It's almost impossible to keep up with AI these days...
Example:
A list of models released since January 2025 that was made yesterday. It's already outdated because @Alibaba_Qwen and @liquidai released new models in the last couple of hours.
(text/image-to-text only)
In the wake of the UFO file release by the DoW and after seeing the videos, some of them really reminded me of Biblical/Mythical descriptions and drawings.
So I ran a quick experiment. I asked Grok to describe four images of modern everyday objects in the way a first century person would do. After that I gave those descriptions to Gemini to create drawings from them.
Here are the somewhat interesting results:
π’ Kimi K2.6 API is live
β’ Input Price (Cache Hit): $0.16 / M tokens
β’ Input Price (Cache Miss): $0.95 / M tokens
β’ Output: $4.00 / M tokens
Kimi K2.6 is our latest + most intelligent model - stronger long-horizon coding, better instruction following & self-correction.
Native multimodal (text/image/video), thinking + non-thinking, 256K context. Supports tool calls, JSON / Partial mode, and web search.
Try it β https://t.co/XCrgjXAqMw
New software position just got created:
FUNCTIONALITY YOINKER
Expect people on LinkedIn to start updating their job descriptions in 4 to 6 business weeks π€£
Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack.
Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords.
LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm.
Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks.
Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages.
Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.