Delwin | Military Theorist

Military Strategy & History | Decoding Global Strategies & Past Campaigns| Data-driven Insights 🌍 | #MilitaryStrategy #MilitaryHistory #Geopolitics

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

My latest article « The trap of rational ruin » published in La Vigie.
Many thanks to @egea_blog.

In depth analysis of Ukraine’s economic prospects post-war and why can the continuation of war remain rational without offering any real strategic outcome?

#Strategy #UkraineRussiaWar #Economy

#Ukraine : Le piège du choix rationnel (Delwin) https://t.co/bfvvHD8n71

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

Absolutely. As I wrote in my latest analysis:
«  I want to make clear that what follows is not a criticism of DeepState, which is following perfectly normal instructions from the Ministry of Defence with regard to operational security. It is not DeepState’s responsibility if analysts and observers fail to make their own assessment of the situation or to use their judgement by cross-checking multiple sources in order to describe the reality on the ground. »
The move made sense from a general staff perspective.

Overall the issue is the double standard for grey zone:
- 3 Ukrainian soldiers enter tolstoi, 46km2 of control is removed.
- Russians have 30+ geolocations west of Huliailpole over a fortnight and nothing is in grey zone.
That says it all.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

DS openly admitted 3 weeks ago that they only update what the MoD authorises them to…. End of story.
Nothing more to say about context.

For the rest, they completely ignored russian progress in May to serve the « they do not advance » narrative.
The -46km2 from a ghost counter attack around Zelenyi hai (still no footage by the way… not one), which on that day brought the russian total for the month to exactly 0 was… how to say… just a coincidence?

They are useful as a baseline source, but not as a base to produce any military analysis that makes sense.

With you on this one.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

I will make the exact calculations tomorrow so everyone can grasp what refined products really represent in the mix and what impact is caused by the strikes.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

As I have been saying, the share of total oil and mineral resources export revenue from refined products, the only decreasing production from strikes on refineries, is limited.

The 10% decline in April versus the past 5-year average is not only anecdotal but completely offset by rising prices, even with the strong ruble. Crude oil, the main revenue source, are up YoY.

The deep strike campaign against Russia’s oil infrastructure is impressive but shows very underwhelming results with regard to its objective, which is to threaten Russia’s ability to self-fund the war, Moscow’s main strategic center of gravity.

[Bloomberg @business]

Russia’s crude exports in the first five months of this year are setting new post-Ukraine-invasion highs, helping Moscow reap maximum rewards from the war in Iran, writes @JLeeEnergy https://t.co/Jr6yAGGS1h

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

@M0nstas This is multi factor, but last winter interception rate war higher. So one parameter degrading further is worrying

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

Seems like air defense performance was at its lowest in a while. Interceptor stocks are definitely insufficient

[AMK Mapping 🇳🇿 @AMK_Mapping_]

Last night and this morning, another large-scale, combined Russian missile and drone attack was carried out on Ukraine.

Missiles launched:

~18 Kh-101 cruise missiles launched from 3 Tu-160M strategic bombers at their launch lines over western Vologda Oblast.

~12 Kh-101 cruise missiles launched from 3 Tu-95MS strategic bombers at their launch lines over western Vologda Oblast.

~11 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles launched from OTRK installations in Kursk Oblast.

~10 Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles launched from ground-based installations near Manturovo, Kursk Oblast.

~6 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles launched from OTRK installations southeast of Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast.

~6 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles launched from OTRK installations near Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.

~6 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles launched from OTRK installations in Crimea.

~5 Kalibr cruise missiles launched from 2 Buyan-M corvettes near Kaspiysk Naval Base, Caspian Sea.

~4 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles launched from OTRK installations northwest of Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast.

~4 Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles launched from ground-based installations in western Crimea.

~2 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles launched from OTRK installation(s) near Bryansk City, Bryansk Oblast.

~2 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles launched from OTRK installation(s) near Liski, Voronezh Oblast.

~2 Iskander-K cruise missiles launched from OTRK installation(s) in Kursk Oblast.

-----------------------

Total missiles launched:

~37 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles
~30 Kh-101 cruise missiles
~14 Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles
~5 Kalibr cruise missiles
~2 Iskander-K cruise missiles

~88 missiles in total.

-----------------------
Ukrainian air defence work:

As of the time of writing, it appears that Ukrainian air defence was able to intercept at least 10 Kh-101s, 5 Iskander-M/S-400s, and 2 Kalibrs,

-----------------------
The main targets for this strike was Ukrainian defence industries in Kyiv. The following was targeted:

- Territorial recruitment centre No. 8041 in Kyiv (50.44350,30.36598).

- Ukroboronprom Defence Plant in Kyiv (50.4633173, 30.4631062).

- A car dealership next to the Kyiv River Freight Port (50.473330, 30.518393).

- A gas processing facility near the village of Krasna Luka, Poltava Oblast (50.422394, 33.949743).

- The "Omega-Auto deliver" car accessories store in the town of Vasyshcheve, Kharkiv Oblast (49.857566, 36.3079897).

- The Shebelinsky Gas Processing Plant in the town of Andriivka, Kharkiv Oblast (49.554433, 36.630076).

- The Motor Sich Plant in Zaporizhzhia City (47.828547, 35.1936918).

- The "Zaporozhtransformator" power transformer plant in Zaporizhzhia City (47.82823, 35.007460).

- The YUMZ trolleybus depot in Dnipro City (48.4271237, 34.997514).

- The Darnytskyi Concrete Factory in Kyiv (50.4290425, 30.6787159).

- The Automobile workshop of the Mayak Defence Plant in Kyiv (50.486409, 30.505953).

- Nova Poshta Warehouse No. 17 in Kyiv (50.487814, 30.482243).

- The Vasylkivska Street Industrial Area in Kyiv (50.395521, 30.489166).

- A garage cooperative on the outskirts of Kyiv (50.412729, 30.358611).

- Warehouses of the Vyshneve Logistics Centre on the outskirts of Kyiv (50.383982, 30.335754).

- Unknown target east of Chernihiv City.

- Unknown target east of Dnipro City.

In addition to this, Tornado-S rockets attacked targets in Balakliya (Kharkiv Oblast), Kharkiv City, and Zaporizhhzia City, while Banderol jet drones took part in the attack with Gerans. Also, a portion of the ballistic missiles used (and intercepted) were S-400 decoy missiles aimed at wasting Ukrainian interceptors.

-----------------------
Keep in mind, the numbers of missiles launched may be slightly higher than what I've listed, as the number of missiles detected is sometimes lower than actual launches.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

@M0nstas No they have not. They could not bring down the 700kV ring in the western side. If they do…

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

@M0nstas Main worry is that by winter the electricity grid will be in a critical state. And a winter campaign with 90% hit rate…

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

La realpolitik

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

Plusieurs détails manquants à souligner dans cet article.
Le titre se concentre sur la part des minorités dans les pertes, en se basant sur la donnée Mediazona par région. S’il est correct de pointer la surreprésentation des régions pauvres de la Russie, il est incorrect d’en déduire une surreprésentation des minorités ethniques spécifiquement, puisque par exemple en Bouriatie, les Bouriates ne représentent que ~30% de la population totale.
Il est dommage que ceci ne soit pas précisé dans le contenu.

« 25 fois plus de risques de mourir au combat que les Moscovites » : la Russie de Vladimir Poutine sacrifie-t-elle ses minorités en Ukraine ?

https://t.co/lJPsRobcbf

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

FPV strikes on HV/MV transformers have increased recently. Even with cruise missiles, it is not easy to precisely target this type of equipment. It seems the Russian forces have decided to use smaller drone systems to disable the entire transmission and distribution grid within 40 km of the frontline. This allows them to target substations in large cities like Sumy and Zaporijia, as well as Kramatorsk/Sloviansk, making residents and defenders reliant on diesel generators and significantly raising costs and logistics needs.

With the decrease in interceptor stocks, next winter could create an extremely difficult power supply situation.

[Thorkill @Thorkill65]

Podsumowanie maja 2026 r. wojny ukr-rus.

W maju 2026 r. według wyliczeń ukr grupy analitycznej Deep State (wykres nr.1 poniżej), ukr utracili zaledwie 14 km kw swojego terytorium. Oznacza to spadek dynamiki zajmowania terenów przez rus w stosunku do kwietnia (141 km kw) o ponad 90 proc.

"Kacapy całkowicie zawaliły maj - najgorszy przyrost okupowanego terytorium począwszy od października 2023 roku, kiedy to wróg rozpoczął strategiczną operację ofensywną na większości odcinków frontu." napisali w poście. Według danych DS rus w maju zwiększyli działania szturmowe o 37,5 proc. w stosunku do kwietnia lecz nie przyniosło to żadnych sukcesów.

Źródło: https://t.co/6nPgkq9arP

Jak zwykle dane i analizy DS porównuje z zestawieniami rus konta tg Creamy_caprice (wykres nr. 2). Według jego wyliczeń rus wojska w maju 2026 r. zdobyły 209 km kw. Był to spadek dynamiki ich zdobyczy terenowych w stosunku do kwietnia (329 km kw) o 36 proc. Według wyliczeń CC najwięcej zdobyczy terenowych rus osiągnęli na kierunku hulajpolskim (55 km kw), sumskim (54 km kw) i dniepropietrowskim (33 km kw). Jednocześnie odnotował ukr zdobycze w ramach ukr kontrofensywy w rejonie Stepnogorska i zmniejszył na tym kierunku stan posiadania rus o 2 km kw.

Źródło: https://t.co/cBqIgQxyvm

Wnioski.

Dane i wyliczenia DS odnośnie zdobyczy terenowych rus w maju noszą znamiona manipulacji. Parafrazując tekst z pewnej znanej serii memów: "jeżeli przestaniesz robić aktualizacje mapy, zatrzymasz letnią ofensywę rus". Tak właśnie postąpiono. Analitycy DS praktycznie przestali aktualizować mapę częściej niż raz na trzy-cztery dni. A gdy to robili to zmiany były z reguły kosmetyczne.

Jedyny wyjątek jaki pamiętam to sytuacja z okolic połowy maja 2026 r., gdy na skutek apelu ukr oficera prasowego 7 Korpusu VDV o wycofanie jego oddziałów spod Pokrowska, analitycy DS przypomnieli sobie że u nich na mapce bitwa o Aglomerację Pokrowską wciąż trwa. Zamalowali więc szybko ostatnie budynki w Pokrowsku i w ten sposób oficjalnie "zakończyli" w maju 2026 Bitwę pod Pokrowskiem. Niejasny jest też status tzw. kontrofensywy ukr na łuku rz. Wowcza w rejonie Iskry, która również posłużyła do zbicia wyniku. Rus źródła twierdzą że jest ona wymyślona. Generalnie na razie opublikowano z niej jeden film z trzema ukr żołnierzami.

Odkładając jednak na bok kontrowersje związane z wyliczeniami DS, warto zauważyć że postępy rus armii według danych CC (209 km kw) także można określić jako rozczarowujące. W maju ubiegłego roku rus ofensywa letnia była już w pełni rozkręcona i zdobyli oni wówczas 550 km według danych CC. Rus armia w tym roku wygląda na dużo słabszą niż w ubiegłym, zarówno pod względem strukturalnym, liczebnym i pewnie także pod względem morale. Wygląda że tegoroczna rus ofensywa letnia będzie znacznie ograniczona w skali w porównaniu do 2025 i skupi się głównie na kierunku konstantynowskim i słowiańskim.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

What matters are export volumes because the center of gravity is self financing capability.
Crude exports (main revenue source) are up y-o-y vs 2025.
Refined products exports are down by a small margin, but the curve for production here is misleading. It makes it look like it is close to the horizontal axis (or 0 level) when it is down by ~10% vs the average of past 5 years. Needless to say that in % of total oil revenue, and even more of total mineral resources exports revenues, this is anecdotal.
So yes, the deep strike campaign is impressive but is it effective, does it have strategic effect? The answer is unfortunately no. (For the time being)

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

@Hugothebos1 Evidemment. Les conscrits Ukrainiens ne sont pas les CSP+
L’article se fourvoie complètement. Mais parler des minorités russes fait le buzz

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

Plusieurs détails manquants à souligner dans cet article.
Le titre se concentre sur la part des minorités dans les pertes, en se basant sur la donnée Mediazona par région. S’il est correct de pointer la surreprésentation des régions pauvres de la Russie, il est incorrect d’en déduire une surreprésentation des minorités ethniques spécifiquement, puisque par exemple en Bouriatie, les Bouriates ne représentent que ~30% de la population totale.
Il est dommage que ceci ne soit pas précisé dans le contenu.

« 25 fois plus de risques de mourir au combat que les Moscovites » : la Russie de Vladimir Poutine sacrifie-t-elle ses minorités en Ukraine ?

https://t.co/lJPsRobcbf

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

FPV strikes on HV/MV transformers have increased recently. Even with cruise missiles, it is not easy to precisely target this type of equipment. It seems the Russian forces have decided to use smaller drone systems to disable the entire transmission and distribution grid within 40 km of the frontline. This allows them to target substations in large cities like Sumy and Zaporijia, as well as Kramatorsk/Sloviansk, making residents and defenders reliant on diesel generators and significantly raising costs and logistics needs.

With the decrease in interceptor stocks, next winter could create an extremely difficult power supply situation.

[Heyman_101 @SU_57R]

🇷🇺🇺🇦 A Russian FPV drone struck another local Ukrainian substation, this time in the Zaporozhye region.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

I keep looking for signs of armored unit training and concentration around Sumy and other northern oblasts.

Russia has about 20,000 reactivated armored vehicles in storage, not deployed or used in Ukraine.

So far we have no signs of any new units being constituted, so this remains very hypothetical. The most likely option is that they are stored for future strategic reserves. However, a small chance remains that some new heavy mechanized units are being formed and trained with more anti-drone tactics to attempt a serious offensive.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

La realpolitik

[Ananke Group @AnankeGroup]

De nombreuses entreprises allemandes maintiennent une présence en Russie, malgré les sanctions.

Certaines ont confirmé leur présence au forum économique de Saint Petersbourg.
Une première depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine.
https://t.co/UnhXiKjMun

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

Very interesting analysis. As I said, the deep strike campaign's impact and efficiency differ from what many believed. Drone payloads are (for now) insufficient to cause lasting damage to oil infrastructure, as we see in crude volumes still increasing and refined products ones dropping but not significantly.
More interesting is the fact successful strike volumes stagnated in 2026 vs 2025.

The asymmetry of damages is real between both sides, a fact that needs to be accounted for in analysis.

One point requiring debate is the inferred claim of depleted Russian air defense because strike range increased. There are many other reasons this would happen, not tied to any AD issues per se: lower density beyond 400km, changes of intended targets, AD strategy to intervene in the later flight phase, etc.
Moreover it seems drone volumes increased but hits stagnated, pointing on the contrary to more efficient russian air defense. To be confirmed over time.

[UkraineDailyUpdate @UkraineDailyUpd]

Kostyantynivka.

Summary: Recent videos confirm additional Russian infiltrations in the northern part of the city, while Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in the south.

Geolocated footage from southern Kostyantynivka shows Ukrainian soldiers under fire, consistent with reports from both Russian and Ukrainian sources that Russian forces are infiltrating via the western flank at Illinivka.
Recent footage confirms Ukrainians still hold a presence in Illinivka while Russian forces have taken control of Berestok.

Notably, some Russian channels, such as creamy_caprice, are labeling large areas as “under full Russian control”, overlooking Ukrainian positions in the south and the fact that Russian infiltrations are coming from the west, and not (!) the south.

Kostyantynivka is divided into two parts, separated by a river and partially demolished industrial facilities, which hinders movement between them. Russian soldiers have been repeatedly observed along the main access road to the western section, which could complicate Ukrainian withdrawals from the southern part of the western area, as they no longer have a supply and rotation route through Ukrainian-held territory. Troop movements now require passage through contested zones.

Similar, albeit smaller-scale, developments are observed in the eastern part of the city. In isolated cases, Russian soldiers penetrated deep into Ukrainian-held territory and have even been spotted once in the high-rise district. However, the primary incursion appears to be in the western part of the city.

The origins of the current situation remain unclear. The loss of a relatively stable line of contact is reminiscent of the battles for Toretsk in early 2025 and Pokrovsk in mid-2025. If this pattern continues, the battle for Kostyantynivka may last several more months. There are currently no indicators that the city will fall into Russian hands anytime soon.

We will continue to monitor the situation and have just updated the map!
https://t.co/Lea4mSCHv8