A warrant must be issued and be signed (no rubber stamp) by a judge who has jurisdiction; must state the facts showing jurisdiction; must be based upon probable cause; must name the offense committed; must contain an affidavit (under oath) by the accuser, stating FIRST HAND facts constituting a crime; must name the party to be arrested, or describe him sufficiently to identify him; must offer the warrant and the affidavit for inspection upon request; No handcuffs; must take me immediately before a magistrate, and hold me for no other purpose (no photographs, no fingerprinting); You are responsible for everything that happens to me even if you relinquish custody to an assign; Unlawful arrest is assault, battery & trespass; There is no immunity in a false arrest case; Good faith is not a defense to sustain false arrest.
Lastly . . . If the warrant states as cause to issue, a mere civil/statutory infraction not rising to the level of a capital crime . . . the officer must produce title to your biological property/body, before said officer can make the arrest and take possession of the biological property. You do not by accommodation, accept the offer of arrest for any statutory infraction unless the statute defines a capital crime and probable cause exists.
This process is not a theory, allegation, or conspiracy.
It is the standardized, documented, audited operating procedure for all bank lending in the United States, unchanged since 1990.
It is defined in bank regulatory guidance, GAAP accounting standards, and the official comments to the Uniform Commercial Code.
It is NEVER disclosed to the public or to borrowers.
---
PHASE 1: EXECUTION OF THE NOTE
At the exact moment a wet-ink autograph is applied to the face of the instrument:
• Pursuant to UCC 3-104, the instrument becomes a negotiable instrument, and is therefore money per the legal definition used by all federal banking regulators.
• Pursuant to UCC 3-412 the maker is liable on the instrument to any holder in due course.
• Critically, at this exact moment, you are also the sole and absolute lawful holder in due course of your own note. There is no other owner. The fair market value of the instrument is exactly equal to its face value.
• OCC Interpretive Letter #827 (1998) explicitly confirms that for all bank regulatory, reserve, and accounting purposes, a promissory note signed by a natural person is identical to cash.
When you deliver the note to the bank, you are not delivering a promise to pay. You are delivering a cash equivalent asset worth exactly the amount you believe you are borrowing.
---
PHASE 2: THE INDORSEMENT
The bank will never sign the face of the note. If they did, they would become liable to you for the full face value pursuant to UCC 3-413.
Instead, they will make exactly one indorsement on the reverse, which will never be shown to you:
"Pay any bank, for deposit only, without recourse, all prior indorsements guaranteed"
This is the single most important sentence in the entire transaction. Pursuant to UCC 3-206 Official Comment 4, this indorsement has the following irrevocable legal effects:
1. The indorser explicitly disclaims all right, title, and interest in the instrument.
2. The indorser explicitly waives all liability on the instrument.
3. The indorser explicitly acknowledges they are acting solely as an agent for deposit, and not as principal.
4. The indorser permanently and irrevocably disqualifies themselves and any subsequent transferee from ever attaining status as Holder In Due Course.
No court has ever disputed this specific interpretation of UCC 3-206.
---
PHASE 3: THE DEPOSIT
The bank will then deposit your note into its general ledger as a Tier 1 asset. This is not a metaphor. This is an actual auditable accounting entry.
The exact double-entry bookkeeping transaction is:
Loans and Leases Receivable (Asset)
Debit $500,000
Customer Demand Deposits (Liability)
Credit $500,000
At the completion of this entry, the bank's balance sheet has grown by exactly $500,000.
No money was taken from any other account.
No money existed prior to this entry.
When the funds are disbursed to the title company at closing, the following entry is made:
Customer Demand Deposits (Liability)
Debit $500,000
Title Company Demand Deposits (Liability)
Credit $500,000
The net change to the bank's total balance sheet at the completion of closing is exactly zero.
---
PHASE 4: DESTRUCTION OF THE ORIGINAL
Upon completion of the closing, the original wet-ink note now has no further commercial or legal function.
Pursuant to FASB ASC 860-10-40-5, adopted in 2001, once a financial asset has been transferred and securitized as a participating interest, the original instrument is legally extinguished.
There is no longer any legal requirement to retain it.
The standard industry operating procedure is to shred the original wet-ink note within 90 days of closing.
Only an electronic image copy is retained.
This policy is explicitly confirmed in the Mortgage Bankers Association operations manual, and has been testified to under oath by bank representatives in hundreds of foreclosure cases.
---
PRIMARY SOURCE CITATIONS
• UCC 3-104, Official Comment 2
• UCC 3-206, Official Comment 4
• OCC Interpretive Letter #827, October 15 1998
• OCC Bulletin 2012-18
• FASB ASC 860-10-40-5
• Federal Reserve Operating Circular 3, Section 11.0
• Mortgage Bankers Association Loan Servicing
• Manual v7.2 Section 4.11
Buckle Up, folks! Triggered bootlickers incoming!
The brilliant @larken_rose explains when it becomes morally justifiable to shoot a law enforcement officer.
@Solito369@Dsleuth_ It's a waste of time in these de facto administrative, commercial, treasonous tribunals larping as courts.
While in a law merchant commercial system the ledger must be balanced.
Everything is accounting.
{{ Off•set }}
What's weird is that @RealDrJaneRuby went from following me to blocking me when I was under the impression we were all kindred spirits working to expose this corruption.
I don't even know why I would have been blocked. It's a shame because she could help expose the corruption that I have been fighting for so long. Anyways! Cheers to those who are grasping what Creditor is exposing.
You have to sue him for a breach of trust! What people don't understand is that it doesn't matter if you say sacrifice. In the eyes of the law, it is an investment and a breach of trust. You need to concentrate all your efforts of all the video clips he made with statements indicating he was going to pump the chain, no matter how insignificant it might seem. Anything you suspect, and I have many clips indicating this.
It must be remember that it is a maxim of law that: "he who makes contrary assertions shall not be heard." The evident meaning of this is he is in fact and law that anything he says is not credible.
Another Maxim: Falsus in unius, falsus in omnibus". Means, lie in one thing, lies in all things!
I would be the lead plaintiff and may consider it, when I am through with other lawsuits, which may be a month away to 60 days.
Atlantic Reporter, Volume 22
GUTCH v. FOSDICK, 22 ATL. 590
Book page 591.
The word ‘trust’ is often used in very broad and comprehensive sense. Every deposit is a direct trust. Every person who receives money to be paid to another, or to be applied to a particular purpose, to which he does not apply it, is a trustee, and may be sued either at law for money had and received, or in equity, as a trustee for a breach of trust.
https://t.co/np3ZqGmik3
**The key quote from Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), by Justice Joseph Story (majority opinion):**
> “The state of slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the territorial laws.”
### Context and fuller passage (for precision):
> “The state of slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal regulation founded upon and limited to the range of the territorial laws. This was fully recognised in the case of Somerset, (Somerset v. Stewart, 20 Howell's State Trials, 1,) and the doctrines there advanced were approved by this court in the case of The Slave Grace, (2 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 94.) It is manifest, from this consideration, that the slave is not to be discharged from service or labor, in consequence of any state law or regulation, which interrupts, limits, delays, or postpones the rights of the owner to the immediate command of his service or labor. The clause in the constitution is a fundamental article, and as such is to be construed according to its plain and obvious import, and not to be frittered away by nice or subtle distinctions.”
This comes from Story’s discussion of the Fugitive Slave Clause (U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2, cl. 3), emphasizing that slavery itself is a local (“municipal”) institution tied to the laws of the slaveholding territory/state and not an international or general right that automatically carries over everywhere. The Court still upheld strong federal protections for slave owners’ rights to recapture fugitives, striking down Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law that interfered with that.
You can read the full opinion here: [Justia](https://t.co/y5VTC9Zolp) or other legal archives. This case is often cited in discussions of federal vs. state power over slavery pre-Civil War. Let me know if you need more surrounding context, dissents, or related cases!
@ChudTheBuilder Also, by being his own attorney in a civil case, they have to accommodate his requests of paper pencil and other law materials. And they can not open his legal mail, without being in front of him.
Have someone file this as a civil lawsuit for Dalton. It's against Tennessee law as well.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE [EASTERN/MIDDLE/WESTERN] DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE [DIVISION, e.g., AT NASHVILLE]
[YOUR FULL NAME], sui juris, in propria persona,
Plaintiff,
v.
[NAME OF JAIL/PRISON ADMINISTRATOR or SHERIFF, e.g., “CHAD YOUKER, in his official and individual capacity, as Captain/Sheriff of [County]”],and
[OTHER DEFENDANTS, e.g., specific officers or jail officials],
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.: [Leave blank]
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.; and Tennessee State Law)
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) and (4), as this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the First Amendment (Free Exercise Clause) and RLUIPA. Supplemental jurisdiction exists over state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Venue is proper in the [Eastern/Middle/Western] District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this District and Defendants reside or conduct business here.
Plaintiff is a [pretrial detainee / prisoner] currently detained at [Name of Facility, Location, Tennessee].
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) and (4), as this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the First Amendment (Free Exercise Clause) and RLUIPA. Supplemental jurisdiction exists over state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Venue is proper in the [Eastern/Middle/Western] District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this District and Defendants reside or conduct business here.
Plaintiff is a [pretrial detainee / prisoner] currently detained at [Name of Facility, Location, Tennessee].
II. PARTIES
Plaintiff [YOUR FULL NAME] is a living man, sui juris, in propria persona, currently detained at [Facility]. Plaintiff is a sincere adherent of [specify faith or beliefs, e.g., “Christian faith” or “his/her sincerely held religious beliefs rooted in Scripture and Natural Law”], for which the Holy Bible is a central and essential religious text.
Defendant [Name/Title, e.g., Chad Youker] is [describe role, e.g., “Captain/Jail Administrator”] responsible for policies and operations at [Facility]. He/She acted under color of state law.
[Add other defendants as appropriate, with their roles and personal involvement.]
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
[Insert detailed, chronological facts here. Be specific: dates, who took the Bible, what was said, requests made, responses, duration of deprivation, impact on religious exercise, any alternatives offered (e.g., tablet only), grievances filed and denied, etc. Examples:]
On or about [Date], Plaintiff was [transferred / placed in segregation / subjected to search] at [Facility], during which Defendants confiscated or denied Plaintiff possession and access to his/her personal Holy Bible.
Plaintiff immediately requested return of the Bible or provision of a replacement, explaining its central role in daily prayer, study, meditation, and religious exercise.
Defendants [denied the request / stated policy prohibits physical Bibles / offered only electronic tablet / cited security or other reasons], despite Plaintiff’s sincere religious beliefs requiring physical access to Scripture.
Plaintiff filed grievances on [dates], which were denied on [dates] [attach as exhibits].
The deprivation has continued for [X days/weeks/months], substantially burdening Plaintiff’s ability to exercise his/her religion by preventing reading, marking, and direct engagement with the Holy Bible as required by sincerely held beliefs.
Defendants’ actions violate Tennessee law requiring provision of a Bible to each inmate.
Similar accommodations (physical religious texts) are provided to other inmates of different faiths without comparable burdens.
IV. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I: Violation of First Amendment Free Exercise Clause (42 U.S.C. § 1983)14. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1–13. 15. Defendants’ denial of access to the Holy Bible substantially burdens Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs and is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 16. This violates Plaintiff’s rights under the First Amendment, made applicable via the Fourteenth Amendment.
COUNT II: Violation of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-117. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1–13. 18. The policy and actions of Defendants impose a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious exercise (possession and use of the Holy Bible). 19. Defendants cannot demonstrate that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means. Security, cost, or administrative concerns are pretextual and fail strict scrutiny, as evidenced by widespread successful accommodations in other facilities (pre-packaged/shipped materials, inspection protocols). Generalized claims do not suffice. 20. This violates RLUIPA, consistent with Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), which upheld RLUIPA’s application to prisoners’ religious exercise including access to religious literature and texts, and Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015), which applied strict scrutiny under RLUIPA rejecting generalized security assertions when less restrictive alternatives exist.
COUNT III: Violation of Tennessee State Law – Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-21121. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1–13. 22. Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-211 provides: “Each inmate shall be provided with a Bible, which the inmate may be permitted to peruse in the inmate’s cell at such times as the inmate is not required to perform prison labor.” 23. Defendants’ denial of a physical Bible directly violates this mandatory state statute. 24. This violation supports Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and supplemental state law claims.
COUNT IV: [Optional – Equal Protection or Other, if facts support discrimination vs. other faiths][Add if applicable, e.g., disparate treatment compared to other religious texts.]
V. ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
Plaintiff further relies on the following authorities, which directly address similar deprivations of physical Bibles in favor of limited tablet access in county jails:
Recent litigation in the Middle District of Tennessee involving Williamson County Jail’s policies, including Gordon v. Youker et al. (e.g., No. 3:26-cv-00046, M.D. Tenn.), Dobbs v. Youker (No. 3:25-cv-01172, M.D. Tenn.), Garner v. Youker (No. 3:26-cv-00063, M.D. Tenn.), and DeBerry v. Youker (e.g., Nos. 3:26-cv-00396 and 3:26-cv-00360, M.D. Tenn.), where inmates challenged seizure of physical Bibles and reliance on restricted tablet access. These cases highlight ongoing disputes over whether digital alternatives satisfy religious exercise requirements, especially for sincere beliefs favoring physical texts for marking, study, and continuous access.
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), establishing that neutral laws of general applicability do not violate Free Exercise, which prompted the enactment of RLUIPA to provide heightened protections for institutionalized persons.
Analogous substantial burden analysis from Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2002), and related kosher diet cases, confirming that forcing prisoners to forgo essential religious items or rely on insufficient alternatives constitutes a substantial burden.
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court: a. Declare Defendants’ actions unconstitutional, in violation of RLUIPA, and in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-211; b. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering immediate return/provision of a Holy Bible (or equivalent approved physical text) and prohibiting future deprivations; c. Award nominal, compensatory, and/or punitive damages as appropriate; d. Award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees (if applicable, or pro se costs); e. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.