Ben Zem 🇪🇷

[Ben Zem 🇪🇷 @BeniamZemichael]

@george_posts It is my earnest hope that our government will eventually move beyond its current perception of infallibility and genuinely align with the aspirations and actions of the Eritrean populace.
❤️🇪🇷❤️

[Yemane G. Meskel 🇪🇷 @hawelti]

The Anatomy of Revisionism: Dismantling the Prosperity Party’s Hostile Campaign against Eritrean Sovereignty

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Research and Documentation Center
19 May 2026

"The Prosperity Party’s three-year hostile campaign against Eritrea exemplifies a dangerous pattern of externalizing domestic structural failures through aggressive foreign policy...Throughout these sustained provocations, the Government of Eritrea has maintained a principled position grounded in international law and a prudent policy of patience and restraint".
https://t.co/swQXbwB0gg

[Amb. Sophia Tesfamariam @AmbStesfamariam]

There has been a lot written about Eritrea in the last few weeks, and I have decided to respond to one of the many pieces coming out of Ethiopia...The IFA article titled “Eritrea’s Sovereignty Claim and the Insecurity It Conceals”.

This article rests on a selective interpretation of international law, an incomplete account of the history of the #Horn of #Africa, and a troubling attempt to recast legitimate concerns regarding #sovereignty and territorial integrity as evidence of political insecurity rather than lawful state responsibility. It is therefore necessary to address several of the issues raised in this selectively framed piece.

The title itself is particularly revealing. It reflects an increasingly common tendency in certain Prosperity Party (PP) political and intellectual circles to delegitimize Eritrea’s invocation of sovereignty by portraying it not as a foundational principle of international law, but as a form of concealment, obstruction, or paranoia. That framing is deeply problematic.

Sovereignty is not something #Eritrea must “hide behind.” Sovereignty is the cornerstone of the modern international legal order, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. For African states in particular, many of which emerged from colonial partition, territorial disputes, occupation, and prolonged external interference, the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be dismissed as rhetorical posturing; these are existential legal principles rooted in painful historical experience.

For #Eritrea, these concerns are not theoretical. Eritrea emerged from a long anti-colonial and anti-annexation struggle following federation, annexation, and decades of war. #Ethiopia was not merely a neighboring state in #Eritrean historical memory; it was Eritrea’s former colonizer. That historical experience inevitably shapes Eritrea’s understanding of sovereignty, borders, and national survival.

As the Amharic proverb aptly states: “የወጋ ቢረሳ የተወጋ አይረሳም” — “The one who inflicted the wound may forget, but the one who was wounded never does.” The proverb captures an essential reality often ignored in external analyses of #Eritrea: historical memory shapes national security consciousness. States and peoples that endured annexation, war, occupation, territorial disputes, sanctions, and prolonged external pressure do not, and cannot, approach questions of sovereignty lightly or abstractly.

From an #Eritrean perspective, sovereignty is therefore not an abstract diplomatic slogan or tactical political shield. It is inseparable from the sacrifices made during one of Africa’s longest liberation struggles and from the determination to prevent any return, direct or indirect, to arrangements perceived as compromising Eritrea’s hard-won independence and territorial integrity.

To suggest that Eritrea’s insistence on sovereignty somehow masks illegitimate motives effectively reverses the legal burden. It implies that smaller states defending internationally recognized borders must justify their concerns, while larger regional powers, advancing inflammatory hegemonistic ambitions and openly invoking “historical rights,” “natural entitlement,” or “strategic necessity” regarding maritime access, are treated as merely pursuing economic pragmatism.

From Eritrea’s perspective, the issue has never been whether Ethiopia, as a landlocked state, possesses legitimate developmental interests in commercial maritime access. Eritrea has never disputed that principle. International law already recognizes the rights of landlocked states to negotiated access and freedom of transit. The issue is whether such ambitions are being articulated and pursued in a manner consistent with the UN Charter, sovereign equality, and the prohibition against the threat or use of force.

Article 2(4) of the @UN Charter prohibits not only the use of force, but also the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states. International law does not require states to wait for military invasion before taking seriously rhetoric, strategic signaling, or political discourse carrying coercive implications. Preventive vigilance regarding credible coercive signaling is fully consistent with the sovereign right of states to safeguard their territorial integrity and political independence.

Against this backdrop, Eritrea’s concerns regarding Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive discourse on Red Sea access are neither irrational nor propagandistic. Senior Prosperity Party (PP) officials, including Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, have repeatedly framed maritime access in existential and revisionist terms, invoking notions of “historical rights,” “natural entitlement,” and strategic inevitability. #Ethiopia|n political discourse surrounding Red Sea access has at times gone even further, with prominent figures openly declaring that Ethiopia would obtain maritime access “peacefully if possible and militarily if necessary.”

This rhetoric has not emerged in isolation. It has been accompanied by a broader climate of increasingly normalized irredentist discourse on Ethiopian social and political media platforms, including circulation of altered maps depicting Assab and portions of sovereign Eritrean territory as part of Ethiopia. Independent fact-checking organizations documented multiple instances in which maps were digitally manipulated to incorporate Assab into Ethiopian territory amid heightened public debate surrounding #RedSea access.

Equally troubling were images and videos circulated from military-linked events and social media accounts showing #Ethiopia|n military figures displaying maps incorporating portions of southern #Eritrea into #Ethiopia during public ceremonies associated with special forces mobilization and nationalist messaging. Whether officially sanctioned or not, the widespread dissemination of such imagery contributed to a political environment in which revisionist territorial narratives increasingly entered mainstream discourse.

Taken together, these developments cannot reasonably be dismissed as harmless nationalist symbolism. In a region with a long history of interstate war, contested borders, and unresolved territorial grievances, such rhetoric and imagery carry legal and security implications that responsible states are entitled to take seriously under the precautionary logic embedded within Article 2(4) of the @UN Charter.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed himself publicly characterized Red Sea access as an existential issue for Ethiopia and suggested that the matter could not remain unresolved indefinitely. International media and regional analysts increasingly warned that such rhetoric, combined with military mobilization and nationalist agitation surrounding Assab, risked contributing to renewed regional instability and fears of interstate confrontation.

The 2024 Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and #Somaliland further heightened tensions, particularly as Somalia formally rejected the arrangement as an infringement upon its sovereignty and territorial integrity. These developments underscore precisely why questions of maritime access in the Horn cannot be divorced from wider legal and security considerations.

Equally problematic is the article’s selective treatment of the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia border conflict.
Eritrea’s borders were not undefined or ambiguous constructs. They were established through the 1900, 1902, and 1908 treaties concluded between imperial Italy and imperial Ethiopia. These treaties formed the legal basis upon which the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), established under the Algiers Agreement, based its delimitation ruling.

Critically, the EEBC’s final and binding decision awarded Badme, the principal flashpoint and casus belli of the 1998–2000 conflict, unequivocally to #Eritrea. That fact is legally fundamental. It demonstrates that the territorial dispute centered on areas ultimately determined by the competent international arbitral body to fall within Eritrean sovereignty.

The article also misrepresents the role of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission by implying that it definitively adjudicated the broader origins of the war. As legal scholars, including analyses published in the European Journal of International Law, have noted, the Claims Commission was not specifically mandated to comprehensively determine the origins of the conflict. The independent investigative mechanism envisaged under Article 3 of the Algiers Agreement for that purpose was never constituted.

Thus, no authoritative international process ever fully examined the broader antecedents of the conflict, including tensions arising from contested administration, local clashes, militia activity, mapping disputes, and allegations of encroachments into sovereign Eritrean territory during the 1990s, as well as the unprovoked assault by Ethiopian troops against an #Eritrean army unit in the Badme area on 5 May 1998. What was conclusively determined, however, was the territorial issue itself. And on that question, the #EEBC ruled in #Eritrea’s favor.

The defining legal and political crisis of the post-war period therefore was not Eritrea’s rejection of international law, but Ethiopia’s refusal, for nearly two decades, to implement a binding arbitral ruling it had expressly agreed would be “final and binding.” This remains one of the most consequential contradictions in discussions surrounding the rule of law in the Horn of Africa.

At stake was not merely a bilateral border dispute, but the integrity of international arbitration itself. If states may disregard binding arbitral rulings when politically inconvenient, the credibility of peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms under international law is fundamentally undermined.

The article’s treatment of the 2009 sanctions regime is similarly incomplete. From #Eritrea’s perspective, the sanctions imposed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1907 emerged from a highly politicized process shaped by Ethiopia’s manipulation of #IGAD and the @AfricanUnion. The allegations underpinning the sanctions were strongly contested and were never established through an independent judicial process meeting accepted evidentiary standards.

For many Eritreans, the sanctions episode remains a troubling example of the instrumentalization of multilateral institutions for geopolitical purposes. Indeed, many #Africa|n observers viewed the process with deep discomfort, recognizing the damaging precedent of one #Africa|n state mobilizing punitive international measures against another amid contested allegations. The eventual lifting of sanctions in 2018 further underscored the fundamentally political nature of the process.

The article also presents Eritrea’s National Service Program in a highly reductionist manner. While external narratives often portray the program solely through a militarized lens, Eritrea’s national service system has long included substantial civic and developmental components. National Service graduates contribute across ministries, schools, colleges, hospitals, infrastructure projects, local administrations, and diplomatic missions abroad.

More importantly, the statutory 18-month duration of National Service was prolonged largely as a consequence of the prolonged no-war-no-peace environment and continued security threats emanating from unresolved tensions with successive Ethiopian governments.

At the same time, Ethiopia itself has, in recent years, undergone extensive military mobilization, major arms acquisitions, and repeated internal armed conflicts across multiple regions. Numerous international organizations, media investigations, and even #Ethiopian institutions have documented serious abuses in regions such as Amhara and Oromia, including extrajudicial killings, drone strikes affecting civilians, arbitrary detentions, mass displacement, and attacks on civilian infrastructure.

A balanced and credible analysis cannot selectively invoke human rights concerns only where they reinforce preferred geopolitical narratives while minimizing or contextualizing large-scale violence elsewhere.

More broadly, #Eritrea’s foreign policy has consistently emphasized sovereign equality, non-interference, regional ownership, and resistance to hegemonic arrangements in the Horn of Africa. #Eritrea’s invocation of sovereignty is not “camouflage”; it reflects the historical experience of a state that emerged from one of Africa’s longest liberation struggles and subsequently endured war, sanctions, prolonged territorial occupation, and sustained external pressure.

Regional integration and economic cooperation in the Horn are both necessary and achievable. Eritrea has never opposed negotiated frameworks for trade, connectivity, or maritime access grounded in mutual consent and international law. What Eritrea rejects, correctly, is the normalization of rhetoric implying that the strategic ambitions or demographic weight of larger states entitle them to exceptional arrangements at the expense of the sovereignty and security concerns of smaller neighbors.

Ultimately, the issue is not opposition to Ethiopia’s development. It is the insistence that all regional ambitions remain firmly anchored within the principles of international law: sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, pacta sunt servanda, and the prohibition against coercion enshrined in the Charter of the @UN.

As for future Eritrea–Ethiopia relations, or “settlement,” as the author characterizes it, prudence, realism, and historical experience counsel patience rather than premature and unrealistic optimism.

Genuine peace and stable relations between neighboring states cannot be manufactured through diplomatic slogans, external pressure, or intellectual wishful thinking. They must emerge organically, gradually, and on the basis of mutual respect, consistency, reciprocity, and trust built over time.

Lasting peace cannot be rushed, especially after the considerable goodwill and historic opportunity extended in 2018 were ultimately undermined by a leadership in Ethiopia that failed to consolidate reconciliation internally, regionally, and institutionally. Sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa will require seriousness, strategic patience, and above all, an #Ethiopia that is first at peace with itself.

[Marilena Dolce @EritreaLive]

Even after the abrogation of the Treaty of Wuchale, the recognized border between Eritrea and Ethiopia runs from the Mareb River to Assab.

A historical fact that should not be overlooked.

https://t.co/kuIEXD8q1O

#Eritrea #Ethiopia #HornOfAfrica #History

[LB @LBGeneraI]

Iran 🇮🇷 just released this emotional video

I don’t think they are stopping until all their objectives have been met

[Peter van 🇪🇺 @vantbag]

If the same stone hits you twice, the stone is you your self,. Abiy is fighting the same war twice. Don't be like Abiy.

[Sulamit @Sulamit_Wegahta]

The UK Ambassador to Ethiopia diplomatically informs Ethiopia to forget soverign sea access, to use Berbera and to increase its intra- African trade. Didn't even address the Ethiopian delusion to contribute to Red Sea security. A very sound advice.

[Ben Zem 🇪🇷 @BeniamZemichael]

@SirakBahlbi He is a political facade with no real power of his own. He's merely a Trojan horse for the UAE & others. By supplying him with military hardware & intelligence, these actors seek to control Sudan & Eritrea to further their own strategic goals.
He's a near-sighted opportunist.

[ⓉⓃ @tesfanews]

SUDAN ―⚡️A recent Reuters investigation has confirmed that #Ethiopia hosted a covert training facility for thousands of Sudanese RSF fighters, while also operating as a key transit hub for weapons and logistical support linked to the UAE.

The revelations have intensified debate in #Sudan over its regional security posture, exposing growing frustration with policies that critics say have constrained Khartoum while others act with impunity.

Sudanese analysts are now openly questioning whether it makes strategic sense to continue "restricting" coordination with the Tigray paramilitary group known as “Army 70,” including limits on launching operations from Sudanese territory against Ethiopian military targets.

With Sudan’s war dragging on and regional alliances rapidly realigning, the Reuters report has injected new urgency into calls for a fundamental reassessment of Sudan’s approach to Ethiopia.

In light of these revelations and rapidly shifting regional alliances, the Reuters report has added momentum to calls for a broader reassessment of Sudan’s policy towards Ethiopia.

Supporters of a tougher line argue that Sudan, working closely with its regional allies, should move quickly to engage multiple armed opposition groups that are already active inside Ethiopia as a way to counter what they describe as external interference in Sudan’s conflict.

It's time for Sudan to return the favor in kind.

(Video showing an Army 70 graduation parade in Sudan, via @Dinlas3)

[George @george_posts]

If @AbiyAhmedAli launches another war, this👇 scenario could unfold quickly. It would seriously threaten his grip on power. His approval ratings in the capital are already low, driven largely by rising inflation. It could also trigger a mass uprising in the capital city in anticipation of these forces.
@Jawar_Mohammed @NeaminZeleke @mamamesay @YonasBiru57 @AndargachewTse2 @HOAAffairs
👇👇👇👇

[Simon K Hagos @tewerwari_1]

Routers has unfolded secretive #RSF military camp inside #Ethiopia.

🚨UAE is using #Somaliland & #Ethiopia to smuggle weapons to #Sudan. Ethiopia’s high ranking military commanders operating this huge military camp & drone airfield.

🚨Ethiopia is now openly supporting, recruiting & operating with RSF. What is that mean?

Today program @HornPolitics, 12 PM central time.

[Elias Amare ኤልያስ ኣማረ @EliasAmare]

The @AbiyAhmedAli regime in #Ethiopia is a proxy of United Arab Emirates, a Gulf monarchy led by depraved sexual perverts, as the #EpsteinFiles are revealing. #UAE is waging loot-&-plunder wars across the Horn of #Africa, unleashing chaos in the process.
#UAEmustGo #AbiyMustGo

[Sharron Yemane @Sharronyemane]

https://t.co/1E0zGQ5YNX
Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say
The news agency spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.
#Sudan #Ethiopia

[Amb. Sophia Tesfamariam @AmbStesfamariam]

https://t.co/6rxt1OglqW On an evening like this, listening to those songs is not nostalgia. It is calibration. They return you to that moral clarity, the understanding that once a just struggle begins in earnest, even the loudest voices become background noise...a people announcing to power that the direction of history has already been chosen.

Those songs were never meant to live in the past, they were meant to keep people aligned when the noise grows louder than the truth...

Have a great weekend, folks.

[ⓉⓃ @tesfanews]

SWEDEN — Alexander Isak has been crowned Sweden’s Best Player, winning the prestigious Golden Ball (Guldbollen) award.

The honor was presented by Kim Källström of the Swedish Football Association, alongside Simon Bank from Sportbladet, Sweden’s leading sports publication.

Congratulations, and have a wonderful 2026 season, Wedi Eritrea. 🇪🇷 🫡 🇸🇪

[Ben Zem 🇪🇷 @BeniamZemichael]

@nahlav @MariaStenergard @UNinEritrea Eritrea is finally receiving the attention it deserves. As the saying goes, patience is indeed a virtue.
We extend our sincere gratitude to @nahlav for your support.
❤️🇪🇷❤️🕊🌽🚴‍♀️✨️💪🏽

[Sirak Bahlbi @SirakBahlbi]

When some #Ethiopians use derogatory terms about #Eritreans or other #Africans —such as “Askaris” or “Italian construct”—it is worth looking honestly at their own history.

Historical records show that until the #Italian invasion of 1935, slavery and the slave trade remained deeply embedded in the Ethiopian/Abyssinian culture and economy, with estimates suggesting that up to a quarter of the population lived in slavery. It was, in fact, Fascist Italy that finally abolished the practice during its occupation—an uncomfortable but well-documented historical reality that is often overlooked when mentioning “3,000 years of uninterrupted history.”

Although Menelik II and Haile Selassie issued proclamations against slavery, these were never genuinely enforced. When Ethiopia joined the League of Nations in 1922, it was required to abolish slavery within ten years, yet slavery continued. In 1932, the League formally reprimanded Haile Selassie for failing to carry out this obligation. Both Menelik and Haile Selassie were themselves slave owners, as widely reported by contemporary observers and historians.

Today, public discourse in Ethiopia rarely confronts this part of its past, nor the long-term social consequences it created—issues that still affect the country’s stability and cohesion. Below are several historical quotations that shed light on Ethiopia’s history with slavery.

Harold G. Marcus:
“Menelik’s palace was staffed with many hundreds of slaves… captured during the southern campaigns.”
— The Life and Times of Menelik II

Richard Pankhurst:
“Slave-taking was intrinsic to the expansion of Menelik’s empire. Tens of thousands of Oromo, Sidama, and other southerners were taken as slaves, many of whom entered the imperial household.”
— Economic History of Ethiopia

“Most slaves were obtained from the southern and southwestern regions… including the Oromo, Sidama, Gurage, Kafa, and various Nilotic groups.”
— Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, Vol. I

“By 1935, despite proclamations, slavery remained widespread. Perhaps two million Ethiopians lived in some form of bondage.”
— Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia

Harold G. Marcus:
“Haile Selassie, like all Ethiopian nobles of his era, possessed slaves in his household until the 1930s.”
— A History of Ethiopia

British Foreign Office Report (1934):
“Even in the household of the Emperor, slaves continue to serve despite proclamations declaring abolition.”

Christopher Clapham:
“Domestic slavery persisted in the imperial family well into Haile Selassie’s reign.”
— Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia

League of Nations evidence
In 1932–1935, the League of Nations repeatedly criticized Haile Selassie for:
- failing to suppress slave trading
- keeping domestic slaves at the imperial palace
- allowing nobles to continue owning slaves

The League’s 1935 report states:
“Slavery exists even in the household of the Emperor.”

Haile Selassie formally abolished slavery again in 1942 (under British pressure). By the mid-1940s, domestic slavery in the palace had largely ended, though forced labor persisted under other names.

[Ben Zem 🇪🇷 @BeniamZemichael]

@george_posts @AbiyAhmedAli Your comprehensive summary is greatly appreciated. Thank you.
❤️🇪🇷❤️

[Ben Zem 🇪🇷 @BeniamZemichael]

@DanielsonKassa1 The desperation of the PP trolls is now completely transparent. Their continued spread of disinformation is counterproductive, leading directly to a loss of public support and followers.
Poor man. Ymharka!
🇪🇷❤️🇪🇷🌽🚴‍♀️🕊✨️💪🏽

[Ben Zem 🇪🇷 @BeniamZemichael]

@Chaltu_Bongase The central irony resides in the self-appropriated use of the "Dr." title, a distinction immediately negated by the notable deficiency in fundamental knowledge regarding President Isaias Afwerki's footwear, which is also customary among the residents of Assab.