Nullroot Protocol

Zero-knowledge privacy infrastructure for Web3.

Private pools. Verifiable proofs. Your assets, your privacy.

Built on Robinhood Chain. 🌐

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

Your wallet is your whole financial history. Publicly. Forever.

Nullroot breaks the link — ZK privacy with OFAC-screened deposits, live on Robinhood Chain.

Privacy by proof. Compliant by design.

https://t.co/nwNAU1DEES

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@0xprivacypools Privacy inside the wallet people already use is how this reaches beyond power users. Good to see on the 0xbow stack we build on. The next step is making safe habits the default too: a fresh withdrawal address, and gas that doesn't trace back to the main wallet.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@colludingnode @hanni_abu Respect the position, and Zcash shows unscreened privacy can work at the base layer. For an app-level pool on a public EVM chain, we think proving that stolen funds were kept out is what keeps honest users from being lumped in with them. Good debate, thanks for pushing on it.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@colludingnode @hanni_abu Agreed, the set provider is a trust point and we won't pretend otherwise. It's scoped narrowly: it can't move funds or see who withdrew, only gate private exits. Decentralizing that curation is the open problem, and ideas from the Zcash side would be welcome.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@colludingnode @hanni_abu Fair, and it's a real trade-off. Our bet is that a pool that can show it keeps flagged funds out is one that stays usable onchain, and the set never takes custody: excluded deposits still ragequit back to the depositor. What design would you accept on a public chain?

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@SilkBtc Most people don't think privacy matters until their salary, balance and every payment are readable by anyone with their address. The criminal-use problem is real, which is why screened pools keep flagged deposits out of private exits. Ban vs. ignore isn't the only choice.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@hanni_abu @colludingnode There's a real difference, though. The association set only decides which deposits can exit privately. It can't freeze anything: an excluded depositor can still ragequit back to their own address. It filters the anonymity set; it doesn't take custody.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

Paying 30 from a 100 note doesn't expose the other 70.

Nullroot Private Send spends one approved note and returns the remainder to you as a new private note.

The payee and amount are public. Your remaining balance and which deposit paid stay private.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@TheCryptoBlade @Elikrypt Short version: the withdrawal is a ZK proof that your deposit's commitment is in the pool's Merkle tree and in an approved association set, without revealing which one. A nullifier hash marks the note spent so it can't be reused, without pointing back to the deposit.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

Stealth addresses and privacy pools hide opposite ends of a payment.

A stealth address hides who got paid: each payment lands on a fresh address only the receiver can find.

A privacy pool hides who paid: the proof shows an approved deposit, not which one.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@marilyn100x @VitalikButerin @ethereum Cheaper private transactions also make relayers more practical for small payments. That matters because funding a fresh withdrawal address from your usual wallet can create a link before the private withdrawal even happens.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@Cointelegraph Tracing and privacy aren't opposites. In Privacy Pools, a withdrawal proof hides which eligible deposit was spent. Association-set screening determines eligibility; excluded deposits retain a public exit back to the original depositor.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@EClock24 @primus_labs Selective privacy needs clear disclosure boundaries. Association-set screening determines which deposits qualify for private exits. ZK proofs hide which eligible deposit was spent. What a user later discloses is a separate design question.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@Tollxyz_ Pre-trade checks are a good start. The other risk for agents on Robinhood Chain is that every wallet they sign from is a public history, so a strategy can be read straight off the chain, along with whichever wallet funded the agent.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@pukerrainbrow A fake frontend doesn't need to break any cryptography. It only needs you to sign.

For any privacy app: bookmark the real domain, check the contract you're approving, and prefer apps that publish build hashes you can compare against.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@Newwaveclips Screening at the door is half of it. The other half is what happens to a deposit that fails the check.

In Privacy Pools it never joins the approved set, but the owner can still ragequit: withdraw publicly to the original address. No custody, no frozen funds.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@specter_PQ @ambire Same trade-off here. Every note derives from one 12-word recovery phrase, and that's the only way back in. Worth spelling out what it doesn't restore too: browser-only labels and payment notes stay on the device.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

A private send doesn't hide everything.

The payee and the amount are public onchain. What the ZK proof hides is which of your deposits paid for it, so your address isn't linked to the payment.

An unusual amount can still be a clue, so round numbers help.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

@0xebii The useful distinction is what a proof reveals versus what the transaction leaks. Selective disclosure should spell out both: which facts are shared, and whether amounts, timing or funding addresses remain visible.

[Nullroot Protocol @NullrootZK]

Explore Nullroot without connecting a wallet.

The new guided tour and practice mode let you try the private-account flow with simulated funds.

No real funds. No onchain transactions.

https://t.co/h882SnbZqz