The market keeps asking the wrong questions about $TMDX.
Why did Waleed acquire Summit Aviation in 2023? Why accept margin compression at the exact moment the model was proving itself? Why enter cold storage with CHOPS after building the case against it for 26 years? Why deploy capital again into PAD Aviation in Europe?
These aren't contradictions. They're the same decision, made repeatedly.
Vertical integration of a service this complex is not a distraction from the moat, it is the moat. Every asset that looks like overhead from the outside is a coordination cost that a competitor would have to replicate before they could meaningfully compete. The margin compression is the price of making the network irreproducible.
What looks like poor capital allocation from a device-company framework looks very different when you understand that TransMedics stopped being a device company in 2022.
They are building the operating infrastructure of US organ transplantation. The NOP. The fleet. The routing algorithm. The digital ecosystem. The hub network. Each layer raises the cost of entry for anyone who comes after.
To understand why Summit was rational, why OCS commands a premium over cheaper alternatives, and why the current investment cycle is compressing margins intentionally, you need to understand the industry before the company.
That's what Part I of our deep dive covers: the 60-year failure of cold storage, the structural dysfunction of the OPO system, and how TransMedics was built from a one-man research project into the infrastructure behind 26% of all liver, heart, and lung transplants in the US.
Part II covers the numbers. CHOPS, next-gen lung and heart trials, OCS Kidney, full valuation. Coming soon.
Part I is live. Link in bio.
I still remember when Scorpion said that $TMDX was putting a freeze on hiring.
7 job openings in Italy in just one week! 🇮🇹🏥
It looks like the expansion in Europe is starting to gain momentum.
When Borel presented cyclosporine to Sandoz in 1972, his employer declined to develop it.
The reasoning was sound: estimated production costs were high, and organ transplantation was too small a market to justify them.
They were right about the market size. They were wrong about what the drug would do to that market size.
Cyclosporine didn't enter an existing transplant market. It created one. FDA approval in 1983. From that point: 2,000 transplants per year to 49,000.
The same logic applied to $TMDX in 2000 when no large device company built the OCS.
Transplant medicine was a small market with complex logistics, variable reimbursement, and no obvious regulatory pathway. The returns weren't sufficient to justify the investment.
They were right about the market size. They were wrong about what the technology would do to it.
Medtronic and J&J didn't build the OCS for the same reason Sandoz almost didn't develop cyclosporine.
The companies that see the market as it is don't build the markets that didn't exist yet.
Part I of our deep dive is the history of both. Link in bio.
Part I of our $TMDX deep dive is live.🏥
The market keeps misreading every decision Waleed makes.
To understand why Summit, CHOPS, and PAD Aviation are all the same decision , you need to understand the industry before the company.🫀
That's what this piece is about. Link in bio. 👇👇
The market keeps asking the wrong questions about $TMDX.
Why did Waleed acquire Summit Aviation in 2023? Why accept margin compression at the exact moment the model was proving itself? Why enter cold storage with CHOPS after building the case against it for 26 years? Why deploy capital again into PAD Aviation in Europe?
These aren't contradictions. They're the same decision, made repeatedly.
Vertical integration of a service this complex is not a distraction from the moat, it is the moat. Every asset that looks like overhead from the outside is a coordination cost that a competitor would have to replicate before they could meaningfully compete. The margin compression is the price of making the network irreproducible.
What looks like poor capital allocation from a device-company framework looks very different when you understand that TransMedics stopped being a device company in 2022.
They are building the operating infrastructure of US organ transplantation. The NOP. The fleet. The routing algorithm. The digital ecosystem. The hub network. Each layer raises the cost of entry for anyone who comes after.
To understand why Summit was rational, why OCS commands a premium over cheaper alternatives, and why the current investment cycle is compressing margins intentionally, you need to understand the industry before the company.
That's what Part I of our deep dive covers: the 60-year failure of cold storage, the structural dysfunction of the OPO system, and how TransMedics was built from a one-man research project into the infrastructure behind 26% of all liver, heart, and lung transplants in the US.
Part II covers the numbers. CHOPS, next-gen lung and heart trials, OCS Kidney, full valuation. Coming soon.
Part I is live. Link in bio.
For all retail investors:
The most common question I get about micro caps:
"Are you sure it is not a value trap?"
And I understand the instinct.
Something this cheap, this ignored, must have a problem nobody has found yet.
But most of the time the question is looking in the wrong direction.
The business is real. It grows. It earns.
The numbers are not hiding anything.
What people miss is not a flaw in the company.
It is the structural reason why the opportunity exists and why it will keep existing long after you have found it.
Liquidity.
The fund manager who would love to own this cannot build a position without moving the price by 20% on the way in and 20% on the way out.
So he does not.
The analyst who would love to cover it has a minimum market cap threshold.
So he does not.
The sophisticated private investor who has the flexibility to buy rarely finds these companies because finding them requires reading filings in languages nobody reads
on exchanges nobody uses.
So the price stays where it is.
Not because the business is broken.
Because the only people who can buy it
are the people who will never look.
And the only people who will look
are priced out by their own size.
Illiquidity is not the risk.
It is the edge.
It is what keeps the opportunity open long enough for you to find it, size into it slowly, and wait.
The smart money is locked out.
You are not.
That is the entire advantage.
It does not get more structural than that.
“The Arithmetic of the Absurd” $LACR $LACR.PA #LACR#LACROIX
An open letter to the Board of LACROIX Group.
Read the full analysis here👇👇
Link in bio.
Part II next week:
DCF, full SOTP, peer comps, catalysts, risks, and the potential separation framework.
🇫🇷 LACROIX Group might be one of the most absurd mispricings in European equities today. $LACR $LACR.PA
The market values the ENTIRE company at just ~€69M equity value.
Inside it sits a hidden critical infrastructure software/IoT asset that alone could plausibly be worth 5-6x that amount.
Today, we published a full deep dive and open letter to the Board.
🧵👇
So today we published a 54-page deep dive + open letter to the Board of LACROIX Group.
Including:
• hidden infrastructure thesis
• Firstronic post-mortem
• governance analysis
• SOTP valuation
• spin-off framework
• critical infrastructure tailwinds
The letter was sent to Investor Relations on May 13th and is currently awaiting response.