Brandon Carr

🇺🇸

[Brandon Carr @Carr12Brandon]

In the April edition of Proceedings, I examine the difficulty of amphibious operations against Iran in the Persian Gulf. These issues facing amphibious power projection are symptomatic of broader shifts in the changing character of war. https://t.co/FoFGpbmfNo

[Responsible Statecraft @RStatecraft]

NEW @jyjamespark & Brandon Carrr @QuincyInst : The US should rethink its posture/strategy in the Pacific but not pull back from the First Island Chain. Here's why.
https://t.co/iFDe0qWlxb

[James Park @jyjamespark]

For more, plz take a read! https://t.co/9N888O56FS

[James Park @jyjamespark]

11) Of course, none of this means that the US should continue on its current policy course in East Asia. We also share Jennifer's concern about worsening US-China relations. But this first and foremost requires making overall political relations more cooperative and positive-sum, as @Dalzell60 points out in his recent piece on constructive strategic stability: https://t.co/8XOrJmoqxQ END.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

10) Geography is critical. Peacetime access ensures wartime access. If the US gives that access up, it cannot get it back unless it attempts to do so by force.
The US can maintain the advantage by operating from the First Island Chain at the outset of a conflict. Vulnerability to US forward forces is real, but the US is already working to execute effective counters: dispersion and the hardening of prepared, defensive positions.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

9) This is especially so given the threat of the PLAN. The US will not have command of the sea in a future US-China conflict. It will be forced to fight fiercely for sea control. The PLAN, if allowed to operate uncontested from the First Island Chain, would have an irreplaceable advantage in using its surface ships and submarines to blunt and defeat US power projection.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

8) A Second Island Chain strategy would force the US to do exactly that — attempting to surge forward from Guam to reach Japan or the Philippines. Thus, the US would have to fight two battles rather than one if it began a conflict in the First Island Chain: the fight for access and the fight itself. Yet the US does not have the required sealift to move its combat forces forward in the event of a crisis. Sea and airlift capabilities only meet 60% of operational requirements for PACOM.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

7) Changes in the character of war make it more vital than ever that forces begin a conflict in the conflict zone from the outset. Long-range precision strike systems — particularly those of the Chinese — are too plentiful and accurate for forces to try to surge forward over exposed terrain to try to reach the site of action when a conflict begins. They would be easy targets.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

6) Militarily, so long as the US is committed to defending against some form of possible Chinese military action in the region, there is no alternative to a First Island Chain defense strategy if the US wants its defense to be both credible and effective.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

5) There is an easy solution to avoid these dangers: maintain US alliances in the region. These alliances not only provide the US with direct benefits, but also set a ceiling on escalation by both adversaries and allies. Ending formal defense commitments to these countries would remove that ceiling and risk exposing a region crucial to US vital interests to even greater dangers of conflict.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

4) It could dramatically increase the risk of conflict — conflict that would not remain isolated. A Second Korean War would likely involve nearly every major player in the region in one way or another, and its effects would boomerang back to the US, not just militarily but economically.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

3) The likeliest policy course these countries would adopt — particularly South Korea and Japan — is pursuing the possibility of an independent nuclear capability. Regional nuclear proliferation — or even flirtation with the idea — could end up disastrous for regional stability.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

2) A Second Island Chain strategy would decisively shift the balance of power in China’s favor, leaving First Island countries extremely vulnerable to Chinese pursuit of interests and influence through coercion and intimidation.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

1) Calls for a Second Island Chain strategy adopt an extremely narrow definition of US interests in East Asia that is overly restrictive. US alliances in East Asia are not ends in themselves but are reflective of fundamental US interests in the region. Ending these alliances would be counterproductive and unnecessary.

[James Park @jyjamespark]

In @RStatecraft, @Carr12Brandon and I offer a counterpoint to @jekavanagh’s recent call for the US to adopt a Second Island Chain strategy for East Asia. We argue against this strategy for geopolitical and military reasons. The US should maintain its alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. (Thread): https://t.co/VvUqFwR8YW

[Brandon Carr @Carr12Brandon]

https://t.co/xXBN6k4dsE
Pleased to present my latest piece in @TheNatlInterest on assessing trends in the changing character of war.

[acdeer @ChampionAlana]

My son recognized Trinadad’s mom yesterday and was determined to go say hey to her. Mrs Cheryl was so gracious with her time. He told her he plays football. She spoke to him about listening to coaches and being a good teammate and giving God the glory in all that we do. Abundance of character flowing from that family. Core memory made for my little Rebel. Hotty Toddy!

[U.S. Naval Institute @NavalInstitute]

Tenured faculty are the bedrock for independent institutional oversight because they can defend curriculum integrity.
https://t.co/1YI0Z2XyZT

[U.S. Naval Institute @NavalInstitute]

The U.S. Naval Institute mourns the passing of Dr. Craig L. Symonds, distinguished naval historian, award-winning author, and professor emeritus of history at the U.S. Naval Academy. Through three decades of teaching and a lifetime of scholarship, he helped generations of naval officers and readers understand the people, decisions, and sacrifices that shaped our naval history.

In May 2023, Dr. Symonds addressed the Naval Institute’s 150th Annual Meeting, reflecting on the enduring relationship between the Navy and its independent forum. His remarks became his most recent Proceedings article, “A Two-Way Street: The Navy–Naval Institute’s 150-Year Relationship.” In it, he described the Institute as “a sounding board and not an echo chamber”—a reminder of the value of thoughtful debate in advancing the naval profession.

We honor his lasting contributions to naval history and extend our deepest condolences to his family, friends, colleagues, and former students. His legacy lives on in the people he taught and the history he brought to life.

Read his article and revisit his 2023 remarks.
https://t.co/kEP996v4xA