Coordinador Técnico de la Comisión para la Reforma al Sistema de Pensiones ~Director en @oppgye_ ~ Intentando ser parte de la solución y no del problema 🇪🇨
El dt no es lo q merecemos, ok, pero ayer rompimos el record de ser la única selección en la historia q patea 15 veces al arco y no mete 1 gol.. Si alguna culpa tiene es la de haber demorado el ingreso de Nilson y Jordi
Estw distinguido abuelito estaba esperando algo así para salir del sarcofago del olvido y la irrelevancia, y devir6: "yo les dije".. https://t.co/5nniry0c6F
.. Ahora resulta que x un mal mundial, nuestros jugadores defensivos no son de los mejores del mundo, sino que comparables a Edwin Tenorio, la Sombra y Checa.. Tampoco así..
EEUU sigue humillando a las selecciones de fútbol que juegan en el Mundial. Ahora le tocó a Uruguay. Los jugadores fueron tratados como narcos, con inspección de perros antidrogas y uniformados con detectores de metales.
La FIFA perpetró una vergüenza histórica este año.
📹 @FutboliPolitica
Esto es espectacular.
Desde Ecuador, instalaron vallas en Madrid, París, Milán y Santiago invitando a cracks que no clasificaron al Mundial a que pasen sus vacaciones de verano en el país sudamericano.
Elegante, respetuoso, astuto. Revivió el mercadeo. CRACKS.
🇨🇻 Quizás este sea un buen momento para recordar cuando en la final de la liga de Cabo Verde la pelota la llevó un muchacho en burro!
Que viva el fútbol caboverdiano!
A Dutch computer scientist gave one lecture in 1988 arguing that programming is unlike anything humans have ever tried to do before, and the reason most software on earth is broken is that we are still teaching it as if it were a hobby.
His name was Edsger Dijkstra. He won the Turing Award in 1972. He invented the shortest path algorithm that every GPS on earth still runs on.
He wrote the paper that killed the goto statement in modern programming languages.
He spent 50 years quietly being one of the most consequential thinkers in the entire history of computer science, and he was in a very bad mood by the time he stood up at the ACM Computer Science Conference in 1988 to deliver the lecture that almost nobody at the conference wanted to hear.
The lecture was called On the Cruelty of Really Teaching Computer Science.
It is now one of the most cited papers in the entire history of computing education. It was filed in his archive as EWD1036, handwritten in his careful fountain-pen calligraphy because he refused to use a typewriter and famously refused to use email for the rest of his life.
The argument was simple and uncomfortable.
Programming, Dijkstra said, is a radical novelty. Not a new tool. Not a new skill. Not a faster version of something humans already knew how to do. A genuinely new category of intellectual activity that has no real precedent in the entire history of the human species, and our brains have not been built to handle it.
Here is what he meant by that.
When a programmer writes a line of high-level code and presses run, that single line might trigger a billion operations at the level of the silicon.
The ratio between the abstraction you are working in and the physical events you are actually causing is roughly one billion to one. No engineer in history before computing ever had to reason about a system spanning that kind of ratio inside their own head.
A bridge builder reasons about steel beams and the physics of weight. A surgeon reasons about organs and the physics of tissue. A chemist reasons about molecules and the physics of bonds.
All of them are working inside ratios of physical scale where the largest and smallest things they need to think about are within a few orders of magnitude of each other.
A programmer routinely writes one line that orchestrates a billion physical events on a chip, and is expected to predict the behavior of all of them in advance.
Dijkstra argued that the human brain was simply not built for this. Every intuition we have evolved over hundreds of thousands of years comes from a world of medium-sized objects behaving in continuous ways. Computing is the opposite. It is discrete, not continuous.
A program that runs perfectly a billion times can crash on the billion-and-first iteration because of a single bit. A single character missing from a line of code can take down a power grid. There is no margin. There is no graceful degradation. The system either works or does not, and the only way to know is to actually run it.
This was the part of the lecture where Dijkstra made everyone in the room uncomfortable.
He said the way computer science was being taught in universities was a quiet disaster. Professors were teaching programming the way carpenters teach woodworking. With examples. With metaphors. With analogies to things students already understood. Files are like folders. Memory is like a desk. A function is like a recipe.
Dijkstra said this was actively making it harder for students to think clearly. The whole point of a radical novelty is that there is nothing in your past experience to compare it to.
The moment you start reaching for metaphors, you are smuggling in old intuitions that do not apply, and those intuitions will betray you the first time you try to reason about a system the metaphor was not built to describe.
His exact line was this: the usual way in which we plan today for tomorrow is in yesterday's vocabulary. And yesterday's vocabulary, he argued, was killing the field.
The reason most software is broken is downstream of this single misunderstanding. Programmers are taught to think of code as a craft. Something you get a feel for.
Something you pick up through practice. Something where intuition gets sharper with experience.
Dijkstra said this is exactly backwards. Programming is not a craft. It is closer to mathematics than to carpentry, and the moment you treat it as a craft, you guarantee that the software you produce will be full of the kind of bugs that craftsmanship cannot catch.
The fix, in his view, was to teach programming the way mathematics is taught. You should be able to prove your program correct before you run it.
You should reason about your code formally, the way a mathematician reasons about a theorem, not the way a carpenter feels their way through a joint. The students who learned this way, he said, would walk out of their classes with a kind of confidence that no amount of typing practice could produce.
The lecture was published in Communications of the ACM in 1989. The field did not listen. Universities kept teaching programming the same way.
Software kept getting bigger. Bugs kept compounding. By 2026, almost every piece of software on earth has known security vulnerabilities, undefined behaviors, and edge cases that nobody has ever proven safe. The doom that Dijkstra warned about in 1988 is now the default condition of the digital world we have built.
The deeper lesson is the one most readers miss the first time through.
Dijkstra was not just talking about software. He was making a much bigger point about how humans learn anything that is genuinely new. The instinct to translate the unfamiliar into the familiar is the most natural thing in the world.
It is also the single biggest obstacle to actually understanding something that has no precedent. If you keep reaching for analogies, you will never see the new thing clearly. You will only see your old framework projected onto it.
This is happening right now with AI. The same instinct that made people learn programming through metaphors of files and folders is making people understand large language models through metaphors of brains and people.
Almost every framework being used to describe AI in 2026 is borrowed from a previous domain. None of them quite fit. The few people who are actually building useful intuitions about how these systems work are the ones who have done what Dijkstra recommended forty years ago.
They have set down the old vocabulary. They have looked at the new thing on its own terms. They have accepted that the radical novelty is radical for a reason.
You are not slow. You were taught a discipline as if it were a hobby. The cruelty is real.
The fix is still available.
Do elite colleges help talented students from modest backgrounds join the social elite or help incumbent elites retain their positions?
NEW in the American Economic Review, by Andrés Barrios-Fernández, Christopher Neilson, and Seth Zimmerman: https://t.co/KvjCwvYlWN
#البحث_العلمي
صممت أداة https://t.co/HHloQRX0Jm الذكية من جامعة ستانفورد خصيصًا للباحثين في العلوم الاجتماعية والسياسية والاقتصاد وعلم النفس.
ارفع بياناتك، وحدد اتجاه بحثك، ودع #الذكاء_الاصطناعي يكتب لك ورقةً بحثية متكاملة وقابلة للتكرار في وقت قياسي.
https://t.co/cuse6hXC9X
This brother called Pacho has ended the season with zero yellow cards in the league and champions league, it’s unbelievable.
He made his professional debut barely 7 years ago, but he plays like a veteran of the game. So composed at only age 24😭
You don’t have to spend billions to sign quality players, he cost PSG €40m, but Brainthwaite and the likes are valued at £80m. Sporting directors and scouts should do some work and stop being lazy, there are players out there waiting to be seen.
You see that club in Ecuador called Independiente del Valle, they produce solid players. From Caicedo to Hincapie, to Pacho, I’m sure scouts specifically go there to sign players.
These are the kind of leagues Tony Bloom and his Jamestown Analytics focus on.
Funny part is that there’s a story where Pacho didn’t want to go to Independiente, he had turned down a team before them because he’s a mummy’s boy, he said he can’t do without his mum😅. Independiente had to present a plan that could accommodate his family before he moved there.
This guy was scouted by Belgian club Royal Antwerp, and later to Frankfurt. Do you know the common thing amongst both clubs, he spent just one full season at both clubs before PSG, such smaller clubs can’t keep stars for long.
Bro has two champions league at 24, zero hype but he’s up there with the best. I can’t wait to see him for Ecuador at the World Cup. He’s a monster, a clean monster, not a typical South American defender😅
Ladies and Gentlemen, Willian Pacho.
🗣️ El día que Luis Enrique dijo: "Kolo, entras, Kyky, estás fuera."
La reacción de Hakimi al escuchar esto 🤣
Años después, han ganado dos Champions CONSECUTIVAS 😭😭�
Economists are making the same mistake electrical engineers made a few of decades ago: expecting their PhD students to master a level of mathematics that’s entirely unnecessary and well outside the realm of usefulness.
As did EE - a bit too late for the AI revolution - Econ too will eventually realize that applied computing skills & systems thinking are far more relevant for the majority of modern careers than epsilon-delta proofs.
🚨💣 Se dice que Kylian Mbappé (27) se unirá al Chelsea en un movimiento estelar que podría sacudir el fútbol europeo.
El nuevo entrenador Xabi Alonso está ansioso por llevárselo a Stamford Bridge, con la creencia de que la superestrella francesa podría convertir al Chelsea de inmediato en contendiente al título. 🇫🇷💥
[TalkSport]
Nokia could have invented the iPhone. Three years before Apple did, a Nokia engineer walked into a meeting in Finland with a working prototype: a touchscreen phone with full internet access. Management killed it. The device looked too expensive and too risky to sell. The same year, Nokia also rejected a proposal for an online app store. Apple would launch the same idea four years later.
In 2007, Nokia controlled 40% of the world's mobile phone market and was worth more than $150 billion. By 2013, it had sold its phone business to Microsoft for $7.2 billion. The company that defined the cell phone became irrelevant in less time than it takes most kids to finish high school.
In 2016, two professors from INSEAD and Aalto University spent years interviewing 76 Nokia executives, engineers, and consultants for a research paper. Their conclusion: nobody at the company could have an uncomfortable conversation.
Senior leaders were described as "extremely temperamental." One consultant remembered then-CEO Jorma Ollila shouting at people "at the top of his lungs" in front of fifteen other vice presidents. Middle managers learned the rules fast. Bad news got you fired, so they stopped delivering it.
The engineers knew Nokia's operating system could not compete with what Apple was building for the iPhone. One design team submitted 500 separate proposals to fix it between 2001 and 2009. Not a single one got approved. When a middle manager once suggested that a colleague push back against a top executive, the colleague refused. He "didn't have the courage; he had a family and small children."
The top managers were also afraid, just of different things. They worried about looking weak to investors. So they publicly defended the old operating system while privately knowing it was dying. The middle managers heard the demand for optimism and supplied it. For four years, the people who knew the company was sinking could not get that message to the people who could do something about it.
Researchers call this shoot-the-messenger culture. It shows up in cockpit recordings before plane crashes, in hospital records before preventable deaths, and in the investigations of the 2008 financial crisis. The cost of avoiding a difficult conversation is always paid later, with interest.
Nokia's case is unusual because the math is so clean: the silence cost roughly $143 billion in market value and an entire company. The discomfort would have cost a few bad meetings.