Douglas Chan

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@DefiantLs I don't even know what cis is..

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@DipanshuKu55175 send

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

"To be able to open the straits of Hormuz , you must close it yourself"

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@Gandalf_da_Grey @DrJStrategy what a sad delusional person 😔 can't even put one argument together on how's he's a moron

[James E. Thorne @DrJStrategy]

Food for thought.

Trump, Hormuz and the End of the Free Ride

For half a century, Western strategists have known that the Strait of Hormuz is the acute point where energy, sea power and political will intersect. That knowledge is not in dispute. What is new in this war with Iran is that the United States, under Donald Trump, has chosen not to rush to “solve” the problem. In Hegelian terms, he is refusing an easy synthesis in order to force the underlying contradiction to the surface.

The old thesis was simple: the US guarantees open sea lanes in the Gulf, and everyone else structures their economies and politics around that free insurance. Europe and the UK embraced ambitious green policies, ran down hard‑power capabilities and lectured Washington on multilateral virtue, secure in the assumption that American carriers would always appear off Hormuz. The political class behaved as if the American security guarantee were a law of nature, not a contingent choice. Their conduct today is closer to Chamberlain than Churchill: temporising, issuing statements, hoping the storm will pass without a fundamental reordering of their responsibilities.

Trump’s antithesis is to withhold the automatic guarantee at the moment of maximum stress. Militarily, the US can break Iran’s residual ability to contest the Strait; that is not the binding constraint. The point is to delay that act. By allowing a closure or semi‑closure to bite, Trump ensures that the immediate pain is concentrated in exactly the jurisdictions that have most conspicuously free‑ridden on US power: the EU and the UK. Their industries, consumers and energy‑transition assumptions are exposed.

In that context, his reported blunt message to European and British leaders, you need the oil out of the Strait more than we do; why don’t you go and take it? Is not a throwaway line. It is the verbalisation of the antithesis. It openly reverses the traditional presumption that America will carry the burden while its allies emote from the sidelines.

In this dialectic, the prize is not simply the reopening of a chokepoint. The prize is a reordered system in which the United States effectively arbitrages and controls the global flow of oil. A world in which US‑aligned production in the Americas plus a discretionary capability to secure,or not secure, Hormuz places Washington at the centre of the hydrocarbon chessboard. For that strategic end, a rapid restoration of the old status quo would be counterproductive.

A quick, surgical “fix” of Hormuz would short‑circuit the dialectic. If Trump rapidly crushed Iran’s remaining coastal capabilities, swept the mines and escorted tankers back through the Strait, Europe and the UK would heave a sigh of relief and return to business as usual: underfunded militaries, maximalist green posturing and performative disdain for US power, all underwritten by that same power. The contradiction between their dependence and their posture would remain latent.

By declining to supply the synthesis on demand, and by explicitly telling London and Brussels to “go and take it” themselves, Trump forces a reckoning. European and British leaders must confront the fact that their energy systems, their industrial bases and their geopolitical sermons all rest on an American hard‑power foundation they neither finance nor politically respect. The longer the contradiction is allowed to unfold, the stronger the eventual synthesis can be: a new order in which access to secure flows, Hormuz, Venezuela and beyond, is explicitly conditional on real contributions, not assumed as a right.

In that sense, the delay in “taking” the Strait, and the challenge issued to US allies to do it themselves, is not indecision. It is the negative moment Hegel insisted was necessary for history to move. Only by withholding the old guarantee, and by saying so out loud to those who depended on it, can Trump hope to end the free ride.

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@Acyn Me: Farking hilarious.

Left: Trump strains diplomatic ties with Allies by invoking WW2 atrocities.

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@Alexcoderzx Claude

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@EshaAA33 should go for the balls.

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@BernieSanders having the audacity to post some weak sht is laughable

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@akafaceUS as a Trump supporter I think it's actually quite a fair message...

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

isn't what US exactly doing what China says it will do? Supply side reform.... prick bubbles, get banks to lend to Main street, increase tech for margins to bog down inflation, no spec on property....

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@alex_prompter Grok

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@SkyNews Trump doesn't give a sht about attitude, just actions

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@elonmusk Classic example of speaking in English Accent doesn't make u sound smarter

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@SenSanders that's a very strong statement I'm sure the Iran government will listen.

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@alex_prompter 🙏🏻 thanksssssss

[FlexFusion @FlexFusion_]

Six years in the gym taught me some brutal truths about fitness:

1. Eat all the damn fruits you want.- It’s almost impossible to overeat it.

[Peter Girnus 🦅 @gothburz]

The company hired me to lead their "Agile Transformation."
I don't know what Agile means.
Nobody does.
That's why it works.

I make $425,000 a year.
To move sticky notes.
From left to right.
On a board.
The board is digital now.
The sticky notes cost $80,000 in Jira licenses.
Progress.

Day one, I said "we need to break down silos."
Everyone nodded.
Silos are bad.
I don't know why.
But destroying them is a career.
My career.

I introduced "squads."
Squads are teams.
But disrupted.
We disrupted the teams into teams.
Different names.
Same people.
Same problems.
But Agile problems now.
Agile problems are strategic.

A senior engineer asked what we're actually changing.
I said, "The mindset."
He asked what that means.
I said, "It's a journey."
He asked where we're going.
I said, "Toward agility."
He asked what agility means.
I pointed at the sticky notes.
They were moving left to right.
That's velocity.
We have velocity now.

The VP of Engineering said two-week sprints don't fit their work.
I said, "That's waterfall thinking."
Waterfall is bad.
Like silos.
I don't know what waterfall is.
But I know it's bad.
She stopped talking.
Waterfall accusations end conversations.

We had a retrospective.
In the retro, we discussed what went wrong.
Everything went wrong.
We put it on sticky notes.
Then we moved the sticky notes.
Into a column called "Parking Lot."
The Parking Lot is where problems go to die.
It's full.
We don't look at it.
That's agile.

Velocity is up 40%.
I defined velocity.
I also defined the points.
I also defined the stories.
We're crushing it.
At the things I made up.
To measure.
Ourselves.

The CEO asked for ROI.
I showed a chart.
The chart went up.
Charts should go up.
This one did.
I didn't label the Y-axis.
Nobody asked.
Leadership is confidence.

We do standups now.
Every day.
We stand.
For 45 minutes.
Standing is agile.
Sitting is waterfall.
My legs hurt.
But we're transforming.

The transformation is now "Phase 3."
Phase 1 was assessment.
Phase 2 was implementation.
Phase 3 is "continuous improvement."
Continuous means forever.
Forever means job security.
I'm very secure.

My contract was extended.
Three more years.
For "cultural impact."
The culture is confused.
But impacted.

Agile transformation isn't about being agile.
It's about transforming.
Continuously.
Toward more transformation.
The destination is the journey.
The journey is billable.

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@DrRitaDed God bless you!

[Douglas Chan @DougieBigBo]

@bennyjohnson I hear a lot of statements but not a lot of examples