Somali Review

[Official Feed] Online journal specializing on the #Somali Peninsula & wider region. The site features political journalism, blogs, arts & videos.

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

https://t.co/0BipFSpfJt

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

What Puntland’s letter to the U.N. means

Political Commentary | The so-called letter to the U.N., allegedly from the #Puntland leadership, is a testament to the lack of communication between Mogadishu and the state of Puntland. This breakdown of communication and cooperation has had major implications for the federal system in #Somalia. This divergence of interests eventuated to Puntland accusing #Mogadishu of backing anti-government forces in Puntland, although Mogadishu claimed they were military units registered under the Somali National Army (SNA). Importantly, during this Mogadishu-Puntland dispute, the Somali people lost opportunities to attract more development aid and foreign investment, because the chronic political instability, heightened investment risks and threats to free commerce undermine conditions for an investmentenvironment.

So, what does the letter, if authenticated, mean? In general terms, the letter is part of the tensions leading up to the 2026/2027 Somali federal elections. Puntland, one of the founding member states of federal Somalia, wants to secede from the federal union? This is intended to create alarm, blame Mogadishu-centric policy approach for further fragmenting the nation, and build pressure for the emergence of a Somali national leader from Puntland. Alternatively, the letter could signal that the Puntland leadership is digging its heels deeper with the intent of staying beyond the constitutional two-term limit that ends on January 8, 2029.

Whichever way the dice rolls, the FGS under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has been responsible for the provocation of regime change and violence in Baidoa, provoking political conflicts in Merka and Beletwein, and rejection opposition proposals for an electoral roadmap. The administration's legacy undermining federalism, mismanaging public lands in Mogadishu, building and breaking alliances due to a fractured and non-strategic foreign policy, may haunt Somalia in the coming years.

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

#Somalia: More time will not make a difference

Political Commentary | The decision by donors to continue funding the African-led international stabilization force in Somalia and supporting UN offices for an additional year is not a development that will necessarily make any tangible difference in the fragile East African nation. AU troops funded by donor nations have been deployed in the country and assisting the federal government with security and stabilization since 2007. However, political bickering has created an environment where clan grievances, extremist ideologies and corruption thrive and undermine governance efforts.

To ensure Somalia benefits and donors see progress from the one-year additional funding, there must be requisite accompanying conditions including the following:

1. Cohesive political framework: An agreement between federal, state and local authorities on a negotiated political settlement, electoral roadmap and independent electoral body.
2. Neutral arbitration: Impartial international actors must be signatories to the final roadmap to ensure all parties adhere to the agreement at the threat of sanctions.
3.. Security guarantees: International forces must oversee security during the electoral process in Mogadishu, where trust between federal institutions and opposition groups has deteriorated significantly.

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

Puntland and Jubaland considering break with the Somali Future Council

Political Commentary | The impending decision by the leaders of #Puntland and #Jubaland to withdraw membership from the Somali Future Council is reportedly driven by two key factors: 1) The states view themselves as constitutional authorities, compared to political parties whose reach does not extend beyond Mogadishu, and 2) The bargaining power of two rival opposition camps, led by former President Mohamed Farmajo and former PM Omar Sharmake, respectively, who are not part of the Future Council but have obtained representative seats during the FGS-opposition negotiations.

This distinction is important. After the fallout from the 2022 federal elections, Said Deni of Puntland and Ahmed Madobe of Jubaland do not trust each other - but have been allied against Mogadishu's overreach and direct intervention in state governance, including KGS state where the former administration was removed from power. As such, there is little substance in the Deni-Madobe alliance, other than a temporary marriage of convenience to pass over the emerging bridge. At the same time, their disappointment with how the Future Council has managed the negotiations, how the Farmajo and Sharmake camps emerged with independent participation and representation, and how the Future Council failed to "unite" the opposition into a single camp are all important factors driving a wedge between the Council and its two most important members: Puntland and Jubaland. If the two states withdraw, this has major implications for the waning influence of the Future Council. In this scenario, the opposition would effectively be divided into four groups. This scenario, without a doubt, benefits the incumbent administration under Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

The more effective scenario would be that all opposition groups united under the Future Council umbrella with a single agenda: promote timely, fair and credible electoral process. Unfortunately, the emerging four-camp opposition set up sends the wrong signal to the Somali people and international partners; if the opposition cannot agree to challenge and unseat the incumbent in a united front, how can they expected to lead #Somalia after the 2026/2027 election cycle?

For the two states, Puntland and Jubaland, its imperative that the leaders stay the course. This gives much needed strength to the Future Council as the most powerful opposition bloc, and thereby severely weaken the Farmajo and Sharmake camps. The alternative is further division, weakening the opposition and granting the incumbent an opportunity to manipulate, exploit and retain power.

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

News & Analysis | The political dialogue process mediated by Western ambassadors between the #Somali government and opposition groups has hit a major snag. The objective of the talks is to resume stalled political negotiations and to sign a comprehensive electoral agreement and roadmap, with a federal election slated for April/May 2027. The government and opposition groups have largely agreed on four key principles; however, the opposition has demanded that the agreement be signed in #Mogadishu after the UN General Assembly in New York City, which concludes towards the end of September. Opposition figures want to "deny" Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the incumbent president, an opportunity to claim victory at the #UNGA.

President Mohamud faces increasing political pressure from international partners who support Somalia's recovery, while struggling to resolve domestic contestations, including conflict in #Baidoa between federal forces and groups aligned to the former KGS state leader Abdiaziz Laftagaren, clan militia violence in Hiran and Lower Shabelle regions in Hirshabelle and KGS states, respectively, and two major states (#Puntland and #Jubaland) who've severed ties with Mogadishu after the mandate of federal institutions expired April/May 2027.

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

News & Insights | The #Türkiye leadership and the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu have divergent views on implementing the country's #Somalia policy. Well-informed sources confidentially tell @Somali_Review that President Recep Tayyib Erdoğan and the Turkish leadership continue to pursue a Somalia policy via aid, investment and security cooperation. This strategy is viewed in Ankara as maintaining a reliable partner at the gateway to Africa, a source for Turkish expertise, technology and a market for its industrial output. Somalia's geostrategic location is an added benefit that, if utilized appropriately, grants Ankara access to the strategic Gulf of Aden waterway. Importantly, the Turkish leadership views the Somalis as one people who need support to rebuild and restore their nation.

However, sources report that this high-level view is not shared by key actors at the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu, including diplomats, TIKA aid staff, and intelligence operatives. These operational players wield significant policy influence and only major incidents are reported back to Ankara. For example, navigating Somalia's increasingly complex regional and localized contexts is not prioritized by Türkiye's operational players in Mogadishu, who have used their influence to steer Ankara's Somalia policy towards one that antagonizes sub-national political entities, including the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, Southwest and Puntland states.

In a recent case, management at a Turkish holding company, which was granted rights to develop Somalia's fisheries resources, was reportedly perplexed with the political complexities in Somalia. The company planned to invest in the fisheries sector under Ankara's guidance. However, when it's operational firm requested to engage directly with Puntland to invest in the fisheries sector, Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) officials reportedly 'discouraged' the Turkish investor from engaging with Puntland.

This unsustainable situation where Türkiye's national leadership and its local representatives hold divergent views on operationalizing Ankara's Somalia policy is heading to a collision course, where Türkiye must choose between building long-term partnerships with the Somali people, irrespective of internal schisms among them, or continuing to side with one side of a factional divide to the detriment of Ankara's strategic objectives in Africa.

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

Rebuilding or robbing #Mogadishu: The government's heavy-handed land management strategy

News & Insight | Under the leadership of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's second term as the President of #Somalia, many Mogadishu residents report experiencing forceful evictions and demolitions of their homes. The government says its regaining control over public lands, improving local security and rebuilding the capital's image. However, opposition politicians and many residents complain about the actions of security forces, night-time raids and bulldozers - targeting both public lands, more commonly in recent weeks, private homes. Opposition figures have accused the government of selling illegally seized lands to business interests to raise funds, thereby neglecting the government's duty of care to citizens.

The fallout from this land management strategy could be catastrophic. In the near-term, it could lead to public uprising against the incumbent administration; more worryingly, it could lead to complex land disputes in the long-term, complicated by the legacy of civil war, communal conflicts, and weak regulatory and institutional capabilities.

Importantly, if left as is by this administration, resolving land disputes will be a major challenge for future Banadir Regional Administration leaders and even for the Federal Government, as the complexity of the land disputes creates grievances that, if unaddressed, could feed into the extremist narratives and youth radicalization that transformed Mogadishu into a hotbed of extremist violence since the mid-2000s.

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

Baidoa Conflict & Foreign Meddling

Baidoa itself does not have a specific geopolitical factor, but the path to the 2026/2027 Somali federal election runs through this city. Gaining a favorable partner to lead Somalia, an East African nation with significant geopolitical value, is an important target for a global and regional powers, including the U.S., China, #Türkiye, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. On the Somali-level, the battle for Baidoa is between the Somali opposition coalition backing former KGS leader Laftagaren and the FGS backing Madobe. On a regional level, Türkiye is aligned with the FGS through the provision of political, military and financial support, whilst GCC actor the #UAE is aligned more closely with the opposition coalition.

If the FGS loses Baidoa, Hassan Sheikh may potentially lose influence over KGS, which has the most seats on the Somali election chessboard per state. This outcome will likely end the political career of Hassan Sheikh in Somalia, as influence over other seats will begin to wane. Secondly, reigniting negative memories of clan conflicts does not benefit the incumbent. Third, losing Baidoa through an armed uprising by local forces may trigger an uprising in ##Mogadishu, where local communities feel disenfranchised by the current administration, which is using questionable means to forcefully remove civilians from their homes and sell public and private lands to dubious business interests. Fourth, the potential fall of Baidoa is likely to give a major momentum to the opposition, although it is unclear if the opposition will capitalize on this potential opportunity. Finally, if Baidoa falls, the outcome will have major implications for Türkiye's involvement in Somalia's internal politics. By aiding the incumbent in Mogadishu to fight the political opposition through the provision of military, intelligence and operational resources, Türkiye is sending the wrong signal to the Somali public by not behaving as an independent partner to the Somali people and the Federal Republic of Somalia, but rather as a foreign power meddling in the country's unresolved, destructive legacy of civil war, political fragmentation, and clan-based power struggles.

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

The Fall of Baidoa

The narrative on the ground is clear: Aden Madobe came to power through a Mogadishu-based political coup, although an 'election' was organized in Baidoa. The deployment of forces from Mogadishu to Baidoa triggers memories of the clan violence of the 1990s, when Baidoa was occupied by Mogadishu-based USC militia until its liberation by the RRA militia in 1999. Because Aden Madobe lacks local legitimacy, is in power on questionable constitutional and legal grounds, and in light of the continued armed pressure from its environs, it is likely that the FGS will withdraw from Baidoa - sooner rather than later. There are already talks of relocating Aden Madobe to Barawe, in Lower Shabelle region, which is the constitutional city of KGS state (KGS operates in Baidoa as an interim capital). The potential fall of Baidoa has major ramifications for incumbent Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. If Hassan Sheikh retains Baidoa prior to the electoral agreement, he stands to gain influence over 68% of the new federal parliament prior to the election (by keeping influence over Galmudug, HIrshabelle and 'Somaliland' seats).

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

Baidoa Conflict & the 2026/2027 Somali Federal Election

At the state level, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) continues to intervene directly, most recently in KGS and #Galmudug states, aiming to install pro-Mogadishu leaders ahead of the anticipated electoral agreement. KGS has 77 seats in federal parliament, while Galmudug and Hirshabelle have 45 seats each. Combined, control over the election processes across these three states grants the incumbent in Mogadishu the power to influence about 50% of federal parliamentary seats. When combined with an additional 57 seats allocated to '#Somaliland', seats 'elected' in Mogadishu, the incumbent has the potential to wield influence over 224 out of 329 seats (68%) of federal parliament.

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

https://t.co/OmuKdtNmhQ

[Liban Abdi @Victor13th]

#SomaliYouthVision is hostin an event which MPs are explainin more to the people they act at JPH
#KudosSYV
#Ismatalaad
@Somali_Review

[Thabit Mohamed @ThabitMhd]

Thank you everyone who congratulated me past few days. I'm very humbled by your words of encouragement. Still in DC working on handover 1/3

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

#Somalia Week in Focus: Top Stories (Mar. 24, 2017) #SomaliaDrought #Yemen #Puntland #ISIS https://t.co/TLv5Vt4sua

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

#Somalia Week in Focus: Top Stories (Mar. 17, 2017) #SomaliDrought #AMISOM https://t.co/bW4WoH6qn0

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

#Somalia Week in Focus: Top Stories (Mar. 10, 2017) #Somaliland #Puntland #drought… https://t.co/PV3vTN59x5

[Ahmed Vision @ahmedvision1]

A new phase of drought response began. students collecting all types of foods from their families and friends for quick help #Caawiwalaal

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

Chaos In #Somaliland Could Trigger Regional Conflict #Somalia https://t.co/hUcS9zljzz

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

#Somalia Week in Focus: Top Stories (Feb. 24, 2017) #Puntland #UKAid #SavetheChildren… https://t.co/lkBrcr2QUl

[Somali Review @Somali_Review]

#Somalia: Hope Springs a Trap! #Farmajo #somaliadecides #Mogadishu https://t.co/6VZMC7l9Ch