πΞ±
"Not hyperactivity but a hell of a lot of patience. You stuck to your principles and when opportunities came along, you pounced on them with vigor." -C.M.
$PGR πΌ10% because: the calendar. π€¦ββοΈ
"Net premiums written growth rate reflects that 1st day of July, which is historically a higher volume day, is included in fiscal Jul23, compared to fiscal Jun22."
Even so, combined ratio is worse y/y, & policies-in-force growth is unchanged
π―π΅ An horrible 20-year JGB auction today tailed the most since 1987, showing that investors require a higher yield to buy JGBs.
Rising JGB yields threaten bonds worldwide, so we see EU and US sovereign yields accelerating their rise this morning.
@saxobank@SaxoUK
And would someone check to see if $FDX investors are still breathing?
Even before the bond meltdown, FedEx's package volume was down below 2019-levels.
But $FDX stock hasn't yet looked down to see the thin air between it and $UPS (the better shipper).
https://t.co/OSyiMfcoNr
$FDX FedEx is not delivering a soft landing.
You need to go back 5 years to 2018 to find a May-ending quarter with fewer average packages, and volume is falling further.
@avgvalueinvest Thank you, one quibble: yes interest expense is so far lower this year, but BLDR is now paying 7% vs 3.7% interest on it's rapidly-growing revolving balance.
I can't dispute the rest.
@Nesjamag@avgvalueinvest "Invest in preparedness, not in prediction." -Taleb
I'm prepared for BLDR stock to be MUCH less valuable over the next couple of years, as the buyback machine gets gummed up by the accumulated debt.
@Nesjamag@avgvalueinvest The problem with that is their cash flow is drying up, and most recently they were paying 7% interest on the revolving funding of those buybacks.
https://t.co/x1rvpzsJuG
$BLDR Builders FirstSource:
Tell me business is deteriorating without telling me.
Last year BLDR was repaying their revolving credit facility, but this year they are drawing from it as cash flow is drying up. And this is *before* times get tougher for #homebuilders in recession.
@avgvalueinvest No sorry, BLDR overpaid >$2.5B for growth during the pandemic housing boom (overpaid measured by goodwill). This growth strategy can work during the good times, but inefficient bloat can rear its head in a downturn.
As the $ dries up, BLDR uses expensive debt for those buybacks.
$BLDR Builders FirstSource:
Tell me business is deteriorating without telling me.
Last year BLDR was repaying their revolving credit facility, but this year they are drawing from it as cash flow is drying up. And this is *before* times get tougher for #homebuilders in recession.
$BLDR Builders FirstSource:
Tell me business is deteriorating without telling me.
Last year BLDR was repaying their revolving credit facility, but this year they are drawing from it as cash flow is drying up. And this is *before* times get tougher for #homebuilders in recession.
@CoinCommoner @jfsrevg π You might get a fabulous BLDR entry opportunity in recession. Although there might not be any non-goodwill equity left then.
https://t.co/J4F5SrE2Hz
I'm watching for $BLDR Builders FirstSource to have zero stockholders' equity, excluding the $3.5B of goodwill they engorged in the boom.
BLDR loves to brag about their "fortress balance sheet."
$BLDR Builders FirstSource:
Tell me business is deteriorating without telling me.
Last year BLDR was repaying their revolving credit facility, but this year they are drawing from it as cash flow is drying up. And this is *before* times get tougher for #homebuilders in recession.
Negative-equity $OTIS announces refinancing $500M 0% notes w/ $750M 5%.
Otis would rather carry debt and pay all profits via divs & buybacks. As long as profits hold up this is fine, but w/o profits the book is less than worthless, & even a decline would lift the already-high PE
Negative-equity $OTIS announces refinancing $500M 0% notes w/ $750M 5%.
Otis would rather carry debt and pay all profits via divs & buybacks. As long as profits hold up this is fine, but w/o profits the book is less than worthless, & even a decline would lift the already-high PE
$OTIS manufactured elevators & escalators, before becoming a buyback-machine. π
Perhaps management & investors should consider a *slightly* more cautious approach in a possible commercial real estate hard-landing.
https://t.co/6iuCmaiULh
Negative-equity $OTIS announces refinancing $500M 0% notes w/ $750M 5%.
Otis would rather carry debt and pay all profits via divs & buybacks. As long as profits hold up this is fine, but w/o profits the book is less than worthless, & even a decline would lift the already-high PE
I wonder how well $OTIS service revenue holds up in recession, one in which commercial real estate is hit hard.
I also wonder when long-option sellers will stop using BlackβScholes to (mis)price their wares.
Mkt Mkr: "If OTIS trades 9x P:E by Jan-2025, I'll pay you 18x prem."π€
"Breaking a delivery habit is an easy way for budget-conscious consumers to cut back on restaurant spending"
" $UBER and $DASH haven't reported the same weakness in their food delivery sales." --Yet π
"Only Grubhub reported shrinking order vol in N Amer for 1st half of the yr"
"Breaking a delivery habit is an easy way for budget-conscious consumers to cut back on restaurant spending"
" $UBER and $DASH haven't reported the same weakness in their food delivery sales." --Yet π
"Only Grubhub reported shrinking order vol in N Amer for 1st half of the yr"