Nicholas Carl

@AEI Research Fellow and @Criticalthreats Assistant Director | Managing joint research with @TheStudyofWar | Covering Middle East and Indo-Pacific

[Nicholas Carl @NicholasACarl]

Iranian sources are claiming that Tehran will retain control over the Strait of Hormuz based on the reported deal with the United States. Iranian leaders believe that they can retain effective control even while opening the passage to maritime traffic. This should be wholly unacceptable to the United States and its partners, ranging from Europe to the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. Iranian control of the strait would have global consequences. My recent piece on the issue explains why.

[Nicholas Carl @NicholasACarl]

https://t.co/jyBeDm8lYb

[Institute for the Study of War @TheStudyofWar]

NEW: Iran’s latest counterproposal frontloads all of Iran’s key demands on the withdrawal of “a US threat to Iran,” financial relief, and Iran’s “right” to manage the Strait of Hormuz while attempting to delay discussion of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s proposal corroborates ISW-CTP’s assessment that the regime believes it is winning the war and is negotiating from a position of strength.

Other Key Takeaways:

Iran’s latest proposal demanded an end to the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and the withdrawal of US forces from the “warzone.” Withdrawing US “threats to Iran” would constitute a withdrawal from the region, presumably, which both removes US military leverage and accomplishes a key Iranian objective: expelling US forces from the region.

Iran emphasized in its latest proposal that the Strait of Hormuz will remain under some form of Iranian control and that Iran will not continue negotiations if the United States does not end its blockade of Iranian ports and ships. Iranian officials continue to emphasize Iranian management of the strait as a key sticking point in negotiations.

US President Donald Trump stated on May 23 that he would decide by May 24 whether to resume strikes on Iran. Trump said he would only accept a deal that addresses key issues, including Iran’s uranium enrichment and its HEU stockpile.

[Ali Vaez @AliVaez]

This is disgraceful! @BarakRavid is a rigorous, deeply credible journalist whose reporting is built on years of trust and exceptional sourcing. Envy over his access should never devolve into antisemitic smears.

[Nicholas Carl @NicholasACarl]

https://t.co/jyBeDm8lYb

[Brian Carter @brian_cartr]

@NicholasACarl and I tried to get to the bottom of how badly the US and Israel damaged Iran's ballistic missile program in our new piece.

We concluded that the program is badly damaged and the Iranian ballistic missile forces failed in their mission to mass and sustain fire to force the United States and Israel to end the war prematurely. But overall success must ultimately be determined by whether the United States achieves its political objectives.

[Institute for the Study of War @TheStudyofWar]

MORE: These positive strategic effects and trends do not mean that the war is an overall strategic success, however. It remains unclear if and how the effects can be maintained absent “spot-hitting” the missile program. Even a years-long setback to the missile program is recoverable.

The ceasefire has likely enabled Iran to rapidly recoup the operational setbacks that it has suffered. Iran will likely be able to launch relatively more missiles more effectively in the days after the resumption of fighting. As fighting resumes, this increase should be understood as a result of the operational pause during the ceasefire rather than a broader failure of the campaign.

The war is not over, and the final judgment of its success must be based on the political agreement that ends it. Overall success must ultimately be determined by whether the United States achieves its political objectives.

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Welcome to the Islamic Republic of Iran 3.0.

Unlike Khomeini’s historic decision to “drink the poison chalice,” this time, through the lens of the Revolutionary Guards, there will be no room for pragmatic politicians to push Iran’s leadership toward compromise, especially after what they perceive as strategic gains against the U.S. and Israel.

If negotiations were difficult before the conflict, they are now far more complex. Iran is facing an increasingly decentralized, hardline, and ideologically rigid system, one that interprets its resilience in the conflict as a form of “divine victory.”

Khamenei was never a moderate, but the decision-making process in Iran was once relatively clear and centralized. The Revolutionary Guards were a dominant force, but not the decisive one.
That reality has changed and it is not coming back.

This is not a leadership inclined to concede.

#iran

[Institute for the Study of War @TheStudyofWar]

NEW | Special Report: Applying US Air Warfare Theory and Doctrine to Evaluate the Campaign Against Iran, Part I by @criticalthreats' @brian_cartr and @NicholasACarl ⬇️(1/2)

The US-Israeli combined air campaign against Iran should be evaluated based on whether it achieved its political objectives, which is the core purpose of any military operation. The campaign to this point has degraded the Iranian ability to project force and thus satisfied a key military objective. The United States and Israel have destroyed a significant portion of Iran’s missile, drone, and naval capabilities, as well as the industrial base that enables Iran to produce more.

The current ceasefire will not secure US interests by default, however, because the United States and its partners have yet to achieve the necessary conditions for a positive political outcome. Iranian leaders continue to threaten international shipping around the Strait of Hormuz and have expressed their intent to continue restricting access to the strait.

Any future agreement between the United States and Iran that does not secure the strait would severely undermine what the campaign has achieved so far. Though the war is not over until a permanent ceasefire is reached, the current pause in fighting provides an opportunity to evaluate what the campaign has achieved to this point.

[Brian Carter @brian_cartr]

@NicholasACarl and I are attempting to assess the progress + challenges of the US campaign by using US airpower theory + doctrine to assess the campaign on its own terms.

There are military successes, but the ultimate evaluation must be based on political outcomes and whether those support US interests.

[Critical Threats @criticalthreats]

The US-Israeli combined air campaign against Iran should be evaluated based on whether it achieved its political objectives, which is the core purpose of any military operation.

The campaign to this point has degraded the Iranian ability to project force and thus satisfied a key military objective. The current ceasefire will not secure US interests by default, however, because the United States and its partners have yet to achieve necessary conditions for a positive political outcome.

Any future agreement between the United States and Iran that does not secure the strait would severely undermine what the campaign has achieved so far.

[Nicholas Carl @NicholasACarl]

Iran War (Day 33)
· Negotiations: The United States and Iran have continued informal negotiations, including discussing measures to secure the Strait of Hormuz. A core Iranian demand is a US guarantee of no further attacks, while US President Trump has mentioned the possibility of returning to strike Iran as needed. We may hear more details during the address on the war that Trump will give this evening.

· Combined strike campaign: The New York Times detailed how the US-Israeli combined force has significantly disrupted Iranian decision-making and complicated Iranian efforts to coordinate large-scale attacks. I’ve made this point previously. Iran has achieved some limited tactical successes but has been so far unable to build on them in any militarily significant way. The combined force has retained the military advantage.

· Energy infrastructure: The IDF has reportedly begun to strike Iranian economic targets, such as energy sites, as part of its efforts to set conditions for the collapse of the regime. This comes amid reports of explosions at two oil refineries in western Iran and widespread power outages. I have concerns about what such attacks will mean for long-term stability in Iran.

· Regime stability: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed some personnel to Iran, according to unconfirmed reports. Iran may be trying to rebuild some manpower amid widespread military desertions. The Iraqi militias have previously deployed to Iran to help suppress protests and could be preparing to do so again given the combined force strikes on Iranian repressive institutions, especially in the Kurdish-majority western provinces.

· Strait of Hormuz: The Iranian parliament is iterating legislation that would require actors to negotiate with and possibly pay Iran to access the Strait of Hormuz. The legislation would also prohibit US- and Israeli-affiliated ships from transiting the strait. This reflects the broader sentiment among Iranian leaders: that the strait is a critical leverage point and what that they might increasingly exploit even after the war.

· Iranian fire at Turkey: Iran fired a missile at Turkey for the fourth time. NATO air defenses intercepted it. My previous hypothesis that missile fire at Turkey was due to a local Iranian missile commander operating autonomously feels less plausible since the attacks have been sustained. This looks increasingly like a centrally directed effort, especially since Russia is reportedly providing the targeting intelligence for strikes in Turkey.

· Partner collaboration: Ukrainian President Zelensky met with the Jordanian king to discuss defense cooperation. This came as Ukraine reached defense agreements with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Our Arab partners have recognized how helpful Ukraine can be in preparing for future conflict, which will resemble the kind of fighting that has been happening in Ukraine for years.

· Lebanon: The Iranian ambassador to Lebanon has refused to leave Beirut after the Lebanese government declared him persona non grata and tried to expel him. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah are backing the ambassador and the decision to stay. This episode is emblematic of how Iran often disregards and undermines the authority and sovereignty of other regional actors.

· Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militants—possibly members of Kataib Hezbollah—have kidnapped American journalist @shellykittleson. Though Kataib Hezbollah declared a temporary ceasefire, it is still threatening US personnel. The Iraqi Interior Ministry has arrested a suspect tied to Kataib Hezbollah. These Iranian-backed thugs are a blight on Iraqi society. Shelly is in my thoughts.

· Yemen: The Houthis launched two more strikes, again firing at Israel. The Houthis are unlikely to meaningfully affect the trajectory of the war if they sustain their intermittent, relatively low-level of fire at Israel, however. Iran has reportedly deployed a cadre of IRGC advisers to Yemen and is pushing the Houthis to renew their attacks targeting international shipping, which remains the greatest risk.

[Nicholas Carl @NicholasACarl]

Iran War (Day 31)
· Negotiations: US President Trump has continued to insist that talks with Iran are progressing while reiterating his threats to strike critical Iranian infrastructure. The United States has nevertheless continued to develop its force presence in the Middle East, with the deployment of the Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, and possibly other SOF units. Reports suggesting that the United States could launch ground operations into Iran persist.

· Combined strike campaign: The US-Israeli combined force has continued to disrupt Iranian missile operations by striking launchers as they appear as well as bulldozing equipment meant to unearth other launchers buried in collapsed underground facilities. A significant portion of Iranian missile and drone capabilities are buried underground and probably damaged or destroyed. Iran is trying to excavate the collapsed infrastructure and salvage what it can.

· Strait of Hormuz: US partners are iterating how to support efforts to secure the Strait of Hormuz. The United Kingdom and France are reportedly discussing a possible multinational effort along these lines. The United Arab Emirates is likewise considering deploying naval assets to protect international shipping and has discussed the possibility with other Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Iran has meanwhile continued to coerce civilian ships to comply with the new rules that it has imposed over the strait.

· Partner collaboration: Ukraine has signed separate defense agreements with Saudi Arabia and Qatar as part of efforts to improve Gulf defenses amid Iranian attacks. This further highlights that the United States and its partners must learn from Ukrainian experience, battlefield innovation, and defense industrial development in order to prepare for future conflict. Ukraine could prove to be an indispensable partner in this sense, especially in preparation for contingencies in the Indo-Pacific.

· Iranian fire at Israel: The Iranian missile campaign against Israel appears focused on maintaining constant but low levels of pressure rather than concentrating significant fire at a discrete place and time. Such an approach, especially in combination with cluster munition warheads, is likely meant to keep Israeli civilians in perpetual alert, exhausting them psychologically and disrupting economic activities. This captures the Iranian approach vis-à-vis Israel: attack their willingness to fight rather than their ability to do so.

· Iranian fire at the Gulf: The Iranian missile campaign against the Gulf states is similar in that Iran is targeting energy infrastructure and other economic sites to kill the Gulf appetite to sustain the war. But Iran is also trying to disrupt the US ability to project airpower by targeting refueling aircraft and AWACS. Three things remain true: (1) Iran has inflicted serious (but relatively limited) tactical losses; (2) that doesn’t equate to strategic defeat; and (3) I’m still very concerned about our ability to achieve strategic success, especially while it’s so undefined.

· Lebanon: Hezbollah fire into Israel has continued to climb. Social media rumors are saying that Hezbollah deployed a fiber-optic FPV drone against an IDF tank in southern Lebanon. This came days after Iranian-backed Iraqi militias alleged to possess fiber-optic FPV drone capabilities. The potential proliferation of this capability across the Axis of Resistance could mark a dangerous adaptation based on lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war and pose a significant threat to US and Israeli targets.

· Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah extended its ceasefire against the United States for another five days. The militia is reportedly under intense military and political pressure, driving it to deescalate. Nevertheless, Iranian-backed groups have continued to strike US targets in Iraq, such as the US Embassy in Baghdad, and Syria as well as energy infrastructure. This likely reflects the perpetual divisions among the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.

· Yemen: The Houthis announced their formal entry into the war on Saturday, firing missiles and drones at Israel. The IDF intercepted the fire. The Houthis stated that they would sustain attacks until the war ends but haven’t done anything since the initial fire. The Houthis have notably refrained from attacking international shipping around the Red Sea so far, which is the greatest risk associated with Houthi involvement. That would, of course, compound the pressure that Iran has already imposed on the Strait of Hormuz.

[Nicholas Carl @NicholasACarl]

Iran War (Day 28)
Resuming the daily war updates after a brief hiatus.

· Negotiations: US President Trump has again extended the deadline for Iran to make a deal, giving Tehran until April 6. Trump has said that he will otherwise order extensive strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure. He has meanwhile continued to insist that negotiations of some kind are ongoing despite Iranian denials.

· Combined strike campaign: The US-Israeli combined force has begun striking targets in Mashhad in recent days, marking the furthest northeast strikes yet. The campaign was always meant to sweep slowly from east to west. It seems that the combined force is now getting to some of the furthest planned targets of the campaign.

· Defense industrial base: The combined force appears to have intensified its strikes targeting Iranian defense industrial infrastructure in recent days in order to prevent Iran from quickly rebuilding its capabilities. The combined force has destroyed over two-thirds of Iran’s missile, drone, and naval weapons production facilities.

· Maritime domain: The combined force has maintained pressure on Iranian naval forces, destroying key facilities around the Persian Gulf and killing the IRGC Navy commander, Brigadier General Tangsiri. The combined force has also damaged around 92 percent of the surface and sub-surface combatants operated by Iran so far.

· Strait of Hormuz: Iranian officials are continuing to assert that they are remaking the rules of the Strait of Hormuz amid continued reports that the regime is charging a fee to commercial vessels looking for safe passage through the strait. The regime is also bracing for US ground operations around the Iranian littoral and nearby islands.

· Iranian fire: The Iranian rate of fire has remained consistent (albeit relatively low) for weeks now. US estimates are that roughly a third of the Iranian missile and drone stockpile remains, with the rest having been destroyed, damaged, or buried under rubble. Iran also still has a little less than a third of its missile launchers.

· Iranian decision-making: Numerous reports continue to indicate that some senior IRGC officers are increasingly influential in regime decision-making, most recently citing the appointment of hardline IRGC officer Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

· Adversary cooperation: Russia is reportedly sending Iran various forms of material support, including drone technologies, medicine, and food. Russia is also providing targeting intelligence and advice on advanced drone tactics. The IDF struck a key Caspian Sea port in northern Iran that Russia has used to send support to Iran.

· Lebanon: The IDF has continued its slow advance into Lebanon, continuing to engage Hezbollah fighters. As I’ve noted previously, the IDF seems focused on seizing key terrain—specific hilltops and ridgelines—to deny Hezbollah the ground from which to fire close-range systems into northern Israel.

· Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias claimed to conduct their second operation with a fiber optic-enabled FPV drone. If the claims are true, this presents a concerning new capability that the militias are using against US targets. These systems can be very precise and difficult to stop.

[Nicholas Carl @NicholasACarl]

Iran War (Day 24)
· Negotiations: US officials have apparently begun to negotiate with counterparts Iran, reportedly including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, to resolve the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Talks will continue this week. President Trump has meanwhile delayed his threatened strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure.

· Iranian decision-making: Ghalibaf’s involvement in the talks—and Trump’s recent remarks about him—further affirm that the IRGC cadre surrounding Mojtaba Khamenei is increasingly influential in the regime these days. I expect that’s especially true since the killing of Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani.

· Regime stability: Baloch insurgent militia, Ansar al Furqan, has released statements throughout the war calling for new recruits and local support to the group and expressing its desire to exploit the war to advance its anti-regime agenda in southeastern Iran. As military pressure mounts against the regime, some Iranian insurgencies will likely see opportunity.

· Iranian fire at the Gulf: Iran will limit further strikes on Saudi Arabia and Qatar while sustaining strikes on the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait, according to Israeli media. Iran reportedly seeks to avoid further antagonizing Saudi Arabia, which has let US military begin using Saudi airspace for combat operations against Iran.

· Lebanon: The IDF has struck five bridges along the Litani river since the war began—as part of its broader ground-air campaign into Lebanon—in order to isolate Hezbollah units south of the river. Fighting around the Israel-Lebanon border remains intense, highlighting the enduring Hezbollah threat, especially to nearby civilians.

[Nicholas Carl @NicholasACarl]

Iran War (Day 23)
· Strait of Hormuz: President Trump threatened last night to strike Iranian power plants if Iran does not cease attacks around the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours. This will not persuade Iran to stop its threats to international shipping. Iranian leaders have responded with their usual fiery rhetoric, threatening more attacks on regional infrastructure.

· Combined strike campaign: The US-Israeli combined force killed the drone unit commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force—another blow to the military leadership structure. The regime will recover in time from such decapitations. But that the combined force can consistently find and remove high-level targets is noteworthy.

· Iranian fire at Israel: Several Iranian missiles landed in Israel yesterday, inflicting significant casualties. One of the missiles landed near Dimona—the site of the main Israeli nuclear facility. Iran is still having some success with its missiles launched at Israel despite increasingly firing from central Iran rather than western parts of the country.

· Yemen: Iranian officials and state media have re-upped their threats that the Houthis could resume attacks on international shipping around the Bab al Mandeb. That risk is certainly significant. The Houthis have clearly tried to avoid getting entangled into the war to this point, though that could change.

[Nicholas Carl @NicholasACarl]

Iran War (Day 22)
· Iranian attack on Diego Garcia: Iran fired two ballistic missiles in a failed attack targeting Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The US-UK base is around 3,800 kilometers from Iran—extremely notable since Iranian leaders had long claimed to cap their missile ranges at 2,000 kilometers. This upends calculations about where Iran could conceivably reach.

· Missile-drone warfare: Iran has reportedly fired around 3,000 missiles in the current war. Interestingly, the pre-war estimate was that Iran had around 2,500 ballistic missiles. The 3,000 number should include cruise missiles fired though. Regardless of where the Iranian missile inventory stands, Iranian Shahed drones pose the most enduring threat.

· Iranian fire at Israel (1): Iranian launches at Israel have increasingly originated from central Iran, according to the IDF, likely due to the degradation of missile forces in western Iran. I’m interested to see whether this translates into any significant changes in the volume of Iranian fire at Israel.

· Iranian fire at Israel (2): Around 70 percent of the Iranian missiles fired at Israel have reportedly had cluster munitions warheads. That’s up from the 50 percent I noted over a week ago. Iran has intensified its efforts to inflict maximum destruction and stoke panic and terror among civilians.

· Iranian decision-making: US and Israeli intelligence believe that Mojtaba is alive but cannot confirm that he’s giving orders. I noted yesterday that Mojtaba has remained surprisingly absent from the public scene, fueling rumors that he is badly wounded or otherwise incapacitated. His IRGC handlers may be the most empowered right now.

· Lebanon: Reuters published an exclusive detailing how the IRGC deployed a cadre of officers to Lebanon after the 2024 conflict with Israel to help the group rebuild. This apparently involved reorganizing the Hezbollah command structure and implementing a decentralized defensive doctrine comparable to what the IRGC Ground Forces use in Iran.

[Ali Vaez @AliVaez]

At this point Mojtaba is anything between the apocryphal tale about Jeremy Bentham's preserved body being noted as "present but not voting" at UCL council meetings and someone running the show from behind the scenes like an IRGC Keyser Söze.

[Nicholas Carl @NicholasACarl]

@ayatr0llah Apparently very weak on production