Anoche se termina la década donde la política estuvo “perdida” por el voto voluntario , 2012-2022. Donde los movimientos y partidos perseguían a los mas interesados en votar y no a todos los chilenos.
Como jurista, me quedo con una frase del discurso del @Pontifex_es en el @Congreso_Es que debería enmarcarse en cada parlamento: "Una ley no alcanza su verdadera grandeza por el mero hecho de haber sido formalmente aprobada; la alcanza cuando puede comparecer ante la dignidad de la persona y salir de ese examen sin avergonzarse".
Profesora Susana Mondschein es elegida decana de la Facultad de Ciencias Físicas y Matemáticas @UChile_Beauchef para el período 2026-2030 https://t.co/cxjj9lN1A8
En Perú mientras el servicio electoral de ese país entrega el 1% de los votos contados, las proyecciones entregan un casi empate con 1% de diferencia entre Fujimori , que gana,y Sánchez. Seguramente pasará lo mismo que en la primera vuelta que habrá que esperar días para conocer el resultado oficial.
Imposible no emocionarse con la tristeza infinita de Juan Luis Ossa por la muerte de su hija Violeta de 14 años. Es q es muy contranatura q no sean los hijos quienes lloren la partida de sus padres. Un abrazo fuerte a los papás y a la abuela Lucía
Hacienda puso a Becas Chile en el centro del debate: apunta a que entre un 20% y 30% no retornó y le debe al país cerca de US$150 millones.
🔗https://t.co/OBaMk6YgO4
Mientras se desarrolla la discusión, te invitamos a revisar los datos completos: 20 años, 42.960 becas, 39.355 personas, 128 países y 2.185 instituciones.
#MásDataMenosGuata
No se pierdan nuestro análisis de la primera vuelta presidencial en Colombia🇨🇴
¿Qué escenarios se proyectan para la segunda vuelta del 21 de junio? Revisa la transición del electorado colombiano: https://t.co/jWj0WQsbUe
🔵Hoy el Presidente @joseantoniokast rindió su primera #CuentaPública.
🔗https://t.co/Yvi0Mp5ext
Ya está incorporada a nuestra plataforma de discursos presidenciales: una herramienta para estudiar 36 años de democracia, con las 37 Cuentas Públicas (1990–2026) y los 9 programas de gobierno desde Aylwin hasta Kast.
Permite buscar cualquier tema y ver cómo ha evolucionado desde 1990, contrastar lo prometido en campaña con lo que cada gobierno informó al país, y analizar el relato detrás de cada discurso.
#MásDataMenosGuata
📈 Alza de la deuda pública proyectada a 2030: ¿un "error" de miles de millones o un cambio de supuestos?
Quisimos aterrizar el debate en los datos: revisamos los informes de la Dipres y descompusimos las diferencias de criterio entre ambas versiones.
🔗Revisa el análisis: https://t.co/DYGddkxCiN
#MásDataMenosGuata
Con datos publicos puedes hacer una trazabilidad de los usos y fuentes de fondos entre informes de finanzas publicas 🇨🇱
Aca un borrador inicial de como los deficits afectan cambian la deuda al 2030 segun esos informes.
Calculo preliminar pero con grafica amigable
Eduardo Engel: "Meter a la Dipres en peleas entre el Gobierno actual y el anterior es debilitar instituciones sólidas, claves de nuestra democracia, por una ganancia política de corto plazo" https://t.co/86ZJGeHQHo
NASA has just launched a new website for its Moon Base missions, which aims to build a permanent $20 billion U.S. base on the Moon. @SpaceX's Starship rocket will play a big role in these missions.
"The Moon Base is a home away from Earth for Artemis astronauts who will live and work at humanity’s first lunar outpost. NASA is leading global teams of innovators across international space agencies, industry, and academia to build the Moon Base and establish an enduring human presence near the lunar South Pole for the benefit of all.
Phase One (Now–2029): Experiment and Learn
NASA will begin with a rapid series of robotic missions to scout the lunar South Pole region, test technologies, and prepare for surface operations ahead of future astronaut missions.:
• A major increase in lunar activity, with up to 25 missions, including 21 landings.
• Crewed and autonomous rovers for mobility demonstrations and surface preparation, along with four drones known as MoonFall and communications relay and observation satellites.
• Early demonstrations of power, navigation, communications, and nuclear radioisotope heater unit technologies designed to endure the long lunar night.
• Scientific payload opportunities integrated across landers and rovers.
• The first tangible footprint of Moon Base effort, with four tons of payload delivered to test what works on the lunar surface.
Phase Two (2029–2032): Early Habitation
By 2029, NASA will transition to assembling semi-permanent infrastructure and initiating early habitation and logistics operations:
• Deployment of expanded solar power systems and initial nuclear surface power capabilities, potentially including fission reactors and radioisotope power systems.
• Upgraded rovers, potential advanced MoonFall drones, and early habitation elements.
• Enhanced surface-to-orbit communications networks to provide reliable connectivity across the lunar South Pole region.
• Delivery of up to 60 tons of cargo through as many as 24 landings using low-, medium-, and heavy-class cargo landers.
Phase Three (2032 and Beyond): Sustained Human Presence
This phase will scale operations to achieve a true enduring presence, with routine crew rotations and continuous surface activity. This is when living and working on the Moon becomes a reality:
• Semi-permanent habitation modules with spacious interior for crew living and operations.
• Operational fission surface power systems capable of delivering steady, reliable energy through the long lunar nights, leveraging in situ resource manufacturing.
• Advanced logistics networks supported by crewed and autonomous rovers to keep the base supplied and functioning year-round.
• Delivery of up to 38 tons of cargo annually to sustain habitats, power systems, logistics operations, and major science outposts, enabled by low-cost reusable heavy-lift capabilities."
Moon base website: https://t.co/nefXl3J2FR
A post about Pope Leo XIV's encyclical on AI. Why the Pope is right, but perhaps not right enough.
Artificial intelligence is reshaping the world in front of our eyes: how we communicate, how we access information, how we work, how income and status are distributed among us, and soon how we fight and kill each other. Yet the public conversation about AI remains stuck on the minutiae of competition between labs, or on a false dichotomy between AI as a “stochastic parrot” with no real capabilities and AI as an alien superintelligence poised to take command of humanity.
The more important questions are about what we want from AI, and whether our current mindset, institutions, and control mechanisms are equal to the task of steering it toward our welfare.
It is refreshing, then, that a bold and powerful voice has weighed into this debate: Pope Leo XIV. As an economist who has long argued that technology is a matter of choice rather than fate, I find Leo’s intervention welcome and, on most points, on target. But on the most consequential question of what AI should actually be designed to do, Leo stops short.
Secular readers may bristle at the encyclical’s opening invocation of the Tower of Babel. They would be mistaken to stop reading there. Leo goes much further than most pundits, journalists and policymakers in the United States by recognizing that what happens to AI, and hence to humanity, is a under our control. There are multiple possible paths for AI, and which one we take will have sweeping consequences. He is also ahead of many commentators when he writes forcefully and unequivocally that “technology is never neutral, because it takes on the characteristics of those who devise, finance, regulate, and use it.”
These were the central themes of the book I wrote with Simon Johnson, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle over Technology and Prosperity. It is heartening to hear them taken up by a voice with Leo's reach.
The Pope is also right to question the current trajectory of AI in warfare and law enforcement. What was taboo only a few years ago – AI-driven mass surveillance, algorithms selecting targets for killing – has become routine. Many in Silicon Valley are now calling openly for a new military-algorithmic complex centered on AI as an instrument of American hard power. Leo captures something deep and too often ignored: “Any technology that facilitates attacks without seeing the face of human beings lowers the moral threshold of conflict.”
His call for the “disarmament of AI” follows directly from these observations. As he explains, disarming AI means “freeing it from the mentality of ‘armed’ competition, which today is not limited simply to the military context, but is also an economic and cognitive phenomenon.” His moral clarity in stating that “there is no algorithm that can make war morally acceptable” should be a warning to technologists rushing to design new weapons of mass destruction.
Underneath these specific concerns lies a more fundamental claim: that what is technically feasible is not the same as what is good for humanity, and that the difference depends on who controls the technology and what ideology and interests guide them.
Leo edges toward what I take to be the most important point about AI's future when he observes that “while AI promises to boost productivity by taking over mundane tasks, it frequently forces workers to adapt to the speed and demands of machines, rather than designing machines to work with those who work.”
But here he does not go far enough. He stops short of questioning the prevailing design philosophy of AI itself: a philosophy centered on mimicking human capabilities and automating human tasks, with the ultimate goal of artificial general intelligence (AGI) that can do everything a person can.
This philosophy rests on a mistake. It assumes that artificial intelligence and humanintelligence are fundamentally similar, and therefore machines should naturally take over whatever humans currently do. Yet these intelligences are fundamentally different.
Humans are “one-shot” learners. We form hypotheses from a few examples, mentally simulate possibilities, and refine our understanding through a social process of trial and error. This is how children learn language - imitating a few words, generalizing, and adjusting based on how others respond. We are not, however, very good at absorbing massive volumes of information or sifting through unstructured data for relevant patterns.
AI models are almost the opposite. They thrive on enormous training sets and excel at pattern recognition at scale. But they have, as yet, no genuine creativity, no real-world embodiment, and no capacity for trial-and-error learning grounded in interaction with the physical and social world.
When two things are different – you shouldn’t, and typically you couldn’t – use one to mimic the other. If you did, you would end up with suboptimal, disappointing results. It would have been a colossal mistake, and the Chicago Bulls’s legendary coach Phil Jackson would have gone down in the annals of basketball as one of the worst coaches in history, if he decided in the 1990s that because Michael Jordan was the better player, Jordan should mimic everything that Scottie Pippen and Dennis Rodman were doing in the team. The team went from championship to championship because these players worked together and complemented each other.
The same applies to AI and human skills.
The more productive path is complementarity – using AI to do what humans cannot, so that humans can do what they do best. An electrician aided by AI diagnostics, a nurse supported by AI in interpreting symptoms, a teacher using AI to personalize instruction for each student; these are the contours of a different AI future, one that raises rather than displaces human capability.
Optimists and industry insiders will respond that automation-first AI can still benefit everyone, provided redistributive policy keeps pace. But this argument has a poor track record. Forty years of digital automation have already concentrated gains at the top, hollowed out middle-skill work, and produced disappointing aggregate productivity growth. There is little reason to expect that an even more powerful round of automation, deployed by even more concentrated firms, will end differently. We can and must demand a different design.
The global stakes from the future of AI are even larger than those we can see around us in the United States. For the developing world, where billions still depend on the prospect of decent jobs as a path out of poverty, an automation-centric AI agenda is not merely suboptimal. It is simply transferring to foreclose the most important route to broad-based prosperity.
The biggest failing of today's AI industry is its refusal to recognize any of this. It is guided instead by an ideology of control (the industry’s own over humanity) and by a conviction that machines are uniformly better than humans.
As Leo rightly notes, this failure is enabled by the fact that a handful of companies now command the future of AI.
What we need is a combination of moral clarity and a serious, society-wide debate about what AI can do and what we want it to do. That debate must move beyond exhortation toward concrete choices: antitrust action against the dominant platforms, public investment in human-complementary AI, regulation of surveillance and autonomous weapons, and meaningful rights for workers and citizens over the data on which these systems are built.
The Pope's intervention makes such a debate a little more likely today than it was before.
It is now up to the rest of us to carry it further than he was willing to go.