We're making our partnership with @Tailscale official. You can now purchase Control D directly through them.
Your tailnet governs what devices can reach internally. Control D takes over once they head out to the open internet, blocking threats and enforcing policy per user, group, or tag.
https://t.co/w8RWiAry91
That's what agentic AI changes.
It can actually trace whether an attacker could trigger the vulnerability in YOUR code, in YOUR config, in YOUR context.
Full breakdown π
https://t.co/0Ovx1Hfcn7
Companies are drowning in CVEs.
Hundreds of thousands. Sometimes millions. Every year.
And most of them arenβt actually exploitable in their environment.
Finding a vulnerable dependency isn't the same as finding an exploitable one.
Is the vulnerable method even reachable? Is there sanitization blocking it? Is it used at all?
Scanners don't ask those questions. They just flag and move on.
A cybersecurity expert said something on our podcast that stopped the conversation cold.
AI is now writing more code in models than humans are.
Humans could be fully out of the training loop by end of year and the counterargument to that is model collapse.
1% bad data. 10% bad predictions. Keep going and the whole thing becomes useless.
This is the real, inside the room account of what the first 24 hours of a LockBit ransomware attack actually looks like, told by someone who lived it.
Full episode with @ZachLewis1, link in bio.
The first night of a ransomware attack comes down to three phone calls.
First: cyber insurance. "We've been hit, need help."
Second: the FBI.
Third call was to his wife. "This might be a resume generating event. I'm going to be late. Maybe hold off on any big purchases until we know how this shakes out."
The ransom note itself instructed him not to contact insurance, not to contact the FBI, and not to tell almost anyone.
It even suggested he reach out to a sympathetic billionaire, specifically naming Elon Musk, to cover the ransom.
He tried. No response.
"Oh and I don't have MFA set up on the new device. can you disable it just while I get in?"
"Of course, totally normal."
Devon Ackerman has spent his career inside incidents like this and he says the scariest part isn't the hackβ¦
*It's that every single person on that call did exactly what they were trained to do.*
Full EP π
βΆοΈ https://t.co/nUpd3AhY4p
A hacker called a company's help desk.
Pretended to be an IT employee with a new laptop.
Said their password wasn't working.
The call center could literally see the failed login attempts. they confirmed it. "yes, we see you trying to get in."
So they reset the password.
Then came the second ask...
The WAF migration got to 98% complete. Nobody finished the last 2%.
That gap created the SSRF vulnerability. Which exposed the EC2 metadata service. Which handed over the keys to everything.
Full episode here π
https://t.co/SYlV23t0GT
"We fixed that years ago."
That sentence is how most breaches start.
Ross Young was inside Capital One when 100 million records walked out the door. He explains exactly what the headlines missed...
Spent 60 minutes with someone who's actually done cyberwarfare.
His hot take on how most security teams operate?
"They're treating everything as equally important."
That's the whole problem.
Ben Lipczynski spent 12 years on nuclear submarines before moving to corporate cybersecurity.
His verdict: legacy OT systems were never designed for a world where everything connects to the internet.
Most organizations have no idea what is actually running on their network.
Full episode: https://t.co/AjaZEAq00d
A cybersecurity consultant walked into a water treatment plant farm.
The entire operation was being controlled from an iPad.
He asked what happens to the iPad at night.
"Oh, my kids use it to play YouTube."
What came next should scare every CISO running critical infrastructure...