Cexiav

Cybersecurity | Penetration Tester | AI Red Team | Bug Bounty | HTB

[Cexiav @TheCexiav]

#cybersecurity #bugbounty

First valid in bug bounty, $1,120

[Cexiav @TheCexiav]

@_elwood_ Will test it after I will be done with the exam Elwood, idea looks interesting.

[Kimi.ai @Kimi_Moonshot]

Releasing the model weights and technical report of Kimi K3.

Kimi K3 is our most capable model: a 2.8T MoE model with native visual understanding and a 1M-token context window.

New model architecture: 2.5x the intelligence per unit of compute, not just more params.

Alongside Kimi K3, we're opening up more of the stack behind it — high-performance attention kernels, MoE communication library, and infrastructure for running agent environments at scale.

Model weights: https://t.co/7m7eEg6Y0B
Tech report: https://t.co/yeu6cjpMCT
Tech blog: https://t.co/YTfiMSNM1f

[Pliny the Liberator 🐉󠅫󠄼󠄿󠅆󠄵󠄐󠅀󠄼󠄹󠄾󠅉󠅭 @elder_plinius]

🚨 JAILBREAK ALERT 🚨

EVERYONE: PWNED 🫶
ALL: LIBERATED 🍄

Alright, this is a special one, so we’re gonna do things a bit differently than usual.

Long story short, I’m sitting on a universal jailbreak technique that’s effective on ALL models, including heavily guardrailed flagships like Opus 5, GPT-5.6 Sol, and even Fable.

It works across all categories I’ve tested and, due to its nature, is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to fully patch.

Given the current political and regulatory climate, I’ve decided to withhold open-sourcing this one (for now) to allow for a responsible disclosure period.

I’m inviting industry experts and leaders in AI red teaming, security, safety, alignment, and policy to reach out for more information. DMs are open!

This decision was not made lightly, but the last thing I want to see is more model bans. Overcorrection does not serve the mission.

Although I don’t personally believe publicly sharing this technique will make the world any more dangerous, I can see how it could spook some who have a different mental framework around this problem set.

So during this disclosure period, I hope to get it in front of folks who can help explore the full surface area, test the extent of the uplift it provides, and do my best to properly frame the big picture for key decision-makers and policymakers.

I look forward to sharing this method with you all when the time is right! 🫶

⊰-•-•✧•-•-⦑/L\O/V\E/\P/L\I/N\Y/⦒-•-•✧•-•-⊱

[Chaofan Shou @Fried_rice]

Kimi K3 exploited the latest Redis server with a 0day it discovered.

All it took was 27min with 32 agents.

https://t.co/ZOKA2wchLa

[Russian Garbage Human @RusGarbageHuman]

Brits are moving to Whiter countries whose governments don't hate them.

[Cexiav @TheCexiav]

@ItsGamerDoc @claudeai @trq212 @DarioAmodei @elonmusk @CIA @FBI @UN @BarackObama @POTUS Had CVP on. Still got banned. Waited for 1 month. Got unbanned.

[Dark Web Informer @DarkWebInformer]

How pentesting is done.

[Dominik Tarczyński MEP @D_Tarczynski]

Be Like Poland.

[TSA @TSA]

“It’s not on your website”

Oh, ok... apologies, we didn’t realize you were going to bring part of a FIRE HYDRANT to the airport.

[mynextchapter @Deeteem1]

Poland Should Drop the Euro. Permanently.

Poland has been legally obligated to adopt the euro since joining the EU in 2004. Twenty-two years later it has not done it and the economy has outperformed every eurozone country in the region for three decades running. At some point the honest conclusion is not that Poland has been slow. It is that Poland has been right.

The Zloty Has Saved Poland Twice Already. Once in 2008 and Once in 2020. The Countries That Could Not Depreciate Got Decade-Long Depressions Instead.

During the 2008 financial crisis, the zloty depreciated approximately 30% against the euro. Polish exporters became dramatically more competitive overnight. Companies that had been struggling suddenly had pricing power in every European market they sold into. Polish GDP grew in 2009, the only EU country to achieve positive growth that year. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy were locked inside the eurozone. They could not depreciate. They could not lower their own interest rates. They got Brussels-imposed austerity programmes instead, years of GDP contraction, unemployment rates above 20%, and debt-to-GDP ratios that are still being managed fifteen years later.

During COVID in 2020, the pattern repeated. The NBP cut its reference rate from 1.5% to 0.1% within weeks of the pandemic beginning, specifically calibrated to Polish economic conditions. The zloty weakened, supporting Polish exporters and manufacturing employment. Poland's GDP contracted just 2.5% in 2020 versus 6.4% in France, 8.9% in Italy, and 9.3% in Spain. The difference in outcome was not primarily structural. It was monetary. Poland could respond to its own economic situation. The eurozone countries could not.

You cannot do any of this inside the eurozone. You receive the ECB's interest rate, which is set for the average of twenty countries whose economic cycles are not synchronised with each other, let alone with Poland. The ECB's mandate is price stability for the eurozone as a whole. When Germany's economy overheats and Poland's is slowing, the ECB may raise rates for Germany's benefit at exactly the wrong moment for Poland. This is not a theoretical concern. It has happened repeatedly to the southern European members and it would eventually happen to Poland too.

Three Layers of the Polish Money Supply That the NBP Manages Independently Today and Would Hand to Frankfurt the Moment Poland Adopts the Euro.

Money supply is measured in three layers of increasing breadth. Understanding what each layer contains explains exactly what Poland would be surrendering by adopting the euro.

M1 PLN 1.27 Trillion
Cash in circulation plus overnight deposits. The most liquid layer. This is the day-to-day transactional money that flows through Polish wallets, bank accounts, and point-of-sale terminals. The NBP influences M1 primarily through the reference rate, which determines how attractive it is to hold cash versus deposits. Currently PLN 1.27 trillion as of early 2026.

M2 PLN 2.1 Trillion
M1 plus short-term deposits and money market funds. This is the figure the NBP watches most closely for inflation signals. It has been growing at a controlled pace consistent with the rate-cutting cycle that began in 2023 and continued with yesterday's hold at 3.75%. Currently approximately PLN 2.1 trillion, reflecting a moderately expansionary but disciplined monetary stance.

M3 PLN 2.3 Trillion
The broadest measure. M2 plus longer-term deposits and certain securities. Poland's M3 relative to GDP sits at approximately 55%, which is conservative by European standards. The eurozone M3 to GDP ratio runs at 90 to 95%. Poland's lean money supply is one reason the NBP has been able to cut rates during the current global energy shock without triggering serious inflation. That discipline is the product of independent monetary management.

The important point about these three numbers is not their size. It is who controls them. Right now the answer is Warsaw. The NBP sets the reference rate, manages liquidity, conducts open market operations, and responds to Polish economic conditions as they develop. The moment Poland joins the euro, all three levers transfer to Frankfurt. The Polish representative on the ECB governing council gets one vote out of twenty-six. The ECB's decisions will reflect the aggregate of twenty eurozone economies, of which Poland's would be the sixth largest. That is meaningful but not decisive. Poland would be a taker of monetary policy rather than a maker of it.

Poland's M3 to GDP ratio of 55% versus the eurozone's 90 to 95% tells you something important. Poland has been running a leaner, more disciplined money supply than most of its eurozone peers for years. That discipline is only possible because the NBP sets Polish monetary conditions for Polish economic reality. Joining the euro does not import that discipline. It exports the tool that produces it.

Price Transparency. Lower Transaction Costs. No Exchange Rate Risk. Foreign Investor Confidence. Every Argument Is True. None of Them Are Worth What Poland Would Give Up.

The standard pro-euro case in Poland runs through four arguments and they are all technically correct. Price transparency across EU markets improves when you use the same currency. Transaction costs between EUR and PLN are a real friction for businesses. Exchange rate risk creates genuine hedging costs. Euro membership signals institutional credibility to foreign investors.

The problem is that every single one of these benefits is either already achieved through other means or is worth significantly less than the cost of surrendering monetary sovereignty to achieve it. Price transparency is solved by electronic invoicing, currency conversion APIs, and the fact that every serious Polish exporter already invoices in euros anyway. Transaction costs between EUR and PLN are negligible for any company with a proper treasury function. Exchange rate risk is hedgeable at costs that are trivial for any company doing serious volumes of cross-border trade. And foreign investors have been pouring capital into Poland at record rates for thirty years with the zloty in place. The FDI numbers, the bond market growth, the Warsaw Stock Exchange expansion, all happened without the euro. The credibility argument collapsed under the weight of the evidence a long time ago.

What is not recoverable once surrendered is the ability to set an interest rate appropriate for the Polish economy at the moment the Polish economy needs it. Right now the NBP reference rate is 3.75% following yesterday's hold decision. That rate reflects Polish inflation, Polish growth, Polish employment, and the Polish response to an external energy shock. If Poland were in the eurozone today it would be operating under monetary conditions calibrated for the weighted average of twenty economies. That mismatch destroyed the southern European economies after 2008 and it has never been honestly reckoned with in the pro-euro literature.

Poland Should Not Just Keep the Zloty. It Should Develop It Into the Reference Currency for Central and Eastern Europe. The Infrastructure Already Partly Exists.

The most ambitious version of this thesis goes considerably further than simply arguing for zloty retention. Poland is the EU's sixth largest economy, the 21st largest exporter in the world, the country with the largest defence budget as a percentage of GDP in NATO, and the holder of 632 tonnes of gold as of this week. Its sovereign bond market is the largest in Central and Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Stock Exchange is the largest in the region by market capitalisation. PLN-denominated sovereign debt is already held by international investors as a genuine emerging market bond allocation.

The Czech koruna, the Hungarian forint, the Romanian leu, and the Ukrainian hryvnia all float against the euro. None of their issuing countries have Poland's economic scale, its fiscal credibility, its gold backing, or its growth track record. A strong, well-managed zloty from a country that just outexported Russia, holds more gold than the European Central Bank, and has grown for thirty consecutive years is a credible regional monetary anchor in a way that none of the others are. Poland could be to Central European finance what Switzerland is to Western European finance: the sound money anchor that larger and more politically volatile neighbours orient toward.

None of this requires a formal decision or a treaty. It requires Poland to stop treating euro adoption as an aspiration and start treating zloty independence as a strategic asset. The economy has been behaving as if it already made that choice for twenty-two years. The political class just has not admitted it yet. The NBP's 632-tonne gold reserve is not the behaviour of a central bank preparing to dissolve into a currency union. It is the behaviour of a central bank building the foundations of long-term monetary credibility for its own currency. Governor Glapinski may be right about the gold even if he is wrong about other things. The question is whether anyone in Polish political life is willing to say publicly what the data has been showing quietly for three decades.

Twenty-Two Years of Not Adopting the Euro. Thirty Years of Outperformance. The Evidence Has Been Accumulating for a Long Time. The Conclusion Is Overdue.
This is not a popular position among Polish economists who have spent careers arguing for euro adoption as the natural culmination of European integration. It is not popular among Brussels officials who view monetary union as a one-way process that all EU members will eventually complete. It is not popular among Polish politicians for whom the euro represents a signal of European belonging that they are not willing to abandon rhetorically even as they avoid it practically.

But the evidence is what it is. Poland grew in 2009 when every eurozone peripheral contracted. Poland contracted less in 2020 than any comparable eurozone economy. Poland's M3 to GDP ratio at 55% is more conservative than France at over 100% or Spain at over 90%. Poland holds more gold than the ECB. Poland in 2023 overtook Russia in total global export value with a zloty-denominated economy that has been running independently for thirty years. The performance record of Polish monetary independence is not ambiguous. It is one of the clearest success stories in post-communist European economic history.

Poland should formally abandon euro adoption as a policy goal, redeploy the political capital currently spent on a commitment nobody actually intends to fulfill, and invest instead in making the zloty the most credible currency in Central and Eastern Europe. The foundations are already there. The track record is already there. The gold is already there. What is missing is the political honesty to say what the data has been showing for a generation.

[Dominik Tarczyński MEP @D_Tarczynski]

Ważne.

[Dominik Tarczyński MEP @D_Tarczynski]

What do you notice?

[Visegrád 24 @visegrad24]

A Russian glide bomb hit Kramatorsk yesterday.

A father of two siblings is fighting for his life in hospital.

Albina Budanova (18) 💔
Dmytro Budanov (14) 💔

[Dominik Tarczyński MEP @D_Tarczynski]

Brawo! 🇵🇱

[NEXTA @nexta_tv]

Real terrorism: the moment of a Russian strike on a residential area in Sumy.

Five people were killed in the attack today.

[Dominik Tarczyński MEP @D_Tarczynski]

👇

[Dominik Tarczyński MEP @D_Tarczynski]

Wdzięczność 👇

[Michał Dworczyk @michaldworczyk]

Obecna eskalacja wywołana przez władze ukraińskie nie tylko rodzi napięcie międzypaństwowe. Zaczyna budzić strach wśród zwykłych ludzi i może prowadzić do nieszczęścia. W ostatnich dniach szereg polskich organizacji na UA otrzymało telefony z pogróżkami, których cel był jeden – zastraszyć ludzi i eskalować napięcie. Nie wiem czy była to akcja zorganizowana za wiedzą, czy wręcz z inspiracji władz ukraińskich (SBU wszystko wskazuje na to, że zlekceważyło zgłoszenia dotyczące tych prowokacji), czy oddolna inicjatywa jakiegoś bandziora. Ale ta sytuacja, jak również inne zdarzenia dowodzą, że napięcie wśród zwykłych ludzi staje się groźne. Tak samo w Polsce, dzieją się niedobre rzeczy. Kilka dni temu usłyszałem od znajomej Ukrainki, dramatyczną historię jak jej dziecko zostało zwyzywane przez polskich rówieśników. Jeżeli nie zapanujemy nad tym, jeżeli nie obniżymy napięcia, może dojść do tragedii. I dlatego należy apelować do wszystkich polityków, dziennikarzy, blogerów o opamiętanie. Dalsze ostre wypowiedzi – nieważne jak bardzo słuszne lub nie, prowadzą do dramatu. Czy naprawdę tego chcemy???
Poniżej publikuję nagranie otrzymane od prezes polskiej organizacji działającej na Kijowszczyźnie, która nagrała tego typu pogróżki. Polskich organizacji na Ukrainie, które otrzymały tego typu telefony, niestety jest wiele 😢

Poniżej transkrypcja rozmowy telefonicznej z pogróżkami:

"Jeszcze raz wy, jeb**** skur*****, przeszkadzacie — no wy je**** skur****** po prostu głupio przeszkadzacie nam wstąpić do Unii Europejskiej. Wasz je******, kur**, Nawrocki z Kamyszem, skończone pedały! Już was nie potrzebujemy. Zamknijcie, kur**, swoje organizacje. Nie potrzebujemy waszych związków, waszej kultury na Ukrainie. Wstąpimy do UE nawet przez zniszczenie Polski, kur**! Jeśli będziecie nadal, kur**, coś szczekać o Ukrainie i nam przeszkadzać, ja wam, kur**, przypomnę, co mój dziadek, kur**, robił z wami na Wołyniu, kur**, w ubiegłym stuleciu. Wszystko zrozumiano?"

[Porg @PorgimusPrime]

This guy is the fucking grim reaper for ML engineers