@mrlongshore Supporting and caring doesn't necessarily mean playing. There must be consequences even if the U. and his coaches and teammates support him and his addiction recovery. But stretching that to he "must play" to achieve recovery is disingenuous
@elonmusk Scenario MIP and the IPCC just retracted the 3 worst-case scenarios in “climate science” that were used in thousands of “peer-reviewed” science articles that became the basis for policies, debates, and climate narrative. Now, years later, they are retracted as not plausible.
•No retractions or corrections of the thousands of earlier papers that relied on these scenarios as central assumptions. Science rarely retroactively retracts modeling studies when input assumptions change; the papers remain in the literature as “what if” exercises from the time they were written.
•Those legacy studies have filtered into policy documents, IPCC summaries, media headlines, activist campaigns, and government regulations for years. The correction lag means decisions were (and still are) based on futures the scenario developers now call impossible.
•This created a feedback loop: extreme scenarios → alarming impact papers → more funding/media attention → more extreme scenarios cited as “consensus” →more trillions of tax dollars spent. Critics warned this was happening, but the system was slow to correct and too politically charged to admit it.
This does make a huge part of the narrative suspect. Over-reliance on the most extreme tail of possibilities distorted risk communication and policy priorities.
The overuse of now-admittedly implausible worst-case scenarios, without timely correction of the literature or policy that relied on them, is an enormous flaw in the system. It justifies absolute skepticism toward the most alarmist claims and the way science has been packaged for public consumption. Science is self-correcting (these scenario retractions prove it), but the dissemination of corrections is entirely too late, incomplete, and politically inconvenient.
Global climate-related spending and investment have already reached massive levels:
•Annual climate finance flows are now exceeding $2 trillion (as tracked by Climate Policy Initiative and others), with projections for net-zero pathways requiring $3–4.5 trillion per year globally through 2050 for clean energy, infrastructure, and transition costs (IEA, McKinsey, and Energy Transitions Commission estimates).
•Some analyses put cumulative transition investment needs at $100–275 trillion between now and 2050.
These numbers aren’t hypothetical. Governments, utilities, and corporations made (and continue to make) multi-trillion-dollar decisions (renewable mandates, EV incentives, carbon taxes, phase-outs, infrastructure builds) mostly justified by impact studies that leaned heavily on the extreme scenarios. When those scenarios are later downgraded as “implausible” (as ScenarioMIP and IPCC did in 2026), the retrospective cost of over-preparation or misallocated capital is beyond enormous. Opportunity costs are real: that money doesn’t fund hospitals, schools, debt reduction, or adaptation in vulnerable places if it’s locked into pathways that overstated the urgency.
There are thousands of scientific papers and policies baked in the high-end assumptions, with little to no systematic retraction or adjustment, even after the scenario developers themselves walked them back. That creates a feedback loop in which extreme projections drive funding, regulation, and public fear… and the correction lags years behind. It’s a legitimate reason for extreme concern about the “consensus” narrative when it’s translated into trillion-dollar decisions.