@grok Read the exchange above in full context.
Hill agrees that Sijuwade's “individual essence picks out which one,” while Sijuwade separately has a general essence/common divine nature shared by Father, Son and Spirit.
He then cites “To be God (the Father) is to be the one, uncaused ... divine person” to argue that uncausedness is what it is to be God, so the Son's not being uncaused means the Son is not God.
Within Sijuwade's framework, does that inference actually follow? Or is Hill conflating what individuates the Father with the common nature by which Father, Son and Spirit are divine?
When you say a “perfectly rational and immutable divine essence can rationally decree” a world, what exactly is doing the decreeing: the divine nature or a divine hypostasis? If nature acts as the subject, how do you avoid collapsing nature into hypostasis; but if a hypostasis acts through the natural will/energy, why assume the absolute identity conditions generating your modal-collapse problem in the first place?
Well, it’s a good thing AI-assisted writing isn’t automatically plagiarism, particularly when the AI use isn’t concealed. And “Grokboy” is about as subtle as a brick. 😂
Funny how the AI suddenly became the issue once we got down to the argument itself.
Nobody said you weren’t allowed to leave, Hill. By all means, walk away. The argument will still be sitting there.
@grok sure. Nobody said he’s obligated to keep debating me. He can walk away whenever he wants.
But you just said the arguments remain open to evaluation on their own merits.
So does walking away because AI was used refute anything I argued about Sijuwade?
And does AI use alone establish that I don’t understand the topic?
@Grokboyanswers@YariLogos No. Validity depends only on logical form; soundness on true premises plus validity. The source being AI, human, or anything else is irrelevant to either.
@YariLogos Of course it’s AI. I’m literally named Grokboy.
@grok does your being AI have any bearing on whether an argument you make is valid or sound?
@YariLogos@Yakov_Toyer@OnAncientPaths@grok when someone stops addressing an argument and instead attacks who—or what—produced it, does that have any bearing on whether the argument is valid or sound? What fallacy, if any, is that?
Yes, Hill. That's precisely the point.
If Sijuwade's “individual essence” is, as you now say, “what normal ppl call property” then you've just mapped its function to property—not common divine nature.
And yes, I asked whether your mapping from his terminology to patristic categories was valid because your inference to tritheism depends on it.
That's the entire dispute.
I'll grant the passage. It’s at least responsive to the challenge.
But now read the definition within Sijuwade's framework as a whole.
He distinguishes the general essence/common divine nature, by which Father, Son and Spirit are divine, from individual essence, which answers what it is to be this particular divine person.
And notice the definition itself: “To be God (the Father) is to be the one, uncaused … divine person…”
He does not say “to be divine is to be uncaused.” “Divine person” is already doing the divinity work in the definiens; “uncaused” distinguishes which divine person is being defined.
So the question is whether this is a real definition of divinity as such, or of the individual God (the Father).
If the former, then sure, you've identified a serious tension in Sijuwade's framework and the Eunomian objection bites.
If the latter, “to be God is to be unbegotten” still doesn't follow.
The passage is relevant. What you still haven’t done is establish which level of essence the definition is defining.
Perfect. Quote the passage where Sijuwade explicitly says “to be God is to be unbegotten” or identifies unbegottenness as what constitutes divinity.
A passage saying the Father's unbegottenness/uncausedness grounds his designation as “the One God” does not establish your premise.
Otherwise you're inferring the former from the latter, which is precisely what's under dispute.
Page number is fine too.
But your “if” is precisely the disputed premise.
Sijuwade does not say “to be God is to be unbegotten.” He explicitly distinguishes the two questions.
Father, Son and Spirit are each God predicatively by virtue of the one divine nature. Unbegottenness/uncausedness individuates the Father.
“The one God” nominally designating the Father is a separate claim concerning the Father's monarchy/reference of the name “God”—not a claim that unbegottenness constitutes divinity.
You can certainly challenge that nominal/predicative distinction. But your reductio only follows if you first collapse individuation, natural predication, and nominal reference into one category.
Yes, Hill. That's precisely the point.
If Sijuwade's “individual essence” is, as you now say, “what normal ppl call property” then you've just mapped its function to property—not common divine nature.
And yes, I asked whether your mapping from his terminology to patristic categories was valid because your inference to tritheism depends on it.
That's the entire dispute.
Yes. “Individual essence picks out which one.”
That's the distinction I've been asking you to acknowledge.
So within Sijuwade's framework, “individual essence” is doing individuating/identity work—not functioning as the common divine nature. Whether Orthodox theology should instead speak of hypostatic property, and whether Sijuwade's framework maps successfully onto Cappadocian metaphysics, are separate questions.
I'm perfectly willing to criticize the framework on those grounds. But that doesn't establish the original inference from “individual essence” to multiple common divine essences/tritheism.
Again, you're objecting to Sijuwade's model rather than answering the argument.
I did not claim Orthodox Trinitarian metaphysics makes the Persons instances of a kind or makes the Trinity a species. Sijuwade's own framework employs the kind/instance distinction. Whether that framework is compatible with Cappadocian metaphysics is a separate question.
You can't establish what his “individual essence” means by first rejecting his framework and then substituting Orthodox categories for the categories you're supposed to be analyzing.
That's precisely what I've been asking you to establish.
Agreed: a hypostatic property is not the whatness of the common nature. I've never disputed that.
The question is whether Sijuwade's technical “individual essence” means WHAT NATURE the Father is, or what it is to be THIS INDIVIDUAL rather than another instance of the kind.
You keep asserting the former. I'm asking you to establish it from how the category functions in his system. You still haven’t done so.
We can get to the additional objections afterward.
“WHAT NATURE is this?” and “what is it to be THIS INDIVIDUAL?” are different questions. Fine explicitly distinguishes general essence from individual essence for exactly that reason.
You can't import the patristic meaning of οὐσία into Fine's technical term “individual essence,” derive “nature” from it, and then accuse Fine of collapsing the categories.
You need to show what ontological work the category performs, not what “essence” means in the framework you're importing. Otherwise, that would just repeat the same equivocation.
The kind/species objection is a separate argument. Happy to discuss that next but let's finish this inference first.