@heynavtoor What's fun in that paper is the title which starts with "Delving" while showcasing the growing usage of "delve" in a chart. Was the paper itself written with some LLM?
@sweis@sejaques It's a good summary. One dimension is usually missing, that is hard to represent in such charts: computing time. How recent progress is related to various space-time trade-offs, and which ones are more fundamental? We must find a way to normalize the shown data.
@preskill@RobertHuangHY Hello John, that’s some amazing work indeed! Is it also bringing some computational time advantage? Or rather is a particular space-time overhead trade-off technique circumventing the huge cost of a bucket brigade-based qRAM?
@apruden08 the confusion is that these 6,100 atoms have been controlled in space with tweezers but I’ve not seen a trail of quantum gates being implemented with them. depending on how it’s done, it can be difficult to very hard.
@apruden08 you could compare functional systems with supported gates. the current 6,100 system has not yet been demonstrated with quantum gates. the record so far is below 300 atoms (QuEra).
@kaepora well, we even don’t have 1,000-1,500 qubits with 99.9% fidelities. The record so far is 98 with Quantinuum (and with ma y limitations). no vendor has ever experimented over 1,000 qubits with even 99% errors.
Most folks are not looking at the physical qubits assumptions, which are 99.9% fidelities for all ops (including 2 qubits gate & readout) at scale. Nobody has done that with cold atoms even at small scale. So, with 20K or 100K atoms, they got some work on their plate for a while!
Scott Aaronson on the Google and the Caltech papers:
> When you put both [papers] together, Bitcoin signatures for example certainly look vulnerable to quantum attack earlier than was previously known! In particular, the Caltech group estimates that a mere 25,000 physical qubits might suffice for this, where a year ago the best estimates were in the millions. How much time will this save — maybe a year? Subtracting, of course, off a number of years that no one knows.
> In any case, these results provide an even stronger impetus for people to upgrade now to quantum-resistant cryptography. They—meaning you, if relevant—should really get on that!
Scott is probably the best-known quantum computing educator and academic and is historically a skeptic of aggressive quantum timelines.
Maybe some of you should start to pay attention?
https://t.co/cQA3VVksh1
@conordeegan The missing question in this story is: how far did we progress meanwhile with the number of operational physical qubits (with 99.9% operations fidelities which is the assumption in most of these papers)?
@amarchenkova@American_Binary Anastasia, the 8 hours was for breaking RSA with Shor integer factoring, here the 9 minutes are for breaking elliptic curves with Shor dlog algorithm (with 500K sc qubits with 99.9% fidelities). these are different things.