@ChrisV197 Man muss nicht die Manager verteidigen aber in einer Zeit in der Gewerkschaften, NGOs und Medien die Klimaideologie in jedes börsennotierte Unternehmen getragen haben ist es nicht absurd zu behaupten wer Karriere machen wollte musste mitspielen sonst war er weg.
@andreaswinckler@c_wie_carsten@RoSt111971 Nein ist es nicht. Alles nur ausreden um vom eigenen Versagen abzulenken. Thema Handelspolitik: haben die USA versucht und sind kläglich gescheitert.
JUST IN: For forty years, memory chips were the worst business in technology. A brutal commodity, made of sand, sold by the ton, with profit margins that collapsed to nothing every few years. Last night that business reported the kind of margins only software companies dream of. AI just broke a cycle that defined an entire industry for four decades.
The numbers do not look real. Micron's revenue quadrupled in a single year, to 41 billion dollars. Net income went from 1.9 billion to 28 billion. And the number that should stop every investor cold: gross margin hit 85%. One year ago it was 39%. Memory chips, the most commoditized product in tech, now earn the fat margins of a software company, on a physical thing you can hold in your hand.
Understand what that means, because it breaks a 40-year rule. Memory was the definition of a cyclical business. Prices boomed, everyone built factories, supply flooded, prices crashed, margins went negative. Every few years, like clockwork. That clock just stopped. The CEO said shortages now run until 2028, and the company has locked half its future revenue in binding multi-year contracts. A commodity does not get contracts. A chokepoint does.
This is the whole year in one earnings report. AI did not just create winners in software and chips. It reached down into the most disrespected business in technology, the one nobody wanted, and turned it into the most profitable hardware on earth, because the machines cannot run without it and there is not enough to go around.
The worst business in tech just became one of the best. Not because memory changed. Because AI changed what memory is worth.
The cycle did not turn. It broke.
@ChrisV197 Nicht nur das die Umsätze durch die gigantischen KI Ausgaben aufgebläht sind, das Kapital dazu wird zum Teil vom Firmen wie NVIDIA bereitgestellt.
I do not understand, in 2026, why anyone is shorting anything, and I have, over the last several years, watched a generation of intelligent, well-credentialed, technically sophisticated investors set fire to their capital on the short side of a market that has been telegraphing its direction with the subtlety of a marching band, and the only explanation I have ever been able to construct is that none of these people have read a single page of monetary history written before 1990.
The setup is not subtle. The federal government is running a 7% structural deficit with no political coalition in either party willing to address it. The Treasury is issuing debt at a pace that will push publicly held debt-to-GDP past 130% within five years, which is the level at which, historically, every government in recorded history has either inflated its way out, defaulted, or both. The Fed is, regardless of what it says in public, the marginal buyer of that debt, and the only mechanism it has to fund the purchases is the creation of new dollars. The money is being printed. The debt is being monetized. The currency is being debased. And asset prices, which are denominated in the currency being debased, are doing the only thing they have ever done in any country that has ever tried this, which is going up.
Every country that has run this experiment has produced the same chart. Weimar Germany in 1922 and 1923 produced one of the most violent equity bull markets in recorded history in nominal terms, as the mark collapsed and the Berlin exchange repriced upward by orders of magnitude. Argentina, across four separate inflationary cycles since 1975, produced in each cycle a nominal rally that outran every short thesis published, while the peso lost 99.9% of its purchasing power. Zimbabwe in 2007 and 2008 produced an equity market that rose so violently the exchange had to be closed because the calculations could not keep up. Turkey, right now, in front of the entire world, has produced a Borsa Istanbul up 1,400% in lira terms while the lira has lost 85% against the dollar, and every short of Turkish equities has been carried out in nominal terms even when they were right in real terms.
The lesson is not that asset prices are going up because the businesses are getting better. The lesson is that asset prices are going up because the unit they are measured in is getting smaller, and any investor who positions short against this dynamic is betting against the will and capacity of a government to debase its own currency, which is the single most reliable bet you can lose in 4,000 years of recorded monetary history. The government always wins. The government always debases. The currency always loses purchasing power. The assets always reprice upward in nominal terms, on a path the shorts always insist is unsustainable and that always, somehow, sustains.
You can short individual frauds. You cannot short the market. You cannot short the currency itself without being on the wrong side of the largest force in modern capital markets, which is the slow, politically inevitable destruction of the dollar’s purchasing power against everything that cannot be printed. The shorts have been wrong for five years. They will be wrong for the next five. The only investors who will, in real terms, preserve and grow their wealth are the ones who understood, early, that the game is not about being right on valuation, it is about being on the right side of monetary debasement, and the right side has always been owning real assets, productive businesses, scarce commodities, and the one monetary metal that has functioned as money continuously for 5,000 years, while the people on the other side continue to insist this time is different. This time has never been different. The math is the math. The shorts will continue to lose. The owners will continue to win.
Thoughts on $PDD
I generally do not invest in Chinese companies because there are simply too many variables outside of the actual business like regulation, geopolitics, government intervention, VIE structures, etc. Even if the business executes perfectly, the rules of the game can suddenly change overnight.
But $PDD is one of the few Chinese companies I’ve looked at for a long time that I find particularly peculiar because the valuation almost does not make sense anymore. You have a company generating billions in quarterly profit, still growing nicely, sitting on $77b of cash and investments, and trading around 5 to 6x earnings. At some point you almost stop asking “why is it cheap?” and start asking “what exactly is the market pricing in here?”
The market is essentially telling you one thing very clearly. These earnings are not sustainable. Margins are eventually going to collapse, growth is going to slow materially, Temu economics are weaker than they appear, or something structurally broken exists underneath the surface that investors have not fully appreciated yet.
This quarter was interesting because management almost sounded like they were preparing investors for a different type of company going forward. Revenue came in at $15.4b while operating profit was still roughly $2.8b even during a much heavier investment cycle. Most businesses in the world would kill for those numbers, especially at this scale, but investors are no longer valuing $PDD based on what the business looks like today.
They are trying to figure out what the business looks like 5 to 10 years from now and whether the economics underneath are structurally changing. Historically, the story almost looked too good to be true. Massive growth, huge margins, asset light marketplace economics, explosive Temu expansion, and unbelievable cash generation created one of the most attractive ecommerce models in the world because they were collecting fees without carrying the infrastructure burden many competitors had.
Now $PDD appears to be evolving into something different. Management repeatedly talked about supply chain investments, first party business, merchant ecosystem investments, and long term infrastructure spending. Once ecommerce companies start moving deeper into fulfillment, warehouses, logistics, merchant support, and first party operations, the business can become much larger but structurally less profitable at the same time.
I think that is what the market is really worried about. If growth slows while margins compress simultaneously, suddenly investors stop valuing the company like an elite platform business and start valuing it more like a retailer. That changes the entire framework investors use to think about the company and probably explains why the multiple has collapsed so dramatically.
At the same time, the balance sheet still looks almost absurd. $PDD has roughly $63b of cash and short term investments plus another roughly $14b of investment assets. A massive percentage of the market cap is backed by liquidity and investments alone while the business itself still generated about $1.8b of quarterly net income during what management openly describes as a heavy investment period.
That is what makes this situation so fascinating because the market almost no longer trusts the framework itself. A few years ago investors were willing to pay enormous multiples for Chinese internet companies because they assumed growth would continue forever. Today many investors almost refuse to own them regardless of valuation because once geopolitical fear enters investing, valuation alone can stop mattering.
1/2👇