Arctic

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[Liam Karr @liam_karr]

First public move by Goita since April 25 is a meeting with the Russians.

Nothing on the attacks, Camara, or the recently announced siege of Bamako.

Hard to read as anything other than asking for protection, especially as rumors of a power struggle with Malick Diaw gain steam.

[Matt Broomfield @MattBroomfield1]

Iraq's vast network of pro-Iranian militias. get little attention compared to Hezbollah or the Houthis.

But they're vital to Iran's economic + strategic survival - and on a collision course with the USA.

My first report from Iraqi Kurdistan for @unherd:

https://t.co/SkUDzqgSwh

[Elliot Kaufman @ElliotKaufman6]

NEW: A witness statement, backed by multiple recordings, says Qatar promised to “look after” the ICC's Karim Khan if he sought arrest warrants for Israel's leaders.

WSJ:
https://t.co/Vt2ZlvVWve

[Javier Blas @JavierBlas]

Interesting movement in the Strait of Hormuz:

A supertanker linked to Japan is entering the SoH on her way out of the Persian Gulf. The Idemitsu Maru VLCC is following the Iranian new shipping lanes with a ~2m barrel cargo of Saudi oil.

Negotiation signal? Diplomatic move?

[Raylan Givens @JewishWarrior13]

🚨NYT: The Trump administration believes that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei or senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are not authorized to agree to any concessions on the nuclear issue. Therefore, there is no reason to think that a change in Iran's position is expected - without a return to fighting.

[Fatima Alasrar @YemeniFatima]

Got excited this morning to read a new piece on the Houthi movement, then watched the framing slide off the rails the way it usually does.

The field is saturated with smart, well-intentioned experts who have been seduced by the idea of Houthi independence. The franchise frame, the autonomy frame, and the "Iran doesn't really control them" frame have hardened into received wisdom, and they keep producing analysis that flatters the Houthis as calibrated strategic actors with their own agenda. Some of that is true. Most of it forgets what's actually in front of us.

The IRGC training pipeline. The weapons that are manufactured by Houthis, but where do the parts come from? The ideological vocabulary borrowed wholesale from Khomeini.

What would the field look like if we treated autonomy not as a default assumption, but as a claim that has to be continuously demonstrated against those material realities?

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

The UAE is poised to officially redraw its lines with the region and beyond.

[Arash Azizi آرش عزیزی @arash_tehran]

Important development: IRGC’s main outlet comes out swinging against the hardliner outlet Rajanews. What does it all mean?

As I’ve said, the anti-negotiation hardliners are a small fringe and the IRGC is not with them

[Tatarigami_UA @Tatarigami_UA]

I would not call it a Malian governmental collapse yet, but based on multiple data sources, there appears to be an ongoing political crisis in the capital, Bamako, with the potential to lead to a change in leadership. Meanwhile, Russian forces have lost several additional bases

[Liam Karr @liam_karr]

The alliance between FLA Tuareg rebels and JNIM, and the resulting loss of huge chunks of northern Mali, is the direct and predictable result of the junta's decision to cut ties with France in favor of Russia, kick out the UN (MINUSMA), and scrap the 2015 Algiers agreement.

We essentially called what happened over the weekend all the way back in February 2023: "Al Qaeda’s Sahel branch, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), is filling the security vacuum in northern Mali following the French withdrawal in 2022. JNIM is establishing itself as the primary partner and power broker for former rebel groups and communities in the north, an area where the Malian government has historically lacked presence. These communities face rising violence from both the Islamic State and the Russian Wagner Group, which partners with the Malian government. This trend will likely lead to JNIM establishing de facto control over northern Mali, a takeover that will feed long-term instability in Mali and its neighbors and increase the resources and opportunities available to al Qaeda in Africa."

[גיא עזריאל Guy Azriel | Diplomatic Correspondent @GuyAz]

My report on i24NEWS: Following PM Netanyahu's security consultation this morning, a decision was made to expand the depth of strikes against Hezbollah, as seen in recent hours. Israeli officials insist they did not require any special approval from the White House, saying the operation is “within the framework of the understandings.”

Yesterday, Benjamin Netanyahu warned that the ceasefire was “falling apart,” and tonight he reiterated: “We have freedom of action to thwart immediate and emerging threats,” adding that Israel is striking both within the security zone and north of the Litani River.

Meanwhile, despite the violations of the ceasefire by Hezbollah and the fragile situation, officials say a summit with the Lebanese president in Washington remains a realistic possibility: “We would not refuse such an offer should President Donald Trump seek to convene it.”

[Elizabeth Tsurkov @LizHurra]

The Coordination Framework of Shia parties is set to nominate Ali a-Zaidi as its candidate for prime minister. a-Zaidi runs the Southern Islamic Bank, which was banned by the US from accessing dollars due to partaking in $ smuggling into Iran, to prop up the faltering Iranian currency. On top of this, Iraqi sources tell me a-Zaidi is an incredibly corrupt businessperson who is close to the Iranian-backed militias. Clearly, a nomination that is a sign of defiance to the US.

[Miad Maleki @miadmaleki]

This confirms ~ 13-day onshore storage estimate: Iran is now using containers and "junk storage" (disused tanks in poor condition) in Ahvaz and Asaluyeh to avoid cutting production. And now rail.

They're delay tactics measured in days, not weeks.

1. Why rail is a dead end: Iran's own senior rail transport expert Morteza Naserian told Mehr News there are only 2 rail corridors to China, never used for petroleum, with severely limited capacity and zero bulk crude infrastructure.

2. The floating storage "fix" is equally thin. Iran pulled NASHA (IMO 9079107), a 30-year-old retired VLCC, out of the breakers. NASHA buys ~48 hours.

3. Jask terminal storage tanks have reportedly already hit maximum capacity as of April 25. Some tankers are now anchored near Kharg acting as improvised overflow. a fleet the Islamic Republic can't replicate at scale.

4. The 2020 precedent that some point out to (85% storage utilization + 120 Mbbl afloat) was managed under very different conditions (I was watching it from the inside): it was sanctions without a naval blockade, and with active export channels still partially open. That escape valve is gone now, and Iran's tankers (including its ghost fleet) are already filled up with 166M barrels.

5. Bottom line: containers, junk tanks, retired VLCCs, and rail fantasies are not a storage strategy. They're the last moves of a system running out of room, exactly on the timeline that was estimated.

Don't forget about the gasoline shortage clock.

https://t.co/isLzXVdFWR

[Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران @ariel_oseran]

A senior Hezbollah commander told Al Jazeera that they plan “to return to tactics from the 1980s” and activate suicide bombers against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

“Large groups of suicide bombers are already deployed in the occupied territory according to pre-prepared plans to prevent Israel from establishing a foothold,” the Hezbollah commander said.

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

A messy divorce indeed. Doha is walking out the door with its funds, and housing -- custody goes to Iran after the militant offspring spoke up for Tehran while it was bombing Qatar. They might wind up temporarily with uncle Erdogan in Istanbul. The hamula is a hot mess. Amit Segal dishes the soap opera’s latest …

[Iran International English @IranIntl_En]

A group of lawmakers aligned with hardline politician Saeed Jalili declined to sign a parliamentary statement backing Iran’s negotiating team led by Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, despite broad support from 261 other MPs.

The statement expressed confidence in the negotiating delegation. However, several prominent hardline figures—including Mahmoud Nabavian, Mohammad Taghi Naqadali, Morteza Aghatehrani, Amirhossein Sabeti, Hamid Rasaei, Ruhollah Izadkhah and Meysam Zohourian—did not sign the statement.

The statement warned that “the enemy” is seeking to create divisions between the state, society and diplomatic institutions during what it described as a new phase of conflict.

It also urged political and social actors to avoid speculation based on “rumors and incomplete information,” cautioning against contributing to what it called the enemy’s “cognitive warfare.”

Lawmakers who signed the statement expressed full support for the negotiating team, particularly Ghalibaf, saying they trust the delegation.
https://t.co/GnayAqU6ys

[Critical Threats @criticalthreats]

NEW: Iranian negotiators are reportedly attempting to secure an agreement that addresses the Strait of Hormuz and ends the war but pushes nuclear talks to a later stage. President Trump referred yesterday to a “new” Iranian offer that involves Iran not having a nuclear weapon, but stated that the offer was “not enough.” (1/5)

[Timothy E Kaldas @tekaldas]

The UAE suddenly withdrew deposits in Pakistan's Central Bank which Saudi quickly replaced. This report indicates UAE did so to punish Pakistan for its mediator role in US-Iran talks. The story clarifies the 2 Gulf powers' views on the war & is a warning for states like Egypt 🧵

[Shahab @hashurtag]

IRGC humiliates Araghchi publicly and then sends him to Pak-Oman-Russia to chalk out a proposal to submit to the Americans. Why don’t they do their own bidding? They will probably listen to Araghchi when he is back and trash nearly all the feedback he comes back with. And humiliate him again.

[Open Source Intel @Osint613]

Iran's ambassador in Cairo listed Iran's red lines in negotiations with the U.S.:

1. No ceasefire based on "neither war nor peace." Iran wants the war ended across the entire region, not just with Iran.
2. Removal of the U.S. naval blockade.
3. No negotiations under threat.
4. Removal of all sanctions on Iran.
5. Release of Iranian assets in the U.S.
6. Full preservation of Iran's nuclear rights.
7. Iran manages the Strait of Hormuz, citing over 1,000 km of Persian Gulf coastline.