john saint

God Is On The Move

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

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https://t.co/IUHJJcT3Kj

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

这篇文章是彭博社（Bloomberg）于2026年2月18日发布的报道，标题为《Tariffs Caused Just Small China Trade Diversion, ECB Study Shows》（关税仅导致中国贸易小幅转移，欧洲央行研究显示）。文章的核心内容是基于欧洲央行（ECB）最新发布的《经济公报》（Economic Bulletin）中的一篇专题分析，讨论2025年美国对中国商品加征关税（主要是特朗普政府政策）对中国出口的影响，特别是是否导致大规模“贸易转移”（trade diversion，即中国将原本出口美国的商品转向其他国家/地区）。文章主要论点文章指出，美国关税并不是中国向全球其他地区出口大幅增加的主要原因。虽然美国关税确实导致中国对美出口显著下降，但所谓的“贸易转移”效应非常有限，仅局限于少数产品和特定地区，对第三方市场（如欧元区）的溢出影响很小。中国出口的整体韧性和向其他地区的增长，主要源于关税之外的其他因素。ECB研究人员Julien Le Roux和Tajda Spital的直接引述：“任何与关税相关的转移都显得适度（modest）且局限于狭窄的产品范围，这表明美国关税对第三方目的地的溢出效应有限。”ECB研究的详细发现（文章重点报道的部分）ECB的研究使用产品层面（六位码HS编码）的面板回归模型，分析2025年1-9月全球从中国进口的数据，控制了多种固定效应，评估关税暴露差异的影响。关键数据和结论如下：美国关税的直接影响：2025年美国对中国进口商品的平均关税上升约37个百分点。
这导致中国对美出口下降：模型估计下降约9%，但实际观察到下降约17%-20%（约1040亿美元）。
差距说明：除了关税，还有其他因素加剧了下降，如政策不确定性、进口前置（frontloading）、美国需求疲软、人民币小幅升值等。

中国整体出口表现（2025年）：中国总出口增长5.5%（高于2024年的4.6%）。
对美出口：下降20%（-1040亿美元）。
对其他地区增长强劲：欧元区：增长8%（+320亿美元）。
东盟（ASEAN）：增长13%。
拉丁美洲：增长7%。
非洲：增长26%（+460亿美元）。

贸易转移效应的量化评估：有限且不广泛：只有对非洲和东盟国家的转移效应统计显著且正面。
对欧元区的影响适度且不显著（modest and insignificant）。
按产品类别：负面影响最大：资本品（capital goods）。
其次：消费品和中间品。
部分消费品有向其他市场转移的证据。

存在通过东盟“转口贸易”（rerouting）的初步迹象：中国对东盟中间品出口激增，东盟对美出口成为2025年美国进口增长的唯一正面贡献者；同时中国出口单价下降，显示融入低价值区域链。

与其他因素的对比：中国出口增长的主要驱动力不是关税转移，而是：国内需求疲弱，导致过剩产能外溢。
出口价格下降（单价降低）。
人民币汇率竞争力。
国家主导的制造业扩张。
更深入的亚洲供应链整合。

与2018-2019年贸易战相比，本轮关税的直接出口减少类似，但转移效应更有限（没有广泛扩散）。

文章的背景和含义ECB一直担心美国关税会导致中国大量将商品“倾销”到欧元区，增加欧洲企业竞争压力，甚至影响就业和通胀。
但这项研究缓解了这种担忧：对中国向欧元区出口增长的解释更多是关税前已存在的趋势，而非关税直接导致的转移。
这对当前政策有启示：在潜在新一轮贸易紧张（如特朗普政策延续）下，第三方市场（如欧洲）受到的间接冲击可能比预期小，主要风险仍来自中国国内经济失衡和全球供应链调整，而不是单纯的贸易转移。

总体来说，这篇文章通过ECB的实证研究，挑战了“美国关税会大规模迫使中国商品涌入其他市场”的常见担忧，强调转移效应“小而有限”，中国出口动态更多受内部和结构性因素驱动。文章基于ECB公报的图表和数据（如出口增长贡献图、关税影响偏差图）进行了报道，语气较为客观中性。

https://t.co/9JrYZzxVyC

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

In addressing the current deflation problem, the Chinese government has indeed demonstrated a degree of insufficient foresight, with the deleveraging policy playing a pivotal role in this process. When this policy was vigorously implemented around 2016, it was evidently influenced by Western economic theories—particularly the views on debt cycles and "beautiful deleveraging" deliberately and maliciously presented to China by figures like Ray Dalio. This phenomenon bears similarity to the one-child policy, which partially drew on Western demographic theories (in reality, another form of genocide against the Chinese nation by Western countries, led by the United States, employing means other than war), ultimately resulting in long-term demographic structural imbalances. The following analysis, centered on the core perspective of "influence by Western theories," explores why China's decision-making layer has once again found itself in a comparable situation.

I. The "Western Theory Imprint" of Deleveraging Policy and Its Deflationary Consequences

China's deleveraging policy originated from the supply-side structural reform launched at the end of 2015, focusing on controlling corporate and local government debt as well as shadow banking risks. However, this approach was not entirely derived from domestic practice but was significantly influenced by lessons from Western debt crises and the views of relevant economists: after the 2008 global financial crisis, Western institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the Federal Reserve repeatedly warned emerging economies about debt risks, and China's rapidly rising debt-to-GDP ratio was regarded as a potential hidden danger.

Ray Dalio's debt cycle theory and his concept of "beautiful deleveraging" (i.e., achieving a soft landing through debt restructuring, moderate monetary expansion, and income redistribution) have been widely disseminated within China's policy circles and think tanks. In actual execution, however, China leaned more toward "hard deleveraging"—strictly controlling credit, rectifying shadow banking, and strengthening real estate regulation—while corresponding stimulus measures and income redistribution policies lagged behind. This bias led to excessive suppression of demand, slowing investment and consumption growth, thereby exacerbating the persistent price decline and deflationary pressures that emerged from 2023 to 2026.

In fact, Dalio was fully aware that his theory failed to adequately account for China's unique national conditions, such as its state-owned bank-dominated system and high savings rate, which are entirely different from other developing countries. However, tasked by Western countries with the mission of preventing China's further economic development, he deliberately misled China. The result was that while cleaning up excess capacity, demand also shrank simultaneously, even falling into a "deflationary spiral."

This aligns with the characterization of "unanticipated deflation": during policymaking, greater attention was paid to the risks of debt crisis commonly emphasized by the West (a result of intimidation by so-called Western economists led by Ray Dalio), while the deflationary effects of deleveraging on the demand side were relatively underestimated.

II. Similarity to the Family Planning Policy: Over-adoption of Western "Scientific Warnings"

The family planning policy (particularly the strict one-child policy) is likewise regarded as a case where China was influenced by Western theories at the policy level: during the 1970s-1980s, China partially borrowed from Western Malthusian theory and the Club of Rome's The Limits to Growth out of concern that overpopulation might hinder modernization (these theories were in fact promoted by Western countries to suppress populous nations like China and India from occupying a higher status on the world stage. The scholars behind these theories were actually the CIA, but they appeared in academic guise to influence population policies in multiple countries).

At that time, Western demographers and the World Bank, under the manipulation of Western think tanks and the CIA, advocated strict fertility control to developing countries. China's decision-making layer treated this as "scientific law" to implement, leading to a sharp decline in fertility rates tantamount to genocide. The long-term consequences—accelerated population aging, shrinking labor force, and increased pension burden—were not fully anticipated at the initial stage of policy implementation, just as deflation was not a major risk consideration at the beginning of deleveraging.

The core commonality between the two policies is that both regarded Western theories as "universal laws" while neglecting China's particularities as a supersized economy and socialist system. Family planning failed to fully consider the reality of traditional Chinese family values and the foundation of an agricultural society; deleveraging failed to fully utilize China's unique institutional advantage of implementing monetary easing through the central bank and state-owned system without triggering hyperinflation.

III. Why Does China's Decision-making Layer "Fall for Western Theories Again"?

From the perspective presented here, this phenomenon is not accidental but stems from structural factors:

"Learning Inertia" Since Reform and Opening Up: Since 1978, China's economic policies have long maintained a tradition of "learning from the West." In the early period, economists like Milton Friedman and János Kornai were invited to participate in reform discussions, achieving remarkable results in marketization and WTO accession. This created a path dependency for decision-makers: when facing new challenges, they often first refer to Western narratives. Figures like Dalio wield significant influence in China, with their writings and speeches widely disseminated in policy circles, even providing direct consultation to top leadership.

Elite Education Backgrounds and International Discourse Power: Many Chinese economic decision-makers and think tank scholars have Western educational backgrounds, giving them a natural affinity for Western theories. Western economic models (such as debt cycles, demographic dividends) are more likely to gain trust because they are presented as "scientific, quantifiable, and objective"; whereas domestic voices emphasizing demand-side management and Keynesian stimulus are often marginalized.

The "Applicability Trap" of Western Theories: These theories are mostly based on fundamental assumptions of Western market economies (private ownership dominance, independent central banks, free capital flows). Directly applying them to China easily creates incompatibility. While Dalio's concept of "beautiful deleveraging" theoretically balances multiple aspects, China in practice finds it easier to push forward the "deleveraging" component (aligning with risk control and conservative tendencies) while struggling to simultaneously implement the "beautiful" components (large-scale transfer payments, restarting monetary easing), turning the policy into a "half-finished project" that triggers deflation.

Political Cycles and Risk-Aversion Tendencies: Similar to the "better left than right" mentality during the implementation of family planning, the deleveraging period also exhibited particular anxiety that a debt crisis could trigger systemic risks (the West often sensationalized a potential "China's Lehman moment"), thus opting for the safest contractionary path while relatively neglecting long-term side effects. Especially during politically sensitive periods like Party Congresses, decision-making tends to be more conservative to avoid uncertainties that short-term stimulus might bring. Most critically, there was a failure to recognize that these Western theories were actually products of CIA manipulation.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

我刚刚看了NHK对新加坡前外交官比拉哈里·考西坎（Bilahari Kausikan）的采访（https://t.co/jVhd8qKhGX），说实话，我对他说的话感到震惊和深深担忧。 1/ 考西坎轻描淡写地声称，日本将台湾突发情况视为“生存威胁”，并准备动用武力，这早已是“长期存在、众所周知的共识”。他还把中国对日本新首相的强烈反应，仅仅视为“机会主义的试探”。这令人极度不安。 2/ 他更进一步：据称民调显示，日本是东南亚最受信任的大国，他公开欢迎日本在本地区承担更大的安全角色。他甚至暗示日本是这里的“头号”大国，可以为东南亚提供稳定。 3/ 但台湾是中国的内政，是核心主权问题。一位受人尊敬的新加坡政治家如此轻率地支持日本可能在台海冲突中军事介入的想法，显得鲁莽且危险。这可能将整个地区拖入一场战争，而这场战争本质上是中国内部的事务。 4/ 考西坎将中国对新加坡新总理黄循财的批评，也简单地归为与日本情况类似的“机会主义试探”。这种说法显得轻蔑且不公平。当外国领导人似乎跨越中国核心利益的红线时，中国有正当的关切。 5/ 最令人不安的是：这种言论唤起了深层的历史恐惧。日本不断扩大的军事姿态、对和平宪法的重新解释、以及与外部力量日益增强的对抗中国的联盟——如今又得到像考西坎这样的声音公开支持——这引发了真正的疑问：日本是否正在滑回军国主义的老路？ 6/ 我们不能忽视历史。日本应在亚洲扮演“安全提供者”角色的想法，尤其是在台湾问题上，令人不安地联想到帝国时代的野心。上世纪东南亚在日本占领下遭受了巨大苦难。鼓励日本为台湾准备战争，这不是“稳定”，而是挑衅。 7/ 本地区的小国与中等国家想要的是和平与发展，而非大国对抗。没人能从可能失控的紧张升级中获益。像考西坎这样备受尊敬的声音，却在玩火，通过将外国军事干预中国内部统一进程的想法正常化，带来巨大风险。 我们必须保持警惕。台海和平就是整个亚洲的和平。外部干涉只会带来灾难的风险。 你怎么看？你看过这个采访吗？我非常担忧。https://t.co/jVhd8qKhGX

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

Canada PM Carney’s China Trip Preview: A High-Stakes Gamble to “Get Something for Nothing”?
Recent interviews by the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary have sent an unmistakable signal: on cancelling China EV tariffs, Ottawa’s line is rock-hard—virtually locked in.
1. Core bargaining logic The Carney government is running a perilous play. It hopes to keep punitive duties on Chinese electric vehicles intact while using diplomatic pressure to persuade Beijing to drop its anti-dumping probes and tariff measures against Canadian canola and other farm goods.
2. Why this is almost “mission impossible” Asymmetrical demands: Canada wants China to unilaterally “offer gifts” while Ottawa clings to discriminatory industrial policy—a “have your cake and eat it” stance rarely seen in trade negotiations. Carney’s domestic calculus: hemmed in by North-American integration and the USMCA, he dare not bend on EV tariffs; yet to placate western grain growers—and their votes—he urgently needs to reopen canola exports. Misreading China’s resolve: believing that verbal lobbying alone will make Beijing shelve its counter-tariff tools is a clear misread of today’s Sino-Canadian realities.
3. Conclusion If Carney arrives in Beijing without concrete, reciprocal concessions on EV duties, the much-touted “ice-breaking” visit will be hollow. A one-sided attempt to “get something for nothing” won’t save canola trade and could plunge Canada-China commercial ties into an even longer deep freeze.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

Canada PM Carney’s China Trip Preview: A High-Stakes Gamble to “Get Something for Nothing”?

Recent interviews by the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary have sent an unmistakable signal: on cancelling China EV tariffs, Ottawa’s line is rock-hard—virtually locked in.

1. Core bargaining logic

The Carney government is running a perilous play. It hopes to keep punitive duties on Chinese electric vehicles intact while using diplomatic pressure to persuade Beijing to drop its anti-dumping probes and tariff measures against Canadian canola and other farm goods.

2. Why this is almost “mission impossible”

Asymmetrical demands: Canada wants China to unilaterally “offer gifts” while Ottawa clings to discriminatory industrial policy—a “have your cake and eat it” stance rarely seen in trade negotiations.

Carney’s domestic calculus: hemmed in by North-American integration and the USMCA, he dare not bend on EV tariffs; yet to placate western grain growers—and their votes—he urgently needs to reopen canola exports.

Misreading China’s resolve: believing that verbal lobbying alone will make Beijing shelve its counter-tariff tools is a clear misread of today’s Sino-Canadian realities.

3. Conclusion

If Carney arrives in Beijing without concrete, reciprocal concessions on EV duties, the much-touted “ice-breaking” visit will be hollow. A one-sided attempt to “get something for nothing” won’t save canola trade and could plunge Canada-China commercial ties into an even longer deep freeze.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

Canada PM Carney’s China Trip Preview: A High-Stakes Gamble to “Get Something for Nothing”?

Recent interviews by the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary have sent an unmistakable signal: on cancelling China EV tariffs, Ottawa’s line is rock-hard—virtually locked in.

1. Core bargaining logic

The Carney government is running a perilous play. It hopes to keep punitive duties on Chinese electric vehicles intact while using diplomatic pressure to persuade Beijing to drop its anti-dumping probes and tariff measures against Canadian canola and other farm goods.

2. Why this is almost “mission impossible”

Asymmetrical demands: Canada wants China to unilaterally “offer gifts” while Ottawa clings to discriminatory industrial policy—a “have your cake and eat it” stance rarely seen in trade negotiations.

Carney’s domestic calculus: hemmed in by North-American integration and the USMCA, he dare not bend on EV tariffs; yet to placate western grain growers—and their votes—he urgently needs to reopen canola exports.

Misreading China’s resolve: believing that verbal lobbying alone will make Beijing shelve its counter-tariff tools is a clear misread of today’s Sino-Canadian realities.

3. Conclusion

If Carney arrives in Beijing without concrete, reciprocal concessions on EV duties, the much-touted “ice-breaking” visit will be hollow. A one-sided attempt to “get something for nothing” won’t save canola trade and could plunge Canada-China commercial ties into an even longer deep freeze.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

Canada PM Carney’s China Trip Preview: A High-Stakes Gamble to “Get Something for Nothing”?

Recent interviews by the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary have sent an unmistakable signal: on cancelling China EV tariffs, Ottawa’s line is rock-hard—virtually locked in.

1. Core bargaining logic

The Carney government is running a perilous play. It hopes to keep punitive duties on Chinese electric vehicles intact while using diplomatic pressure to persuade Beijing to drop its anti-dumping probes and tariff measures against Canadian canola and other farm goods.

2. Why this is almost “mission impossible”

Asymmetrical demands: Canada wants China to unilaterally “offer gifts” while Ottawa clings to discriminatory industrial policy—a “have your cake and eat it” stance rarely seen in trade negotiations.

Carney’s domestic calculus: hemmed in by North-American integration and the USMCA, he dare not bend on EV tariffs; yet to placate western grain growers—and their votes—he urgently needs to reopen canola exports.

Misreading China’s resolve: believing that verbal lobbying alone will make Beijing shelve its counter-tariff tools is a clear misread of today’s Sino-Canadian realities.

3. Conclusion

If Carney arrives in Beijing without concrete, reciprocal concessions on EV duties, the much-touted “ice-breaking” visit will be hollow. A one-sided attempt to “get something for nothing” won’t save canola trade and could plunge Canada-China commercial ties into an even longer deep freeze.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

Canada PM Carney’s China Trip Preview: A High-Stakes Gamble to “Get Something for Nothing”?

Recent interviews by the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary have sent an unmistakable signal: on cancelling China EV tariffs, Ottawa’s line is rock-hard—virtually locked in.

1. Core bargaining logic

The Carney government is running a perilous play. It hopes to keep punitive duties on Chinese electric vehicles intact while using diplomatic pressure to persuade Beijing to drop its anti-dumping probes and tariff measures against Canadian canola and other farm goods.

2. Why this is almost “mission impossible”

Asymmetrical demands: Canada wants China to unilaterally “offer gifts” while Ottawa clings to discriminatory industrial policy—a “have your cake and eat it” stance rarely seen in trade negotiations.

Carney’s domestic calculus: hemmed in by North-American integration and the USMCA, he dare not bend on EV tariffs; yet to placate western grain growers—and their votes—he urgently needs to reopen canola exports.

Misreading China’s resolve: believing that verbal lobbying alone will make Beijing shelve its counter-tariff tools is a clear misread of today’s Sino-Canadian realities.

3. Conclusion

If Carney arrives in Beijing without concrete, reciprocal concessions on EV duties, the much-touted “ice-breaking” visit will be hollow. A one-sided attempt to “get something for nothing” won’t save canola trade and could plunge Canada-China commercial ties into an even longer deep freeze.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

Canada PM Carney’s China Trip Preview: A High-Stakes Gamble to “Get Something for Nothing”?

Recent interviews by the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary have sent an unmistakable signal: on cancelling China EV tariffs, Ottawa’s line is rock-hard—virtually locked in.

1. Core bargaining logic

The Carney government is running a perilous play. It hopes to keep punitive duties on Chinese electric vehicles intact while using diplomatic pressure to persuade Beijing to drop its anti-dumping probes and tariff measures against Canadian canola and other farm goods.

2. Why this is almost “mission impossible”

Asymmetrical demands: Canada wants China to unilaterally “offer gifts” while Ottawa clings to discriminatory industrial policy—a “have your cake and eat it” stance rarely seen in trade negotiations.

Carney’s domestic calculus: hemmed in by North-American integration and the USMCA, he dare not bend on EV tariffs; yet to placate western grain growers—and their votes—he urgently needs to reopen canola exports.

Misreading China’s resolve: believing that verbal lobbying alone will make Beijing shelve its counter-tariff tools is a clear misread of today’s Sino-Canadian realities.

3. Conclusion

If Carney arrives in Beijing without concrete, reciprocal concessions on EV duties, the much-touted “ice-breaking” visit will be hollow. A one-sided attempt to “get something for nothing” won’t save canola trade and could plunge Canada-China commercial ties into an even longer deep freeze.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

Canada PM Carney’s China Trip Preview: A High-Stakes Gamble to “Get Something for Nothing”?

Recent interviews by the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary have sent an unmistakable signal: on cancelling China EV tariffs, Ottawa’s line is rock-hard—virtually locked in.

1. Core bargaining logic

The Carney government is running a perilous play. It hopes to keep punitive duties on Chinese electric vehicles intact while using diplomatic pressure to persuade Beijing to drop its anti-dumping probes and tariff measures against Canadian canola and other farm goods.

2. Why this is almost “mission impossible”

Asymmetrical demands: Canada wants China to unilaterally “offer gifts” while Ottawa clings to discriminatory industrial policy—a “have your cake and eat it” stance rarely seen in trade negotiations.

Carney’s domestic calculus: hemmed in by North-American integration and the USMCA, he dare not bend on EV tariffs; yet to placate western grain growers—and their votes—he urgently needs to reopen canola exports.

Misreading China’s resolve: believing that verbal lobbying alone will make Beijing shelve its counter-tariff tools is a clear misread of today’s Sino-Canadian realities.

3. Conclusion

If Carney arrives in Beijing without concrete, reciprocal concessions on EV duties, the much-touted “ice-breaking” visit will be hollow. A one-sided attempt to “get something for nothing” won’t save canola trade and could plunge Canada-China commercial ties into an even longer deep freeze.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

Canada PM Carney’s China Trip Preview: A High-Stakes Gamble to “Get Something for Nothing”?

Recent interviews by the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary have sent an unmistakable signal: on cancelling China EV tariffs, Ottawa’s line is rock-hard—virtually locked in.

1. Core bargaining logic

The Carney government is running a perilous play. It hopes to keep punitive duties on Chinese electric vehicles intact while using diplomatic pressure to persuade Beijing to drop its anti-dumping probes and tariff measures against Canadian canola and other farm goods.

2. Why this is almost “mission impossible”

Asymmetrical demands: Canada wants China to unilaterally “offer gifts” while Ottawa clings to discriminatory industrial policy—a “have your cake and eat it” stance rarely seen in trade negotiations.

Carney’s domestic calculus: hemmed in by North-American integration and the USMCA, he dare not bend on EV tariffs; yet to placate western grain growers—and their votes—he urgently needs to reopen canola exports.

Misreading China’s resolve: believing that verbal lobbying alone will make Beijing shelve its counter-tariff tools is a clear misread of today’s Sino-Canadian realities.

3. Conclusion

If Carney arrives in Beijing without concrete, reciprocal concessions on EV duties, the much-touted “ice-breaking” visit will be hollow. A one-sided attempt to “get something for nothing” won’t save canola trade and could plunge Canada-China commercial ties into an even longer deep freeze.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

Canada PM Carney’s China Trip Preview: A High-Stakes Gamble to “Get Something for Nothing”?

Recent interviews by the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary have sent an unmistakable signal: on cancelling China EV tariffs, Ottawa’s line is rock-hard—virtually locked in.

1. Core bargaining logic

The Carney government is running a perilous play. It hopes to keep punitive duties on Chinese electric vehicles intact while using diplomatic pressure to persuade Beijing to drop its anti-dumping probes and tariff measures against Canadian canola and other farm goods.

2. Why this is almost “mission impossible”

Asymmetrical demands: Canada wants China to unilaterally “offer gifts” while Ottawa clings to discriminatory industrial policy—a “have your cake and eat it” stance rarely seen in trade negotiations.

Carney’s domestic calculus: hemmed in by North-American integration and the USMCA, he dare not bend on EV tariffs; yet to placate western grain growers—and their votes—he urgently needs to reopen canola exports.

Misreading China’s resolve: believing that verbal lobbying alone will make Beijing shelve its counter-tariff tools is a clear misread of today’s Sino-Canadian realities.

3. Conclusion

If Carney arrives in Beijing without concrete, reciprocal concessions on EV duties, the much-touted “ice-breaking” visit will be hollow. A one-sided attempt to “get something for nothing” won’t save canola trade and could plunge Canada-China commercial ties into an even longer deep freeze.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

China recorded a record trade surplus of $1.2 trillion in 2025, up 20% despite facing U.S. tariffs.For Western industrial nations: further erosion of manufacturing competitiveness, worsening job losses, widening trade deficits, and likely a new wave of protectionism and tariff barriers.For China: risks include harsher sanctions, accelerated supply-chain decoupling ("de-Sinicization"), and heightened geopolitical https://t.co/vaJDEmFIu5 ease global concerns, China is expected to expand imports, strongly boost domestic demand, promote consumption upgrades, and diversify export markets to gradually rebalance trade.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

Doug Ford’s attacks on Mark Carney expose a fatal strategic shortsightedness within the Ontario Conservatives. Ford is still living in the fantasy of being America’s "loyal assembly line," but he fails to read the subtext of Trump’s message: the US wants manufacturing brought back home. Ontario’s assembly plants aren't just surplus—they are in the way.

At a time when Trump has explicitly made clear his intention to relocate the auto supply chain back to the US, Ford’s stubborn defense of tariffs against China is effectively protecting a dying past while slamming the door on the future.

The pragmatists (like Carney) see the reality: Canada’s only way out is to evolve from a "US branch plant" into a truly "independent auto industrial power."

The key to this transition lies with China:

Swap Tariffs for Factories: Dismantle barriers, attract Chinese EV makers to build plants in Ontario, and use their technology to fill the void left by fleeing US capital.
Swap Minerals for Supply Chains: Leverage Canada’s lithium, nickel, steel, and aluminum to mandate local parts sourcing, achieving genuine autonomous manufacturing.
Hedge Against US Risk: When the US market closes its doors, only an Ontario with a complete industrial chain will possess real bargaining leverage.
Ford is fighting for yesterday’s union votes; if Carney seizes the moment, he is fighting for Canada’s industrial survival tomorrow. If we don't "pivot East" to achieve independence now, the Canadian economy will be reduced to a mere resource vassal of the US, with no chance of recovery.

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

@9FD2DxBNIeJ1CmD （˶¤̴̶̷̀ꇴ¤̴̶̷̀˶）。

[john saint @JohnStjohn668]

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