Pinned note: Who am I?
“rawbooty” was chosen because it’s highly memorable (and theoretically brandable). The irony is that the domain is the antithesis of my personality.
I once considered developing https://t.co/yZgulnA2bk as a game or non-adult site. Instead I turned it into a free, no-tracker, no-ads HTML repository of lessons and notes I’ve written down. It’s still a work in progress, but I think there’s real value if you decide to visit. (You can ask an AI to confirm the site is safe before you go.)
As for me? I’m a retired hedge fund manager. Net CAGR ~18% over my tenure; ran a long-only fund that was down ~5% net in ’08. The fund stayed small partly because I dislike self-promotion. Background includes the CME, fund-of-funds, real estate, commodities, and agriculture. Style is value-biased, bottoms-up, and contrarian. These days I run my own book, no outside money.
I’m not here to grow an audience or persuade anyone. I post to clarify my own thinking; sometimes structured writing, sometimes rants, sometimes shitposts. Assume I’m wrong about everything. Nothing here is investment advice. I’ll occasionally note what I’m long or short and why; that’s just me working through a thesis, not a recommendation.
This isn’t a solicitation to follow—just context.
Price ≠ ΣFCFₜ/(1+r)ᵗ. Price is what you pay.
Note: I have long-form articles as well. Most are also on the website. You can find them on my profile under Articles.
Today the bears are getting served a McSqueezy at McShitty.
I still think this bear market is going to be a nasty one, and not in the way most people think.
Here's how I currently see it playing out (briefly):
Everyone wants to compare today's excesses to 2008. I think that's too easy and probably the wrong mental model.
2008 wasn't simply "too much debt." It was a highly concentrated credit event driven by a specific transmission mechanism. The key ingredients were terrible underwriting and massive leverage, which led to a collapse in the collateral values the financial system was built upon. The assumption that housing prices could never decline nationally was proven spectacularly wrong.
Also, I'm not convinced we have a Lehman Brothers lurking in the shadows.
That said, I do see:
-plenty of fraud
-circular financing
-promotional BS everywhere
-sketchy private credit structures
-AI dogshit trading at valuations that only make sense if we discover another planet filled with rich humans willing to buy this crap
What don't I see? An equivalent transmission mechanism to what happened in '08. (Lehman's derivatives exposure and millions of dogshit loans resetting from teaser rates into obligations borrowers couldn't afford.)
For me, the question isn't how much debt exists in the aggregate. It's how much bad debt exists, where it sits, how levered it is, what collateral supports it, and whether defaults can become concentrated enough to force systemic liquidation that undermines collateral values across the system.
Without a mechanism, some form of compression event, or a cascade of defaults that floods a major collateral pool and undermines otherwise healthy credit, I keep thinking less about 2008 and more about the 1970s.
Not a crash.
A slow, long, brutal grind.
Imagine a world where bad debts are discovered slowly, not suddenly. Where fraud is dragged into daylight one piece at a time.
In that world, refinancing becomes incrementally harder, credit spreads slowly widen, and capital is forced to become increasingly selective.
Asset values don't collapse. They slowly deflate in real terms while the Fed struggles to mask the underlying problems through interventions, bailouts, restructurings, and liquidity support.
Think a thousand paper cuts, one after another after another, not a gunshot wound.
Think a decade of perpetual disappointment.
Then again, I could be wrong.
I usually am.
The mechanical problem with $CRWV right now is the algos now see it can be pushed 20% in a day.
hard to see how they don't try to milk this for as long as possible.
Let's assume a company has 1 billion shares out.
The bid/ask is 1/1.05
but it's very illiquid.
You hit the ask buying 100 shares paying $1.05/share for a total cost to you of $105.
the Bid ask is now 1.05/1.06
The company is now worth $50m more because of your $105 investment.
Question: did $50m in value get created / revealed by your $105 investment?
If, one day later the price returns to 1/1.05 was $50m just lost? or are you just out $5? 🤔
Close, but probably more like a handful of smart people at the top are using it and seeing benefit and falsely assuming less capable people will receive similar benefit... so they roll it out company-wide, at great expense, only to later reel it back in once they realize their employees are using it to waste time and fuck stuff up.