🚨 A new China-linked threat cluster is going after Microsoft IIS servers.
OP-512 uses 3 custom web shells to get remote access, run commands, hide traces, and report hacked servers back to attackers.
Read: https://t.co/3YSNNStHp1
🚨 Hackers turned hijacked cloud servers into a hidden email-sending network.
AWS. Google Cloud. Azure.
PCPJack tested which hosts could send mail, kept the working ones, and synced the proxy list every 5 minutes. What they planned to use it for is still unknown.
The setup was still live when found.
Learn more: https://t.co/avKbZCohkR
🎯 Threat actors are actively teaching newcomers how to find, exploit, and profit from vulnerable systems.
🛡️ @flaresystems explores what a popular underground hacking tutorial reveals about modern attacker workflows.
➡️ https://t.co/hWRWs6wd9D
#cybersecurity#sponsored
🌍 Cloudflare Turnstile Bypass Source Code Shared on Cybercrime Forum
* A threat actor has publicly shared source code claiming to bypass Cloudflare Turnstile challenges
* According to the post, the implementation is described as:
* Browser-based only
* Not intended for direct HTTP request automation
* Released publicly to forum members
* The actor further claims they may release additional CAPTCHA-related bypass tools in the future, including solutions targeting other challenge systems
* Cloudflare Turnstile is widely deployed across websites to mitigate:
* Automated bot activity
* Credential stuffing attacks
* Account creation abuse
* Web scraping operations
* Fraud and spam campaigns
* Public availability of CAPTCHA bypass tooling can lower the barrier of entry for threat actors seeking to automate malicious activity against protected websites
* Organizations relying solely on CAPTCHA-based controls should assume that challenge systems may eventually be bypassed and implement layered defenses including:
* Behavioral analytics
* Device fingerprinting
* Rate limiting
* Bot management solutions
* Risk-based authentication
* Multi-factor authentication (MFA)
* Daily Dark Web has not independently analyzed or verified the effectiveness of the released source code
Analyst Note:
The growing trend of publicly shared CAPTCHA bypass frameworks highlights a broader reality: security controls that depend on a single defensive layer rarely remain effective for long. Modern bot operators increasingly combine browser automation, residential proxies, AI-assisted solving services, and anti-detection techniques to emulate legitimate users at scale.
#DDW #Intelligence #Cloudflare #DarkWeb
🚨 One malicious GitHub issue could hijack Anthropic’s #ClaudeCode Action and turn prompt injection into repo write access.
In agent mode, a crafted issue could leak OIDC-related workflow credentials that attackers could replay.
The bypass trusted [bot] actors. Fixed in v1.0.94. Audit your workflows.
Details ➝ https://t.co/hveTOyB6Gu
Attackers are targeting open-source software ecosystems at scale, using coordinated and repeatable approaches that take advantage of dependency chains and maintainer trust models to distribute malicious packages across widely used registries. https://t.co/Gh6lgCtIHM
The use of AI is reducing barriers to entry, enabling high‑volume package creation and faster iteration of malicious code. At the same time, shifts in coding patterns and tooling behaviors can provide defenders with signals to better identify and track adversary activity.
These campaigns increasingly focus on the software supply chain itself, targeting the tools, libraries, and pipelines used to build and distribute applications. As a result, a single compromised component can propagate across complex dependency trees and significantly expand impact.
Learn more from Microsoft Security’s Allie Luhrs and Mario Samolis from their talk at this year’s Blue Hat USA on the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Podcast, hosted by Sherrod DeGrippo.
🛑 Google and YouTube ads are delivering FlutterShell, a new #macOS backdoor that passed Apple notarization with valid Developer IDs.
The malware can hijack Chrome traffic, run shell commands, alter files, and update its behavior from attacker servers.
Read: https://t.co/ELUmQYd4n8
🚨 Hackers spent 5 MONTHS quietly copying a senior executive’s Outlook mailbox at a major Global Stock Exchange.
They ran with SYSTEM privileges and used a custom tool based on the legitimate Aspose library to export emails in small batches, routing the data through Dropbox and OneDrive to blend in with normal traffic.
Learn more: https://t.co/5WOxQUjTRv
🚨 WARNING — New HTTP/2 Bomb exploit targets NGINX, Apache HTTPD, Microsoft IIS, Envoy, and Cloudflare Pingora.
A single client can consume 32GB of server memory in roughly 20 seconds, causing remote DoS conditions.
Details here: https://t.co/58xDxAKRcZ
An update to our Threat Brief on npm supply chain attacks discusses the latest compromise, pushing a payload named Miasma. The tradecraft used substantially matches Mini Shai-Hulud malware used by TeamPCP. Read now: https://t.co/ktpqy8loGB
AI is shrinking exploitation timelines from days to hours.
Enterprises still take a median of 43 days to patch critical vulnerabilities.
That's a gap attackers are already exploiting.
Patching alone isn't enough.
Read: https://t.co/5PnnJ3pQ7s
Microsoft has identified a npm supply chain compromise impacting 90+ redhat-cloud-services/* packages, including patch-client 4.0.4, insights-client 4.0.4, rbac-client 9.0.3, host-inventory-client 5.0.3, frontend-components 7.7.2, and others. The payload is a self-propagating worm that infects other npm packages and self-publishes.
Each compromised package adds a malicious preinstall hook, embedding an index.js script in the package.json that silently executes “node index.js” during installation, downloads Bun, and runs a payload that steals secrets from npm, GitHub, Amazon Web Services (AWS), and Secure Shell (SSH). The added code bloats index.js from ~8KB to ~4.3MB, acting as a heavily obfuscated ROT-9 eval loader.
If any of the compromised packages are installed, users and organizations should assume compromise, rotate credentials, revert to a previously trusted version, and block compromised packages. Identified compromised npm packages have been taken down, and we continue to work with the npm team. Microsoft continues to investigate this attack and will publish updates as more information is available.