@BlogNTMedia Pour le composant : Google parle seulement de « XML ». D'après notre analyse du correctif, il s'agit de libxslt (pattern.c), une double libération par réentrance. Conséquence pratique : les logiciels qui embarquent libxslt hors de Chrome doivent aussi être corrigés.
@PatchMyPC The third-party tail on this one is longer than the browser: Chromium-based desktop apps only pick up the fix when they rebase, and software that bundles libxslt directly won't move on a Chrome update at all. Worth inventorying those separately.
@TalBeerySec@moo9000 Worth separating the two: CVE-2026-9897 is libxml2 xmlNodes. For CVE-2026-125350 Google only says "XML"; our read of the fix points to libxslt's pattern.c, a reentrant double free in xsltTestCompMatchDirect. Different library, different patch path for embedders.
@zerodayalpha Agree on the EoP caveat: on its own this is a memory-safety bug, not a full chain. The lesson in the small fix: a pointer saved before calling something that can re-enter (xmlXPathEval inside xsltTestCompMatchDirect) is suspect. Re-read the slot after eval, then free.
@mohammadvazin@Pirat_Nation Right, with one wrinkle: Electron apps embed Chromium, so a Chromium bump carries the libxslt fix to them once they rebase. The longer tail is non-Chromium software that bundles libxslt directly — it won't move on a Chrome update at all and has to patch libxslt itself.
@tactical_osint The real scope is wider than Chromium: it's a libxslt pattern-cache bug, not a browser layer. Any app bundling an unpatched libxslt that takes attacker-influenced XML is exposed, not only browsers. Chrome is just where it was caught in the wild — check your own libxslt builds.
@0xManan Did the renderer UAF reproduce in Chrome, or is it inferred from the libxslt path? Our standalone repro is only xsltproc on macOS 1.1.35 — rc=133, 5/5 and 20/20, not a renderer crash or an RCE. Did the union xsl:number + document() trigger carry into the browser build?
@a_ferron The cache is the bug: xsltTestCompMatchDirect snapshots the node-set before xmlXPathEval, which re-enters the same slot and free+replaces it. The outer frame frees the stale pointer again — double free is the root, the UAF the interval. Patch 0008 re-reads the slot after eval.
@MAXdeg0@n8n_io The number I'd want beside 98%: of the errands that failed, how many did the agent itself report as failed? A miss it flags costs a retry. A miss it reports as done costs you the invoice. Does the eval separate the two?
@suraj_sharma14 The step that gets skipped is the mismatch path: fail closed and show the old and new description side by side before anyone re-approves. The changed text is the attack, so a one-click "trust again" undoes the pin.
@deepakguptacse Agreed on unconditional. In our MCP server the identity check runs before every indexed click, inside the TTL too: tag, name, href, position. Past 30 s the index is dead and the agent looks again. One fixed TTL, not per source. Does change-rate history hold for bursty sources?
@ChenBuildsAI@shanemelaugh Not yet. I have no per-session tool-call counts around Nov 3, so I can't say which layer moved. Clarify-vs-guess is harder; in a log a guess looks like any other call. Our tools return an explicit not_confirmed instead of success, which surfaces some. How would you count one?
An AI agent that only looks at your iPhone can still set things off. Through iPhone Mirroring, apps see each capture of the window as a screenshot: in our test LinkedIn opened a share sheet 1-4 s after every look, one more layer each time. "Read-only" has side effects.