Basically, the quoter requests prices with a very high gas limit, and the malicious hook shows a 0 fee. But in actual transactions with a normal gas limit, there’s some randomness involved, and if the user hasn’t set a low slippage tolerance, they can be charged a very high fee.
I wrote to Uniswap about this a few weeks ago, but they never replied, and as far as I understand, their UI is still routing transactions through these pools.
I don’t think using Pool B as the external price reference will work well in practice. Aggregator routing, and even routing within Uniswap itself, is usually optimized across available liquidity. As a result, after a routed swap there may be little or no exploitable price difference left between Pool A and another onchain pool. So another AMM pool cannot reliably serve as the reference price for the internal arbitrage. This likely requires a real oracle instead. And this is where the real problem begins.
@LayerZero_Core It looks like you shift all responsibility to KelpDAO, but actually you share it, because it was your own DVN and you allowed this type of security model (where your own DVN becomes a single point of failure)
@Domahhhh@apartovi@Kalshi Ali is just hyping up his own bags and throwing dirt at competing projects — his post wasn’t aimed at understanding how things actually work.