@SomaliaPdrc You guys are destroying the legacy of the great Professor Shuke. PDRC was known for great research and publication. What happened to groundbreaking documentaries like this? https://t.co/fQcxNRuS87
Instead of inviting meaningless nobodies, return to the work PDRC did under Shuke
Political and lawful options for federal member states:
The credible path is political cohesion, lawful protest, institutional control, and disciplined messaging.
1) Establish a unified FMS and opposition position
Jubaland, Puntland, Southwest opposition, and national opposition figures should treat the Doolow incident as a single file: the alleged use of foreign air power in an internal political dispute. A joint statement, a joint request for investigation, and a shared red line should translate - no foreign strikes against political figures or FMS population centre, carry more weight than separate reactions.
2) Create an international record
Member states should submit formal communications to the UN Security Council, UN Secretary General, the African Union, IGAD, EU, US, and Ethiopia. Those notes should request an independent inquiry, relevant flight or unmanned-aircraft data, the chain of authorisation, and a civilian-casualty review.
3) Address the consequences of lifting the arms embargo. This is a central diplomatic argument, not a side point. Member states can state that the embargo was eased on the understanding that transferred weapons, aircraft, and enabling support would strengthen Somali institutions against Al-Shabaab under accountable national command. If those capabilities can be used, or reasonably appear to be used, against political opponents on FMS territory, the lift has created new risks rather than reducing them. They can argue that:
a) advanced air and strike capacity concentrated in one federal camp changes the internal balance of force
b) weak command-and-control and unresolved federal disputes increase the chance of misuse
c) civilian harm in a previously stable border town undermines the case that transfers improve security
d) partners who supported the lift now have a duty to review end-use, authorisation, and oversight
e) the UN should examine whether current safeguards are adequate and whether further transfers should be conditioned on non-use in domestic political conflicts.
The request should be specific: review implementation of the embargo exit, tighten end-use monitoring, and make clear that foreign-enabled strikes on Somali political rivals are incompatible with the purpose of the lift.
4) Separate counter-terrorism from factional conflict. Member states should affirm support for operations against verified Al-Shabaab targets coordinated with local authorities, while rejecting strikes on the residences of Somali political or security figures. That distinction preserves cooperation with Western and African partners and avoids an “anti-security” label.
5) Withdraw political consent for non-CT missions. Federal member states do not exercise exclusive sovereignty over Somali airspace. They can nonetheless declare that they do not consent to foreign combat missions over their territory except against designated terrorist targets, and notify international partners accordingly. This will not physically stop an aircraft. It does weaken the political and legal cover for a repeat incident.
6) Defend through existing institutional control
Jubaland’s leverage lies in Kismayo, parts of Gedo, its security forces, and the practical reality that the FGS cannot administer the south without local arrangements. Puntland’s leverage lies in institutional autonomy and geographic distance from Mogadishu. Sustained defence means retaining administration, ports, airports, and recruitment so that Mogadishu cannot replicate the Baydhabo model.
7) Engage Ethiopia and Kenya as neighbouring stakeholders. The death of an Ethiopian civilian in a border town, and the wider implications for Gedo and the Kenya frontier, give Addis Ababa and Nairobi a legitimate interest in deconfliction. Member states should ask both capitals to oppose political air operations near the border. They should not seek to draw either country into a military contest with Turkey.