wartime industrialized economy and thus is a cost-effective investment by transferring personnel casualty via infantry assaults to equipment casualties (most AFV crewmen survive) is under threat
There's been a lot of reporting about drones acting as carrion on the battlefield - that is picking off already damaged vehicles.
When we take a look at historic armor operations, it becomes evident that armor units have historically often taken heavy equipment losses 1/x
One of the most dangerous time for an SPG is on the road.
While this North Korean M1989 looks to have been abandoned by an earlier strike of some sort, it just goes to show you that drones can turn damaged vehicles into destroyed vehicles quite easily.
If drones are able to consistently independently target or cue other assets to target damaged tanks and other vehicles and turn recoverable losses into irrecoverable losses, a basic premise of armor operations, that tanks can easily be returned to combat if backed by a 3/x
@MAGTravF Interesting that combat forces made battlefield modifications to increase their survivability prior to industry sanctioned and enacted modification. Almost as if this is a known historical pattern and we should be wary about too quickly deriding battlefield modifications
Russian milblogger Vault 8 says that Ukrainians are effectively leveraging drones, artillery, and advanced tactics to neutralise Russian armored vehicles, forcing Russian tanks to operate only from covered positions while enabling their own tanks to engage more freely, even with direct fire. Meanwhile, Russian capabilities, particularly in drones and artillery, are hindered by shortages and inefficiencies, limiting the ability to counter these advancements effectively.
A UMO three days ago: I don't know why we have to print off all these stickers and do 50 different train trackers. It's not as if a Bradley is just gonna disappear between here NTC
@KiranPfitzner@The_Lookout_N@SashoTodorov1 might remember the article but a year ago there was a great deal of making fun of a US Army general for saying something to the effect of you might need two armies - one for blunting, one for protection - just not as elegantly hence the commentary
@ChemicalFire I'm being lazy and haven't tried *actual* research yet. I figure someone somewhere has looked at it - but it's kinda niche it's gonna be a pain in the ass to get the word combo right - or speed read/skim a bunch of hits from a wide search
Anyone know of any Army/AF/DOD studies on the anticipated effect of second-echelon targeting as part of ALB in projected force casualty rates for Soviet Second Echelon formations or the effect that such targeting would hopefully have on slowing down their projected march tables