TankoRex

Visca el Barça💙❤️. Still a liberal despite of the political left married islamonazism. What I’ve lost in people, I gained in backbone.

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@politico Norway’s antisemitism know no boundaries or limits.

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@RichardHanania 🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂🤣😂

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@FonsiLoaiza Wow, el activista de Hollywood!

[Hillel Neuer @HillelNeuer]

Amnesty International—which was silent when Israeli hostages were tortured in Gaza tunnels—now devotes its entire global organization to non-stop campaigning for Hamas Colonel Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya who celebrated October 7 atrocities and ran hospital that hid Hamas terrorists.

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@zarahussain999 This is what we use to call freedom of speech, and in our democratic systems your feelings cannot triumph the freedom of expression. If you don’t like it, go somewhere else where censure is the normal way of life.

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@FonsiLoaiza Un buen islamonazi es un islamonazi mu3rto!
🥳🥳🥳🥳🥳🥳🥳🥳

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@iraninitaly @Reuters A good Islamonazi is a dead islamonazi.

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@Reuters 🥳🥳🥳🥳🥳

[Trisha Posner @trishaposner]

A new report documents what Jewish staff inside MSF (Doctors Without Borders) have been saying for years — and it is damning.

Insiders describe an organizational culture where Israel is called a "Nazi state," where a Jewish employee was told "Israel doesn't have a right to exist," and where staff were instructed not to speak out for Israeli victims because it would "victimise the perpetrators."

A former Secretary-General says MSF has become "an accomplice of Hamas." A board consultant says Jewish staff concerns about antisemitism were "dismissed."

This isn't a few bad actors. It's a pattern — at the top and on the ground.
Read it 👇

https://t.co/15xtOaCJmo

[Amit Segal @AmitSegal]

One of the enduring mysteries of October 7 is why Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, chose not to join in. When Hamas’s Nukhba forces flooded into the south, Hezbollah’s Radwan forces were poised for a similar push in the north—but the order never came.

A newly published set of internal Hezbollah documents, analyzed by researchers at the Amit Institute for Terrorism and Intelligence Research, sheds light on years of coordination between the two Iranian tentacles in the run-up to the attack and why Nasrallah ultimately didn’t pull the trigger.

The alliance faced its first real test two years earlier, during the May 2021 conflict, Operation Guardian of the Walls. Internal Hamas documents reveal that during the operation, a joint intelligence war room was established in Beirut, staffed by Hamas, Hezbollah and the IRGC. Through this channel, Hezbollah supplied Hamas with intelligence on request. Khaled Ghanem, then head of Hamas’s overseas military intelligence, wrote in an internal report that the war room was operational from the second day of fighting through the day after it ended, and that Hamas had requested—and received—information on Israeli military deployments, aerial intelligence activity and fighter jet movements.

That wasn’t the only intelligence Hezbollah seemingly had access to.

One of the most striking disclosures involves the Israeli military’s “Metro” operation—a deception designed to lure Hamas fighters into their tunnel network by making them believe a ground invasion was imminent so Israeli forces could then strike underground. According to the same Hamas intelligence report, it was Hezbollah that tipped Hamas off, roughly two hours before the ground assault began, that the operation wasn’t a real invasion at all but a ploy to draw fighters into the open and build a target bank—effectively exposing the Israeli bluff before it worked. A senior Israeli security official who helped command the operation later confirmed to Army Radio that Hezbollah did indeed play a significant role in unraveling that ruse.

The documents also reveal that Hezbollah helped Hamas avoid the targeted killing of Ahmad Ghandour, commander of the northern Gaza brigade (later killed during the current war), by detecting a buildup of Israeli intelligence surveillance over his location in the Jabaliya refugee camp and warning Hamas roughly two hours in advance that an assassination attempt on a senior figure appeared imminent.

Despite this support—along with tacit approval for Palestinian factions in Lebanon to fire rockets into Israel from Lebanese territory—Hamas came away from the operation disappointed. In one exchange, a senior Hamas official abroad pressed Hezbollah’s response coordinator to push for greater involvement in order to tie down Israeli forces in the north, complaining that Hezbollah’s support so far had been limited.

A year later, in May 2022, a pivotal meeting took place in Beirut: senior Hamas officials sat down with Nasrallah and a senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard general. The Hamas delegation argued conditions were ripe for expanding the conflict with Israel into a full-scale, multi-front campaign—pointing to a wave of terror attacks then sweeping the West Bank and Israeli cities, Israel’s fragile political standing at the time (the meeting came just two days after the ruling coalition shrank to 59 Knesset seats and two months before the Bennett-Lapid government collapsed), and a wave of regional normalization that Hamas wanted to derail.

Surprisingly, Nasrallah didn’t embrace the idea. He told the Hamas delegation the concept was sound in principle and worth discussing, but insisted any campaign first needed clearly defined objectives. Did Hamas expect this confrontation to force a complete Israeli withdrawal? Or was the aim something more limited, like simply preventing Jews from entering the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound—a modest goal, he noted, that wouldn’t require war at all? In effect, Nasrallah was asking Hamas to define its strategy and war aims before he’d commit Hezbollah to anything.

Hamas reported back to Sinwar that they hadn’t yet defined clear war objectives and that Nasrallah remained hesitant. Sinwar responded with his plan.

The most ambitious scenario—internally called “The Second Promise” (later renamed the “Jericho Wall” plan behind October 7)—envisioned Hamas striking with full force in a surprise, multi-front war aimed at toppling Israel. Sinwar called it the preferred option, tying its timing to a Jewish holiday—Passover, most fittingly. This is the first evidence that he didn’t originally target October 7 at all; he was initially eyeing Passover 2023. He also sketched softer scenarios involving partial Hezbollah participation, but in every version treated the Jordanian border as key, envisioning guerrilla forces infiltrating from Syria and Jordan.

Nasrallah responded favorably, calling it a realistic scenario, and said he’d bring it to Khamenei for final approval.

By June 2023, Sinwar appeared confident that Hezbollah and Iran were coming around. Addressing Hamas’s political bureau in Gaza, he said recent efforts had succeeded in pulling both out of what he called their lingering psychological trauma from the 2006 Second Lebanon War, and that they were now highly prepared to form an alliance with Hamas for a future campaign.

Two months before the attack, in August 2023, Sinwar addressed Hamas’s Shura Council, sounding even more certain, telling members that if the great strategic campaign broke out, multiple fronts would open against Israel.

Not everyone inside Hamas shared his confidence. An internal military intelligence document from around that time referenced a lingering “psychological barrier” on Hezbollah’s part, along with hesitation within Hamas’s own ranks about how reliable that support would really be.

None of that seems to have shaken Sinwar. At 6:29 that morning, having caught Israel completely by surprise, he sent a letter to Nasrallah apologizing for the lack of advance warning and urging him to join the fight immediately, asking for a concentrated rocket barrage and a major ground offensive. He was met with silence.

In the hours that followed, Sinwar himself appears to have been stunned to find Hezbollah wasn’t joining him. Only a full day later did any assistance arrive—and even then, it was relatively symbolic in scale.

Had Hezbollah joined the fight as Sinwar expected, October 7 would have been incalculably worse. In the end, it was Nasrallah’s hesitation—not Israeli preparedness—that spared the Galilee from a similar fate.

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

❌ Yahya Sinwar
❌ Mohammed Sinwar
❌ Mohammed Deif
❌ Marwan Issa
❌ Ismail Haniyeh
❌ Saleh al-Arouri
❌ Izz al-Din al-Haddad
❌ Ahmed Ghandour
❌ Ayman Nofal
❌ Ali Qadi
❌ Ahmed Jabari
❌ Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi
❌ Ahmed Yassin
❌ Hassan Nasrallah
❌ Fuad Shukr
❌ Ibrahim Aqil
❌ Muhammad Neamah Nasser
❌ Abbas al-Musawi
❌ Imad Mughniyeh
❌ Fathi Shaqaqi
❌ Ali Khamenei
❌ Hossein Salami
❌ Mohammad Bagheri
❌ Gholam Ali Rashid
❌ Amir Ali Hajizadeh
❌ Mohammad Reza Zahedi
❌ Mohsen Fakhrizadeh

The world is safer thanks to Israel 🇮🇱

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

❌ Yahya Sinwar
❌ Mohammed Sinwar
❌ Mohammed Deif
❌ Marwan Issa
❌ Ismail Haniyeh
❌ Saleh al-Arouri
❌ Izz al-Din al-Haddad
❌ Ahmed Ghandour
❌ Ayman Nofal
❌ Ali Qadi
❌ Ahmed Jabari
❌ Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi
❌ Ahmed Yassin
❌ Hassan Nasrallah
❌ Fuad Shukr
❌ Ibrahim Aqil
❌ Muhammad Neamah Nasser
❌ Abbas al-Musawi
❌ Imad Mughniyeh
❌ Fathi Shaqaqi
❌ Ali Khamenei
❌ Hossein Salami
❌ Mohammad Bagheri
❌ Gholam Ali Rashid
❌ Amir Ali Hajizadeh
❌ Mohammad Reza Zahedi
❌ Mohsen Fakhrizadeh

The world is safer thanks to Israel 🇮🇱

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@IsraelinSpanish Yeah, that’ll fkcng show’em!

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

❌ Yahya Sinwar
❌ Mohammed Sinwar
❌ Mohammed Deif
❌ Marwan Issa
❌ Ismail Haniyeh
❌ Saleh al-Arouri
❌ Izz al-Din al-Haddad
❌ Ahmed Ghandour
❌ Ayman Nofal
❌ Ali Qadi
❌ Ahmed Jabari
❌ Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi
❌ Ahmed Yassin
❌ Hassan Nasrallah
❌ Fuad Shukr
❌ Ibrahim Aqil
❌ Muhammad Neamah Nasser
❌ Abbas al-Musawi
❌ Imad Mughniyeh
❌ Fathi Shaqaqi
❌ Ali Khamenei
❌ Hossein Salami
❌ Mohammad Bagheri
❌ Gholam Ali Rashid
❌ Amir Ali Hajizadeh
❌ Mohammad Reza Zahedi
❌ Mohsen Fakhrizadeh

The world is safer thanks to Israel 🇮🇱

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@Independent Here

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

Never forget. Never forgive.

[Fazer 🇺🇦🇮🇱 @Fazer_DDorf]

Palästinenser schiessen mit einer Rakete auf einen Krankenwagen.
Interessiert @amnesty aber nicht. Sind ja nur Juden.

[Casey Babb @DrCaseyBabb]

Palestinians — “we want Hamas out.”

Lebanese — “we want Hezbollah out.”

Western leftists — “no you don’t.”

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@CNNEE Islamonazis lloriqueando cada que inician una guerra que no pueden ganar. 😂😂

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@teleSURtv Islamonazis lloriqueando cada vez que inician una guerra que están destinados a perder. 😭😂

[TankoRex @TankoRex]

@teleSURtv La trágica y patética muerte de un confundido Islamonazi. 😂😂😂