https://t.co/8S2FIWZxcs
Joackim Rønnebergs report after the Heavy water mission.
Rønneberg, who passed away on the 21st, was one of the first SOF Soldiers.
The strangest oil trade of 2026 isn't happening at sea.
It's 700 tanker trucks a day crossing the Iraq–Syria desert.
The biggest winner is a government that barely produces oil at all.
Hormuz shut → Iraq lost 90% of export revenue.
Baghdad will take ANY outlet.
So 2 land corridors opened: al-Waleed in Anbar (31 March) and Rabia/Yarubiyah (20 April) the latter sealed since 2013.
Destination: Baniyas, Syria's Mediterranean port. Then by sea to Europe.
The numbers are medieval and massive at once:
500–700 trucks/day, 30 tonnes each.
Baniyas unloading capacity up 30%, 120k bpd flowing. Baseline 150k bpd, target 350k.
Moving just 50k bpd of crude takes 1,000 trucks running nonstop, this is a pipeline made of wheels.
💰The economics
Here's the desperation premium: SOMO is paying $20–22 per barrel to move fuel oil by land.
By sea it costs cents.
Iraq signed for 650k tonnes/month anyway because the alternative isn't a cheaper route.... It's zero.
Damascus collects on every barrel: transit fees, storage, port charges, plus cheap Iraqi fuel.
At $2–3/bbl that's $8–13M/month, rising to $21–30M at full flow.
For al-Sharaa's empty treasury, possibly his most reliable hard-currency stream.
The worse Iraq's crisis gets, the more Syria earns.
The structural irony is that Iran shut Hormuz to punish its enemies.
Result, Iraqi oil money now flows to a Damascus government Tehran calls an adversary while Iraq, Iran's closest Arab partner, sits on life support.
Chokepoints don't choose their victims, Geography does.
It would be a really boring NATO exercise if they were allowed to locate and bomb OPFOR like this.
A general reminder that headlines proclaiming devestating NATO defeats to Ukrainian UAS teams fail to take into account that that was the goal.
Simply taking out the drone teams by simulating a pair of 500kg bombs falling on their position does nothing to help us experience a scenario in which shaping attempts prior to an assault failed and UAS teams were not suppressed or destroyed.
#OTD August 14, 1987 – By Order No. 0213 of the Minister of Defence of the USSR, the BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle was adopted into service with the Soviet Army. The vehicle was developed at the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant by its design bureau under the leadership of A. Blagonravov.
Unlike other vehicles of its type, the BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle was adapted for paradropping, featured an active troop placement arrangement, was capable of engaging enemy personnel in cover and on reverse slopes of high ground, and could dig a trench using its built-in bulldozer equipment.
ATGM launches were carried out through the barrel of the 100-mm rifled gun–launcher, with reloading performed from inside the vehicle. For the first time in Soviet tank building, this combat vehicle employed a hydromechanical transmission with a hydrostatic axial-piston drive.
What can be said about the BMP-3? I've written quite a lot about it – in my opinion, it is the most striking example of the degradation and decay that the USSR had reached by the end of its existence.
Paradropping capability for an IFV is an unnecessary feature that was never actually used.
"Active troop placement" meant an awkward exit located above the engine-transmission compartment and served as an excuse for design incompetence.
The built-in bulldozer equipment would deform after the very first use.
Firing from the 100-mm gun was not particularly effective, since specialized rounds for it only entered series production a couple of years ago.
The BMP-3 was the apotheosis of the absurdity of senile military brass and the triumph of formal numbers over the real priorities of an infantry fighting vehicle. After 40 years in production, many design flaws of this vehicle still remain uncorrected, and it still holds the record for unreliability, with a failure rate exceeding that of the T-64, T-72, and T-80 combined.
The story of the BMP-3 – see:
How the Soviet IFV Went Down the Wrong Path #1. Layout. (https://t.co/2TjMPwuaxs)
How the Soviet IFV Went Down the Wrong Path #2. Armament. (https://t.co/fkMZLVfUe9)
The year is 2028. Hormuz is still closed. Fuel is now 10 dollars. The sixth pipeline across the Arabian peninsula has been opened. It got hit by a Shahed-378 the next day.
The largest industry in the US is betting when Axios posts that the MoU #37 is close to being signed.
there are no guardrails to restore trust. it's about Google compromising the tool and destroying trust in its product, on top of satellite image providers enhancing resolution by using ML, blurring/manipulating images to hide sensitive places, shifting coordinates, etc.. already
This was the opening shot for the 2020s, a decade marked by one humiliation after the other for Russian air defenses: in Syria, occupied Ukraine, Russia, Iran and Venezuela.