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Italian Leftcoms As Useless Idealists Without Receipts Who Sip Cappuccinos While Fascists Run Amok - The Asymptotic Revolution of the Ultra Left that Argues with History The entire structure of this argument collapses once we recognize that it is based not on history but on a sequence of abstractions constructed in hindsight. The Italian Left tradition imagines itself as the sole custodian of classist principles while dismissing every real historical attempt at socialist construction as opportunist. It produces a theoretical universe without consequences, without states, without armies, and without any responsibility for the actual survival of the working class in moments of catastrophe. One Marxist Leninist standpoint is that the problem is not that these Leftcom abstractions are incorrect in the conventional sense but that they are not testable political theories. They are counterfactual moral judgments that assume an imaginary proletariat following an imaginary party in an imaginary sequence of confrontations with fascism. Trotskyists at least grounded their speculative frameworks in actual political battles and organizational efforts (although they were usually entirely tangential to the actual struggle). The ultra left goes further and constructs a hypothetical proletarian subject for whom its system of principles always retroactively works, largely because it never has to be carried out in practice. This entire argument begins by pretending that the Third Period Comintern strategies and the later Popular Front arose in a vacuum where one could simply choose a set of classist principles and judge success by fidelity to those principles. Historically the Third Period was shaped by the brutal class offensives of the late twenties, the deflationary wave of the Depression, the growing militarization of European powers, and the real experience of the initial victories of Italian fascism. Bordiga’s political thought developed under an unusual historical constraint. After 1926, when Mussolini outlawed the Communist Party of Italy, dissolved all legal avenues of opposition, and imprisoned or exiled its leadership, Bordiga was effectively removed from active political life. He was arrested in 1926, held until 1928, and then lived under continuous surveillance. As Aldo Agosti notes in Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, clandestine organizing inside Italy after 1926 was extremely limited and often fatal, and meaningful party work shifted to exiled leadership circles in France and the Soviet Union. Bordiga did not participate in this work. As a result, his theoretical contributions were produced removed from the kinds of problems other communist movements faced during the same years. The German Communists were attempting to survive in a state that was rapidly collapsing into Nazism. The Soviet leadership was confronting industrial backwardness, foreign intervention, and the real threat of a renewed imperialist war. Chinese Communists were facing the White Terror, the Long March, and a protracted civil war. Spanish Communists confronted a fascist insurrection backed by two major European powers. These movements were forced to devise strategy in conditions where tactical decisions had immediate consequences. Italian scholarship on the period, including work by Paul Corner and Renzo De Felice, emphasizes that the PCI’s reorganization, underground networks, and armed resistance emerged primarily in the late 1930s and early 1940s, long after Bordiga had withdrawn from politics. The leadership that reorganized the party inside Italy included figures such as Scoccimarro, Longo, and Secchia, whose practical experience during the Resistance shaped postwar PCI strategy. The gulf between theoretical speculation and practical political experience widened further because Bordiga chose not to engage with these developments. The advantage he possessed was therefore structural rather than personal. His theories did not confront the practical problems associated with building mass organizations under repression, forming alliances in heterogeneous anti fascist coalitions, coordinating armies or militias, or maintaining a revolutionary state under pressure. His strategic proposals were not subjected to the test of implementation, counterstrategy, or material constraints. They remained internally consistent because they were never required to adapt to rapidly shifting political realities. This historical context does not invalidate theoretical analysis by itself, but it explains the distinctive character of Bordiga’s contributions. They were shaped in an environment where abstraction was often the only available tool, whereas communist parties operating in China, the Soviet Union, Germany, Spain, and the Balkans were forced to synthesize theory with organizational practice under extreme conditions. Understanding this divergence clarifies why Bordiga’s positions appear rigorously coherent yet remain disconnected from the strategic problems that shaped the major communist movements of the twentieth century. Stalinist self criticism after 1934 was not an opportunist retreat but a dialectical adjustment in response to material conditions that no Bordigist group ever had to confront with actual governing power. The claim that both the Trotskyist united front and the Comintern’s Third Period line misunderstood fascism is a classic ultra left move. It assumes that fascism is a purely economic phenomenon and that the appropriate strategy simply flows from a universal schema of the party, the class, and the union. Yet fascism historically was a political phenomenon built by the bourgeoisie to destroy the organs of working class organization. It involved paramilitary street fighting, control of the state apparatus, the destruction of the press, the smashing of unions, and the deployment of a national chauvinist mobilization. It also had no fixed ideology or economic system, Fascism in Italy through its "capitalismo eroico" era to the Bombacci IRI and finally into complete subservience to Hitlerism (and Nazism corresponding Eugenics based Speer era policies) evolved with their own material conditions (or in this case immaterial idealistic conditions based on pure war economy). None of these could be countered by the narrow economic union tactic that the Italian Left proposes. Germany proved that even large and militant trade unions could be crushed in a matter of weeks. The Bordigist idea that the solution was a purely economic united front is an abstraction with no historical referent. It was never tried, never tested, and would have been quickly obliterated by fascism’s structural and military force. At the center of this debate is the question of what fascism actually is. Classical Marxism Leninism, crystallized through Dimitrov’s analyses at the Seventh Comintern Congress, defines fascism as the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary segments of finance capital. It is not merely an ideological deviation or a spontaneous revolt from below. It is a political form born when the bourgeoisie can no longer rule through parliamentary means and must reorganize the state for violent confrontation with the working class. My own position continues this line in a more specific direction. Fascism is the political expression of an unproductive financial oligarchy that has exhausted its capacity for normal accumulation and therefore reorganizes society along purely rentier lines. In such a system productive labor is no longer the basis of national wealth. The economy is hollowed out and subordinated to rent extraction, debt peonage, and asset inflation. This unproductive oligarchic core then turns outward and relies on externalized military expansion to sustain itself. War, occupation, and arms production become the remaining engines of accumulation. The military industrial complex (or more aptly, a de-industrial complex) becomes the only protected productive sector (which is entirely unproductive ironically) while all other sectors are gradually destroyed or rendered dependent on rents extracted by finance. This is why fascism always involves a furious militarism combined with the political liquidation of independent unions, peasant organizations, and industrial labor. It requires the smashing of productive forces that cannot be integrated into its rent based imperial logic. This conception aligns entirely with Dimitrov’s insight that fascism is the dictatorship of finance capital but explains exactly why finance capital, in its most degenerate unproductive form, must resort to terror, war, and state enforced parasitism to survive. The Bordigist abstraction of fascism cannot grasp this dynamic. It reduces fascism to an economic reflex detached from imperial strategy and therefore treats it as an error in the class struggle rather than a historically specific reconfiguration of capitalism around finance, militarism, and the destruction of productive labor (and it's real time conversion into slave labor). The next claim, that Stalinism cannot be social democratic because it produced critiques of revisionism such as internally published Soviet works or its polemics against Tito is similarly formalistic mechanism. The Comintern polemics were never abstract purity tests but strategic interventions related to state security, imperialist encirclement, and the material contradictions of building socialism under blockade. Siege socialism. The argument that Stalin or the USSR could not have followed a social democratic trajectory because they produced anti revisionist interventions ignores the fact that reformist parties have always issued similar polemics, from the SPD’s attacks on Bernstein to Kautsky’s theoretical condemnations even as he defended parliamentarism and war credits. The text Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR was not proof of revolutionary content but a policy document defending a particular planning model against internal pressures, just as countless non revolutionary states have produced ideological justifications to protect their administrative line. The existence of critiques of Tito or of revisionism therefore reflects geopolitical and organizational needs, not the class character of the state, and cannot serve as evidence that the USSR was something other than a system evolving in a social democratic direction. Leftcoms treat these critiques as if they prove Stalinism did not deviate into state capitalism. In reality they only demonstrate that the Soviet leadership continued to defend the dictatorship of the proletariat and refused to dissolve the revolutionary state under pressure from imperialism. The ultra left move is to say that this defense was itself a deviation because the very existence of a state becomes "suspect." This is precisely where the argument reveals its purely hypothetical nature. Marxism Leninism recognizes that the proletarian state is a fact of the transition period and that revolution must survive the armies of imperialist powers. The "Italian Left" treats this concrete problem as a philosophical aberration and therefore accuses every successful revolution of betrayal. It is a political position made possible only by never having to seize or defend power. Bordiga was an engineer who saw everything as a bill of goods list that needed to combined in a certain way. The claim about "Socialism in One Country" demonstrates the same pattern. The argument asserts that nation states are irrelevant to the proletarian revolution because the proletariat is a global class (again relying on idealistic notions of International solidarity). Historically this is true in some complete philosophical abstraction but false at every level of practical struggle. Marx and Engels already understood that revolutions do not unfold simultaneously across all nations and that proletarian power must first be consolidated where conditions allow. Lenin’s theory of uneven development explicitly predicted that socialism would first triumph in the periphery or the weakest link of the imperialist chain. To argue with this is to argue with History itself; pure folly. The Leftoidcom rejects this as national deviation and demands a kind of synchronized world revolution that has never occurred and could never occur under actual material conditions similar to Trotsky. Because this position has never been tested the Italian Left can endlessly assert that it would have succeeded. It is the perfect unfalsifiable theory. Any real revolution becomes evidence of betrayal because it does not match the hypothetical model. The critique of the united front versus social fascism is built on another false premise. It claims the Comintern misunderstood the nature of reformist organizations by treating them as political organs of the bourgeoisie rather than as neutral vehicles of proletarian unity. History refutes this instantly. The German Social Democratic Party in 1919 massacred the Spartacists and handed power to reaction. The Austrian Social Democrats surrendered their arms and allowed Dollfuss to crush the workers. The British Labour Party openly allied with the liberal bourgeoisie and upheld the Empire. Reformist organizations were never neutral terrain. They were political instruments used by the bourgeoisie to discipline the working class. The Comintern’s strategic shifts were attempts to deal with this fact in real time. The Italian Left simply denies the political character of reformism entirely and collapses everything into the union form. It treats unions as if they can spontaneously transform into revolutionary organs simply by being administered by a "true" party? This is economic reductionism and mechanistic thinking disguised as revolutionary purity. Formally the Bordigist argument relies on several fallacies. It assumes a hypothetical proletariat that acts without internal contradictions and follows a unitary party without deviation. It assumes historical conditions in which revolutionary defeat is impossible unless the leadership betrays. It assumes that fascism can be reduced to economic relations and ignores its political character. It assumes that revolutionary strategy can be deduced from first principles rather than analyzed historically. Finally it assumes that the existence of a state is evidence of counterrevolution, which means that any actual socialist construction is already invalid. These assumptions render the argument unfalsifiable. If a revolution succeeds it is declared bourgeois because it has a state. If a revolution fails it is declared proof that the correct line was not followed. If a revolution adjusts its strategy to survive it is called opportunist. There is no possible empirical outcome that could challenge the theory. Marxism Leninism begins from entirely different premises. It sees revolutionary politics not as a series of fixed principles but as a concrete struggle within hostile class forces. It evaluates strategy based on historical results, on the survival of the proletarian dictatorship, and on the actual building of socialist industry and culture. The Italian Left evaluates strategy based on imaginary outcomes in which the revolution never has to face famine, invasion, sabotage, diplomatic isolation, or fascist terror. The result is a worldview where purity is always preserved because the theory never touches reality. It is just endlessly asymptotic. The problem is not that these arguments are malicious but that they are irrelevant. As I have said earlier Bordia was an engineer, but a particularly bad one, yelling at the workers about a plan that couldn't be built and totally ignorant of the reality of practical revolution and building it. Typically many engineers fall into this category, it's a failing of theory over practice.

CDMorlock's tweet photo. Italian Leftcoms As Useless Idealists Without Receipts Who Sip Cappuccinos While Fascists Run Amok - The Asymptotic Revolution of the Ultra Left that Argues with History

The entire structure of this argument collapses once we recognize that it is based not on history but on a sequence of abstractions constructed in hindsight. The Italian Left tradition imagines itself as the sole custodian of classist principles while dismissing every real historical attempt at socialist construction as opportunist. It produces a theoretical universe without consequences, without states, without armies, and without any responsibility for the actual survival of the working class in moments of catastrophe.

One Marxist Leninist standpoint is that the problem is not that these Leftcom abstractions are incorrect in the conventional sense but that they are not testable political theories. They are counterfactual moral judgments that assume an imaginary proletariat following an imaginary party in an imaginary sequence of confrontations with fascism. Trotskyists at least grounded their speculative frameworks in actual political battles and organizational efforts (although they were usually entirely tangential to the actual struggle). The ultra left goes further and constructs a hypothetical proletarian subject for whom its system of principles always retroactively works, largely because it never has to be carried out in practice.

This entire argument begins by pretending that the Third Period Comintern strategies and the later Popular Front arose in a vacuum where one could simply choose a set of classist principles and judge success by fidelity to those principles. Historically the Third Period was shaped by the brutal class offensives of the late twenties, the deflationary wave of the Depression, the growing militarization of European powers, and the real experience of the initial victories of Italian fascism.

Bordiga’s political thought developed under an unusual historical constraint. After 1926, when Mussolini outlawed the Communist Party of Italy, dissolved all legal avenues of opposition, and imprisoned or exiled its leadership, Bordiga was effectively removed from active political life. He was arrested in 1926, held until 1928, and then lived under continuous surveillance. As Aldo Agosti notes in Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, clandestine organizing inside Italy after 1926 was extremely limited and often fatal, and meaningful party work shifted to exiled leadership circles in France and the Soviet Union. Bordiga did not participate in this work.

As a result, his theoretical contributions were produced removed from the kinds of problems other communist movements faced during the same years. The German Communists were attempting to survive in a state that was rapidly collapsing into Nazism. The Soviet leadership was confronting industrial backwardness, foreign intervention, and the real threat of a renewed imperialist war. Chinese Communists were facing the White Terror, the Long March, and a protracted civil war. Spanish Communists confronted a fascist insurrection backed by two major European powers. These movements were forced to devise strategy in conditions where tactical decisions had immediate consequences.

Italian scholarship on the period, including work by Paul Corner and Renzo De Felice, emphasizes that the PCI’s reorganization, underground networks, and armed resistance emerged primarily in the late 1930s and early 1940s, long after Bordiga had withdrawn from politics. The leadership that reorganized the party inside Italy included figures such as Scoccimarro, Longo, and Secchia, whose practical experience during the Resistance shaped postwar PCI strategy. The gulf between theoretical speculation and practical political experience widened further because Bordiga chose not to engage with these developments.

The advantage he possessed was therefore structural rather than personal. His theories did not confront the practical problems associated with building mass organizations under repression, forming alliances in heterogeneous anti fascist coalitions, coordinating armies or militias, or maintaining a revolutionary state under pressure. His strategic proposals were not subjected to the test of implementation, counterstrategy, or material constraints. They remained internally consistent because they were never required to adapt to rapidly shifting political realities.

This historical context does not invalidate theoretical analysis by itself, but it explains the distinctive character of Bordiga’s contributions. They were shaped in an environment where abstraction was often the only available tool, whereas communist parties operating in China, the Soviet Union, Germany, Spain, and the Balkans were forced to synthesize theory with organizational practice under extreme conditions. Understanding this divergence clarifies why Bordiga’s positions appear rigorously coherent yet remain disconnected from the strategic problems that shaped the major communist movements of the twentieth century.

Stalinist self criticism after 1934 was not an opportunist retreat but a dialectical adjustment in response to material conditions that no Bordigist group ever had to confront with actual governing power. The claim that both the Trotskyist united front and the Comintern’s Third Period line misunderstood fascism is a classic ultra left move. It assumes that fascism is a purely economic phenomenon and that the appropriate strategy simply flows from a universal schema of the party, the class, and the union.

Yet fascism historically was a political phenomenon built by the bourgeoisie to destroy the organs of working class organization. It involved paramilitary street fighting, control of the state apparatus, the destruction of the press, the smashing of unions, and the deployment of a national chauvinist mobilization. It also had no fixed ideology or economic system, Fascism in Italy through its "capitalismo eroico" era to the Bombacci IRI and finally into complete subservience to Hitlerism (and Nazism corresponding Eugenics based Speer era policies) evolved with their own material conditions (or in this case immaterial idealistic conditions based on pure war economy).

None of these could be countered by the narrow economic union tactic that the Italian Left proposes. Germany proved that even large and militant trade unions could be crushed in a matter of weeks. The Bordigist idea that the solution was a purely economic united front is an abstraction with no historical referent. It was never tried, never tested, and would have been quickly obliterated by fascism’s structural and military force.

At the center of this debate is the question of what fascism actually is. Classical Marxism Leninism, crystallized through Dimitrov’s analyses at the Seventh Comintern Congress, defines fascism as the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary segments of finance capital. It is not merely an ideological deviation or a spontaneous revolt from below. It is a political form born when the bourgeoisie can no longer rule through parliamentary means and must reorganize the state for violent confrontation with the working class.

My own position continues this line in a more specific direction. Fascism is the political expression of an unproductive financial oligarchy that has exhausted its capacity for normal accumulation and therefore reorganizes society along purely rentier lines. In such a system productive labor is no longer the basis of national wealth. The economy is hollowed out and subordinated to rent extraction, debt peonage, and asset inflation. This unproductive oligarchic core then turns outward and relies on externalized military expansion to sustain itself. War, occupation, and arms production become the remaining engines of accumulation. The military industrial complex (or more aptly, a de-industrial complex) becomes the only protected productive sector (which is entirely unproductive ironically) while all other sectors are gradually destroyed or rendered dependent on rents extracted by finance.

This is why fascism always involves a furious militarism combined with the political liquidation of independent unions, peasant organizations, and industrial labor. It requires the smashing of productive forces that cannot be integrated into its rent based imperial logic. This conception aligns entirely with Dimitrov’s insight that fascism is the dictatorship of finance capital but explains exactly why finance capital, in its most degenerate unproductive form, must resort to terror, war, and state enforced parasitism to survive.

The Bordigist abstraction of fascism cannot grasp this dynamic. It reduces fascism to an economic reflex detached from imperial strategy and therefore treats it as an error in the class struggle rather than a historically specific reconfiguration of capitalism around finance, militarism, and the destruction of productive labor (and it's real time conversion into slave labor).

The next claim, that Stalinism cannot be social democratic because it produced critiques of revisionism such as internally published Soviet works or its polemics against Tito is similarly formalistic mechanism. The Comintern polemics were never abstract purity tests but strategic interventions related to state security, imperialist encirclement, and the material contradictions of building socialism under blockade. Siege socialism.

The argument that Stalin or the USSR could not have followed a social democratic trajectory because they produced anti revisionist interventions ignores the fact that reformist parties have always issued similar polemics, from the SPD’s attacks on Bernstein to Kautsky’s theoretical condemnations even as he defended parliamentarism and war credits. The text Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR was not proof of revolutionary content but a policy document defending a particular planning model against internal pressures, just as countless non revolutionary states have produced ideological justifications to protect their administrative line. The existence of critiques of Tito or of revisionism therefore reflects geopolitical and organizational needs, not the class character of the state, and cannot serve as evidence that the USSR was something other than a system evolving in a social democratic direction.

Leftcoms treat these critiques as if they prove Stalinism did not deviate into state capitalism. In reality they only demonstrate that the Soviet leadership continued to defend the dictatorship of the proletariat and refused to dissolve the revolutionary state under pressure from imperialism. The ultra left move is to say that this defense was itself a deviation because the very existence of a state becomes "suspect." This is precisely where the argument reveals its purely hypothetical nature. Marxism Leninism recognizes that the proletarian state is a fact of the transition period and that revolution must survive the armies of imperialist powers. The "Italian Left" treats this concrete problem as a philosophical aberration and therefore accuses every successful revolution of betrayal. It is a political position made possible only by never having to seize or defend power.

Bordiga was an engineer who saw everything as a bill of goods list that needed to combined in a certain way. The claim about "Socialism in One Country" demonstrates the same pattern. The argument asserts that nation states are irrelevant to the proletarian revolution because the proletariat is a global class (again relying on idealistic notions of International solidarity). Historically this is true in some complete philosophical abstraction but false at every level of practical struggle.

Marx and Engels already understood that revolutions do not unfold simultaneously across all nations and that proletarian power must first be consolidated where conditions allow.

Lenin’s theory of uneven development explicitly predicted that socialism would first triumph in the periphery or the weakest link of the imperialist chain. To argue with this is to argue with History itself; pure folly.

The Leftoidcom rejects this as national deviation and demands a kind of synchronized world revolution that has never occurred and could never occur under actual material conditions similar to Trotsky. Because this position has never been tested the Italian Left can endlessly assert that it would have succeeded. It is the perfect unfalsifiable theory. Any real revolution becomes evidence of betrayal because it does not match the hypothetical model.

The critique of the united front versus social fascism is built on another false premise. It claims the Comintern misunderstood the nature of reformist organizations by treating them as political organs of the bourgeoisie rather than as neutral vehicles of proletarian unity. History refutes this instantly. The German Social Democratic Party in 1919 massacred the Spartacists and handed power to reaction. The Austrian Social Democrats surrendered their arms and allowed Dollfuss to crush the workers. The British Labour Party openly allied with the liberal bourgeoisie and upheld the Empire. Reformist organizations were never neutral terrain. They were political instruments used by the bourgeoisie to discipline the working class. The Comintern’s strategic shifts were attempts to deal with this fact in real time.

The Italian Left simply denies the political character of reformism entirely and collapses everything into the union form. It treats unions as if they can spontaneously transform into revolutionary organs simply by being administered by a "true" party? This is economic reductionism and mechanistic thinking disguised as revolutionary purity.

Formally the Bordigist argument relies on several fallacies. It assumes a hypothetical proletariat that acts without internal contradictions and follows a unitary party without deviation. It assumes historical conditions in which revolutionary defeat is impossible unless the leadership betrays. It assumes that fascism can be reduced to economic relations and ignores its political character. It assumes that revolutionary strategy can be deduced from first principles rather than analyzed historically. Finally it assumes that the existence of a state is evidence of counterrevolution, which means that any actual socialist construction is already invalid. These assumptions render the argument unfalsifiable. If a revolution succeeds it is declared bourgeois because it has a state. If a revolution fails it is declared proof that the correct line was not followed. If a revolution adjusts its strategy to survive it is called opportunist. There is no possible empirical outcome that could challenge the theory.

Marxism Leninism begins from entirely different premises. It sees revolutionary politics not as a series of fixed principles but as a concrete struggle within hostile class forces. It evaluates strategy based on historical results, on the survival of the proletarian dictatorship, and on the actual building of socialist industry and culture. The Italian Left evaluates strategy based on imaginary outcomes in which the revolution never has to face famine, invasion, sabotage, diplomatic isolation, or fascist terror. The result is a worldview where purity is always preserved because the theory never touches reality. It is just endlessly asymptotic.

The problem is not that these arguments are malicious but that they are irrelevant.

As I have said earlier Bordia was an engineer, but a particularly bad one, yelling at the workers about a plan that couldn't be built and totally ignorant of the reality of practical revolution and building it. Typically many engineers fall into this category, it's a failing of theory over practice.

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penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

9 months ago

@gunfetish116 It may be as dark woke as a film can be..

Who to follow

he/him || marxist || doesn't understand twitter bios

BoilTheBagels

@BagelsBoil

have sex with me or I kill myself

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

9 months ago

@gunfetish116 You said you don't like action but please check out Duel to the Death (1983). I was expecting a serious wuxia films like the many boring newer ones (hero and crouching tiger hidden dragon) but it's so fucking good, it's really fun tipsy with others but I loved it on my own too

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

9 months ago

@gunfetish116 Angst 1983 is really interesting but its a love or hate movie, if u love character psychology stuff it's kind of served on a platter but I enjoyed it also the cinematography is crazy,

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

9 months ago

@gunfetish116 One of the actresses is so good at what she does you start hating her too, not only the character

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

9 months ago

@gunfetish116 The Devils (1971). Such a beautiful movie

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

9 months ago

@HaroldPilgrimag get into anti arguments aka answering questions

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

9 months ago

@AbodyDialectics complete nonsense

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

9 months ago

@HaroldPilgrimag banger, but even Socrates had a wife..

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drank gore @thedarkprowler

10 months ago

In Japan, riding the train is something to be taken seriously as they have cultural belief that public services are only to be used to grope women against their will and take pictures of them

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penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

9 months ago

@GranMarcha Traditionalist... hmmmm.....

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

9 months ago

@guy_plasma @AbodyDialectics @gabecommunista connect with people on your own it's not much harder even if it seems to be

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

10 months ago

@HaroldPilgrimag Deep bellow the arteries of class war make the surface tremble..

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

10 months ago

@AbodyDialectics @boguswaves1 Crazy

penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

10 months ago

This is such a lie I remember fucking up some shawarma during peak and I was messy as fuck and it was getting everywhere I was covered with hummus and shit but God that shit was so fucking good ugh I love food

john v. variety ❤️.U.∞ OUT NOW

@johnvvariety

10 months ago

Biggest letdown of 2025. Anyone who's even done 2g knows that first meal post-peak is disgusting. He's working from a script of tropes. I can't believe the Fountain of Youth 2 viral scheme vampire guy would mislead us like this

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penguin 🐧 @AngryRobot5

10 months ago

@malcxlmflex What is it?

penguin 🐧

@AngryRobot5

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