@MichaelGielkens Probleem voor beleggers in EXOR is dat de Agnelli familie zo hard gehecht is aan Stellantis en Juventus dat ze deze, volgens mij nooit zullen verkopen. Desondanks is de discount van 60% te hoog IMO.
Exor NV $EXO.NA was once held up as an example of disciplined NAV building, but that reputation has slipped as the discount to NAV has widened to roughly 55-60% today. The widening reflects cracks in its investment strategy and a growing set of conflicts of interest. Take the Juventus $JUVE.IM: the company received a bid for its stake and rejected it outright. Juventus is a long-term trophy asset for the Agnelli-family, but it has little to do with Exor's stated long-term value-creation strategy — the rejection reads as family preference overriding shareholder interest. A second conflict sits inside Lingotto Asset Management. Lingotto, where a growing % of NAV is allocated, behaves much like a hedge fund — trading with a short-term, performance-driven mandate — but inside a publicly-listed vehicle, whose shareholders are underwriting a long-term compounding story. Those two incentive structures don't sit well together. A third, potential conflict is Exor's continued involvement in Stellantis $STLAM.IM $STLA, where family interests may increasingly diverge from those of Exor's outside shareholders. Given all this, I'd argue the family should use the liquidity coming from the Iveco $IVG.IM sale, together with the liquid assets currently sitting at Lingotto, to fund a take-private offer for Exor. Taking the company private would convert it into a true family office — freeing the family to pursue long-term, concentrated bets without the discipline (and discount) that public markets impose, and removing the conflicts described above in the process. Is there an activist investor out there willing to write to Mr. Elkann and the Board making this case?
Investmentbolaget 🇸🇪 Industrivärden handlas till substanspremie för första gången på 5 år - trots att hela portföljen är noterad. Sandvik och Volvo utgör strax under 60 % av portföljen 🧐 Påminner lite grann om MSAB (Melker Schörling) som bara hade några få noterade innehav och där Hexagon utgjorde mer än halva substansen, men som ändå handlades till rätt hög substanspremie vill jag minnas #PrataPengar #Finanstwitter
@InvestiBrew@ReneSellmann But what if prices of their products will decrease and margins decline in the coming years? Will the high EBIT margin be maintainable?