Barleyroad

Independent private investor. Passionate about the stock market and how it sits in the center of everything that’s going on.

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

@SvenNordenstam Det är väl en vy av flera kring bolagets aktiveringar som nya DNB analytikern presenterat, inte nödvändigtvis facit.
Insynsköp kommer visa på det ena eller det andra. Det köpet som presenterats idag var inte så imponerande iofs…

[Simona Mohamsson @SMohamsson]

Four more years! 🇸🇪

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

@wallstengine Not a chance. December earliest

[Borspicker @borspicker]

Största kapitalförstörelsen i svensk historia?

#MP

[Peter Benson @benson_ptr]

Brutalt spännande och positivt. Magdabubblan har spruckit och alltfler förstår att S är i djup symbios med V-dervärdiga krafter.

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

And, the winner is🥁🥁🥁

CHINA

as always an excellent analysis and summary by @citrinowicz

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

This meeting is, above all, a reflection of the profound disappointment across the Gulf with Washington and with U.S. policy in the region.

No Gulf government has any illusions about the nature of the Iranian regime. They know exactly who they are dealing with. But their choice today is not between Iran and the United States. It is between an open-ended confrontation with no clear political endgame, one that is destabilizing the region and inflicting enormous economic costs, and an accommodation that can restore a degree of stability.

And increasingly, they are choosing stability. The willingness to pursue an arrangement in the Strait of Hormuz, even one that could entail accepting a greater Iranian role there, is perhaps the clearest indication of how badly confidence in Washington has eroded. From the Gulf perspective, American policy is generating unprecedented economic damage without offering a credible path toward ending the crisis.

President Trump’s reluctance to become deeply involved in the confrontation with the Houthis only reinforces the conclusion in Gulf capitals that they cannot simply outsource their security to Washington. They need direct channels with Tehran, and they need an arrangement that can reopen the straits and protect their economies.

Anyone who expected the war with Iran to push the Gulf states toward isolating Tehran is once again being confronted with the opposite reality.

This is not because they trust Iran. They do not. It is because, from their perspective, an imperfect accommodation with Tehran may be preferable to an endless conflict whose strategic objective remains unclear and whose economic consequences are becoming increasingly severe.

If the Gulf states reach an understanding with Iran that allows maritime traffic to resume, the next step is predictable: they will intensify pressure on Washington to ease or remove the maritime blockade.

Tehran will welcome this development. It would allow Iran to turn military and economic pressure into diplomatic leverage, while widening the gap between Washington and its traditional Gulf partners.

That is the uncomfortable reality facing U.S. policymakers today, and there is little reason to believe it will change anytime soon.

#IranWar‌

[Esfandyar Batmanghelidj @yarbatman]

“Gulf foreign ministers plan to meet their Iranian counterpart in a push by Oman and Iran to secure buy-in for a deal temporarily managing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.”

Important scoop by @cornishft.

Gift link:
https://t.co/OOO1CdXRbK

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

Kom igen nu!!
Stor chans att slippa en socialistisk röra i 4 år till!! 🙏🙏

Sverige behöver detta på alla sätt!!

[Stefan Stern @SternStefan]

Indikators nya mätning bekräftar trenden, nu endast 90000 väljare mellan block. S på rekordlåga siffror, V/MP tillsammans större än 50% av S. L ovanför spärr.

Mer intressant jämföra lika med lika; t ex Novus 2022 med Novus 2026 i valveckan med några dagar kvar. Helt öppet läge.

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

So...What now?

Since the collapse of the Syrian army, the Middle East has rarely witnessed a strategic failure of this magnitude.

The Houthis were capable of disrupting maritime traffic even before gaining greater control over the approaches to the Bab al-Mandab. But territorial control changes the equation. It gives them far greater operational flexibility to threaten, disrupt, and potentially regulate one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.

What has happened over the past several days is therefore not simply a Saudi problem. It is an international problem.

Saudi strategy bears considerable responsibility for how we got here. Riyadh spent years believing it could contain the Houthis through financial incentives while simultaneously focusing much of its political energy on weakening the UAE’s influence and its partners in southern Yemen. That approach has failed spectacularly.

But the consequences now extend far beyond Saudi Arabia. Washington’s reluctance to reenter a major confrontation with the Houthis suggests an uncomfortable conclusion: the previous U.S. campaign failed to establish sustainable deterrence. In one important sense, the Houthis succeeded in creating their own deterrence equation with Washington. The Trump administration does not want another open-ended Middle Eastern war, and the Houthis understand that constraint.

More importantly, what we are seeing is directly connected to the broader failure to establish deterrence against Iran. Tehran and its partners have concluded that the current moment presents an opportunity to change the regional strategic map rather than merely survive within it.

Which strategy to adopt?
One important caveat must be said before: the Houthis are not ten feet tall.

They face severe economic problems, significant challenges in governing the population and territory under their control, and real limitations in their ability to employ strategic weapons effectively and consistently, even if their capabilities in this area are clearly improving.

Most importantly, the Houthis remain economically vulnerable. Their ability to absorb military pressure should not be confused with an unlimited ability to withstand sustained economic isolation and pressure.

That distinction matters. The lesson of recent events should not be that the Houthis are unbeatable. It is that military pressure alone has failed to produce sustainable deterrence. A more effective strategy would exploit their vulnerabilities, particularly economic ones, while simultaneously strengthening their opponents, disrupting Iranian support, improving intelligence, and establishing credible consequences for attacks on international shipping.

The Houthis have become a formidable strategic problem. They have not become an invincible one.

1. Build a real international coalition centered on Riyadh.
Its primary mission should be unambiguous: protect freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab and prevent any armed group from acquiring effective control over an international maritime chokepoint.

2. Stabilize southern Yemen.
The remaining anti-Houthi forces need serious political, economic, and security support. That requires rebuilding a functioning southern front and finding a workable arrangement involving Aidarous al-Zubaidi and the STC.

3. Maintain sustained maritime and land interdiction.
Iran must be prevented from exploiting the new situation to further improve Houthi missile, drone, maritime, and intelligence capabilities.

4. Start building real military capacity in southern Yemen.
That means training, organization, intelligence, logistics, command-and-control, and foreign advisers. The objective should be to create credible options for the future rather than improvise them during the next crisis.

5. Establish clear international red lines.
The Houthis should understand in advance what consequences will follow attempts to close or fundamentally disrupt international shipping through the strait. Red lines without credible enforcement, however, will only make the problem worse.

6. Maintain economic pressure.
Military deterrence and economic pressure should reinforce one another. The Houthis cannot be allowed to conclude that territorial expansion will eventually produce international economic normalization.

7. Consider recognizing Somaliland and developing it as a strategic hub.
A long-term coalition requires infrastructure on the western side of the Gulf of Aden. Somaliland could provide access, logistics, intelligence, training, and force-projection capabilities close to the Bab al-Mandab.

8. Disrupt the Houthis’ expanding regional network.
Particular attention should be paid to their presence and relationships in Iraq and potentially Jordan. The challenge can no longer be treated exclusively as a Yemen problem.

9. Focus much more seriously on Houthi links with al-Shabaab.
Any operational, financial, technological, or logistical cooperation across the Red Sea could transform two regional security challenges into a much larger strategic threat.

10. Dramatically improve intelligence.
The coalition needs better intelligence on senior Houthi leadership, missile and drone infrastructure, strategic weapons, logistics networks, and Iranian assistance. Deterrence without intelligence is largely rhetoric.

And what is likely to happen instead?

The danger is that Riyadh will conclude that the costs are simply too high, seek an immediate ceasefire, and eventually accept the lifting of restrictions on the Houthis in return for quiet.

That might stop the fighting temporarily. But it would also teach the Houthis, and Iran, a devastating lesson: escalation works.

This is therefore bigger than Yemen and bigger than Saudi Arabia. The fundamental question is whether the United States and its partners are prepared to defend freedom of navigation through one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints—or whether they are prepared to accept a new Middle Eastern reality in which an Iranian-backed armed movement can rewrite the regional order through force.

#IranWar‌
#yemen
#Houthis

[Jan Eliasson @JanKEliasson]

Remember Hannah Arendt’s warning of the effects of lying:

If everyone always lies to you ,
the consequence is that no one believes anything at all anymore.
People are deprived of their capacity to act, think and judge.

And with such a people you can then do what you please.

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

Absolutely not. Independently of position, it’s hard to see any member wanting to challange an increasingly erratic Trump just before midterms. It’s just bad diplomacy.

Warsh will point to the unemployment rate and his working groups that has just started but not concluded any policy directions.

I wouldn’t be surprised if the next hike comes as late as december passed midterms.

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

@davelevinthal @lrozen @byMarkAlfred @washingtonsun Affordability 👊🫣

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

@Barchart Silver is just testing its monthly lows.

Fed will not hike next week just before midterms. To challenge the erratic orange person will not happen.

Warsh will connect to recent unemployment rate and the working groups. First hike in december.

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

😂😂😂

[Jesse Cohen @JesseCohenInv]

Live look at Wall Street

[Hannah Stutzinsky @Stutzinskys]

Centerpartiet vill vara företagarnas parti – men politiken som hennes statsministerkandidat vill genomföra innebär mer krångel och högre kostnader för företagare.
https://t.co/UkVPCImTx4

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

@DeItaone Why not utilize their investment in eutelsat..🤔🤔

[Ten_Bagger @Ten_Bagger]

Veckan video är här!

"Starka börser givet motvinden!"
https://t.co/7wItV6Bi3r

Vi kikar vi på samtliga större index, SOXX, RSP, oljan, US10Y, USDSEK, Guld, Silver och Bitcoin!

Det är inte lätt att hitta något bullish där ute. Brentoljan noteras på 104 usd per fat, långräntorna rusar vidare och dollarn har stärkts den senaste månaden samtidigt som säsongsmönstret på börserna är negativt.

Trots allt detta håller sig börserna bra, speciellt med tanke på det tidigare rallyt mot mitten av augusti! Mestadels korrektiva rekyler de senaste 3-4 veckorna.
Det ser generellt ut som att mycket laddar för vidare starka uppgångar när väl den absoluta botten i rekylen är klar.

US CPI imorgon fredag kl 1430 kan bli en stor trigger med mycket cross asset volatility vid större avvikelse åt något håll. Viktig tidpunkt!

Mycket nöje!
/David

[Ten_Bagger @Ten_Bagger]

Som alltid finns videon utan reklam på Marketmate:
https://t.co/Jvt94IDY7F

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

@AbcpokerBI Säkert SAP, pengarullningen tar aldrig slut i så fall😂.
Kanske mgmt även valt en tier 1 konsult för att det är lite coolt och har samtidigt varit dåliga beställare.
Då blir det dyrt och dåligt..

[Barleyroad @barleyroad]

As always a must read from @citrinowicz
One can only imagine China sitting comfortable seeing their geopolitical power grow without lifting a finger except from probable intellegence support to Iran.

Pride comes before Fall. US ans Saudi only have loose/loose options

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The Houthis Are Changing the Rules of the Game and Washington and Riyadh will Need a New Strategy

It is time to acknowledge an uncomfortable reality: Saudi Arabia was not prepared for this confrontation with the Houthis.

For years, Riyadh’s approach was essentially containment. The Saudis sought to buy stability, support arrangements that would allow the Houthi government in Sanaa to function, and gradually move toward a political roadmap that would prevent another major war.

But the #Houthis drew a very different lesson from recent events. They increasingly concluded that Saudi Arabia was more vulnerable, more risk-averse, and less willing to return to a full-scale war. Instead of reinforcing deterrence, Saudi restraint appears to have strengthened the Houthis’ confidence that escalation could produce additional gains.

This matters for Washington because there is a temptation to believe that the problem can be solved through Tehran: pressure Iran hard enough, and Iran will force the Houthis to stand down.

That misunderstands the relationship. Iran considers the Houthis one of its most important strategic partners in the region. Tehran has provided weapons, technology, expertise and other forms of assistance that have dramatically strengthened Houthi capabilities. But influence is not the same as control.

The Houthis do not see themselves simply as Iranian proxies waiting for instructions from Tehran. They see themselves as partners in the so-called Axis of Resistance, with their own interests, ideology and decision-making process. Previous confrontations with the United States demonstrated the limits of Tehran’s ability, or willingness, to restrain them.

That leaves Washington with an increasingly difficult problem. The United States has already fought a military campaign against the Houthis at considerable cost and with limited strategic results. There is little reason to believe that another round of strikes, by itself, will fundamentally change Houthi behavior. A renewed campaign would consume additional munitions and military resources while again exposing American assets, particularly at sea, to attack.

Washington can and should provide intelligence, defensive and military assistance to Saudi Arabia and its partners. But it cannot compensate indefinitely for the weakness and fragmentation of the anti-Houthi camp inside Yemen.

Meanwhile, the Houthis are pursuing something far more consequential than another battlefield victory. Their advance toward Bab el-Mandeb potentially strengthens their ability to threaten one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

That is the real strategic issue. The Houthis do not need to defeat the United States Navy or conquer Saudi Arabia. They only need to demonstrate that they can repeatedly threaten commercial shipping, impose economic costs and force Washington and its regional partners to choose between accepting a new reality and entering another costly military confrontation.

None of this means that the Houthis are invincible. They have vulnerabilities. Their military infrastructure can be attacked, their capabilities degraded and significant costs imposed on them.

But destroying launchers is not the same as establishing deterrence. The central challenge is how to deter a highly ideological movement that is willing to absorb substantial punishment and possesses increasingly sophisticated missiles, drones and other capabilities developed with Iranian assistance. Saudi Arabia has already learned another important lesson: money may buy temporary calm, but it cannot buy strategic deterrence.

The response therefore cannot remain a Saudi problem with occasional American military support. Protecting Bab el-Mandeb and freedom of navigation requires a broader and sustained international coalition combining maritime security, intelligence, military pressure, strengthening local partners and diplomacy.

This will not be a quick campaign. And Iran is already benefiting. Tehran does not need to control every Houthi decision. From Iran’s perspective, a powerful Houthi movement capable of threatening Bab el-Mandeb, tying down Saudi Arabia, consuming American military resources and raising the economic costs of regional confrontation is itself a major strategic achievement.

The main question is how to prevent the Houthis from permanently changing the strategic reality around Bab el-Mandeb. Because once they can force the United States and its partners to choose between costly escalation and accepting potential restrictions on freedom of navigation, they do not need to defeat America militarily. They have already achieved something far more valuable: changing the rules of the game.

The Houthi advance and the attacks on Saudi Arabia are also exposing the so-called “Mecca Alliance” between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan to its first real strategic test — and so far, the results are hardly impressive.

An alliance ultimately matters not because of the declarations made when it is established, but because of what its members are prepared to do when one of them comes under attack. Riyadh now faces a direct and growing Houthi threat, yet neither Ankara nor Islamabad appears eager to become meaningfully involved in confronting it.

This raises an uncomfortable question: Is the Mecca Alliance an emerging regional security architecture, or is it becoming a paper tiger precisely when Saudi Arabia needs it most?

The Houthis are providing the first serious stress test. If Turkey and Pakistan are unwilling to provide meaningful assistance when Saudi territory and strategic interests are under attack, Riyadh will have to reconsider what this alliance actually provides beyond political symbolism.

For Washington, this matters as well. The United States has increasingly encouraged regional partners to assume greater responsibility for their own security. But the current crisis demonstrates the gap between announcing new regional security frameworks and actually creating alliances whose members are willing to share risks when deterrence fails.

An alliance that works only in peacetime is not much of an alliance.

#IranWar‌
#yemen