Eight questions that could completely change our assessment of the US-Iran War:
I've seen a lot of confident declarations about who is winning or losing the Iran war, and what the ultimate strategic outcome will be.
I think many of these assessments are premature.
There's a tendency to focus on the destruction we've seen, the missiles fired, the targets hit, or the economic damage inflicted.
These are obviously important, but they don't necessarily tell us whether the strategic objectives of either side have actually been achieved.
And in Iran's case, there are quite a few major unknowns that could fundamentally change how we assess the outcome of this war. Depending on the answers, we could be looking at very different conclusions about what the US and Israel have achieved, what Iran has lost, and what capabilities the Islamic Republic will retain once the fighting eventually ends.
1. What is the actual state of Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities?
How extensive was the damage inflicted by American strikes on Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan during the Twelve Day War in 2025?
Based on subsequent American statements and demands for access to these facilities, it appears that even the US may not be entirely certain how successful its bunker buster strikes actually were.
And that was well over a year ago. A lot can happen in that time.
The general assumption today is that Iran still possesses a substantial stockpile of highly enriched uranium but has lost the ability to produce more of it.
But what if this assumption is wrong? What if some of the facilities survived in better condition than expected? Or Iran has managed to repair portions of them?
There's an enormous difference between a country possessing a finite stockpile of enriched uranium and one that still has the ability to continuously produce more.
And that would fundamentally change our assessment of how successful the campaign against Iran's nuclear program has actually been.
2. Does Iran have additional underground nuclear facilities that haven't been revealed?
When we think of underground enrichment facilities, we generally imagine enormous complexes like Fordow or what is believed to be under Pickaxe Mountain near Natanz.
But does an undisclosed nuclear facility necessarily have to look like that?
Particularly given the large quantities of uranium Iran had already enriched to 60%, it's entirely possible that a much smaller, more specialized facility could serve a very different purpose from the enormous civilian enrichment complexes we've become accustomed to seeing.
Such a facility might have a considerably smaller physical footprint, and may not necessarily be buried deep under a mountain.
Or perhaps there are additional large underground complexes that simply haven't been publicly identified.
I don't think we should automatically assume that everything Iran has built necessarily resembles the facilities we already know about.
And if additional facilities exist, the destruction of the known nuclear infrastructure may have accomplished considerably less than we think.
3. Has the IRGC initiated a covert nuclear weapons program?
I've discussed this before, but I suspect the answer to this question is probably yes.
The rhetoric coming from within the Islamic Republic has been moving in a fairly clear direction. There has been an increasingly open discussion about acquiring nuclear weapons, and much of this messaging, particularly from media and figures close to the IRGC, looks increasingly coordinated to me.
It seems that at least some factions are trying to prepare domestic public opinion for a fundamental change in Iran's nuclear doctrine.
Of course, that doesn't necessarily establish that such a program has actually been authorized or initiated.
But I think the more important question may ultimately be how far they've managed to get.
Iran has a long history of developing technologies with both civilian and military applications. Its space program is an obvious example.
It's not particularly difficult to imagine something similar happening with the nuclear program, with a much smaller military effort operating in parallel to the larger civilian infrastructure.
And such a program wouldn't necessarily have anything resembling the physical footprint of Iran's previous enrichment facilities.
If the war has pushed the Iranian leadership towards actually acquiring nuclear weapons, then it's entirely possible that the campaign could ultimately produce the opposite of one of its most important strategic objectives.
4. How healthy is Mojtaba Khamenei and to what extent is he actually governing?
There's been a noticeable change in the frequency and speed of statements being issued in Mojtaba Khamenei's name.
In the early stages of the war, it sometimes appeared that he was almost impossible to reach for days at a time. More recently, statements and directives attributed to him have been appearing much more frequently, often responding to developments relatively quickly.
This would seem to suggest that his ability to communicate and exercise authority has improved, assuming these statements genuinely reflect his own decisions.
But how healthy is he actually? Is he communicating regularly with senior officials? How much control does he personally exercise over the country's political and military decision making?
And will he eventually emerge publicly and begin exercising the kind of visible authority his father maintained?
There's a significant difference between an Islamic Republic in which a Supreme Leader is actively directing the state and one in which major decisions are being made by competing factions or a relatively small collection of IRGC commanders and senior officials.
Whether there is actually a central authority capable of coordinating these different institutions has major implications for how Iran conducts the war, whether it can negotiate an end to it, and what happens afterward.
5. How quickly can Iran rebuild its destroyed industrial infrastructure?
Particularly the country's steel, petrochemical, and other major industrial facilities.
One thing we've already seen is that Iran has sometimes been able to restore critical infrastructure surprisingly quickly.
For example, after strikes destroyed or damaged bridges and tunnels around Bandar Abbas, Iranian engineers were able to restore some transportation links to a functional level without necessarily rebuilding the original structures entirely.
Of course, rebuilding a bridge or reopening a road is very different from restoring a major steel or petrochemical complex.
There have been some extremely ambitious statements about how quickly Iran can restore its industrial production, particularly in the steel industry.
Can they actually achieve these targets? And can they restore production to anything resembling its previous capacity and quality?
I don't have much doubt about the abilities of Iranian engineers. But engineering expertise alone isn't enough. They also need equipment, financing, materials, and access to industrial technologies that may be difficult to obtain under the current circumstances.
Are we looking at a disruption lasting months, several years, or something much longer?
The answer matters enormously for understanding the long term economic consequences of the war and Iran's ability to rebuild its military and industrial capabilities.
6. How extensive and reliable are Iran's longer range missile and drone capabilities?
I think it's becoming increasingly clear that Iran probably possesses the technical ability to develop missiles with ranges considerably beyond the 2,000 kilometer limit it previously maintained.
Reaching at least parts of Southern Europe appears increasingly plausible.
But there's a difference between being able to demonstrate that a missile can travel a certain distance and possessing a reliable operational capability to strike targets at that distance.
How accurate are these systems? How consistently can they be used? And how much of a meaningful military threat do they actually represent?
We've already seen that Iran has generally had a much more difficult time striking Israel compared to targets in the Persian Gulf.
Part of this is obviously because Israel possesses much more extensive air defenses. But distance also matters.
So what happens when considering targets in Europe that may be farther away but don't necessarily possess anything resembling the multiple layers of defenses protecting Israel?
And what about Iran's longer range drone and cruise missile capabilities?
I think there's still a lot we don't know about how effective these systems actually are, and that has major implications for how far beyond the Middle East Iran can credibly threaten to extend a future conflict.
7. How much Iranian oil is actually making it out despite the blockade?
The general assumption is that the blockade has been extremely successful and that Iranian crude oil exports have been reduced to almost nothing, with relatively small quantities of other petroleum products still getting out.
And based on the publicly available information, that certainly appears to be the case.
But is it possible we're underestimating how much is actually leaving the country?
Could there be more substantial quantities moving through land routes, concealed maritime shipments, transfers between vessels, or exports being represented as originating from other countries?
And if so, are these relatively isolated exceptions or is there a larger trade that simply isn't being captured by the available data?
I think this is particularly important because the economic impact of the blockade depends heavily on how successful it actually is.
If Iran has effectively lost its primary source of foreign currency, the economic consequences could be catastrophic over time.
But if it has managed to maintain a meaningful amount of oil revenue through less visible channels, then its ability to withstand economic pressure may be considerably greater than we currently assume.
Even a relatively modest difference in the amount of revenue coming in could become very consequential over the course of a prolonged war.
8. How much of Iran's missile production infrastructure is actually underground?
We know that Iran has extensive underground facilities for storing and launching missiles, and there is evidence of at least some underground production capacity.
But how extensive is that production infrastructure?
Are we talking about a relatively limited number of protected facilities? Or has Iran managed to move a substantial portion of its missile manufacturing industry underground, including production processes and equipment that would traditionally have been housed in aboveground factories?
This is particularly interesting because it seems clear that Iran anticipated the possibility of a major war for years and invested enormous resources into expanding its missile production.
But did that expansion also include a major effort to protect the manufacturing infrastructure itself?
And what about the period between the Twelve Day War in 2025 and the outbreak of the current war in February 2026?
Iran had several months to study the lessons of the earlier strikes and make adjustments. To what extent did that include moving additional production infrastructure underground?
Recent IRGC statements have claimed an expansion of underground manufacturing capabilities, but the actual scale and effectiveness of these efforts remains difficult to independently assess.
This matters because there's a fundamental difference between destroying a country's existing missile stockpiles and destroying its ability to manufacture new ones.
If Iran has lost a substantial portion of its missiles but retains much of its production capacity, then those losses could eventually be replaced.
But if the manufacturing infrastructure itself has been largely destroyed, then Iran's missile capabilities could be severely degraded for years to come.
And that would represent a much more significant long term strategic loss than the destruction of existing stockpiles alone.
Conclusion:
I think people confidently declaring winners and losers in a war that hasn't even ended yet, without knowing the answers to many of these questions, are being far too hasty.
And what I find particularly frustrating is that many of these assessments seem to assume that we already know the answers, when in reality I think there's considerably more uncertainty than people are willing to acknowledge.
Some of these questions may already have answers known to the intelligence services of the countries involved. Others may not become clear until months or even years after the war ends.
But unless someone has access to intelligence that isn't publicly available, I think it's very difficult to make confident assessments of the ultimate strategic outcome.
It's entirely possible for Iran to suffer catastrophic military and economic losses while still preserving enough of its capabilities to frustrate the strategic objectives of its adversaries.
It's also entirely possible for Iran to continue launching attacks and imposing costs on its adversaries while having suffered damage that will leave it substantially weaker for many years to come.
These two things aren't mutually exclusive either.
Ultimately, I think any serious attempt to assess who is winning or losing the war has to acknowledge just how much we still don't know.
And until we have better answers to at least some of these questions, I think the only intellectually honest conclusion is that *it depends.*
@idkijustthibk For the sake of what i was saying, "real" means coming from a living animal. Personally, I would be (and am) happy with lab grown or plant based substitutes. I don't think they are equivalent to each other though, and I think the former may convert more carnivores than the latter
No American policymaker has ever explained how making it harder for ordinary Iranians to afford food and medicine advances U.S. national security.
Very important report from @yjtorbati and colleagues.
https://t.co/Isi1ZCIrVZ
@idkijustthibk I'm saying people generally outsource the manufacturing of things they enjoy, meat isn't unique in that regard. "Real" meat requires violence, letting people have it without the violence is a good thing.
The widespread backlash against the @NYTimes report drawing an unproven link between Iran’s dams and missile sites reflects two realities: the ongoing war on Iran and the US media’s dark history of manufacturing consent for wars in the Middle East.
First, context matters. We do not live in normal times. We are in the midst of an illegal war of aggression launched by the US and Israel on Iran without congressional authorization or a UN Security Council mandate. A war that opened with the bombing of a school full of children in Minab, has killed thousands of civilians and destroyed or damaged hundreds of civilian sites, with staggering disregard for international humanitarian law. Meanwhile, the US president, commander in chief of the most powerful military in human history, openly threatens to wipe out an entire civilization.
It is against this backdrop that the New York Times published its report, promoted with the hashtag #MissileCity and terms such as “dual-use”, language long invoked to justify attacks on civilian infrastructure on grounds of alleged military use. The insinuation is clear, despite the lack of conclusive evidence. The question is not whether such a hypothesis warrants investigation, but what it means to publish and promote it when civilian infrastructure is already under attack, risking legitimizing further attacks. Imagine the reaction if similar speculative claims were published about water infrastructure in the US, Israel or Europe while those countries were under bombardment.
Second, history matters. The mainstream US media has a troubling record of manufacturing consent for wars in the Middle East by uncritically amplifying US government claims. The New York Times, in particular, lent credibility to the Bush administration’s false claims about weapons of mass destruction, helping manufacture consent for the US invasion of Iraq and the devastation that followed. That history inevitably shapes how such reporting is received, particularly in the region.
This is not about shielding Iran from journalistic scrutiny. It is about evidentiary standards and editorial responsibility when the stakes are measured in human lives.
In wartime, the distance between an unsubstantiated allegation and a justification for bombing can be dangerously short. The New York Times, of all institutions, should know this from its own history.
@idkijustthibk Correct, and most people who enjoy video games don't develop software themselves. Most people who enjoy movies aren't actors or cinematographers. Most people who enjoy sleeping in didn't cut down a tree to build their own bed. So on and so forth.
@idkijustthibk Both are ways of indulging in "guilt free" forms of pleasure that have problematic aspects in the status quo. Meat isn't mandatory for existence, but it's pleasure that humans have evolved to particularly treasure. The motivation isn't going away, so the method should improve.
"Manufacturing consent" is not a particularly useful concept anymore, but it is nonetheless distressing to see this and the contemptible NYT article on Iran's water infrastructure. The professional exiles being on the same frequency is a bad omen for regular Iranians.
To end the war the Islamist regime started against the United States 47 years ago, the United States should defeat the mullahs snd win the war. The best way not to be in forever wars is to win them.
Speculation is not evidence. Spatial proximity is not causality.
Even those who attacked Iran have not made such claims linking dams to missiles!
This reductionist, sensational narrative is irresponsible journalism with potentially dangerous consequences for civilian water infrastructure.
The @nytimes should know better.
10 Voices From Inside Iran To Keep an Eye On
Journalists, academics, and commentators offering a window into the competing ideas shaping the Islamic Republic.
It's been some time that I've been thinking about how to present a framework for people less familiar with Iranian domestic politics to better understand the spectrum of ideas within the system and how its debates are evolving.
One thing I frequently emphasize is that following official government statements, international media coverage, or statements by organized opposition figures is not enough. Most people probably understand this, but tend to revert to these sources because they're the most accessible.
If not them, then what should people follow?
One answer is to pay attention to the journalists, academics, and commentators participating in political debates inside Iran itself. Unfortunately, some of the loudest voices reaching audiences outside Iran are poor representations of their respective political currents.
In reality, the Islamic Republic's political landscape is far from monolithic. It contains competing factions, rival interpretations of the country's national interests, and emerging intellectual currents that don't always fit neatly into established factional divisions. These differences are particularly important at a time of generational change, as younger voices increasingly challenge assumptions inherited from earlier generations.
My inclusion of people in this list is not an endorsement of their views (in fact, most of the people on this list vehemently disagree with each other, and a few probably hate me). Nor does it imply that they represent the spectrum of Iranian public opinion as a whole. I've written other articles about different anti-government currents, but this piece focuses on figures who are more or less within the system.
Some have close connections to the diplomatic or security establishment. Others have faced prosecution or professional consequences for challenging powerful institutions. Some primarily report developments, while others seek to explain, defend, or challenge the ideas shaping Iranian policy.
None is primarily identified with the organized opposition to the Islamic Republic. Though I would add that the delightful thing about human beings is that they are complex beings. Each of these individuals can fall into several different buckets.
The descriptions below are my own impressions. I apologize if I mischaracterize anyone, and I'm tagging those who have X accounts so they can correct me if they find my descriptions unfair.
1. Abas Aslani
A window into the Foreign Ministry's official thinking
Abas Aslani is a Tehran based foreign policy journalist who previously headed foreign policy coverage at Fars and Tasnim news agencies and is now editor-in-chief of Iran Nuances.
He has deep contacts within Iran's diplomatic establishment, making him an important source for understanding Tehran's official positions. His reporting frequently provides early indications of the government's diplomatic messaging, particularly useful during breaking events such as negotiations.
Unlike more openly partisan commentators, Aslani generally operates outside the conventional reformist-conservative divide, focusing instead on the positions and priorities of Iran's diplomatic establishment.
His particular value lies in providing insight into what the Iranian government is communicating, especially during nuclear negotiations, diplomatic crises, and rapidly developing international events.
X Account: @AbasAslani
2. Sara Massoumi
Reporting from Iran's reformist diplomatic circles
Sara Massoumi is one of Iran's established foreign policy journalists, having worked with the reformist newspaper Etemad and the Iranian Diplomacy website.
She is particularly well connected among reformist and pragmatist figures within Iran's foreign policy establishment. Her own outlook generally leans reformist, although her work combines original reporting, interviews, and political analysis.
Massoumi has also faced legal consequences for her public commentary. In 2023, she was prosecuted over a social media post questioning the official account of an incident involving a teenage girl (her sentence was subsequently suspended).
Her combination of access and analysis makes her particularly relevant during nuclear negotiations and diplomatic crises. Beyond reporting developments, she frequently examines the direction of Iranian foreign policy and the debates taking place among those who favor diplomatic engagement.
X Account: @SaraMassoumi
3. Ali Gholhaki
A conservative insider willing to challenge official narratives
Ali Gholhaki is a conservative journalist and political commentator known for his connections within Iran's political and security establishment.
Although firmly rooted in the revolutionary conservative camp, Gholhaki belongs to a younger current within the Iranian right that is sometimes willing to break taboos by openly criticizing officials, exposing internal disagreements, and challenging official accounts of events.
His access to political sources has occasionally allowed him to report information before its public announcement. During the 2021 presidential election, for example, he published the Guardian Council's approved candidate list ahead of the official release.
His reporting style bears some resemblance to that of Barak Ravid at Axios, whose work frequently draws on access to political insiders, although the institutional and political environments differ considerably.
Gholhaki's reporting provides a window into internal conservative discussions, including disagreements that might otherwise remain out of public view.
He briefly ran into legal trouble in 2022 when IRGC Intelligence cracked down on several insider political channels, but has continued his work since then.
X Account: @aghplt
4. Foad Izadi
The academic voice of traditional hardline foreign policy
Foad Izadi is an associate professor of American Studies at the University of Tehran. Notably, he completed his entire university education in the United States (bachelor's and master's degrees in Houston, followed by a PhD in Louisiana).
An established commentator on Iranian television and political discussion programs, Izadi articulates positions closely associated with the Islamic Republic's ideological conservative and hardline foreign policy currents.
His analysis emphasizes American hostility toward the Islamic Republic, skepticism about the value of negotiations, and the importance of deterrence and resistance to Western pressure.
Compared with some of the more populist personalities on Iran's political right, Izadi generally presents these arguments through a more structured academic framework.
His commentary offers insight into a significant current of thinking within Iran's traditional ideological establishment, particularly its interpretation of American intentions and the risks of diplomatic compromise.
His prominence in right wing circles has significantly increased over the past five years, allowing him to surpass some older figures in that space. I consider him one of the most effective thinkers of the more traditional right, as opposed to the new revisionist generation.
X Account: @IzadiFoad
5. Javad Mogoei
Extended access to Iran's military and revolutionary establishment
Javad Mogoei is a documentary filmmaker, historical researcher, and interviewer with extensive connections to Iran's revolutionary conservative and security circles.
Following the June 2025 Iran-Israel war, he launched Majara-ye Jang (The Story of War), a series of lengthy interviews with senior Iranian political and military figures. He subsequently continued the project with Majara-ye Jang 2, examining the later conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States.
His interviews, sometimes lasting several hours, feature unusually detailed accounts from officials directly involved in major political and military decisions.
Despite his strongly revolutionary and conservative outlook, Mogoei often challenges his guests with difficult questions, including those reflecting public skepticism toward official narratives. Disagreements over the content of his original series even led to a dispute with Iranian state television.
Similar to other figures in the younger Iranian right, he clearly understands the taboos and dissatisfaction within Iranian society and is far more comfortable breaking them than traditional conservative figures (though sometimes this may also be a marketing gimmick).
His work offers insight into how senior establishment figures explain consequential events, particularly their own roles in the country's recent conflicts. Both series are outstanding and have greatly enhanced my understanding of those conflicts.
6. Hamzeh Rahim Safavi
A reform oriented critic from within an establishment family
Hamzeh Rahim Safavi is a political scientist at the University of Tehran and the son of Yahya Rahim Safavi, a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and senior military adviser to Ali Khamenei.
Despite his family's longstanding connections to Iran's military establishment, his own political views are considerably more reform oriented. When confronted with the divergence of views, he has explained that his father is a military man while he is a political scientist, and that they inherently view the world through different lenses.
In recent years, Safavi has become increasingly outspoken in questioning Iran's strategic assumptions, particularly regarding the United States and Israel. He has criticized intelligence failures, the underestimation of adversaries, and the costs of the Islamic Republic's established foreign policy approach.
His arguments bear some resemblance to those of outspoken reformist intellectuals such as Sadegh Zibakalam, although Safavi generally operates closer to the political framework of the Islamic Republic.
His unusual combination of establishment connections and reform oriented criticism provides insight into debates over Iran's strategic direction, including those emerging from backgrounds traditionally associated with the security establishment.
7. Fereshteh Sadeghi
An English language voice from Iran's nationalist conservative spectrum
Fereshteh Sadeghi is a Tehran based journalist and commentator with a longstanding presence in English language coverage of Iranian politics, including work for Al-Monitor and other international outlets.
Her political outlook is broadly conservative, nationalist, and strongly skeptical of American intentions toward Iran. She frequently criticizes reformist approaches to relations with the West and social policies, but is also willing to challenge elements of the conservative establishment.
She has previously expressed sympathy for some figures associated with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, although that does not necessarily indicate a formal political affiliation.
Her commentary often reflects perspectives that do not fit neatly within the Islamic Republic's conventional factional divisions.
For English speaking audiences, Sadeghi provides access to a nationalist and anti imperialist current of Iranian political discourse that is not always well represented in international coverage.
Her reporting and commentary can be particularly useful for understanding criticism of both reformist diplomacy and elements of the conservative political establishment. I've frequently encountered her perspective in real life but see it far less commonly online and in English.
X Account: @fresh_sadegh
8. Yashar Soltani
Investigating corruption within the Islamic Republic
Yashar Soltani is one of Iran's prominent investigative journalists, known for exposing alleged corruption involving senior officials, government institutions, and politically connected business networks.
He gained widespread recognition in 2016 after publishing documents concerning controversial property transfers during Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf's tenure as Tehran mayor. His investigations have repeatedly led to prosecution and imprisonment.
More recently, Soltani has reported allegations concerning the intermediaries involved in Iranian oil exports under sanctions, raising questions about transparency, political influence, and the management of oil revenues.
He is widely assumed to be associated with reformist leaning political circles, leading to accusations that he selectively discloses information in ways that benefit particular political factions.
While Soltani primarily publishes in Persian, his investigations have made him a prominent figure in domestic debates about corruption, accountability, and the relationship between economic and political power.
X Account: @yasharsoltani
9. Saeed Laylaz
A reformist veteran challenging conventional reformist thinking
Saeed Laylaz is an economist, journalist, and longtime figure within Iran's reformist political establishment. A former adviser to President Mohammad Khatami, he was imprisoned following the disputed 2009 presidential election.
Despite these longstanding reformist credentials, Laylaz has increasingly articulated positions that diverge from conventional reformist thinking.
He has expressed deep skepticism toward American intentions, arguing that Washington's objectives go beyond the nuclear dispute and threaten Iran's independence and territorial integrity.
In recent commentary, he has made particularly striking remarks about the failures of the Islamic Republic and speculated about the emergence of a Bonaparte like figure from within the political establishment who could overcome political paralysis and transform the country's governance.
He has specifically mentioned Mojtaba Khamenei as one possibility in this context, illustrating how far his thinking has moved beyond conventional reformist assumptions.
Laylaz's commentary illustrates the changing ideological boundaries within Iran's reformist establishment, particularly where nationalism, state power, economic development, and relations with the West intersect.
10. Mohammad Fazeli
The developmentalist tradition of Iranian reformism
Mohammad Fazeli is an Iranian sociologist, author, and former university professor whose work focuses on governance, institutional effectiveness, and the obstacles to Iran's economic and social development.
Associated with a pragmatic and development-oriented current within Iran's reformist intellectual tradition, Fazeli emphasizes administrative competence, institutional reform, and economic progress over ideological confrontation.
His ideas overlap with the developmentalist tradition associated with Iran's Sazandegi movement, although this does not necessarily imply formal political affiliation.
Fazeli lost his position at Shahid Beheshti University in disputed circumstances and attracted national attention during the 2024 presidential election following a confrontation on state television while accompanying Masoud Pezeshkian.
Through his podcasts Daghdaghe Iran and IranTalk, he now hosts extensive discussions with academics, economists, and political thinkers about Iran's structural problems.
His work provides insight into a reformist intellectual current focused less on daily factional disputes and more on the institutional foundations of development and effective governance.
X Account: @Mfazeli114
Conclusion
Iran's political and intellectual landscape cannot be reduced to a simple confrontation between reformists and conservatives, or between the Islamic Republic and its opponents.
Within the existing political system are competing ideas about diplomacy, national security, economic development, state institutions, and the country's future direction.
One of the more interesting developments within Iran's political establishment is that some of its most consequential disagreements no longer follow traditional factional lines. Younger conservatives increasingly challenge the methods and assumptions of older revolutionary figures, while some veteran reformists have begun questioning the political frameworks that defined their own careers.
These shifts do not necessarily indicate a rejection of the Islamic Republic, but they complicate the familiar categories through which its politics are often understood.
These ten figures offer different points of entry into those debates. Their perspectives are neither exhaustive nor necessarily representative of Iranian society as a whole.
Understanding the competing ideas circulating inside Iran is an essential part of understanding the country's politics … and the directions in which they may evolve.