@KofmanMichael Musk is no different from a politician in this regard: facts don’t matter, and fabricated or manipulated data is used to provide a veneer of legitimacy for whatever vile thing he’s cooking up. Who cares about the facts as long as he can sway public opinion in his favor?
@KrahMax@donaldtusk In what year was NATO founded? 1949. When was Warsaw Pact formed? 1955. That remark of yours is just so incompetent. I guess it is you who should answer your last question: do you realuze the nonsense of your post? Poor German voters... they don't know who represents them.
@jakluge There is an important detail that seems to be unaccounted for: Trump can always say that it was Zelenski, who violated the ceasefire - it won't be his first time, as according to him it was Zelensky who started the war. To Trump, this is a personal ego exercise, to be done once.
@RomanKalisz1@carlbildt You are wrong. You would have made sense, though, if it was Ukraine to invade Russia, and not the other way around. But I guess you know that and just trying to troll @carlbildt.
@meistefan1 Stefan, it's based on minimum two factors: 1.expectation of Ru troops reconstitution speed (realistic, ceterisparibus);2. Ru optimal strategy of upping the ante on Ukr (credible, given Ru sees an irresolute West, based on mil.assist to Ukr; Ru looks for new leverage vs the West)
@carlbildt 2Consider the attack against Israel in 10.2023 as a declaration of war - one does it when believing to be prepared, and the spillover is the continuation, like a different battle, but with the same belligerents. Wars end when one side cannot continue fighting. Same as in Ukraine
@carlbildt 1Mr Buildt, not sure why you believe "closing down the Gaza war", will lead to de-escalation. It will not: 1.the preference of local powers is to fight, they think differently than you 2.they have the capability to escalate. It will lead to more violence when they see weakness.
@meistefan1 Didn't Putin demand that NATO retreats to its 1997 borders, just shortly before invading Ukraine? Analitically, this would imply Putin's ambitions/strategic designs do not stop on Ukraine. They start there. You only examine capabilities, not the intent - an incomplete analysis.
@KofmanMichael There is uncertainty and inductive judgement in the study of any social puzzle, not only of war. Errors are natural in this exercise - they are the roads leading to a more accurate understanding, as new info updates old beliefs. Making errors is useful in knowledge creation.
@TonyvanderTogt@NielsvanderTogt Some wishful thinking, mixed with an incomplete understanding of the conflict mechanism. Russia is always part of negotiations process, as long as it has the military/security tools in the region to make Tiraspol operate as its local political proxy. It participates by proxy.
Here is where Kissinger was wrong. The impact of time/history on states is less prevalent than that of 'space', since time effect is nothing more than the continuous & slow accumulation of space effects. That's why Kissinger also got Russia wrong before its 2022 Ukraine invasion.
”No significant conclusions are possible in the study of foreign affairs - the study of states acting as units - without an awareness of the historical context. For societies exist in time more than in space.” HK in “A World Restored” 1957
'Only by losing Crimea’s full military functionality will Russian planners be disabused of their idea that the peninsula is critical for Russia’s wider Black Sea strategy', writes Dr @DumitruMnz in the latest #RUSINewsbrief.
https://t.co/7hPdRzyRyW
From a public policy perspective, the policy advice below is not helpful. Assisting UA in rebuilding its defence industry now is not sustainable. Any installation would immediately become a target of RU strikes: to disrupt production & discredit Western help.
To arm #Ukraine for the long war, Europe and the United States should support the development of the country’s military industry to reduce its reliance on Western weapons, write @ritaylor_ & @Krivosheev_Dima ⬇️
https://t.co/fshbtju3sv
@GresselGustav Not really. 1st, it's analytically wrong to draw conclusions based solely on current dynamics in Ukraine. 2nd, the drone argument is awfully weak.
#KCIS2023 | Later on in the second panel, @DumitruMnz explains that the effect of scale enables the rapid proliferation of ideas, regardless of their accuracy, or lack thereof. Thus, modern warfare must be understood with its #human, #geopolitical, and also #cyber repercussions.
@jakluge How naive of him. I am rather surprised that Western researchers continue to believe that their contacts in Russian official circles reveal accurate information to them. A faulted research design and a sourse of disinformation, likely run under FSB supervision.
@jakluge This can guide our evaluations of Russia only if we can trust the data published by Russian institutions. Can we trust it, though, under the current war of resolve between Russia and the West? I don't think so.