Nişanyan bu konuda yanlış bilgi veriyor.
Ayrıca verdiği bilgiyi net açıklamadığı i��in de yanlış anlaşılıyor.
Öncelikle doğru aktardığı konu Diyarbekir, Urfa, hatta Musul ve Erzurum gibi şehirlerin tarih boyunca salt bir "Kürt, Ermeni, Türk, Arap" şehirleri olmayıp birçok milli ve din�� unsurları barındıran bölgeler olması, bu doğru.
Ancak, süreç içerisinde bölgenin İslamlaşması ve Kürt siyasi egemenliğinde kalmasıyla - Mervaniler'den başlayıp Eyyubiler ve Kürdistan mirlikleri dönemi - 10.yy ve 19.yy arasında 1 yüzyıllık süre harici hemen hemen tüm bölgenin Kürt sultan ve mirlerinin yönetimiyle bu bölgelerde Kürt nüfusu varlığı kültürel mirası, faaliyeti diğer unsurları geride bırakmıştır.
Ve süreç içerisinde Mardin, Diyarbekir, Musul'un kuzey ve doğu tarafları ve Sincar/Şengal ve Erzurumun güney taraflarında Kürt nüfusu daha baskın hale gelmiştir.
Şimdi Nişanyan diyor ki, Diyarbekir Türk şehriydi" kesinlikle yanlış.
Aslında demek istediği şey - ki bunu diyor ama tepkilerden de anlaşıldığı üzere bunu söylediği anlaşılmayan bir kitle - Amid yani bugünkü Sur ilçesi için "Türk şehri" diyor.
Bunu bu şekilde açıklamak lazım.
Öncelikle Diyarbekir bir bölge ismidir de zaman zaman sınırları değişmiş olsa da genel olarak Diyarbekir Eyaleti
Çabakçur
Amid/Amed
Tercil
Siverek
Cemişgezek
Kulp
Ergani
Nusaybin
Hasankeyf
Atak
Sincar
Siird
Çermik
livalarını kapsıyor. Nişanyan buradaki 13 livadan sadece Amid" livasına bakarak Diyarbekir için "Türk şehri" demiş. Bu hem yanıltıcı bir ifade hem doğru değil.
Osmanlı'nın şark yani Kürdistan bölgesinde bazı kaleleri vardı buralara merkezden vali, molla, asker, memur atardı.
Diyarbekir'in Amid kazası Van şehri yani bugünkü İpekyolu ilçesi, Erzurum kalesi gibi bölgeler buna örnek.
Bu sebeple burada, lisan-ı ticari, lisan-ı idari ve sonunda lisan-ı mahalli "Türkçe" olmuştu.
Ama bu bölgenin Türk olduğunu göstermiyor.
Elimizdeki kaynaklar Amid için "lisan-ı mahalli Türkçe olup ekserisi Kürtçe dahi bilirler" diyor.
Kürtçe'nin orada pazar dili olmamasından bu "eskerin" de Kürt olduğunu anlayabiliriz.
Mahalli Lisan Türkçe olduğu için şehrie Türk muamalesi yapmak da şehirde Ermeni, Süryani, Arap da yok demek olur.
Ayrıca Kürtler "köyde" yaşamıyordu hem köy hem şehirde yaşıyorlardı. Nasıl bugün Diyarbekir'in 17 ilçesi varsa o zaman da ilçeleri vardı. Sadece Amid şehrine bakıp "Kürtler daha çok köydeydi" demek de ayrı bir yanılgıya sebep oluyor.
Mirdasî, Zirkî, Silivan beylerinin elindeki bölgeler dağ bayır mıydı? Şehir ve kaleydi.
Van Kalesi yani şehrinde de Kürtler vardı bununla ilgili de kaynak var elimizde, Bitlis şehrinin de çoğu Kürtler'di Muş şehrinin de.
Tabi bu 19.yy sonrası, öncesi ile ilgili bu kadar net bilgiler yok.
Neyse kısaca böyle.
@Mailesses You are illiterate and cant read the sources you have posted yourself. Look at the legend and read out the lineages written under Indic, and then read the lineages under Iranic. Troll account alert.
Pashtuns have an Iron Age Iranian ancestry from south central Asia, typically ranging from 20–50%, whereas Kurds typically range from 20–30% from SCA. Pashtuns have higher levels of Sintashta ancestry than Kurds because the non-Iranian ancestry component among Pashtuns also contains a substantial amount of Sintashta ancestry, whereas the non-Iranian ancestry component among Kurds effectively contains no Sintashta ancestry.
Kurdish Iron Age Iranian paternal lineages originating from south Central Asia account for roughly 45%, compared to 49% among Pashtuns. A degree of uncertainty remains for certain clades in both groups, but these figures are based on DNA diversity. There is certainly a stronger Iranian pull in Kurds based on the current dataset but it is no where near as high as you think. It is very comparable. Among Pashtuns, the Iranian lineages are predominantly represented by G2b and R1a-YP413, whereas among Kurds, they are distributed across a much wider variety of lineages, typically including various R1a branches, J2-Z7700, L1a1, and others.
Interestingly, this individual is using a screenshot from @Afghan_DNA , someone I have been friends with for many years and with whom I frequently share data. Since you consider his source authoritative, perhaps you could ask him what he thinks about Kurdish Y-DNA lineages. He has seen my data and agrees with my conclusions. He also uses the same methodology I do when classifying lineages. All the data I use for my charts is publicly available for anyone to verify.
Note: There is no good source to use for early Indic ancestry so I am forced to use moderns for Pashtuns. Iron age Iranian is not Andronovo. It is a reflection of what early Zoroastrian society would have had in south central Asia. Zoroastrianism is where Iranianness as a concept was originally born, and that is why that is the point of reference.
@JiCiyayeZagrose The thing is, There is zero evidence that 50% of Kurdish Y-DNA comes from the Yaz culture, especially considering that even Pashtuns barely hit 50% Yaz-related Y-DNA themselves. Claiming that half of Kurdish Y-DNA came from Yaz-related expansions is completely absurd
This message was clearly written by AI haha, but I'll address it for your little group, whom I'm not yet sure are even Kurdish. Anyways I'll quickly dismiss these garbage rebuttals.
The Oghuz Turkic ancestry of Kurds accounts for only a few percent and is sometimes entirely absent. Furthermore, Turkish ancestry among Kurds is predominantly female mediated.
No one said that haplogroups determine autosomal ancestry, or vice versa. Ancient Turkic groups are among the best sampled ancient populations, and, thus far, none of the SCA lineages found among Kurds can be attributed to them.
So far, the only rare Turks who match Kurds on these lineages in modern times are Turkified Kurds, with evidence to demonstrate this (claiming Kurdish tribes as Turkic, having families that speak Kurdish, etc.). Oghuz Turks independently carry SCA lineages, and we have a fairly good idea of which lineages they brought to the Middle East. They simply do not match those found among Kurds.
The conversation we have had thus far has focused exclusively on SCA Iranian ancestry. We have not yet discussed West Iranian ancestry, which Kurds overwhelmingly share with other Iranian ethnic groups across the Iranian Plateau and which is fundamental to the very ethnogenesis of Kurds. Once that is taken into consideration, we are talking about almost the entirety of the Kurdish genome.
Y-DNA is a tool through which we can trace the patrilineal history of a people. Kurds are a patrilineal people, and this is traditionally how Kurdish ethnicity has been determined. You cannot reconstruct the exact distribution of Y-DNA among historical Iranian populations, but you can identify whether Y-DNA diversity points towards a particular population group. Funnily enough, you tried to use this very methodology to argue for the non-Iranian origins of Kurds by posting AfghanDNA data, and now you are backtracking.
@Mailesses@bilz_27@shoresh03@JiCiyayeZagrose Your carpenter friend does not know how to interpret basic information. All these samples are distant matches. The ONLY close match Kurds have with Hasanlu is the outlier which models with 70% BMAC and 15-20% Sintashta.
https://t.co/NplhgzO6Am
Y-DNA matches of all available Western Grey Ware (WGW) samples at Hasanlu, Dinkha Tepe, and Hajji Firuz.
Western Grey Ware (WGW) is an early Iron Age ceramic tradition found in northwest Iran that predates the arrival of Iranians onto the plateau. The primary source of the culture seems to derive from Teppe Hissar–related and derived expansions westwards into central and northwest Iran, as seen in the technological continuity and developments, with smaller degrees of technological input from Transcaucasia.
Interestingly, the Hasanlu site shows massive signs of being a genocide site, conducted by invading Urartians. Outside of the current WGW samples found in the most western regions of WGW at sites like Hasanlu, there are archaeological sites such as the Sagzabad cluster, Godin Tepe, and Nush-i-Jan Tepe. Godin Tepe and Nush-i-Jan Tepe are sometimes erroneously described as Median archaeological sites. This remains highly doubtful.
The WGW samples can be modelled as a three-way mix between Teppe Hissar, Meso BA, and Armenia BA. Perhaps the more eastern archaeological sites will contain more Teppe Hissar–enriched ancestry in the future. The genocide site at Hasanlu shows a large number of Armenia Bronze Age–derived paternal R1b-Z2103 clades, and a very high portion of the men show alleles associated with micropenis.
The WGW clades at present are generally very small among modern testers showing they are largely irrelevant paternally to modern populations. There is a repeated theme of Armenians inheriting clades close to the samples at hand. WGW clades at hand do not seem to have any significant matches with west Iranians. With over 300 Kurdish Y-700/FF samples available, only one person matches a WGW sample, and that individual is seemingly from a relatively recent assimilated background (the exact TMRCA is yet to be calculated). Check Dinkha Tepe 4238 in the Excel screenshot.
The one outlier sample from the BMAC culture, who had immigrated to Hasanlu before dying, is the only major match with modern Kurds from the current WGW list. The Kurds, Tajiks, Kazakhs, etc. do not descend from this specific BMAC migrant to Hasanlu, but from other BMAC-derived migrations (almost certainly via Iranians) out of south-central Asia. Check Hasanlu 4097 (outlier) in the Excel screenshot.
The end of the WGW horizon is marked by the massive surge in Iranian activity via new arrivals onto the plateau, first interacting with the Parsua tribes, and later the Median tribes, who would have modelled as a mix of SCA cultures like BMAC and late Andronovans.
It's difficult to believe that WGW populations went completely extinct, but progressive waves of Iranians, Mesopotamians, Armenians, etc., would have largely erased their signature. Modern west Iranian affinity to WGW is due to the accumulation of similar types of ancestry independently from WGW, not direct descent. I discuss the autosomal aspect in more detail here:
https://t.co/BESJvSgzsN
1). Pamiris are heavily dominated by Sintashta, WSHG, and BMAC ancestry, both in terms of Y-DNA and autosomal DNA. They average 70–80% SCA Iranian ancestry, compared to 20–30% among Kurds and 20–50% among Pashtuns. It is not surprising that Pamiris average 45% R1a, according to my AfghanDNA friend, whom you have already cited. Not that the percentage matters, because, for isolated and bottlenecked groups such as the ones you have described, it could very easily have been 5%, 90%, or anything in between.
2). Iranian lineages are not bottlenecked into a single lineage like R1a. SCA lineages include numerous subclades under R2, J2, L, etc. You cannot project the exact distribution of lineages in modern populations back into history.
3). Autosomal DNA does not determine Y-DNA. Yaghnobis, for instance, have a far lower percentage of R1a despite being the most Iranian population globally. Meanwhile Kyrgyz have one of the highest Iranian R1a rates despite being very little Iranian autosomally. Do you want me to go through populations from around the world? I mean there is countless examples. Mhallamis, Brahmin Begalis, and many others we can draw a direct comparison.
4). Iranian Zoroastrian society is not merely assumed to be patrilineal; this is a fact attested to historically and religiously. Kurdish society has likewise been patrilineal throughout history, even more so than most other Iranian ethnic groups.
5). Andronovo is completely irrelevant to Iranians. But yes, they were patrilineal too, which should have influenced the spread of SCA Iranian ancestry. However, the exact nature and distribution of the lineages that ended up in any given Iranian ethnic group cannot be determined without mass sampling. The only thing we know is that many BMAC/WSHG lineages became highly prominent among Iranians.
It is impossible that the Courdenes/Carduchians are related to the Kurds or Kurdistan. You think there is barely any evidence, but on the contrary there is quite a lot, and it almost entirely goes against connecting these words with Kurds.
Historically, Kurds first appear in that land in the late 300s AD, long after the two terms in question. Neither term has any etymological connection to the word Kurd, and that is a linguistic fact. The only etymological match in Greek sources is the Cyrtians. When the Greek form is rendered into Iranian, it produces Kurti, which is an exact match of what you would expect the word Kurd to be written as during that time. I have already made a post on the phonological development of this, proving it. Not to mention the Cyrtians are also an excellent match for the Kurds in both social and geographical terms.
The historical distribution and areal contact of the Kurdish language demonstrate that Kurds did not inhabit Upper Mesopotamia or the northern Zagros during whenever Carduchians are attested. The Kurdish language possesses features that could only be consistent with a group situated in the southern Zagros at that time.
Unlike the Courdenes/Carduchians theory, the identification with the Cyrtians does not contradict what is historically known about the Kurds from Aramaic, Middle Persian, or even Arabic sources. On the contrary, it perfectly well with the evidence from these sources. Finally, we have genetic samples from areas bordering the lands associated with Courdene, and these samples show no resemblance whatsoever to the genetic profile of modern Kurds.
I could elaborate and continue even further, but this topic is not even worth the effort. It is seriously a very larpy mickey mouse thing Kurds need to stop doing.
Complete slop. The first account described here is not a Roman account, but rather a Greek account found in Xenophon's Anabasis. It has nothing at all to do with Kurds either, since it concerns the Carduchians rather than the expected form, Kurti, who are indeed attested separately by Greek sources in the southern Zagros (a completely different area), some 200 years after Xenophon's death.
The claim that "the Kurds hated Persia too" (with Persia erroneously used synonymously with Iran) is also completely made up. There is no text predating Islam that states anything of the sort. On the contrary, one of the things that repeatedly appears in the pre-Islamic period is that Kurds were in favour of the "Persians" (with the term erroneously used interchangeably with Iranians here). For example, in Armenia, Kurds rebelled in favour of Shapur II against the locals. In Fars Province, Kurds rebelled against the Parthians and supported Ardeshir I's quest for kingship. Kurds are listed as one of the loyal groups of the "Persians". In fact, Kurds also appear in Zoroastrian apocryphal religious texts as a people, alongside the Kermanis, who will restore Iran from foreign rule in the end times.
Moving on to the actual Roman accounts, Tigranes never ruled the Kurds. Kurds do not appear in these lands for another few hundred years. Corduene, which is attested later in roughly the same area where the Carduchians lived, is completely unrelated to the word Kurd, historically, linguistically, or genetically. The first Kurds attested in this region appear much later, in the late 300s AD, as foreigners. The eventual establishment of the Korchayk Province over these areas can be attributed to Kurdish activity. These were the "non-Christian pagans" who rebelled in favour of the Sassanid state against the local population, whom I briefly mentioned earlier. The bulk of Kurdish migration into this zone occurred even later, during the late Sassanid and early Islamic periods.
The follow-up AI-slop image in the thread is a complete mockery of human intelligence. Garbage fanfiction, complete with an entirely fabricated chronology that places the Gutians among the earliest ancestors of the Kurds. At this rate, we might as well claim Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck as our ancestors, too.
The first time Kurds ever appear in history, they are Iranian. The etymology of the word Kurd is Iranian. The language of the Kurds is Iranian. The cultural roots of the Kurds are Iranian. The historical roots of the Kurds are Iranian. The genetic roots of the Kurds are Iranian. Make peace with it, otherwise, you will end up engaging in a complete joke of a larp.
Before anyone starts larping about "Zagrosians", just understand that this is an insecure larp with no real meaning beyond geography. The majority of the non-Iranian genetic ancestry we have inherited does not even come from the Zagros. It largely comes from a variety of Semitic, Hurrian, Anatolian, and other admixture, which is also shared with the majority of other Iranians across the plateau. This non-Iranian ancestry is heavily attributable to admixture with non-Kurdish women, FYI, as there is a very strong patrilineal predominance of Iranian Y-DNA lineages among Kurds compared to their autosomal ancestry. This makes sense because Kurds are a patrilineal society.
The non-tribal segments of Iranians across the plateau, outside the Caspian region, all identify as Iranis by ethnic origin. This applies not only to Persian speakers but also to others, such as CPD speakers in Isfahan and Yazd. Historically, there has been no concept of ethno-linguistic identity among Iranic peoples. Rather, identity has been based more on socio-cultural, tribal, and geographical origins. Among the conservative and tribal segments of Iranian society, identity is traditionally understood to be transmitted almost exclusively through patrilineal descent.
The first time the word Persian gets used to describe an ethnic group by Iranians themselves in an Iranian language is in the late 1800s and early 1900s, during the late Qajar and early Pahlavi periods, by so called intellectuals, as a response to the spread of European nation-state nationalism and a desire to reformulate and centralise a singular nation-state identity in an otherwise tribally fragmented society (some 50% of Iran in the early 1800s belonged to tribal populations).
Historical usage of the term Persian to describe a people is an exonym derived from Greek and Arabic writings. The Greek usage is the source of how the word Persian is used in various European languages, such as English, whilst non-European usage tends to derive from Arabic. The European usage derives from the identification of the tribal ruling class of the Achaemenid Empire with the rest of Iranian society via classical writings, while the Arabic usage derives from the identification of Persian, as the administrative language of the Sassanids, with the rest of the Iranian populace.
Ironically, perhaps the first person recorded as introducing the idea of Persianness as an ethnic concept from an Iranian POV was a Kurdish man by the name of Zeyn al-Abedin Maraghei (1823–1895), who moved back and forth between Ottoman lands and Iran. You have various Iranian authors who use the term Persian in the same way around that time, such as Mirza Yahya Khan Moshir od-Dowleh (1832–1868). The most important author is undoubtedly Ali-Akbar Dehkhoda (1879–1956), who is at the foundation of the newly and artificially created Persianness.
Even today, if you ask any Iranian what their ethnicity is in the Persian language, almost no one will ever say Persian. Their ethnic endonym is Irani, and they will be confused if you say you are Persian ethnically. Of course, the Iranian diaspora in America will suggest otherwise, but they are largely driven by an identity crisis and a desire to be seen positively by white people. It is usually the non-Persian-speaking minorities who feel the need to assert Persianness anyway, because they feel unsure about the legacy and legitimacy of their Iranianness, since it does not fit into the new nation-state narratives.
The correct usage of the term Persian is only in the following contexts: a tribal organisation in the Old Iranian era that created the Achaemenid Empire; a provincial demonym for people living in a province in southwestern Iran in the Middle Iranian era, as seen in Pakuli inscriptions; and, from the Middle and New Iranian eras, a language. Any usage of the term Persian outside of these is simply incorrect.
Ignoring the early Islamic period, for most of the last 1,000 years of mostly Turco-Mongol rule, Persian speakers were primarily identified by outsiders using exonyms like Ajam and Tajik, even inside Iran. Ajam, of course, originated as an Arabic insult meaning "mumbler", but became synonymous with Iranians (including Kurds until the Safavid era).
Tajik derives from the Middle Persian rendering of the Arab tribe Tayyi, which became synonymous with all Arabs due to extensive interactions. It was most likely a Zoroastrian insult against Muslim Iranians, but was then adopted by Turks to refer to the urbanite Persian speaking populations. Inside some Turkish heavy zones of Iran, like among the Qashqai of Fars Province, the local Persian speaking population self identifies as Tajik even today. In Central Asia, the Soviets were instrumental in solidifying Tajik as an ethnic label for Persian speakers.
Accepting the term Persian as an ethnic identifier is a token of submission to and acceptance of the currently officialised, hijacked narrative of what it means to be an Iranian, because it ultimately rewrites history and is an attempt to reduce legitimacy and heritage of non-Persian Iranian peoples. Ironically the projection that the word Kurd is a new ethnic label, couldn't get any more true for the word Persian given it still does not properly function as an endonym label in 2026. Kurds should not dignify any personhood of the word Persian.
Kurdish dog (Persian: sag-e kurdī; Arabic: al-kalb al-kurdī) was a famous dog breed in the medieval period.
First mentioned in Arabic literature by Muḥammad al-Shaybānī (749–805 CE) and in Persian literature by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1149–1210 CE). /1
That doesn't work because the Kurdish association exists in the Karnamag, which is written in Middle Persian. It doesn't explicitly state that they are Kurdish, but it is quite evident that the author is trying to explain away the existence of this Kurdish association; namely, that Sasan fled among the Kurds following Alexander the Greek's conquest of Iran. This story is obviously a fabrication, but it does show that the Kurdish narrative existed outside of any Arabic histography.
Finally, an actual good question. The only sources where the name has to be read with a K are Arabic ones, for reasons I have already explained in my post. Early New Persian manuscripts often write g as a plain ک. Bal'ami's own editors note that its oldest manuscript (1190) doesn't use the gāf mark, and the Mujmal writes Gustahm as کستهم in the same sentence as کردیه. So whether you see ک or گ in a printed edition depends on the editor's choice, not on how the name was pronounced. The edition you read prints ک, either following the manuscript or the Arabic form. The real killer is that the meaning of the names of Bahram Chobin's brother and sister, "brave" or "hero", is attested in these sources. This is an exact match for the word gurd, not Kurd, which has an entirely different etymology and cannot be linked to it linguistically, despite some historical authors proposing folk links. So the Shahnameh attested form is indeed correct.
By the way, Bal'ami isn't authoritative either, because his work still rests on early Islamic Arabic writers rather than the Middle Persian sources that many others historians were using at the time.
I have actually solved the etymology of the Kurd as a side note, which is further evidence against any gurd connection:
https://t.co/DDgUQZeGca
MAJOR development. After several years of on and off attempts, I have finally solved the etymology of the ethnonym Kurd, which currently has no solution in academia. It comes from Proto-Indo-European *kr̥t-í- “cut” → Proto-Indo-Iranian *kr̥ti- → Proto-Iranian *kr̥ti- → *kur(ə)ti- (“cut”, but also an outer “garment”) → *Kurt(i)- (adopted as a tribal name) → *Kurt → *Kurd (by the 3rd c. CE) → Kurd (from a tribal identity to an ethnonym).
The first image, an etymological tree, sets out and justifies each sound change, if you want to see how the derivation is linguistically proven. It also contains the historical details on each form where attested. X reduces image resolution, so to read it clearly, expand the image and open it in a new tab. The second image shows the garment in question: the thick, tent-like traditional shepherd’s cloak made of dense felted wool, or wool mixed with goat hair.
Specifically, the name Kurd comes from this outer-garment sense, which was later adopted as a tribal name. Among Iranian languages, the garment word first appears in Avestan as kərəti-, in instructions on how Zoroastrians should wear it together with the sacred shirt and belt. In Parthian, kórt-ēn was the garment boys received as a coming-of-age gift when they reached manhood (which is linguistically a close match to the word Kurd, as the stem's predicted outcome of the Parthian would eventually become Kórd/Kurd since that gloss predates t > d). The word has cognates across the Iranian world, living and extinct, such as Khotanese, Ossetian, Sogdian and Bactrian.
There is historical evidence that Kurd still carried a secondary garment meaning in the early Islamic period, as the word was borrowed into Classical Arabic for a type of garment: kurdī, from the narrator Ibn Abī al-Zinād (d. 790 CE in Baghdad), in Abū Dāwūd 915 (before 889 CE), and kurdiyya in Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 1148 CE), among others. The hadith reads: “…from ʿĀʾisha, with this report. He said: and he took a kurdī that belonged to Abū Jahm. It was said: O Messenger of God, the khamīṣa was better than the kurdī.” This is important because it shows the t > d form unlike Kurt-(ek), and other forms that passed through west Iranian languages later on via Sogdian. They are still from the same root however.
Tribal names and clans very often come from places, animals, objects and so on. The Kurdish tribe Sanjabi is named after the squirrel fur, Herki is named after a citadel, etc. Kurds are first attested in history specifically as a tribe by Eratosthenes, Strabo and others. The older reading of Kurd as “nomad” has no etymological basis in any Iranian language, and many Kurdologists/Iranologists today regard it as an anti-Kurdish narrative with no basis in the historical record (see Boris James). Some earlier academics unknowingly built on Arabic mistranslations and deliberate misreadings, which are now corrected. There were also at least 11 Iranian nomadic tribal organisations on the plateau before Islam with no Kurdish identification, and 5 Iranian tribal organisations on the plateau that never had a Kurdish tribal affiliation which completely contradicts this narrative.
The main sound-change question left open in my tree is how r̥ became ur, since it normally gives ar or ər. There are several resolutions, but it is not yet clear which one it is. The u-form *kur(ə)ti- may have spread by borrowing, as a garment from the East Iranian lands: ur is the usual outcome in Parachi, Sanglechi-Ishkashmi and Shughni (Clayton 2022), and Sogdian kurθ- probably passed into Persian kurta. Or it may be a regular change in some western dialect, as in Balochi kurt “did” < *kr̥ta- (Korn 2003).
Several scholars already tie the garment word to the root for “cut”. Abaev derives Ossetian kærc “fur coat” from Old Ossetian *karti-, which “corresponds perfectly” to Avestan kərəti- “garment” (that is, *kr̥ti-), perhaps from *(s)ker- “to cut”; he calls Ossetian kuræt a loan. Bailey derives Khotanese kīḍakyä “garment” from kart- “to cut, tailor”, comparing kərəti-. Henning took Sogdian kurθ- “garment” as the same word as kərəti-, and Benveniste linked Persian kurta to the Sogdian. Sims-Williams, publishing Bactrian kuratīg “shirt”, calls it “a word of unknown but probably non-Iranian origin”, which would leave room for a substrate source such as the BMAC (2007: 224). Although Sims-Williams did not gloss through the full extent of the Iranian forms, or look too deeply into it.
I have opted otherwise, and agree with the other scholars who do derive it through Iranian, because of the following reasons. Avestan kərəti-, Ossetian kærc and Khotanese kīḍ- show the regular outcomes of *kr̥ti- at opposite ends of the Iranian world. The root has an Indo-European etymology, *(s)ker-t- “cut”, shared with Vedic kṛtí- “dagger”, and the Pahlavi commentary renders kərəti- as kirrēnīdag “cut”. The forms Sims-Williams compares are the u-forms, and they can all be accounted for within Iranian. The Sogdian θ comes from the regular change ty > θy. Persian kurta, Arabic qurṭaq, Pashto kurta and Ossetian kuræt are loans. A word with a regular Iranian etymology doesn’t need a substrate source.
To clarify for anyone who doesn't know, the stem is important for derivation as it carries the evidence of descent, while the the suffixes don’t necessarily. A stem passes down through Iranian forms and goes through its regular sound changes, so kurt- with t, kurθ- with θ and kurd with d each show where a form sits on the tree. Suffixes are added afresh by each language and are often swapped or borrowed depending on the application and context.
Given this etymology, the identification of the Cyrtians with the Kurds is even stronger than it already was, as the forms are an exact match. Identifications with the Carduchi, Qardu, among other folk proposals have become even more improbable, both linguistically and historically, than they already were.
Debunking a popular myth: that Bahram Chobin, the general who seized the Sasanian throne in 590, and the Parthian house of Mihran he belonged to were Kurds. The claim basically rests on the personal names of his siblings in the Arabic language. In Arabic, his sister is named Kurdiya (كردية) and his brother Kurdi (كردي).
The major issue is that Arabic had no letter for this g, and that is not how their names are spelt in Iranian languages. Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh renders their Iranian Bahram's siblings as Gurdiya (گردیه) and Gurduy (گردوی), and introduces the brother with the meaning of his own name: "که گرد و دلیر و جهانجوی بود", “a hero (gurd), brave and ambitious”. Take another example of poor Arabic rendering: the Gūrāns of Kurdistan, who are written as Kūrān in Arabic, with a k.
The same texts turn Bahram’s father Gushnasp into Jushnas and Bahram Gor into Bahram Jur. One sentence in the Mahasin wa’l-addad writes Kurdi with a k and Jur with a j: "دعا بكردي، أخي بهرام جور".
A further problem is that the words Kurd and gurd are not etymologically related. Persian gurd, “hero, brave”, comes from Old Iranian *wr̥ta-, beginning with *w-. Kurd comes from proto Iranian *kr̥ti-, beginning with *k-, which meant cut, semantically shifting to mean type of cultural outer cloak garment used by herders during the Old Iranian era, loaned into the plateau, then adopted as an Iranian tribal name, first attested by Greek writers by 220 BCE.
Ibn Wadih’s description of al-Jibal as a home of the Kurds in the 9th century has no bearing on the Mihranid house. Çelebi’s Ottoman list, which counts Bahram among Kurdish heroes and explains “Kurd” as meaning “brave”, is the exact same confusion and mistake I have explained above, because it is not Kurd that means brave, but rather gurd. A lack of textual criticism can not be used as justification.
What is more, on the same exact page that names the siblings, al-Tabari shows Bahram Chobin using the actual word “Kurd” as a slur against the Sasanian king Khosrow II: “son of an adulteress, raised in the tents of the Kurds”. This makes it even more unlikely he was Kurdish.
The Kurdish tribe bearing the name Mihran, being equated with Sassanid houses, is effectively equivalent to equating random Muslims with the name Muhammad. Mihran is the name of the Zoroastrian God Mithra. Claims such as these are wishful thinking, and nothing else.
In these sources the Kurd label never attaches to Bahram Chubin himself, only to the names of his sister (maybe also wife) and his brother. Those names are more properly rendered as Gurdiya and Gurduy anyways. Gurd and kurd are etymologically unrelated words. Iranian g is often written as k in Arabic, so Gurdiya became Kurdīya. Celebi’s claim that Kurd means “brave” looks like the same confusion, since it is gurd that means “hero” or "brave" in Persian. If anything, the sources point the other way. When Bahram Chubin went to war against Khosrow II, he used “Kurd” as an insult, calling Khosrow the son of an adulteress, raised in the tents of the Kurds. The classical fahla regions are not a match for the Kurds either. Kurds are heavily attested outside them, in Fars for example, while many non-Kurds lived inside them. If you take historically reconstructed movements of Kurds, then the fahla association even makes less sense.
@JangPiroz@HemdadArwandi Clearly, this is not evident enough for many Kurds. Not to mention, this is a good publication to refer to for those who want to investigate the subject more deeply. Is that hard to understand?
An important 2025 publication investigating how Öcalan’s democratic confederalism opposes only one state, the Kurdish one, by socially engineering and removing Kurdish social and political structures that act against assimilation. This is proven using his own writings and notes. In his original Turkish he calls Turkey’s borders legitimate and says the Turkish flag can fly over his grave. He told Kurdish MPs that asking the state for Kurdish education “is a mistake”. He promised that his model removes the “danger” of Kurdish becoming an official language, and eases the assimilation process of Kurds in the countries they live in. He said he built the KCK during talks with Turkish intelligence chief Emre Taner. He also called the Kurdish National Congress the body that would “determine the Misak-ı Milli”, the 1920 pact that claimed Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah for Turkey.
It draws on Öcalan’s post-2000 Turkish texts, including the KCK Social Pact, Democratic Confederalism, Problems of Democratization in Turkey, Defending a People and his İmralı notes from 2013 and 2014, and prints the originals in the footnotes. Democratic confederalism is presented as an alternative to the nation-state, yet it leaves all occupying forces that rule Kurdistan untouched and treats them as legitimate.
The translation problem is specific. Democratic Confederalism is under 50 pages, yet its flag statements, “I respect the Turkish flag” and “your flag is mine”, appear only in the Turkish edition. The English version uses the word “assimilation” five times, always critically. The Turkish original uses it once, and there Öcalan accepts the “natural assimilation” of Kurds, describing them as a “sociological phenomenon” and a “richness” for the Turkish nation. Most Western scholarship on Öcalan, including Jongerden, Akkaya, Gunes, Dirik and Graeber, rests on these selective translations. Kamran Matin and Michiel Leezenberg are among the few critical exceptions.
The story that Öcalan converted from Kurdish statehood to post-nationalism under Murray Bookchin’s influence does not hold, because there was no statehood project to give up. In 1977 he said the PKK ���did not emerge exclusively for only one nationality”. In 2004 he admitted that “Independent Kurdistan” was a slogan and that the PKK never thought the question of a state through. In a 1988 interview with Mehmet Ali Birand he spoke of coexistence and “internal independence”. At a 1993 press conference in Lebanon with Jalal Talabani he said Kurds and Turks could not separate, comparing them to “a fingernail and the surrounding flesh”, and offered to disarm in return for legal guarantees. In 1996 interviews with Nabil al-Mulham he denied that Western Kurdistan exists, saying “it is correct to say Syrian Kurds”, and proposed federalism inside Turkey, Iran and Iraq on the German, Spanish and Swiss models. The real shift after his capture was from supporting Kurdish federalism to opposing it. He also claims that without his “insight” in prison he “would have been a primitive nationalist aspiring for the nation-state”, which contradicts his own account.
Behind this sits a Kemalist view of Kurds that runs through his writing. In 2004 he wrote that Kurds “were not even aware of the extent of their betrayal” and that “neither human nor animal laws applied to them. They almost played the role of a third kind of being.” He spoke of the “old Kurdish trouble”. He told cadres that Kurds who believe they are free “must first be enslaved, and then these slaves must be freed”. He said his personality and principles “are more like those of a prophet”. In 1992 he told Birand that Kurdish power must stay under a single leadership: “I hold all these strings in my hand.” The PKK’s working language remained Turkish, and in 47 years it has produced no serious plan to revive Kurdish. Meanwhile the war emptied 2,685 Kurdish villages and hamlets by 1996, according to Human Rights Watch. A Van teachers’ union estimate puts the share of Kurds speaking Kurdish at 90% in the 1920s and around 7 to 8% today, with voluntary assimilation peaking during the Turkeyification years under the AKP.
In Öcalan’s own words, democratic confederalism leaves the Turkish state untouched. “The institutions and existing borders of the Republic of Turkey are considered legitimate. Issues such as whether it should be unitary, federal or confederal are not discussed, and it is not even recommended to bring them up.” “Yes to state reform, no to opposition to the state.” A completely stateless democracy is “adventurism”. “I am not saying that Turkey should become confederal. I am saying that it should be a democratic republic without losing its unitary structure.” Kurds should build their confederalism “without touching the borders”. The 2005 KCK Social Pact declares that three legal systems will now apply in Kurdistan: EU law, unitary state law and democratic confederal law. Öcalan describes the KCK as a civil society body that belongs “within the totality of the people or nation of Turkey”. He calls it parallel and complementary to the unitary state, and says its flexible idea of the nation will block “the problem-causing potential of federalist solutions”. He calls the nation-state fascist and compares it to Hitler and Mussolini, yet he declares the Turkish nation-state legitimate by calling it a republic. France, the first modern nation-state, was also a republic. Real multinational states such as Switzerland and Belgium rest on decentralisation and constitutional multilingualism, the very things Öcalan rules out.
On where the KCK came from, the İmralı notes are blunt. “We want to be a fundamental democratic element of this state… I built the KCK on this condition during Emre’s time.” Emre Taner was then head of Turkish intelligence (MİT). Öcalan describes five exhausting years of negotiations with Taner and a 156-page roadmap that was rejected. In his 2009 book he calls for “an intensive dialogue with the state’s security forces” to resolve the KCK’s legal questions. The KCK came out of bargaining with the Turkish state, not out of a Bookchinite change of paradigm.
Then there is the Misak-ı Milli. The last Ottoman parliament adopted it in 1920, and it defined Turkey’s borders as the armistice line of 1918. Mustafa Kemal’s own definition ran from south of İskenderun through the Jarablus bridge between Aleppo and Katma to the Euphrates and down to Deir ez-Zor. It included Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah, which means South and West Kurdistan. He wrote to Talat Pasha that “all our provinces where Turkish and Kurdish are spoken will belong to us”. He told parliament that “the line that we will determine with our strength and power will be the border”. Turkey annexed Hatay on the same logic in 1939, and Erdoğan invoked the Pact over Mosul in 2016.
Öcalan presents this pact as a Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood. He writes that its borders were “built on the unity of Kurds and Turks”. He says its break-up after 1925 “is actually the fragmentation of the Kurds” and that “when we mention the Middle East Confederation, it is about reviving this”. He says he does not see it as “an imperial event”. He tells the PKK: “All Kurds will establish a strong alliance with Turkey. The National Pact Commission will discuss this… This alliance has existed since the Hittites.” He describes the KCK as an umbrella for “all Kurds of the Middle East within the framework of Turkey’s national integrity”. He builds a thousand-year history for this alliance, from Manzikert in 1071 to the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639, which he calls a betrayal of it. He says he pitched the Mitanni-Hittite alliance to Emre Taner and the Battle of Manzikert to Taner’s successor, Hakan Fidan. He also claims Kemal’s speech of 23 April 1920 described Kurds and Turks respecting each other’s rights. The parliamentary minutes show that Kemal never mentioned Kurds. He spoke of Turks, Circassians and “Islamic elements” and put off all details until “after our existence is saved”.
The plan was put into practice through the Kurdish National Congress. “This Kurdish congress will be the thing that determines the Misak-ı Milli,” Öcalan told a pro-Kurdish delegation. He proposed four conferences. One was in Diyarbakır and open even to Hizbullah and Kemal Burkay. One was in Ankara under the HDP, one in Europe, and one in Erbil, which “should approach it within the framework of the National Pact”, with Kurds from Syria taking part. When Selahattin Demirtaş asked for a message for the Erbil conference, Öcalan told him to explain “the issue of Misak-ı Milli in the right form”. HDP MP Nursel Aydoğan put it plainly: Öcalan “is the main obstacle to the establishment of a Kurdish state”, and every negotiation on İmralı aimed to resolve the Kurdish issue within the framework of the Misak-ı Milli. The whole project fits the AKP’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy.
Öcalan says Jewish lobbies first planned “a proto-Israeli project” in South Kurdistan. Later they “got rid of Saddam” in order to take over the Kurds through Kurdish nationalism. He recasts Sheikh Said’s 1925 revolt as a British-provoked attempt to restore the caliphate, which reverses his earlier view that it was a religious and national uprising against near-genocidal attacks. He calls Iraqi Kurdish self-rule “a bomb” placed at “the very bottom of Turkey’s belly” and the Kurdistan Region “a cheap collaborator state”, likening it to Enkidu. In the Social Pact, self-determination shrinks to villages, neighbourhoods and cities managing their own affairs, and the UN system is dismissed as a failed model built on nation-states.
From 2004 the Kurds stop being a nation in his writing and become a people, and Kurdish becomes “the local language”. By 2011 he questions whether Kurds have even “reached the stage of nationhood”, while Turks remain “the Turkish nation”. He writes that “considering the Kurds as a sociological phenomenon serves the interests of the Turkish nation better” and that “leaving social phenomena to natural assimilation” has been humanity’s basic tendency. His “fraternal unity” comes with a guarantee: “With this approach, there is no danger of Kurdish becoming the official language, followed by a federation.” He dismisses insistence on nation and language as “dogmatic values” and writes that he was “born into a society that has not really progressed beyond Neolithic culture”. He calls this policy Türkiyeleşme (Turkeyification) and presents it as Atatürk’s own inclusive idea of a “nation of Turkey”. In reality Kemal used “Turkish State” and “Republic of Turkey” interchangeably, spoke of the “Turkish nation”, and called Kurdish identity an “incorrect label” left over from despotic times. Turkeyification is voluntary Turkification.
The İmralı notes from 2013 show where this leads. When pro-Kurdish MPs pressed for state-funded Kurdish education, Öcalan replied: “Asking the state is a mistake. This is not the duty of the state but of society. If you cannot teach your mother tongue to your own child, how can you ask the state?” He said there is “a principle of equality in the constitution”, so such education “cannot be demanded”. He said boycotts only inflame things and that the MPs should open model schools in Diyarbakır instead. A Kurdish school did open there in 2013, and the authorities later sealed it. Elsewhere in the notes he says: “I am not even discussing language education.” When the PKK leadership in Qandil demanded that the new constitution name the existence of the Kurdish people, he refused: “Do not conflate national identity with state citizenship.” The only wording he proposed was “our constitution accepts all historical cultures as the richness of Turkey”. He told MPs “we belong to the state” and borrowed the AKP’s Islamic language of a shared millet. He summed it up: “There is a Turkish nation, and that is a reality… We can call it the nation of Turkey.” Elsewhere he says: “We have no objections to the unitary state, to the republic. Turkish will remain the official language, the flag will of course be there.”
This is the constitution he declared legitimate. Article 66 says that everyone bound to the state by citizenship is a Turk. Article 42 says no language other than Turkish may be taught as a mother tongue. The preamble places sovereignty in the Turkish nation alone, and Article 301 of the penal code makes “insulting Turkishness” a crime. It is the system İsmet İnönü summed up as “our task is to Turkify everyone, no matter what the cost”. Iran’s constitution allows regional languages in the media and the teaching of their literature in schools, which is more than Öcalan asks for. His position also falls short of UN standards on language rights. It is a neoliberal position: a self-declared enemy of “capitalist modernity” leaving the survival of Kurdish to the market.
In 2003 he wrote that forced assimilation should end and “voluntariness should be the basis”, because “the necessities of life take care of one’s own language”. He warned that forcing Kurds to count as Turks damages “Turkish purity” and produces “an ugly hybridisation��. In 2004 he described assimilation before the Republic as “peaceful and culturally enriching”. The results can be measured. A 2023 Kurdish Studies Center survey found that only 30% of Kurds in Turkey are proficient in Kurdish, 30% have intermediate skills and 40% do not use it in daily life. More than half the children of fluent parents know little or no Kurdish, and nearly 60% of respondents report discrimination. Öcalan’s prescription leads to language death from the top down. He says that Kurdish can only be encouraged at primary level, and he treated Turkish as the sole official language.
Öcalan opposes a Kurdish state, not the nation-state. His proposal asks Turkey to tolerate the physical existence of Kurds and to replace forced assimilation with voluntary assimilation, and in return he promises that Kurds will not seek federalism or official status for their language. The result is a “civil society of subjects” under colonial sovereignty.
@nezih_seven Thanks Nezih, I elaborated a bit more about the specifics here as to why I think these languages are indeed forming a node. I will probably release it in the coming week or two. A formal publication is good to reinforce in academic circles, yes.
https://t.co/xAFvYKqGmq
Kurdish proper (excluding Zazaki and Gorani) went through the same shifts from Proto-Iranian through Old Iranian, and partly through Middle Iranian, in all its dialects: *j > ž, *θr > s, *wi- > gu-, etc. Linguistic features only begin to diverge long after the Kurds are attested as a tribal group, so there is really no reason to assume it doesn't form a common linguistic node, much like Italian languages. Thinking that Kurmanji having w > h and w > b, which the other dialects do not share, does not mean too much. In the grand scheme of things these are relatively late shifts. I don’t want to go into too much detail before I release my table, but much as I respect Agnes Korn, she is wrong on this topic. Kurdish also remained one large contact zone even after it diversified.
The grouping I have marked as Proto-sp probably reflects a shift that took place before 1500 BCE. I say this because the Scythians come from archaeo-genetic spheres quite different from those of most other Iranian speakers, yet their language still underwent the important shift *ćw > sp, attested among the western Scythians. The spheres relevant to Scythian are Mongun-Taiga/Sagsai > DSKC, Karasuk, the Idzhim burials (however they should be classified) and perhaps Baitag in south-western Mongolia, whereas most other Iranian languages evidently descend from the Yaz–Dahistan and Chust cultures.
Kurdish proper (excluding Zazaki and Gorani) went through the same shifts from Proto-Iranian through Old Iranian, and partly through Middle Iranian, in all its dialects: *j > ž, *θr > s, *wi- > gu-, etc. Linguistic features only begin to diverge long after the Kurds are attested as a tribal group, so there is really no reason to assume it doesn't form a common linguistic node, much like Italian languages. Thinking that Kurmanji having w > h and w > b, which the other dialects do not share, does not mean too much. In the grand scheme of things these are relatively late shifts. I don’t want to go into too much detail before I release my table, but much as I respect Agnes Korn, she is wrong on this topic. Kurdish also remained one large contact zone even after it diversified.
The grouping I have marked as Proto-sp probably reflects a shift that took place before 1500 BCE. I say this because the Scythians come from archaeo-genetic spheres quite different from those of most other Iranian speakers, yet their language still underwent the important shift *ćw > sp, attested among the western Scythians. The spheres relevant to Scythian are Mongun-Taiga/Sagsai > DSKC, Karasuk, the Idzhim burials (however they should be classified) and perhaps Baitag in south-western Mongolia, whereas most other Iranian languages evidently descend from the Yaz–Dahistan and Chust cultures.
The following image is my tree of the Iranian language family, based on descent alone. Terms like “North West Iranian” and “East Iranian” are not genetic terms, and they don’t map properly onto areal contact zones either. A great deal of research is still needed to refine how the Iranian languages descend (some more than others). A big problem at the moment is that linguists often contradict each other on how some of these branches should be classified, because the traditional groupings rest on a handful of features, assumptions, etc that newer data no longer support.
Glottolog is one attempt to bring the classifications of various linguists together. The problem is that it combines placements that contradict each other. For example, it places North Western Iranian under Agnes Korn’s Central Iranian node, yet Korn (2016), in the same paper that proposes Central Iranian, argues that the North Western node should be deleted from the tree. Central Iranian is also not well established enough to be asserted as fact: Korn herself presents it as a preliminary sketch. Glottolog’s tree also gives no indication of roughly when these splits are supposed to have happened.
The position of Proto Iranian itself might need to be revised. Persian, the ś branch (Khotanese Tumshuqese and Wakhi) and Nuristani, which Halfmann (2025) now places within Iranian, all split off before Proto sp, so their separate histories go back an unknown length of time before 1500 BCE. Nonetheless, until further investigation I have kept Proto Iranian where it is, with the changes that could define it listed beside it. If that node fails in the future, several more Indo Iranian branches would need to be opened up, and the deepest node we could still support would be the one I have called Proto sp.
I have relabelled some branches. For example, Khotanese Tumshuqese is usually called “Saka”, a name that ties it to the Scythians. But the little evidence we have for Scythian proper puts the two on different branches: Scythian has sp (Akkadian Išpakāya, c. 675 BCE, from *spaka ‘dog’), while Khotanese has ś (aśśa ‘horse’). In other cases I have kept the names, like the “Pamir” branch, but limited it to Shughni Roshani, Sarikoli and Yazghulami, a grouping that goes back to Sokolova (1967). The other so called Pamir languages are placed elsewhere.
What I have listed as Proto sp needs the most attention in future. The exact path by which those languages diversified could involve some regroupings, and some of them have had little to no attention in academia. One possible regrouping is whether Ossetian forms a closer branch with Sogdian, as Novák (2014) and Glottolog both propose.
Expand the image, and open it in a new tab for a higher resolution.
@avzaagzonunaada From my reading Pashto and Wanesti diversifies sometime around 1000 CE. I couldn't find much information about when exactly Yidgha and Munji diversifies so I just left it in a random position for now.