not how analysis works.

You can critique US policy, incentives, and behavior without endorsing China, Russia, or anyone else. Those are separate things.

What you’re doing is trying to label instead of engage. “Anti-US”, “bot”, “mouthpiece” none of that addresses the actual point.

The point hasn’t changed: how countries respond to incentives within the current system and where that may be heading.

Critiquing those incentives isn’t taking sides. It’s recognising how the system shapes behavior.

If your only way to process that is to assign it to a “team”, then you’re not arguing the topic. You’re defending a position.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

It’s interesting how quickly you keep shifting from discussing logic to personal jabs about who I follow.

That alone says a lot about where your argument has gone.

Yes, I follow a range of non-Western accounts. That’s deliberate. If you want to understand the other side, you don’t limit yourself to one narrative. You look at how different sides think, communicate, and operate.

Being exposed to one perspective by default is exactly why it makes sense to seek out others. That isn’t endorsement. It’s context.

The substance hasn’t changed, though. The discussion is about how countries respond to incentives within the current system.

Shifting the focus to who I follow doesn’t address that. It just avoids it.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

When I said “less and less,” that’s a direction over time, not a claim of an overnight collapse. You’re arguing against speed, not the trend.

Telling countries they can’t do something, then punishing them when they do doesn’t just enforce rules. By sanctioning them, it removes the US from parts of that market and forces others to adjust around it.

Take India. They shifted toward US oil supply, then back to Russian oil when that supply couldn’t meet demand.

They even asked for permission, which tells you how the system is structured.

If the US had said no, they were left with two real outcomes.

Enforce it and push India, along with their trade partners, further away from the dollar system, effectively isolating the US from that flow.

Or allow it, take the internal political hit, and reframe it as “controlled approval,” even though India would have done it anyway because it was a national necessity. This wasn’t about price. It was about securing supply.

I also didn't say this is about replacing the US system outright. I said it'll be used less and less. Most countries don’t want that, even Russia, China, and Iran etc, they benefit from a multinational system.

The shift is in how they engage with it. If the US doesn’t adapt to that shift, it's going to gradually isolate itself from parts of the market over time.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

You’re still arguing a snapshot as if it disproves a trend.

No one said the dollar isn’t dominant today. No one said it’s being replaced tomorrow. You keep repeating that because it’s easier than engaging the actual point.

You say “utility dictates reality” while ignoring why that utility exists. The dollar system works because it’s deep, liquid, and globally embedded, but it also comes with jurisdiction attached. That’s the part you keep sidestepping.

When you point to SWIFT share or reserves being stable or even growing, all you’re showing is that the system is still heavily used. That tells you nothing about whether countries are actively reducing dependence risk alongside that usage.

Those two things can happen at the same time: use the system because you have to, while building alternatives, so you don’t have to forever.

On stablecoins, you’re making my point for me. Yes, they’re dollar-backed. That’s why they’re gaining traction because they provide access to dollar liquidity outside traditional rails. That’s not the system strengthening itself. That’s its function being abstracted into new environments.

And notice the pivot. We’ve gone from financial structure to “what about China’s politics.” That’s deflection. The question isn’t whether China is perfect. It’s whether the current system incentivises others to reduce exposure to it.

You keep trying to frame this as a defense of one country. It isn’t. It’s an observation about how the rest of the world is behaving.

Reducing this to memes or trying to label it as “pro-China” just highlights the problem. You’re viewing a global shift through a single-country lens and relying on snapshot data, while I’m describing how multiple countries are responding to the same set of incentives.

You can be critical of one system without endorsing another. That’s where actual analysis happens.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

You’re still proving my point while trying to dismiss it.

Yes, the dollar has unmatched liquidity and infrastructure today. No one is disputing that. You’re arguing the present snapshot as if it invalidates the direction of travel.

The reason alternatives are being built isn’t because people suddenly forgot how efficient the dollar system is. It’s because participation comes with jurisdiction attached.

When you say “if you transact in dollars, it clears through US banks,” that’s exactly the issue. That means US policy, US sanctions, and US legal reach apply to transactions between non US parties outside US borders. That’s not neutral infrastructure. That’s conditional access.

And your “only bad actors need alternatives” argument collapses under its own weight. Countries aren’t redesigning payment systems just to “do illegal things.” They’re reducing exposure to a system where another nation can unilaterally decide what is acceptable behavior. That’s not about avoiding transparency. It’s about sovereignty and risk management.

On SWIFT, you’re quoting a share of transactions on a legacy messaging system, not total global settlement behavior. Of course, the dollar dominates the system it built. That doesn’t tell you whether dependency on that system is increasing or being hedged against. Growth inside the system can happen at the same time alternatives are being built outside it.

On crypto, same pattern. Yes, stablecoins are dollar backed. That doesn’t prove that dependence is permanent. It proves demand for dollar liquidity is being pulled into new rails that can evolve over time.

You keep treating dominance today as proof it can’t erode. I’m pointing out that the very mechanisms that created that dominance are now incentivising others to build around it.

So, back to your original claim:

No one said the dollar is being replaced tomorrow.

No one said another currency matches its liquidity today.

The point is that global reliance on that system is being actively reduced because of the control attached to it.

And dismissing that as “no one cares” doesn’t change the fact that countries, institutions, and payment systems are clearly acting like it matters.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

You’re arguing my point while pretending you’re refuting it.

“Yes, dollars clear through US correspondent banks” isn’t some gotcha, it’s exactly the mechanism I’ve been describing. That’s the leverage. That’s why OFAC can reach beyond its borders. That’s not a rebuttal, that’s confirmation.

The part you keep avoiding is what happens because of that. When the system is used as a control point, others build ways around it.

That’s not theory, it’s already happening. Bilateral settlement, alternative rails, reduced exposure to dollar clearing, those are direct responses to the exact “plumbing” you’re describing.

You keep zooming in on how dominant the system is today and acting like that ends the conversation. It doesn’t. Dominance is the reason the shift is happening, not a defense against it.

https://t.co/ypxAfpC6Uo

On SWIFT percentages, again, snapshot thinking. Of course the dollar dominates current flows. No one argued otherwise. The question is whether reliance is increasing or decreasing over time. Those are two very different claims, and you keep trying to collapse them into one.

On the “imminent collapse” angle, that’s something you inserted, not something I argued. Pointing out erosion at the edges is not the same as claiming overnight replacement. You’re arguing against a version of my position that’s easier to dismiss.

So to bring it back to your original claim:

Yes, the dollar still has unmatched liquidity and infrastructure today.

No, that does not mean it’s unchallenged.

The mechanisms you’re pointing to as proof of strength are the same ones driving others to reduce dependence on it.

If your argument requires pretending those responses don’t redefine them as irrelevant “margins,”then you’re defending a static snapshot of it.

[RealAdamFrost @RealAdamFrost]

@AScopeShift @circlethywagons @rebelliousdogra No one cares bro. There is no currency on earth EVEN BRICS that matches the liquidity transparency and infrastructure that is available for the US dollar. Suggesting that the US dollar is going to be replaced anytime soon by systems with their own financial issues is massive cope

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

You’re celebrating a point no one disputed.

“Yes, the dollar has unmatched liquidity today” isn’t a concession, it’s the baseline. The disagreement was never about the present, it’s about direction.

You keep reframing this as if acknowledging current dominance ends the conversation, when the actual question is whether that dominance is static or being chipped away over time.

And that’s where you keep dodging.

Trade settlement shifting outside the dollar, sanctions forcing parallel systems, bilateral agreements reducing exposure, those are not hypotheticals, they’re already happening. That’s what “margins” means, the edges where systems change before the centre does.

You’re treating change like it has to appear fully formed or it doesn’t exist. That’s not how any dominant system in history has declined.
On the digital yuan point, again, observing that alternative rails increase liquidity options is not endorsing the system behind it. You keep trying to force that into a moral argument because it’s easier than addressing the structural one.

So no, nothing collapsed. You just anchored yourself to a snapshot in time and are calling anything beyond that “backpedalling.”

The position hasn’t changed. The dollar dominates today. The trend is that others are reducing reliance on it.

If your argument only works by freezing time at “today,” that’s not analysis, that’s avoidance

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

You’ve moved this from your original point about dollar liquidity and dominance into “code vs control” and court cases, but that doesn’t actually address what I said.

No one argued the dollar is being replaced tomorrow. The point is direction, not instant substitution.

Yes, the dollar still has unmatched liquidity and infrastructure today. That’s not in dispute. But that position is being eroded at the margins as more trade settles outside it, whether that’s China–Russia flows, sanctioned economies, or bilateral agreements reducing exposure.

And this ties directly back to control.
You’re saying “they can’t choke math,” but real-world finance doesn’t operate at the base layer, it operates at the edges. Liquidity, settlement, access to markets, those are all controllable. That’s exactly why alternative rails are being built in the first place.

If the system wasn’t exerting influence through those channels, there’d be no incentive to build around it.

So the point still stands. Not that the dollar is collapsing overnight, but that the same mechanisms that created its dominance, control, liquidity, infrastructure, are now driving others to reduce reliance on it over time while creating the same under another banner.

That’s not “cope,” it’s just how systems evolve under pressure.

https://t.co/ypxAfpC6Uo

[RealAdamFrost @RealAdamFrost]

@AScopeShift @circlethywagons @rebelliousdogra No one cares bro. There is no currency on earth EVEN BRICS that matches the liquidity transparency and infrastructure that is available for the US dollar. Suggesting that the US dollar is going to be replaced anytime soon by systems with their own financial issues is massive cope

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

You keep saying “look at outcomes,” but then reduce the outcome to one court case. That’s selection, not analysis.

If we look at the full system, KYC still exists, exchanges are still regulated, chain analysis is still funded, and assets are still seized. None of that changed. One tool was limited, and the system adapted and continued. That’s not a loss of control. That’s how control operates under constraint.

Your firewall vs. ransomware analogy actually works against you. The US doesn’t stay within its own boundary. OFAC sanctioning Kunlun Bank for transactions outside US jurisdiction, non USD, non US parties, shows the system extending influence outward using financial leverage. That’s not passive defense. That’s active control across networks.

And this isn’t “intent ghosts.” OFAC designations explicitly reference foreign policy objectives. That’s published policy.

Pointing out how systems operate isn’t endorsing another system. You’re trying to turn analysis into allegiance instead of engaging the point.

If your definition of “no control” is “one method failed,” then you’re not analysing outcomes. You’re isolating one you like and ignoring the rest.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

Nobody championed an alternative system. The original point was that both sides are doing statecraft, not virtue. Noting that the US pursues financial control through adaptive methods isn't an endorsement of authoritarian governance. It's an observation about intent. You can critique a system without pledging allegiance to its rival.

That's called analysis, not hypocrisy.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

@circlethywagons @ForumForThought @rebelliousdogra Noted. The oil prices and supply chains don't care either way.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

Every major power has rooms full of people doing exactly this. Russia, China, the UK, India. Planning capability isn't unique to the US. It's just what states do.

The Maduro situation shows good operational execution. But military doctrine and economic foresight are two completely different capabilities, and conflating them makes every policy reversal look like 4D chess when sometimes it's just course correction.

If the energy side was fully mapped out, India wouldn't have scrambled back to Russian oil at a premium. That part didn't go to plan, and no amount of Pentagon war gaming changes that.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

@DougAMacgregor It's more like he doesn't have the power to. He would need Iran's agreement to do that.

[Average Joe @AScopeShift]

That's exactly the point. The system attempted control, got checked, and adapted. That's not a win for freedom. That's just how financial power operates.

After Snowden exposed NSA bulk collection, courts forced changes to the program. The intent never moved. They just shifted to FISA 702, tech company arrangements, and national security letters. Same goal, new method. KYC mandates and Chainalysis contracts didn't disappear because one court said no to one tool.

The intent is consistent. Only the mechanism changes.