The rent is too blessed high!
@AlanGordonRI has proposed a radical new insurance product for landlords and tenants that would protect both.
He developed two versions, one for higher risk landlords/properties/tenants and one for more stable situations.
Think Progressive vs Amica.
The policy covers security deposit, last month’s rent, provides a benefit to pay the rent for a few months, enrolls landlord and tenant in a maintenance agreement with access to qualified repair people, and provides mediation and legal assistance in the unfortunate event of termination of lease.
For 1/3 - 1 month’s rent depending on risk factors.
Can you open this link?
https://t.co/N6YEvBl1u4
Comments, please.
@GoJackFlynn1@AshleyKalus@X I second that request.
Ashley, the money you used to run for Governor was taken from the nasal passages of trusting Rhode Islanders you schwabbed when you and your doctor husband shoulda known better.
The Westerly Police wrote up your sloppy operation-five pages of condemnation.
Here are the relevant legal arguments and precedents to hold the man accountable for harm he causes a woman:
Rhode Island Battery Law and Reproductive Consent
Rhode Island law provides a plausible existing doctrinal basis for treating an intentional reproductive act that exceeds the scope of a woman’s consent as a battery, although no reported Rhode Island appellate decision appears to have applied these principles specifically to impregnation.
In Proffitt v. Ricci, 463 A.2d 514, 517 (R.I. 1983), the Rhode Island Supreme Court defined battery as an intentional act causing “offensive contact,” “unconsented touching,” or “trauma” to another person’s body. Significantly, the Court held that an intent to injure is not required where the defendant “willfully sets in motion a force that in its ordinary course causes the injury.” Thus, the relevant intent may attach to the physical act that sets the causal process in motion rather than to the ultimate injury itself. (Justia Law)
The Court reaffirmed this principle in Great American E&S Insurance Co. v. End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc., 45 A.3d 571 (R.I. 2012). The Court emphasized that although the resulting injury need not be intended, “the contact or unconsented touching itself must have been intentional.” Consequently, an intentional physical act exceeding the recipient’s consent may constitute battery even if the actor did not intend the resulting injury. (Justia Law)
Rhode Island law also recognizes that bodily consent can be limited in scope. In Nolan v. Kechijian, 75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866 (1949), the Supreme Court recognized potential battery liability where a patient consented to surgery involving her spleen but had not authorized removal of the spleen. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972), subsequently reaffirmed Nolan, distinguishing an unauthorized bodily intervention, which may support battery, from an authorized procedure whose undisclosed risks ordinarily sound in negligence. (Justia Law)
These principles create a legally significant distinction between consent to sexual intercourse and consent to a particular reproductive act. If a woman consents to intercourse but expressly withholds consent to insemination or impregnation, her consent to one form of bodily contact does not necessarily establish consent to every additional physical act occurring during that encounter. Under Nolan, the scope of the consent matters.
The causal principle articulated in Proffitt must also be read alongside Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691 (R.I. 1997). There, intentionally striking a golf ball did not constitute battery when a misdirected ball unexpectedly struck another person, because injury to that person was not the force’s “ordinary course.” (Justia Law) Pregnancy presents a materially different causation question: fertilization and pregnancy are recognized biological outcomes of introducing viable sperm into the female reproductive tract. A court would therefore have to determine whether an intentional, unconsented reproductive contact that results in pregnancy falls within Proffitt’s rule governing a force that causes injury “in its ordinary course.”
Taken together, Nolan, Wilkinson, Proffitt, Hennessey, and Great American support a coherent but novel application of established Rhode Island battery principles: consent may be limited; an intentional touching outside that consent may constitute battery; the resulting injury need not itself be intended; and liability may extend to injury produced in the ordinary course of an intentionally initiated force.
The unresolved question is therefore not simply whether a woman consented to sex. It is what physical and reproductive contact she consented to, whether the man knowingly exceeded that consent, and whether the resulting pregnancy and bodily injury followed in the ordinary causal course of the intentional, unconsented act.
New Rhody Reporter, explaining Alan Gordon for Attorney General IN RI’s REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE proposal.
He’s getting lots of good press about this radical improvement of @AhernForAG plan.
Republican attorney general nominee Alan Gordon said he’s confident in his legal analysis of the 19-page plan he unveiled Tuesday in his campaign’s first press conference at the Rhode Island State House.
“I ran it through three AIs,” he told the only reporter who showed up.
https://t.co/HhWrdYSdTI