A quarter of a century has passed since September 11, 2001, when the peace of our Nation was shattered by terrorists.
Today, we remember the 2,977 precious lives taken from us, honor the heroes who answered the call, & keep their families in the heart of our Nation.
Above all, we must ensure the memory of 9/11 never fades, but is carried from one generation of Americans to the next.
We will never forget. 🇺🇸
We are building Sanenta, the AI infrastructure layer for healthcare benefits brokers. We ingest claims data, identify the biggest opportunities to reduce healthcare insurance costs, match employers with high-quality providers in our marketplace, and automate compliant contracting.
https://t.co/sHrc8D7ZUg
The part that makes this story possible is easy to miss: Bank of America can compute that ROI at all only because it's self-funded. It sees its own claims. A fully insured employer gets a renewal with one number on it and no way to know what the GLP-1 line actually did — so it can't run the calculation, let alone defend the answer to a board. Worth flagging that $250M is gross. Rebate flow on GLP-1s is enormous, and the number that matters is net cost PMPM after rebates actually pass through to the plan — which, under a lot of PBM contracts, a meaningful share doesn't. What are you seeing in the mid-market? Curious whether employers in the 500–5,000 life range are getting anywhere near BofA's per-script economics, or whether the gap is as wide as I'd guess.
The 100-life line is less about headcount than about whether the claims history is credible enough to price spec. Plenty of 60–80 life groups pencil out fine. What actually kills those deals isn't the math — it's month 3, when incurred-but-not-reported claims hit and the CFO sees a cash-flow month that looks nothing like the fixed premium he's used to. Aggregate stop-loss with monthly accommodation plus a terminal liability rider makes that survivable, and almost nobody explains it that way up front. Which objection do you hear more from the CFO seat — the cash-flow volatility, or giving up the "someone else owns this problem" comfort of fully insured?
That’s the key point. Self-funded employers already have the purchasing power — the harder part is actually putting it to work. I have been working on this at @sanentahq : helping employers identify where they’re overpaying and make it easier to contract directly with providers at better rates. It seems crazy that an employer with 20,000 employees still has so little ability to influence what it pays for healthcare.
"Break the employer link so insurance is portable" needs more attention! Job lock is now measurable (Gallup: ~1 in 4 workers stay in a job they don't want just for coverage). Portability + real price transparency + DPC does more for your prior-auth fights than either bureaucracy. The prior auth you fight for a statin exists because the payer, not the patient, is the customer. Fix who the customer is and half of it disappears.
I had a hospital visit where they gave me two options.
Pay $500 out of pocket or bill my insurance.
I told them to bill my insurance.
They billed my insurance $20,000.
Very normal healthcare system.
@realdocspeaks We are building the infrastructure to aid and connect employers and providers seeking direct contracts at @sanentahq . Would you be open to connecting to discuss pain points providers face when navigating the direct contracting process?
Agreed. Just delay, finger-pointing and higher costs. It is why I built tools that actually cut through the nonsense. @sanentahq is one of the few things that feels different — letting self-funded employers go straight to high-value providers, model the real numbers, and lock in direct contracts without the endless ladder. Would you be open to connecting about how Sanenta can be used to improve your benefits strategy at your company?
When the dopamine wears off and your new, shiny goals start to feel impossible, it’s not because they are hard, but because your brain panics and throws every excuse, fear, and distraction at you to protect the version of yourself it already knows.
Direct contracting can create real value, but it also has downsides. Our CEO Rob Andrews shared with @MorningBrew that one of the biggest challenges can be as simple as an employee asking, “What insurance card do I put down for this appointment?”
📖https://t.co/7EJ2EF0ssK
Closing jails doesn’t reduce crime!
When Rikers is replaced by four smaller borough jails, total capacity drops from ~11,300 to roughly 3,300–4,000. NYC’s current jail population is already 6,500–7,000. To keep the new facilities from being dangerously overcrowded, the city will have to slash the jail population by thousands. I am calling it here first: Socialists will then celebrate “record low” jail numbers as a huge success while New Yorkers pay the price in higher crime.