Dutch Renitent

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

Also bought a book today by @MelanieLatest at Pomeranz Bookseller in Jerusalem. Looking forward to reading it.

The Builder’s Stone: How Jews and Christians Built the West—and Why Only They Can Save It

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@ShleppingN @IzaTabaro @JohnMirisch @sfrantzman No reason for @sfrantzman to defend nazism.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@govertvanbrakel @DalesGeert63675 Wellicht herinner ik het me verkeerd en ging het om zijn opa:

[Teun van Gelder @TeunvanGelder11]

Ik heb mijn tweet over Paul de Leeuw nog eens bekeken ,ik zeg dat hij er niets aan kan doen dat zijn opa NSB er was ,de sneer dat het misschien in zijn genen zou kunnen zitten om niet te deugen ,was niet zo netjes maar ik neem het niet terug ,ik mag het denken toch ?

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@govertvanbrakel @DalesGeert63675 Ischa Meijer vertelde dat hij merkte dat Paul de Leeuw zich ongemakkelijk bij hem voelde en toen hij daarop ging doorvragen kwam de aap uit de mouw. Jaren 90 op tv gezien. Misschien in interview met Theo van Gogh.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@ThieuVisser @geenstijl Ischa Meijer vertelde dat hij merkte dat Paul de Leeuw zich ongemakkelijk bij hem voelde en toen hij daarop ging doorvragen kwam de aap uit de mouw. Jaren 90 op tv gezien. Misschien in interview met Theo van Gogh.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@ThieuVisser @geenstijl Ischa Meijer heeft eens verteld dat Paul de Leeuw hem had toevertrouwd dat zijn vader een NSB’er was.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@mdubowitz Is Mojtaba running things in Iran? Here I read Ahmad Vahidi and former IRGC chief Mohammad Ali Jafari. are:

[Kasra Aarabi @KasraAarabi]

The West is ignoring a dangerous alliance reshaping Iran’s regime.

Dr Golkar and I reveal how Ahmad Vahidi has joined forces with former IRGC chief Mohammad Ali Jafari.

The consequences of the Vahidi-Jafari alliance will be deadly inside Iran and beyond👇https://t.co/tUG10bcAUE

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@RonnyNaftaniel En Halsema komt nu ook met de leugen er geen bewijs is dat moslims verantwoordelijk waren voor de Jodenjacht en wil de coalitie Israël aanpakken. Wanneer wordt er voor het stadhuis van Amsterdam tegen Halsema & co gedemonstreerd? cc @CIDI_nieuws @RemcoYizhakCoor @KerenHirsch

[Keren Hirsch @KerenHirsch]

Toch gek, ik dacht dat Amsterdam 2500 fte gaat bezuinigen.

Maar lees ik nu dat de er ‘beleidscapaciteit’ vrijgemaakt moet worden om Israël aan te pakken vanuit Amsterdam.

Beleidscapaciteit die anders naar beleid voor de Amsterdam zou gaan. Schimmelwoningen misschien?

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@HFaber56 @P0eMPieDinges En wel wat serieuzere straffen dan de fopstraffen in Nederland. Begrijp het nooit wanneer @SaskiaBelleman zegt dat in Nederland wel zwaar gestraft wordt.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@AmitSegal Your timeline leaves out the fact that the day before the IDF’s strike in Dahieh the U.S. warned its citizens in Israel. They knew Iran was up to something. Dahieh was not the reason for Iran to attack:

[Lillian H. Mueller @lill_the_swiss]

An interesting assessment by @BittonRosen :

Do not buy into the Iranian attempt to create a false equivalence, suggesting that tonight’s attack on the north of Israel is merely a response to the IDF’s minor strike in Dahieh.
Since the conclusion of Operation Lion’s Roar, Israel has eliminated two senior terrorists in Dahieh — the commander of the Radwan Force and the head of the missile array in an Iranian terrorist militia.
The terrorist regime decided in recent days to launch an attack on Israel and simply sought the most readily available pretext.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@lill_the_swiss @BittonRosen And a day before the IDF’s strike in Dahieh the U.S. warned its citizens in Israel. They knew Iran was up to something.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@wierdduk @Coen_2018 @Esther_Voet @CJO_NL Halsema vanaf 17 minuten: https://t.co/xz1AAhxs5z

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@wierdduk @Coen_2018 @Esther_Voet Dit zou vroeg of laat gebeuren.
Het @CJO_NL had zelf al lang geleden moeten breken met Halsema.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@GeraldNGOM @AmitSegal No, it’s different:

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

There is no credible pathway to a structurally viable diplomatic resolution that doesn’t leave the US exposed. Trump has signaled awareness of this. So has the Pentagon in articulating ‘the simultaneity problem’ in the NDS. The regime is unlikely to survive this US presidency on those core US interests, but shaping the theater of operations is a tactical constraint.

Washington wants an interim deal to stabilize the theater and global energy markets by evacuating the hundreds of vessels that remain trapped inside the Gulf. US forces have been quietly assisting dozens of non-Iranian ships to navigate Hormuz with transponders turned off, providing sensing and combat air patrol support.

Reducing the number of vulnerable targets inside the theater of operations preserves air defensive capacity for critical infrastructure sites along the roughly thousand mile littoral stretching from the northern tip of the Gulf to the southern Omani coastline.

Renewed US-Israel combined operations come with renewed exposure to Iranian retaliation against ports, terminals, refineries and the roughly 400 desalination plants along the Gulf, and notably the UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant which Iranian backed militias in Iraq have already targeted with drones.

Concurrently, Israel is facing northern flanking pressure from Hezbollah which dilutes force availability in a renewed air operation against Iran. The Israeli Dahieh strike today tested Iranian resolve and the IRGC Aerospace Forces responded to deny clearance of that flanking pressure while continuing to hold commercial vessels hostage in the Gulf.

A second phase of the US-Israel kinetic campaign will cost the IRGC dearly and they know it—they likely lose the island chains as coalition forces push to establish seaward based weapons engagement zones to secure an SoH corridor, and their strategic missile sites are likely to be isolated, limiting them to onsite diesel reserves which provide roughly 5-20 day supply depending on size.

The Iranians, facing an economic cliff due to the blockade and desperate for a deal, are operating to deny the US and Israel favorable conditions for renewing combat operations while manufacturing leverage through escalations and threats.

For the US and Israel the situation may not yet present the right timing or requisite theater conditions for relaunching a second phase of combined operations.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@netanyahu @TranslateMom English

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@ErnstLissauer Inderdaad. Zie ook dit:

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

There is no credible pathway to a structurally viable diplomatic resolution that doesn’t leave the US exposed. Trump has signaled awareness of this. So has the Pentagon in articulating ‘the simultaneity problem’ in the NDS. The regime is unlikely to survive this US presidency on those core US interests, but shaping the theater of operations is a tactical constraint.

Washington wants an interim deal to stabilize the theater and global energy markets by evacuating the hundreds of vessels that remain trapped inside the Gulf. US forces have been quietly assisting dozens of non-Iranian ships to navigate Hormuz with transponders turned off, providing sensing and combat air patrol support.

Reducing the number of vulnerable targets inside the theater of operations preserves air defensive capacity for critical infrastructure sites along the roughly thousand mile littoral stretching from the northern tip of the Gulf to the southern Omani coastline.

Renewed US-Israel combined operations come with renewed exposure to Iranian retaliation against ports, terminals, refineries and the roughly 400 desalination plants along the Gulf, and notably the UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant which Iranian backed militias in Iraq have already targeted with drones.

Concurrently, Israel is facing northern flanking pressure from Hezbollah which dilutes force availability in a renewed air operation against Iran. The Israeli Dahieh strike today tested Iranian resolve and the IRGC Aerospace Forces responded to deny clearance of that flanking pressure while continuing to hold commercial vessels hostage in the Gulf.

A second phase of the US-Israel kinetic campaign will cost the IRGC dearly and they know it—they likely lose the island chains as coalition forces push to establish seaward based weapons engagement zones to secure an SoH corridor, and their strategic missile sites are likely to be isolated, limiting them to onsite diesel reserves which provide roughly 5-20 day supply depending on size.

The Iranians, facing an economic cliff due to the blockade and desperate for a deal, are operating to deny the US and Israel favorable conditions for renewing combat operations while manufacturing leverage through escalations and threats.

For the US and Israel the situation may not yet present the right timing or requisite theater conditions for relaunching a second phase of combined operations.

[卄𝐎ù𝔰ε 𝐨𝔣 ℙｏє𝐌 _ @P0eMPieDinges]

The Netherlands also has its Henry Nowak cases.

In July 2020, 14-year-old Tamar from Marken was hit by a car on a dark dike road and left to die. Her body was later found in the berm.
What happened next is deeply disturbing.

The police initially told her mother that the driver was German. Days later the truth came out: it was four Iraqis in the car. The mother was told they withheld the real background because they didn’t want to create a "Wilders-effect" — they didn’t want to give Geert Wilders political ammunition.

Even worse: evidence strongly suggests Tamar’s body was moved after the accident. The driver didn’t just flee, they dragged her off the road and left her there like an animal.

The driver received only a €1,500 fine for looking at his phone while driving. He then disappeared completely. The fine was returned “undeliverable” and for years he was untraceable.

Only after years of fighting by the family (including going to court to force prosecution), a breakthrough came in March 2026: the now 33-year old Jamal is finally being prosecuted for causing the fatal accident and leaving the scene.

Just like Henry Nowak in Southampton — an innocent young person dies, authorities seem more focused on protecting a narrative and avoiding “political incorrectness” than on delivering swift justice.
A 14-year-old girl dies on a Dutch dike. The system lies about the identity of the driver, gives him a slap on the wrist, loses him for years, and only after massive pressure does real prosecution begin.

This is not just a traffic accident. This is a story about truth, accountability, and what happens when institutions put ideology before grieving families.

Her name was Tamar.
She was 14.
She deserved better.

♡

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@AmitSegal @Brian0732868494 This is a more convincing analysis:

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

There is no credible pathway to a structurally viable diplomatic resolution that doesn’t leave the US exposed. Trump has signaled awareness of this. So has the Pentagon in articulating ‘the simultaneity problem’ in the NDS. The regime is unlikely to survive this US presidency on those core US interests, but shaping the theater of operations is a tactical constraint.

Washington wants an interim deal to stabilize the theater and global energy markets by evacuating the hundreds of vessels that remain trapped inside the Gulf. US forces have been quietly assisting dozens of non-Iranian ships to navigate Hormuz with transponders turned off, providing sensing and combat air patrol support.

Reducing the number of vulnerable targets inside the theater of operations preserves air defensive capacity for critical infrastructure sites along the roughly thousand mile littoral stretching from the northern tip of the Gulf to the southern Omani coastline.

Renewed US-Israel combined operations come with renewed exposure to Iranian retaliation against ports, terminals, refineries and the roughly 400 desalination plants along the Gulf, and notably the UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant which Iranian backed militias in Iraq have already targeted with drones.

Concurrently, Israel is facing northern flanking pressure from Hezbollah which dilutes force availability in a renewed air operation against Iran. The Israeli Dahieh strike today tested Iranian resolve and the IRGC Aerospace Forces responded to deny clearance of that flanking pressure while continuing to hold commercial vessels hostage in the Gulf.

A second phase of the US-Israel kinetic campaign will cost the IRGC dearly and they know it—they likely lose the island chains as coalition forces push to establish seaward based weapons engagement zones to secure an SoH corridor, and their strategic missile sites are likely to be isolated, limiting them to onsite diesel reserves which provide roughly 5-20 day supply depending on size.

The Iranians, facing an economic cliff due to the blockade and desperate for a deal, are operating to deny the US and Israel favorable conditions for renewing combat operations while manufacturing leverage through escalations and threats.

For the US and Israel the situation may not yet present the right timing or requisite theater conditions for relaunching a second phase of combined operations.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@GeraldNGOM Trump doesn’t believe in the deal:

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

There is no credible pathway to a structurally viable diplomatic resolution that doesn’t leave the US exposed. Trump has signaled awareness of this. So has the Pentagon in articulating ‘the simultaneity problem’ in the NDS. The regime is unlikely to survive this US presidency on those core US interests, but shaping the theater of operations is a tactical constraint.

Washington wants an interim deal to stabilize the theater and global energy markets by evacuating the hundreds of vessels that remain trapped inside the Gulf. US forces have been quietly assisting dozens of non-Iranian ships to navigate Hormuz with transponders turned off, providing sensing and combat air patrol support.

Reducing the number of vulnerable targets inside the theater of operations preserves air defensive capacity for critical infrastructure sites along the roughly thousand mile littoral stretching from the northern tip of the Gulf to the southern Omani coastline.

Renewed US-Israel combined operations come with renewed exposure to Iranian retaliation against ports, terminals, refineries and the roughly 400 desalination plants along the Gulf, and notably the UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant which Iranian backed militias in Iraq have already targeted with drones.

Concurrently, Israel is facing northern flanking pressure from Hezbollah which dilutes force availability in a renewed air operation against Iran. The Israeli Dahieh strike today tested Iranian resolve and the IRGC Aerospace Forces responded to deny clearance of that flanking pressure while continuing to hold commercial vessels hostage in the Gulf.

A second phase of the US-Israel kinetic campaign will cost the IRGC dearly and they know it—they likely lose the island chains as coalition forces push to establish seaward based weapons engagement zones to secure an SoH corridor, and their strategic missile sites are likely to be isolated, limiting them to onsite diesel reserves which provide roughly 5-20 day supply depending on size.

The Iranians, facing an economic cliff due to the blockade and desperate for a deal, are operating to deny the US and Israel favorable conditions for renewing combat operations while manufacturing leverage through escalations and threats.

For the US and Israel the situation may not yet present the right timing or requisite theater conditions for relaunching a second phase of combined operations.

[Dutch Renitent @DutchRenitent]

@bpschut Er zit meer achter de strategie van Trump:

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

There is no credible pathway to a structurally viable diplomatic resolution that doesn’t leave the US exposed. Trump has signaled awareness of this. So has the Pentagon in articulating ‘the simultaneity problem’ in the NDS. The regime is unlikely to survive this US presidency on those core US interests, but shaping the theater of operations is a tactical constraint.

Washington wants an interim deal to stabilize the theater and global energy markets by evacuating the hundreds of vessels that remain trapped inside the Gulf. US forces have been quietly assisting dozens of non-Iranian ships to navigate Hormuz with transponders turned off, providing sensing and combat air patrol support.

Reducing the number of vulnerable targets inside the theater of operations preserves air defensive capacity for critical infrastructure sites along the roughly thousand mile littoral stretching from the northern tip of the Gulf to the southern Omani coastline.

Renewed US-Israel combined operations come with renewed exposure to Iranian retaliation against ports, terminals, refineries and the roughly 400 desalination plants along the Gulf, and notably the UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant which Iranian backed militias in Iraq have already targeted with drones.

Concurrently, Israel is facing northern flanking pressure from Hezbollah which dilutes force availability in a renewed air operation against Iran. The Israeli Dahieh strike today tested Iranian resolve and the IRGC Aerospace Forces responded to deny clearance of that flanking pressure while continuing to hold commercial vessels hostage in the Gulf.

A second phase of the US-Israel kinetic campaign will cost the IRGC dearly and they know it—they likely lose the island chains as coalition forces push to establish seaward based weapons engagement zones to secure an SoH corridor, and their strategic missile sites are likely to be isolated, limiting them to onsite diesel reserves which provide roughly 5-20 day supply depending on size.

The Iranians, facing an economic cliff due to the blockade and desperate for a deal, are operating to deny the US and Israel favorable conditions for renewing combat operations while manufacturing leverage through escalations and threats.

For the US and Israel the situation may not yet present the right timing or requisite theater conditions for relaunching a second phase of combined operations.