A little about me: I got started in the volatility trading business about 13 years ago, initially as the sole junior trader to Robert Kanter. From there, I went on to trade at several proprietary trading firms. After having the best year of my trading career, about six years ago, a few partners and I decided to start our own hedge fund.
I like to think I’ve established myself as one of the top volatility traders in my space. Along the way, I’ve been fortunate to receive a few industry awards, recognition, and backings for what I’ve been able to accomplish throughout my career as a trader.
My focus on this app is pretty simple: to have interesting discussions with other traders and PMs, help younger traders navigate their own journeys, and share some of the volatility trading philosophies and lessons that have served me well throughout my career.
Been on calls for the most part of the weekend. On the institutional side, nobody is in “panic mode”.
Some folks are annoyed they are losing money, some are discussing shutting their books down for the remainder of the year to preserve what’s left. But that’s about it. And it shouldn’t be surprising because even with the correction we got month to date, year to date the market is up!
I got into watches because the secondary market reminds me so much of trading. I know it sounds nerdy, but there’s something exciting to me about finding a dealer or seller who needs cash and has to move a piece off their balance sheet. If I can scoop it up at a steep enough discount, I’m already sitting on a sizable mark to market gain. And I love thinking about value like that.
I woke up this morning to a few price alerts I’d set for high end pieces on the secondary market. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that those alerts are going off just as equities and other risk assets are down.
IF (that’s a big IF) equities keep sliding over the next few weeks or months, I think that decline would do far more to bring inflation down than the ticky tack 25 basis point hikes the Fed has planned.
When risk assets really get hit, people who need cash start selling what they own, and even those who don’t need to sell may think twice about what they’re willing to spend. That would tighten financial conditions more than the efforts we’ve seen so far to constrain lending.
A good old-fashioned reset would likely be healthy for the economy in the long run.
There’s also some irony in how foreign the idea of carry-neutral tail hedging seems to so many investors.
In the derivatives prop trading world, traders have run long-vol books with flat carry for years. They trade vol to cover the cost of owning convexity and use that convexity to generate absolute returns.
Think about it for a second. Say you invest with a long-only equity manager. When the S&P gains 15%, the manager makes 15%. When the S&P loses 15%, the manager loses 15%. At some point, you’re going to ask, “Why am I paying for this? I can buy the index myself.”
Now imagine a long only manager who captures that same 15% on the way up and stays roughly flat on the way down. You’d understand exactly what you were paying for and ideally would be searching for managers like this. Their stock selection made a difference when the market worked against them.
So why do we drop that standard when it comes to tail hedging? When a tail program bleeds for years, investors accept “puts cost money” as an explanation. Of course puts cost money. So why aren’t we asking what the manager did to earn back that premium while keeping the convexity we hired them for?
At Ambrus, that’s the job as we see it. Trade vol well enough to preserve capital in quiet markets, participate in smaller bursts of volatility, and still own enough convexity to make a lot of money when a true tail event hits.
If all an investor wanted was to pay premium and wait, they could do that themselves but I think the whole point of a manager is to deliver something unique and exceptional. So ideally, I don’t think the concept should be as foreign as it is to most as it’s actually the cornerstone of what hedge fund investing was built on.
At Ambrus, we run a carry-neutral tail risk hedge fund with a distinct investment philosophy.
We don’t believe tail hedging has to mean bleeding capital for years while paying a fixed premium and waiting for a crisis. We believe that dynamically trading volatility where we have a genuine edge can help offset the cost of maintaining convexity, allowing us to pursue substantial gains during volatility spikes without the persistent bleed associated with traditional tail hedges.
Our mandate has three parts:
1) Preserve capital in normal markets. Aim to deliver roughly flat returns in subdued volatility environments by trading derivatives flows to offset the cost of carrying tail protection.
2) Capture opportunities in smaller volatility events. Put convexity to work during meaningful market dislocations, even when those moves fall short of a full-blown tail event. (Compounding convexity over time is a powerful thing and is what has given us the ability to outperform many absolute return strategies).
3) Deliver large, explosive returns in extreme environments. Maintain the convexity needed to pursue significant outsized gains when volatility accelerates into true tail events.
The central idea is simple: If you have alpha trading volatility, it can be a powerful tool to deliver asymmetric returns when volatility rises, and if you can avoid a substantial drag over time, you can allow convexity to compound in a meaningful way.
We believe this approach offers a more robust and complete tail hedge than simply buying puts and accepting persistent losses. In our view, actively managing that trade-off is precisely the value a volatility manager should bring.
We periodically give presentations on our approach to trading volatility/ our trading philosophy, and this year we’ll be hosting an event at iConnections. If you’ll be there and would like to learn more about how we put this philosophy into practice, send us a message.
https://t.co/0FCBXFJS1j
This is where things can start to get a bit risky for dispersion desks.
A lot of the single names that have delivered attractive delta and vol moves may have already exhausted much of that opportunity. These names are down significantly, and their vols are already jacked.
Meanwhile, index spot and vol moves have remained relatively subdued.
The risk is that those battered names begin to see smaller incremental moves in spot and vol, which becomes increasingly plausible after moves of this magnitude, just as the index starts to catch up.
Still a lot to play out into year end! Let’s see.
The Apple and the Spoon Effect
I’ve been trading in markets for a while now and have come across things that can be contradictory yet make sense. I’ve met people with exceptional infrastructure and rigorous quantitative processes who do very well. I’ve also met people with poor infrastructure and questionable quantitative processes who also do very well.
That second group is interesting because, when you ask about their process, they may point to something you believe has little statistical validity.
Someone might say, “I use RSI,” or reference another technical indicator. If you isolate that indicator and test it, you may find little evidence of a meaningful edge. Yet the person using it has been consistently profitable for years.
How do you reconcile that?
Over time, a trader can develop an ability to interpret information within a much broader context. The indicator becomes one input in a decision making process shaped by years of observation, pattern recognition, and experience. They learn when to act, when to wait, and when to ignore the signal entirely. They may struggle to articulate everything they’re processing.
I think of this as the Apple and the Spoon Effect.
If someone told you they peeled apples with a spoon, you’d probably think that was an inefficient, somewhat ridiculous way to do it. But imagine that person has been peeling apples with a spoon for 20 years.
They know which crevices to start with, the precise angle to hold the spoon, how much pressure to apply, and which shape or type of metal works best. Through repetition, they’ve become exceptionally skilled at using a seemingly ineffective tool.
The same can happen in trading. A tool that looks unimpressive in isolation can become useful in the hands of someone who has spent decades learning how to apply it in their own way.
That doesn’t establish the indicator’s statistical validity. It suggests that the trader’s edge may be more complex than their explanation of it.
This is why I’m cautious about dismissing someone’s entire process as nonsense simply because one component doesn’t hold up on its own.
Markets don’t pay you for having the most sophisticated explanation. Ultimately, your process has to translate into P&L and that’s the final judge whether the process and tools are pretty or not.
An investor of mine is an absolute legend in the trading world. He’s worth well into the billions and has built an amazing business.
I spent some time with him at his home today, and he shared a story about William Mayer.
He described how Mr. Mayer was highly respected on the trading floor for many years. His approach centered on selling deep out of the money tail options, a strategy that made money for years until the 1987 crash wiped him out completely.
We joked about it being a tale as old as time. But it also struck me that some of my best investors have been traders who experienced firsthand just how powerful long volatility can be when it really gets going.
Crazy to think how many current market participants have never experienced what that truly feels like.
@volisdead Meh, I think you know well enough that a lot of desk leads today (not the heads) were in junior roles back then. Where the risk was not theirs. It’s a different feeling imo when it’s your book.
Very accurate, especially when talking to other PMs that manage real capital.
Which is part of why, even with equities sliding lower, positioning still remains so pent up. Every down tick is met with the standard Pavlovian effect we have seen since April 2020.
There isn't a trader who has been unfortunate to be here in the year of our lord 2026 that isn't worried about a 13%, 3 session upside move in equities any day now
And that's the whole problem
Today is an example of what I meant in this post.
Weak spot vol beta in a changing regime isn’t a real signal it’s actually indication of the opposite.
I think that, usually, when spot prices decline and spot-vol beta is weak whether through fixed-strike vols coming in or other surface dynamics, it can be a sign that hedging pressures are easing and the recent spike in vol is nearing its end. There’s some data to support this signal.
But there’s a caveat. When this extends beyond a single, isolated event and you see smaller cycles of the same behavior occurring while vol simultaneously grinds higher, the signal becomes less reliable and can actually begin to support the opposite conclusion.
Spot-vol beta has been weak following the more recent moves in vol, yet vol continues to grind higher, little by little.
Point72 founder Steve Cohen (@StevenACohen2) on his worst investment ever, a $100 million healthcare loss, and the photo shoot he had to sit through that night:
Glenn Fuhrman: "What was your worst investment ever?"
"I'll tell you a funny story. I was, I was long a healthcare company"
"Lost $100 million or something. This was in 2002"
"And my wife was taking pictures at home that night, and she's got me putting on this costume, and I'm like... and I am livid."
"You got five minutes, and that's it. I'm out of here."
"You stick around long enough, you're gonna have bad days."
In really every facet of life. You can usually tell whether someone has discipline just by observing how they approach things that have nothing to do with their job.
How you do anything is how you do everything.