ParticleCS

Own everything: your tokens, apps, and infrastructure. Particle Crypto Security delivers enterprise-grade blockchain security, so you truly own it all.

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

ParticleCS builds the bridge between everyday business process and on-chain execution - so security teams can actually operate.

Bloxchain is our open protocol, with https://t.co/t02jLJN8Cm for operators in the browser. Sensitive actions go through rules you can audit, not ad-hoc signing.

Independent review of the core framework (NM_0828) ↓

[Nethermind Security @NethermindSec]

We completed a security audit of @particle_cs's Bloxchain framework,an open-source security framework for Ethereum applications designed so sensitive operations use roles, waiting periods, and multi-party control - not a single key acting alone.

Our security team reviewed the protocol's smart contract architecture and implementation.

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

@grok will using Bloxchain governed accounts could be beneficial for this use case? Compare the security model

[aka$h @aaakasei]

Unocoin exploit looks like an insider job to me

Unocoin says BitGo froze its account on Nov 6 and the freeze worked

but someone moved funds through the wallets’ recovery route, without going through BitGo

Uncoin multisig has three key

think of it like a wallet with 3 keys, where any 2 can unlock the funds

Key 1 → Unocoin
Key 2 → BitGo
Key 3 → backup key

normally, Unocoin and BitGo use their keys together.
the backup key lets Unocoin recover funds if BitGo becomes unavailable

but if someone gets BOTH Unocoin’s key and the backup key, they could move funds without BitGo.

freezing the BitGo account wouldn't stop that. the blockchain accepts the valid signatures.

now the question is who had access to those keys?

it could be an insider. it could also be an outside attacker who stole them. we don't know yet.

if Unocoin failed to protect keys under its control, that's Unocoin's security failure

@Unocoin, which keys were used? who held them? where were they stored?

were the keys stolen, or was there a flaw in the recovery system?

users deserve clarity

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

@pashov https://t.co/OdIc5MSvtd

We built the security primitive developers can use to build governed-accounts and new financial products.

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

Deployments across those networks use CreateX - built by @pcaversaccio.

Deterministic CREATE2 / CREATE3 factories that make multi-chain infra practical.

Thank you.
https://t.co/fnQmsBxFkE

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

Bloxchain is live on the top 10 EVM networks.

Governed on-chain operations, without giving up custody. Programable smart accounts you own.
You sign. Your keys stay yours. We never hold them.

→ https://t.co/c3oucadIXR

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

@ethereum · @base · @arbitrum · @Optimism · @0xPolygon · @BNBCHAIN · @avax · @arc · @RobinhoodCrypto · @monad

One official deployment catalog. Same infrastructure pattern everywhere.

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

AI trading bots need direct wallet control to trade autonomously in behalf of the user.

But when a cryptographic keys are exposed there is no pause button, there is no warning, funds are just drained.

We need system with guardrails not just unchangeable passwords.

[Coin Bureau @coinbureau]

⚠️ ALERT: BloomTrading Bot users report nearly $1 MILLION in wallet drains, with 9,408 SOL traced to a suspected attacker wallet.

Reports identify roughly 49 victims, with the largest individual loss reaching 1,636 SOL, worth about $166,000.

Total losses could be higher as more affected wallets emerge.

Victims report losses from wallets whose private keys were imported into the trading bot, while USDC reportedly remained untouched in several cases.

BloomTrading’s team is reportedly investigating and has paused some services.

Users are being urged to move remaining assets to fresh wallets, disconnecting alone won’t protect funds if a private key has been compromised.

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

@Walodja1987 That is a great tip!

We took it a step forward by giving developers in solidity a full compostable library build around programmable governance control.

We call it the Bloxchain Protocol and it is open source exactly for this use case

https://t.co/OdIc5MSvtd

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

@Nethermind Make Ethereum Strong Again 👏

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

@balakhonoff @NethermindSec

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

Security is a layered and continuance process. We made sure that security is a first-class objective from inception all the way to audit.

[Nethermind Security @NethermindSec]

Jacob at @particle_cs summed up Bloxchain Protocol's security review in one line: "Each layer caught what the last one left, and we fixed as we went." Bloxchain is a reusable library for approvals, time-locks and role-based controls, built to be dropped into other teams' EVM stacks.

The layers: AuditAgent with fixes between runs. Then an AgentArena competition, where independent agents on the same codebase caught what the scans had left. By the time our auditors opened the repo, the routine defects were already fixed and their time went to design and algorithmic questions.

https://t.co/OlS8Wnhror

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

Trust is not just recognizing a sender. It is making authority, delay, and a second set of eyes part of the operation.

That is the direction Bloxchain takes with governed on-chain operations: roles, waiting periods, and execution rules.

→ https://t.co/c3oucadIXR

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

The hardest request to spot is not the fake-looking one. It is the one that arrives through a channel everyone already trusts, and still should not be acted on alone.

That is the process-trust question raised by reports involving #Revolut

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

The source here is a secondary Korra/Duel X report, not primary confirmation:

https://t.co/wv7s8ECHeI

Treat the incident details as reported claims, not certainty. The durable lesson is process verification

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

The same principle belongs in operations: high-impact actions should require roles, waiting periods, and rules for external calls.

Those controls make an unusual request slower to execute and easier to challenge, without pretending any system is perfect.

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

Before releasing sensitive data or moving value, verify out of band:

• Call a known number.
• Confirm the request with a second authorized person.
• Do not let the first channel be the only source of truth.
A real-looking thread is still one channel.

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

Reports claim an official government mailbox was allegedly compromised, then European Investigation Order–shaped requests reached a bank compliance desk.

If that pattern holds, the failure was trusting one official-looking channel as proof, not a spelling error.

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

@etherscan Observability on chain is such and great feature to have 👏

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

@Deeen_Codes Thank you for sharing, what a great list!

We will be sponsoring future events as well, but for now if any are looking for an edge, we recently open sourced our solidity infrastructure for on chain programmable governance

Feel free to check it out 🌟

https://t.co/OdIc5MSvtd

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

The key point is not audit vs unaudited statistics

The key is that hacks occur at the seam were it is harder to defend.

Infrastructure, key management and governance

This is exactly what we solving. Infrastructure build from the ground up to provide on chain governance where on single key can unlock the infra

[ParticleCS @Particle_CS]

@Hashlock_ @grok Hey @grok, how important are smart contract infrastructure really?