Daniel Silverberg

Managing director at Capstone, a policy analysis firm. Former foreign policy advisor to House Dem leadership. Lover of all things CA. All views are my own.

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

Policymakers and investors are focused on the above-ground infrastructure for AI (data centers, grid access, etc)). A massive vulnerability for AI and offshore wind power lies beneath the sea. My colleague and I wrote an oped in the Washington Post on danger to undersea cables

[Washington Post Opinions @PostOpinions]

A critical internet infrastructure lies vulnerable at the ocean floor, @DSilverbergDC and Elena McGovern write.

“What a patient adversary could do to these cables is plain to see.” https://t.co/8pURABCJyk

[Yaakov Katz @yaakovkatz]

I hate to be the guy to pour cold water on the reports of IDF troops reaching the Beaufort Ridge in Lebanon, but I struggle to understand why this is being celebrated.

For anyone who lived here in the 1990s, the Beaufort is not a symbol of success. It represents Israel's long and costly presence in Lebanon - something that claimed too many soldiers' lives and ended without Israel achieving its strategic goals.

The fact that the IDF can reach the Beaufort today is obvious and - despite the media festival - is not even close to a victory. The real questions are different: How does Israel eventually leave? What is the political endgame? And are we possibly witnessing the beginning of another prolonged military presence in Lebanon without a clear horizon for how it ends?

Because here is what we already know way too well - getting into Lebanon is always easier than getting out.

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

@brianromick useful oped on complexity of Israeli-Palestinian conflict and agency on both sides, often overlooked in recent criticisms of Israel and invocation of term “genocide.” https://t.co/bx2ZDsxJmu

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

Trump not unique among second term presidents for ignoring fate of party in midterms. Obama was similarly detached from Dem congressional efforts. However, endorsing opponents of sitting senators is unique.

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

When does Trump support subside and GOP members move on to someone else? @TheAtlantic provides excellent analysis that the moment might be sooner than expected bc of Trump alienating GOP senators and fixation with his projects, not economy. https://t.co/6nBIFTfNSZ

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

@yaakovkatz captures such a basic issue here.

[Yaakov Katz @yaakovkatz]

On April 6, @NickKristof posted a picture from the West Bank posing with Munther Amira, a Palestinian he described as having endured “brutal abuse in Israeli prisons.” I forwarded it to a few well-connected people with a simple question: “Does someone in the Israeli government know he is here? If so, they should be reaching out.”

The tweet, I figured, had definitely been seen by officials in Israel’s public diplomacy apparatus, and they should have reached the same obvious conclusion – whatever Kristof was doing here was not going to end well. Someone needed to try to get ahead of it.

Nobody did.

After Kristof’s rape column was published earlier this month, the answer was what I expected: no one from the @IDFSpokesperson’s Office had called the New York Times columnist. No one had sat across from him, heard his accusations, and tried to tell a different story. Not even an attempt.

Would it have made a difference? Maybe. Maybe not. 

Maybe the column would have been more balanced. Maybe it would have been worse. That is always the uncertainty with public diplomacy – you never know what might have been until you try. 

And that is the point. Israel didn’t try. It rarely does. And that, right now, is the story of Israeli public diplomacy in a single sentence: Israel is not even in the game.

The question is why. And to answer it, consider two things that happened recently that most people missed.

1/3

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

near Arlington National Cemetery, the conversion of a Washington, D.C., public golf course into championship links, and, of course, the ballroom. The economy? Not so much.”

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

Useful summary of Trump dynamics with Senate. He does not enjoy margins he once had, in part due to endorsements of opponents of sitting senators. https://t.co/hIjrslkHrI

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

Key quote: “for months now, Republicans have fervently hoped that Trump’s focus would shift to issues that could help the party in November. Instead, he has been consumed with an Iran peace agreement and with his projects: new paint for the Reflecting Pool, a triumphal arch..”

[Richard Fontaine @RHFontaine]

Amid new attacks, will there be an Iran deal or no deal?

1. The President today refused to let Iran wait him out, saying that he doesn’t care about the looming midterm elections. Contrary to previous expectations, Trump is not so desperate that he’ll accept a terrible deal. The question is whether a reasonable one is attainable.

2. The administration dismissed an Iran-published draft as a fabrication. Let’s hope so. It would not only leave the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian management but require the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region - and it leaves out the nuclear program entirely. Even if fake, it indicates how sweeping Tehran’s objectives remain.

3. Each side now has two key sources of leverage. For Iran, its nuclear program and closing the Strait. For the U.S., blockading Iranian ports and the threat of resumed bombing. All four have clear limitations.

4. The U.S. blockade is imposing real costs on Iran. But the costs of a closed Strait are higher still – likely too high to endure indefinitely. And six weeks of strikes against 13,000 Iranian sites, with a few more recently, have not broken Tehran’s will. It’s not clear that a new attempt to “finish the job” will do so.

5. Meanwhile, the nominal ceasefire in Lebanon is barely holding. Iran wants to stop the fight on all fronts, including Lebanon. Israel, likely fearing that it’ll be pressured soon to stop, is ramping up attacks, hitting more than 150 targets in just the last day. A deal with Tehran should not constrain Israel from defending its northern border.

6. So now what? It’s easier to say what hasn’t happened than what will. Iran has not surrendered unconditionally. The regime has not changed. Trump did not select the new Supreme Leader on the Venezuela model. If help was ever on the way to Iranian protesters, it never actually arrived.

7. The likeliest outcome remains a narrow deal to reopen the Strait, with some aspirational language on the nuclear file but no definitive end to the Iranian program. We may see a return to military force before we get there.

8. That would leave Iran economically broken and militarily weak, with damaged proxies and destroyed nuclear sites, but possessing enough missiles and drones to threaten the Strait and regional energy infrastructure.

9. The regime will remain in place, likely even more hardline than before, and China and Russia will help Tehran get back on its feet, hoping to tie the U.S. down in the region.

9. A narrow deal is the likeliest end to this hot war. Long and possibly unproductive negotiations will then follow. The cold war will resume. And the U.S. and Iran will await a new round of fighting on another day.

[Dan Shapiro @DanielBShapiro]

With all due caveats about a deal that has not been announced yet, some thoughts:

The US-Iran deal being described in the news is a weak deal, and the net result of this war is significant damage to US strategic interests. That said, since the war was a mistake from the beginning, we can at least be thankful it appears President Trump is moving, belatedly, to end it.

This war was ill-conceived in every respect. There were no clear strategic objectives, and no way to achieve most of the objectives mentioned at an acceptable cost.

After the Strait of Hormuz was closed, and the global economic crisis started to spread, reopening it became the most important objective.

That meant Iran had far greater leverage than we did.

So President Trump faced only terrible options, of his own making. The deal being reported is among the less terrible options he could have chosen. At least he is not choosing to escalate the war, which would cause an even greater global economic crisis.

The least terrible deal would have been a verified opening of the Strait -- and nothing else. Keep full sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, maintain watchfulness and deterrence established in the 12-Day War last June, and try to negotiate a significant rollback of the program and intrusive inspections.

This deal is weaker than that. It reportedly provides $25 billion in unfrozen assets without receiving any concessions on the nuclear program. That money will give the regime a lifeline and help it begin restoring funding to its proxies. And there are no guarantees that Iran will make meaningful concessions on enrichment or HEU once those talks do start.

Those talks, which will likely drag on, may well take place without a credible US military threat backing them up, as the United States labors to recover from all it expended and lost in this campaign and shore up other strategic priorities (IndoPacific) that have been set back, and as US midterm elections approach.

Meanwhile, the deal says nothing about Iran's ballistic missile program or its support for proxies. Yes, US and Israeli strikes degraded, but did not eliminate, many Iranian attack capabilities. But overall, Iran has gained significant leverage for the future by demonstrating it can control the strait, by attacking its neighbors and US bases in the region and causing significant damage, and by taking the United States' and Israel's best punch and surviving with enough ability to project aggression in tact.

It's a bleak day for US strategic interests. But it's better than continuing the war and making it even worse.

Once the dust clears, one thing must not be forgotten. The Iranian people continue to live under a vicious regime. Trump has barely spoken of them in weeks. They deserve help, support, and appropriate non-military external pressures on the regime to give THEM the best chance to change it.

The Administration, which put so much faith in military power to do what it could not, should invest in Iran experts, communicators, Persian language broadcasting, transition planning, diplomacy, and more aimed at supporting the Iranian people in their quest for freedom from tyranny.

That was true in January when the Iranian people were demonstrating for their freedom. And it is still true today, despite this stupid war.

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

So will Netanyahu fire BenGvir? Either fire him or don’t say anything.

[Ambassador Yechiel (Michael) Leiter @yechielleiter]

As @IsraeliPM Netanyahu and FM @gidonsaar have made clear, Itamar Ben Gvir’s reckless grandstanding is not representative of government policy.

I am Israel’s top diplomat in the U.S., at the heart of our most important alliance. Ben Gvir’s antics take a sledgehammer to our diplomatic efforts while Israel’s enemies gleefully jump on every unfortunate nonsense to discredit and demonize.

The provocateurs of the Flotilla charade were properly detained in accordance with international law and will be deported to their home countries.

End of story.

[Steny Hoyer @RepStenyHoyer]

Barney Frank and I both came to the Congress in 1981 and have been close friends for over four decades. Across a range of issues, and on behalf of those in Massachusetts and the entire country, Barney was a tireless champion.

He'll long be remembered for his courage. May his memory be a blessing to all.

https://t.co/jGhNewaDkO

[IndiaToday @IndiaToday]

Trump-Xi Meet

It’s highly speculative to say what exactly China can do vis‑à‑vis Iran. The better question is: how much is China actually willing to do? In my view, they do not want to get any more entangled in the U.S.–Iran dynamic than they already are: @DSilverbergDC

#NewsToday | @sardesairajdeep

[Dan Shapiro @DanielBShapiro]

How can President Trump emerge from his visit to China with a strategic victory? No doubt much of his discussions with Xi Jinping will be devoted to the mess in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. But the real opportunity in this visit is an opening to end the war in Ukraine.

Having not found an off-ramp to the war in Iran, Trump is in the unfortunate position of needing to seek Xi's help. The most realistic way out is getting China to use its leverage with Iran to arrange a Hormuz-only deal: an end to Iran's threats to target ships transiting the Strait or seek tolls from them, and an end to the US blockade of Iranian ports. That will not be easy to get, and Iran's compliance will have to be monitored, but China, which has an interest in an open Strait, can help with that too.

The nuclear issues would be left for another day. All sanctions would remain in place, and US deterrence and monitoring established after the 12-day war in June 2025 would continue. Trump is right that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon, but they are no closer today than they were last summer after Operation Midnight Hammer. And Iran is nowhere close to agreeing to a deal to hand over their enriched uranium and make a long-term pledge to end enrichment. So maintain pressure, watchfulness, and deterrence for now. But allow the global economy to recover.

But Trump can offer Xi another joint project. Throughout the war in Ukraine, China has sustained the Russian war machine with economic support and dual-use technology. That has given Xi great leverage with Putin. But Ukraine's innovative warfighting, mastering both frontline and long-range strike drone capabilities, has begun to turn the tide of the war. Strikes on Russian energy infrastructure threaten to deprive Putin of the economic boost he expected from rising oil prices, and Ukraine was effectively able to hold Moscow's May 9 Victory Day parade hostage. Russian troops continue to die in the frontline meat grinder, with negligible territorial movement.

For the first time, Putin, facing notable internal discontent with the war, is sending subtle signals that he might be looking for his own off-ramp. He has suggested the war is coming to and end, proposed a meeting with Zelensky in a third country, and mooted possible mediators.

A firm message from Xi could seal the deal, likely ending the war with current frontlines frozen in place for future negotiations, but ending the absurd attempt by Putin (which Trump has backed) to acquire Donbas territory he could not take by force. That could deliver Trump the end of the war he has claimed only he could achieve (albeit on more generous terms to Ukraine than he envisioned), which he could add to his (dubious) count of wars he stopped.

That's a decent trade-off: China helps Trump out of his Hormuz bind, and the United States gets what it should consider a win (notwithstanding Trump's sympathy for Putin) in ending the war in Ukraine on acceptable terms to Kyiv and Europe.

Along they way, Trump should resist Xi's attempt to extract any change in US policy on Taiwan as part of the equation (Trump's team has already indicated that is not expected). And the rest of the summit agenda can focus on trade deals and stabilizing commercial, investment, and technology ties and competition. But the above framework could make the China visit a strategic win for Trump.

[Raz Zimmt @RZimmt]

What Can Be Learned from the Iranian Response:
A. Tehran’s underlying assumptions have not changed. From Iran’s perspective, it won the confrontation; the other side will blink first because of the accumulating economic damage; the U.S. is not interested in renewing the hostilities; and even if the war resumes, Iran retains the capability to inflict significant additional damage, particularly on the Gulf states.
Not only have these assumptions remained unchanged since the ceasefire, but they have actually been reinforced over the past two weeks in light of U.S. conduct toward Iran: Washington’s tolerance of delays in the Iranian response, the relatively weak response to attacks on American destroyers, the absence of any U.S. response to attacks on tankers and targets in the UAE, and the suspension of the "liberation project."

B. Iran is prepared for certain concessions, including on the nuclear issue, but is unwilling to return to the status quo that existed prior to February 28 and insists on securing vital economic and security guarantees.
The economic guarantees, deemed necessary for postwar reconstruction, include sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets.
The security guarantees, intended to prevent future attacks, include preserving some control over the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining essential nuclear capabilities.

Therefore:
A. Iran is unwilling to relinquish its two most significant leverage cards — control over Hormuz and fissile material — before a final and definitive end to the war.

B. Iran will demand substantial economic relief already in the early stages of implementing any agreement, based on the assumption that there is no certainty negotiations will progress in a way that enables it to obtain such benefits later on.

C. Iran is unwilling to permanently dismantle capabilities, for example, nuclear infrastructure, in a way that would prevent it from restoring them in the future.

There is considerable doubt that these underlying assumptions will change even if economic pressure continues or military strikes are renewed. Faced with a choice between war and capitulation to U.S. dictates, the Iranian leadership chooses war. This was true before the war, and it is even more true under the “new” leadership in Tehran headed by Mojtaba Khamenei and the IRGC.

The U.S. currently faces four main options—none of them particularly good:
A. Continue economic pressure despite growing recognition in Washington itself (as reflected in the intelligence assessment published last week) that Iran likely has the ability to withstand the naval blockade for months.

B. Launch another offensive operation aimed primarily at inflicting pain on Iran and further complicating postwar reconstruction through attacks on infrastructure and power stations, although it is highly doubtful such a move would alter the calculations of the leadership in Tehran.

C. Accept, at least partially, the Iranian framework: a permanent ceasefire, arrangements regarding Hormuz in exchange for lifting the naval blockade, immediate economic benefits, and postponement of nuclear negotiations to a later stage.

D. Undertake the significant risks associated with military operations, including ground operations, designed to deprive Iran, even partially, of its key leverage assets: control over Hormuz and its stockpile of fissile material.

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

@HamzehKarkhi Well said @HamzehKarkhi

[Hamzeh Hadad | حمزة حداد @HamzehKarkhi]

Except the other half of the story that Trita is conveniently leaving out is the one where Iran worked to keep post-Saddam Iraq weak & fractured as well. Just as there is American presence, there is malign Iranian interference, so each side has to live with the consequences.

[Congressman Brendan Boyle @RepBrendanBoyle]

Wrong. The single most significant event since Christ has been the American Revolution. We are by no means a perfect country. But the ideals set forth in the Declaration of Independence were radical for their time and still are today.

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

Reupping my post from last summer on War Powers amidst the 60 day clock on Operation Epic Fury. I had a front row seat to war powers votes for 14 years as a congressional lawyer. I am not surprised Congress will not act.

[Daniel Silverberg @DSilverbergDC]

I am getting lots of questions about what Congress will do re: Iran. See my analysis here in @thehill https://t.co/Ld1wt2dCdu