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A Review of Afghanistan After the Fall of the Republic: The Taliban, the Opposition, and Regional and International Dimensions
August 14, 2026
The Taliban's Rule and Conduct
In politics and political opposition, it is important to understand the other side. If you do not understand your opponent's strengths and weaknesses, you can never effectively counter your opponents or adversaries through superficial, short-term tactics or false narratives.
The Taliban have spent five years deceiving the public. In reality, however, Afghanistan's problems have neither been resolved nor reduced during these five years. Politically and economically, as well as in terms of physical, human, and psychological security, the country's problems have increased rather than diminished.
For five years, the Taliban have blamed the Republic for everything and repeatedly reopened projects that had already been completed during the Republic. They have also presented their use of the systems and capacities built during the Republic as their own achievements.
If the Taliban were to look honestly at what remained after their previous fall and compare it with what they inherited after the fall of the Republic, they should be ashamed of themselves and ask why they fought against the Republic for twenty years in pursuit of Pakistan's interests.
For example, the establishment and activities of the National Public Enterprise (ملي شرکت) were achievements of the Republic. The projects carried out by that institution were the result of the Republic's efforts, not achievements produced by the Taliban's ideas or capacity.
I am not discussing here the overall performance of the National Public Enterprise. There had previously been criticism of it concerning the quality of its work, transparency in contracting, and high prices. Another weakness was the lack of coordination between its projects and the relevant ministries. If there is no maintenance plan for a project, it can deteriorate very quickly, increasing the cost of damage over the long term. At that time, contracts were also sometimes awarded to the National Procurement Authority through single-source procurement rather than through open competitive bidding. Such contracting practices themselves create opportunities for corruption.
During the Taliban's five years in power, killings, kidnappings, revenge killings, extrajudicial executions and torture of former employees of the Republic, and bribery have been no less prevalent than they were during the Republic, and in some cases may have been greater.
According to a United Nations report, approximately 27,000 people are imprisoned in Taliban prisons, including around 1,900 women. By comparison, near the end of the Republic there were approximately 22,000 prisoners, of whom around 8,000 were Taliban. The number of female prisoners was approximately 900. These figures, in themselves, indicate that crime has increased during the Taliban's five years in power.
Education
The deterioration in the quality of education and the ban on women's higher education are unforgivable injustices against the people of Afghanistan.
According to credible sources, the daughters of many senior Taliban officials are receiving higher education, both inside and outside Afghanistan, through in-person and online programs. Yet the Taliban have prevented the daughters of ordinary Afghans from pursuing higher education.
This is reminiscent of the practices of the former jihadist leaders, who used to prevent others from studying modern sciences while sending their own children to Peshawar, Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, or other countries for higher education.
Poverty
Poverty has increased during the Taliban's five-year rule, and Afghanistan remains internationally isolated.
The people are capable of making sound judgments. They understand that despite the shortcomings of the Republic, its system was better than Taliban rule because people could raise their voices against problems and there was freedom of expression. Young people were able to pursue higher education and had hope for the future. Although the insecurity of that period was sometimes exaggerated, much of that insecurity had itself been created by the Taliban.
Of course, a few people living abroad who travel to Afghanistan for tourism or other personal purposes, carrying a few dollars or euros in their pockets, cannot make this judgment. They enter the country as guests, and every society treats its guests well. But the people who actually live there know what the situation is really like.
The Absence and Conduct of the Taliban Leader, Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada
In Herat, Kunar, Baghlan, Badakhshan, Nuristan, and other areas, earthquakes and floods have killed and injured hundreds of Afghans and destroyed homes. Likewise, despite repeated Pakistani airstrikes and violations of Afghanistan's airspace, the Taliban leader has still not appeared publicly during such critical moments to reassure the people or demonstrate accountability to them.
To this day, no one has publicly seen his face or appearance. During the past five years, many questions have been raised by Afghans inside and outside the country about Mullah Haibatullah.
Is this the same Haibatullah Akhundzada who served as a judge in Nangarhar during the Taliban's previous period of rule and taught at the Kuchlak madrasa near Quetta?
Or was Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada killed in the Kuchlak explosion and replaced by another person, whose identity and whereabouts are unknown, who is now ruling Afghanistan and its people under the name of Haibatullah?
Some opponents of the Taliban go even further and claim that Mullah Haibatullah does not exist and that, in his place, a Pakistani colonel is indirectly ruling Afghanistan, while the Taliban's disputes, rhetoric, and clashes with Pakistan are merely a staged conflict intended to win popular support for the Taliban among Afghans.
Whether Mullah Haibatullah exists or not, in the twenty-first century there is no country in the world whose leader remains unseen by the people and hides from both his own population and the outside world.
From an Islamic perspective, living in caves and withdrawing completely from society is not the model of Islamic leadership. La rahbaniyyata fi al-Islam—there is no monasticism in Islam. Even during the early period of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the Rightly Guided Caliphs did not isolate themselves from the people.
The Rightly Guided Caliphs considered themselves accountable to the people and listened to their concerns. People publicly challenged them over injustice and other issues, and the caliphs listened patiently and responded to their criticisms.
Yet Mullah Haibatullah says that the people must accept and obey the orders of the Emirate's officials without question or objection. Muslims are required to believe in the unseen only in relation to Allah; they are not required to believe blindly in human beings.
Unfortunately, many of Mullah Haibatullah's statements and decrees are in conflict with Islamic principles, including his restrictions on women's education and his division of society into different groups and classes.
In his Farewell (Hajatul Weda) Sermon, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said that an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab, and that a Black person has no superiority over a White person, nor a White person over a Black person. Human superiority is based on piety.
Allah honors those who possess the greatest degree of piety. Titles such as mullah, maulvi, sheikh, or Akhundzada are not themselves measures of piety. The true measures of piety are fear of God and compassion toward other people.
Even knowledge itself is not necessarily a measure of piety. Satan possessed greater knowledge than the angels, yet he was expelled from God's presence because he disobeyed Him.
On this basis, a leader or group that contradicts God's commands and interprets Islam according to its own interests cannot claim legitimacy simply by invoking religion. Such people are, in essence, rebels against God's commands. And those among them who possess some religious knowledge may nevertheless be using that knowledge in a manner comparable to Satan's knowledge—knowledge without obedience or righteousness.
Summary of the Taliban's Five Years in Power
The issues discussed above are only a few examples of a much larger picture.
Ultimately, the result of five years of Taliban rule has been that they have effectively given their supporters licenses for killing, bribery, kidnapping, looting and plundering state assets, mistreatment of women, and even other immoral acts.
Their so-called Amr bil Ma'ruf wa Nahi anil Munkar—the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice—is itself contrary to Islamic principles, Afghan cultural traditions and customs, and fundamental human values.
Sexual abuse and assault against women in prisons have become a serious and recurring issue. Some Taliban leaders and officials, as well as those below them, who take pleasure in torturing, oppressing, abusing, and humiliating people have become sadistic.
A system of government whose leader is unknown to the public, and whose policies contradict Islam, Afghan culture, and the realities of the twenty-first century, cannot be sustainable. Yet people have a legitimate concern: What will happen when this system eventually collapses?
The Taliban's Opponents
The Taliban's opponents can broadly be divided into three categories, although each category is itself divided and often in conflict internally.
The first category consists of those who are beating the drums of war. Although their own record in government was not particularly successful, they portray themselves as military and intelligence experts. Politically and militarily, however, they do not possess the leadership capacity or political organization required to lead Afghanistan, and their activities remain fragmented.
Their strategy of seeking support from Pakistan itself risks creating the same kind of instability in Afghanistan's future that the country experienced in the past.
Tactically, their strategic communications strategy is also based on misinformation, emotional appeals, and misguided approaches. According to their public statements, many former soldiers and employees of the Republic have been killed or tortured by the Taliban.
Because of the actions, divisions, and lack of coordination among these opponents, the Taliban's rule has so far been prolonged. For example, they continue to describe the Taliban as Pakistan's puppets. But if being a Pakistani proxy is a bad thing, why do they ask Pakistan to eliminate the Taliban? In other words, are they asking one proxy group to replace another proxy group?
What, then, is the difference between them and the Taliban?
These are questions that Afghans inside and outside the country continue to ask.
The second category consists of political and civil movements operating outside Afghanistan.
These groups can themselves be divided into two broad categories. The first is essentially the other side of the same coin as the armed fronts. They maintain contacts and travel to and from Pakistan. In Western circles, they present themselves as opponents of the Taliban and as civil and political activists, but many are connected to former warlords and factional networks that played an important role in the collapse of the Republic.
The Taliban were already tested once; these groups were tested twice before. Individuals from these circles held secret negotiations with the Taliban in Qatar, Moscow, Pakistan, and elsewhere and helped create conditions that facilitated the Taliban's return to power.
Their return would be another chapter in Afghanistan's tragic history. If the Taliban have already stripped the people to the bone, these groups would consume whatever flesh remains, and, as in the 1990s, they could once again turn Kabul into ruins.
Some people's slogans—such as "I do not accept Afghanistan" or "I am not Afghan"—continue to create and fuel the conditions for future conflict.
The second group of political and civil opponents, most of whom are led by former officials of the Republic, have failed over the past five years to agree on even five basic principles and have been unable to establish leadership that could command the confidence of Afghans, the region, and the international community.
Instead of learning from their past shortcomings and uniting around a common vision for the future, many former leaders of the Republic continue to accuse one another. They have poisoned and frozen the political environment and prevented the emergence of a strong national movement.
There is little indication that they will establish a united national movement in the near future. As a result, neither the Taliban nor their opponents inside and outside Afghanistan are viewed with much hope, and neither receives significant attention from regional or international countries.
The third category consists of a number of Afghans inside and outside the country, including former members of previous governments, who oppose the Taliban because of their conduct and political policies and are deeply concerned about Afghanistan's current situation.
Although this category may constitute the majority, these people are not actively engaged in political activities and largely remain passive.
In political terminology, this group is known as the silent majority. A silent majority cannot play a positive role in a country's political transformation, although its opposition strengthens the narratives of those who actively oppose the government.
Summary of the Taliban Opposition's Performance
So far, the opponents of the Taliban have failed to organize themselves into a credible political opposition.
Most of them continue to rely on the same old approaches and narratives that contributed to the collapse of the Republic.
With old faces, old narratives, and old approaches, they cannot become a credible alternative to the Taliban. At most, however, they can be recruited for further disorder and create additional problems in Afghanistan.
The Taliban, the Opposition, and Relations with Pakistan
Because of the Taliban's policies, Afghanistan's international isolation has resulted in Pakistan repeatedly carrying out airstrikes in Kabul, the capital, as well as in the provinces, targeting universities, hospitals, civilian homes, and other facilities. Pakistan has also threatened to continue such operations inside Afghan territory.
As a result of Pakistani airstrikes and interference, many Afghans have been killed or wounded, while homes and infrastructure have been destroyed. Targeting civilians is a war crime.
Unfortunately, the Taliban's political and military response to Pakistan's open aggression and war crimes has been weak and confusing.
Regional and international countries have also failed to strongly condemn Pakistan's attacks. In practice, this has sent a signal to Pakistan that it can continue its operations.
No one is listening to the voice of Afghans, either inside or outside the country. The Taliban have also been unable to effectively defend Afghanistan's national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the lives, property, and interests of its people.
The Taliban still do not have a clear strategy regarding their dispute with Pakistan. It remains unclear whether this is merely a tactical and staged conflict or a genuine strategic disagreement. Nor does it appear that Pakistan genuinely intends to overthrow the Taliban government.
Pakistan, which is essentially a center of extremism and terrorism, now wants to remove this label from itself and portray Afghanistan as the center of extremism and terrorism.
At the same time, the Taliban's own conduct has created opportunities for this kind of Pakistani intervention. During the past five years, the Taliban have taken no meaningful steps toward gaining domestic and international legitimacy by establishing a legitimate, law-based, and representative government. Nor have they taken steps to end Afghanistan's isolation so that the country's interests could be defended nationally and internationally.
It should also be noted that some Taliban leaders may actually be comfortable with this state of isolation because it allows them to rule the population without accountability and exploit Afghanistan's resources.
According to an important person inside Afghanistan, some Taliban leaders even say that they can continue exploiting the people and maintaining their power for another ten years. When a government views its relationship with its own people in terms of exploitation, there is little reason to expect such a system to act in the interests of the population.
On the other hand, Pakistan has provided offices to some opponents of the Taliban, and they have been traveling regularly to Pakistan for the past three years.
Initially, these contacts were kept secret because of sensitivities surrounding relations with Pakistan. But now some politicians, civil society activists, former parliamentarians, and so-called resistance fronts openly travel to Pakistan. Some even take pride in their close relationship with Pakistan, arguing that the Taliban and the former mujahideen also received assistance from Pakistan and lived there.
If that is the argument, then there is no difference between you and the Taliban. The Taliban and the mujahideen were both part of a project that contributed to Afghanistan's destruction—and so are you.
If the Taliban's record was not good during their previous period of rule and their current conduct remains unacceptable, then your own record during your two periods of political dominance was also not good. There is little reason to believe that your record would be better in the future. As the saying goes, "It is a mistake to test what has already been tested."
Relations Between the Taliban, Their Opponents, and Iran
The result of the Taliban's negative interaction with Iran was that Iran simultaneously invited the Taliban and some leaders of the so-called resistance front to attend the funeral ceremony of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Officially inviting Taliban opponents sent a clear message: if you become an obstacle to our interests, we have your opponents in our pocket and can use them against you whenever necessary.
Recent statements by Iranian officials, including renewed demands concerning the killing of ten Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998—asking why, by whom, and how they were killed and who was responsible—raise additional questions in light of the changing geopolitics of the region.
Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have signed a security agreement among themselves, and Iran sees this agreement as a potential threat.
That is why Iran has once again raised the issue of the killing of its diplomats. In recent times, there have even been statements from members of the Fatemiyoun group indicating their readiness to fight against the Taliban.
Like Pakistan, Iran can also create problems for Afghanistan. Iran has the Fatemiyoun group, as well as some Taliban opponents and religious allies, under its influence and can use them to pursue its interests in Afghanistan.
Relations with Afghanistan's Northern Neighbors
Afghanistan's northern neighbors are like harmless birds that simply want to be left alone.
They want to remain safe from the problems emanating from Afghanistan. Their primary concern is that extremist Islamic groups such as ISIS, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and al-Qaeda should not become stronger and create instability in their countries.
They also understand that the Taliban have had relationships with some of these groups and that certain Taliban circles may potentially support them. For this reason, rather than confronting the Taliban directly, these countries have chosen engagement.
Some Taliban opponents, including the so-called resistance front and other opponents who are not part of that front, have maintained a presence in Tajikistan based on their previous relationships. However, Tajikistan does not allow them to conduct military operations from its territory.
Another concern for these countries is drug trafficking, in which some Taliban members are also involved.
Of course, some people who believe in conspiracy theories claim that the Americans brought the Taliban back in order to destabilize Afghanistan's northern neighbors and Central Asia and thereby create problems for China and Russia in the region.
Because of these three concerns—extremism, drug trafficking, and instability—the northern countries prefer engagement with the Taliban rather than confrontation. However, this engagement could easily turn into negative engagement.
Russia and China: Relations with the Taliban and Their Opponents
Russia, like Iran and Pakistan, maintains close relations with both the Taliban and some of their opponents and always wants to have an alternative available.
If necessary, Russia wants to be able to use these actors to advance its own interests. Although Russia and China have relatively good relations with the Taliban, neither has used its veto power in the UN Security Council on any resolution against the Taliban.
This itself indicates that they are not satisfied with the Taliban's style of governance. However, they also do not want to support the Taliban's opponents. Russia is already involved in the war in Ukraine and does not want to open another front.
China's primary objective under the current circumstances is to prevent the influence of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) from spreading in Afghanistan.
From an economic and strategic perspective, Afghanistan is not particularly important to China. This is one reason Afghanistan has so far not become part of China's major economic strategy, including the Belt and Road Initiative, CPEC, and the transit projects connecting Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran.
For the same reason, China does not currently want Afghanistan to establish a connection with China's Xinjiang region through the Wakhan Corridor.
However, if a legitimate, law-based, and representative government is established in Afghanistan and the threat of extremism is reduced, China and Afghanistan could potentially be connected through the Wakhan Corridor for transit purposes. China could also make some investments in Afghanistan's mineral and mining sectors.
India, the Arab States, the United States, and Europe: Relations with the Taliban and Their Opponents
India's policy toward Afghanistan has been cautious for many years. India wants Pakistan to remain occupied with Afghanistan and wants to protect its western borders from threats emanating from Pakistan.
For many years, India has not regarded Pakistan as a competing rival and has focused primarily on protecting its own interests.
India has consistently supported the governments that were in power in Afghanistan, and Pakistan has opposed Indian activities in Afghanistan because of these relationships.
India and Pakistan have economic and political relations with each other and even maintain intelligence channels for dealing with various security issues. Nevertheless, Pakistan views India's relationship with Afghanistan as contrary to its own interests.
For example, Pakistan and India conduct trade and maintain travel through the Waghah crossing, but Pakistan does not allow Afghan exports to pass through Waghah.
In any case, India's political and economic engagement with Afghanistan has been relatively limited. India has neither provided nor appears capable of providing assistance that would have a profound impact on Afghanistan's security and economy.
There has, however, been one important change in India's policy compared with the past: India does not allow opponents of the Taliban to conduct political activities openly on its territory.
Relations between the Taliban and the Arab countries are also not strategic. Pakistan has considerable influence in the Arab world, and these countries generally give greater priority to Pakistan than to developing an independent relationship with Afghanistan.
So far, the Arab countries have not provided Afghanistan or the Taliban with assistance capable of significantly strengthening Afghanistan's economy. On the contrary, a considerable amount of Afghan capital has been transferred to these countries.
The Arab countries also do not allow Taliban opponents to conduct political activities on their territory. Even former President Ashraf Ghani left Abu Dhabi partly because of these restrictions.
The United States has also not given significant importance to the Taliban's opponents and does not want to recognize the Taliban.
پر وطن د ننني هر وحشت عامل سبا ته واکمن و قدرمن دی.
د هغې بلې ورځې وحشت کوونکي پرون پر څوکيو ناست وو. د پرون ورځ وحشت کوونکي نن پر واک ناست دي او د نن ورځ وحشت کوونکي به سبا د واک و قدرت پر ګدۍ ناست وي.
په افغانستان کې واک ته د رسېدو یوه لاره ډېر وحشت کول دي.😢
#کابل_کاج
افراطیت هم لکه د ریاضي اعداد حد نه لري، هم تر لایتناهي تلی شي او هم جفت، طاق، کسري ، مثبت او منفي بڼې خپلولای شي.
افراطیان د افراطیت لومړني قربانیان دي. دوی ځانونه هم له ژونده ایستي دي او ټولنه یې هم له ژونده ایستې.