Trying to be a little less wrong each day. Old grad, Hoya, and Jedi (non-star wars variety) just swimming in a new pond. Views are mine but may be sarcasm
Always happy to work w @Strategy_Bridge! Thanks for the repost.
Pretty sure back in the day I got hired at @USArmyMCCoE in part for this effort. Found an interesting topic and deep dived it. Another story to support a common theme— keep a reading and writing practice
“The U.S. Army is in the midst of the most important rethinking of doctrine since the Cold War.” Ryan Orsini discusses the ongoing changes in @USArmy Mission Command in this engaging study.
https://t.co/HQ0oLWJjbG
staff SMEs often talk past each other wo/ common risk mgmt language. Authors determinants of survivability{susceptibility (avoiding/defeating attack), vulnerability (withstanding attack damage), and recoverability (damage control/capability restoration} has potential to help
The Department of Defense and its services should reevaluate what survivability means when planning (both operationally and financially). https://t.co/vWMfwyDUlt
Lots of insights here. tactically, how RUS is able to so effectively use RW ATK in the close fight. How UKR uses a combo of infantry/UAS/PGM to win the counter fire fight. Operationally, how the OBJs must be shaped by the season—change the BF geometry before the MCOO changes.
Stakes are high as Ukraine’s offensive starts to secure a military advantage, I write for the @FinancialTimes on the dynamics of the ongoing offensive: https://t.co/sCj4zm9pXB
Exclusive: Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top uniformed officer, expressed annoyance at suggestions that the long-anticipated counterattack to oust Russian forces from occupied territory is moving more slowly than expected. https://t.co/GhfLSkxW7p
Great read. But one of the underlying themes of Russian military theory over time is how damn hard it is to (1) find a policy window and drive change from just theory into practice and (2) successfully iterate between problem/solution at the institutional level
Soviet military theorist Georgii Isserson wrote that "each historical period is pregnant with a new one and displays new rudimentary tendencies and forms." That's why studying historical Soviet military theory illuminates Russia's actions in Ukraine today. https://t.co/o0INQpBEwB
@andy_morgado@jameskgreer77 @us_sams @doctrinatrix_C2 @melianpdialogue @MarshallMcgurk One Note “Professional Development” notebook. I used to note books in green notebooks (and that took a while to transfer) but can’t replace the ability to query/reference from any personal device. Also easy to sort w my pages for podcasts, guest speakers, writing outlines, etc
3– operational-level shaping efforts. If the right operational context is present (local institutions, popular will, etc) and you need an economy of force effort to secure a region of populated GLOCs. Not a bad case study to pull out. Not decisive—but a condition setter
Excellent convo about Vietnam Combined Action Platoons by @TheKrulakCenter. 3x institutional/operational takeaways. Some @us_sams extra credit #ReadWithSAMS#SAMSminute
#TeamKrulak community, our latest #BruteCast is up! Former #Marine Cavender Sutton led us through a great discussion on “Combined Action in Vietnam:”
YouTube: https://t.co/eNzu0nWYEP
Spotify: https://t.co/qwrb5sxl6G
Apple: https://t.co/aV7vvCc20W
2–tactical success doesn’t translate into higher outcome on its own. Advise, assist, accompany can work. But CAPs lacked unity of cmd to translate decentralized success. Not feasible to put them everywhere. Similar story to today see @SWilkins11 & @WestPointSOSH team on Afg
@jameskgreer77 @us_sams Timely/related what do you think of @teaandtactics@WarOnTheRocks piece adding nuance to the popular distinction of friction in war btwn Carl (~goal to minimize your own) and Boyd (~goal to generate for enemy)? https://t.co/G9XEOOQ4LF
@doctrinatrix_C2 who eats this doctrinal challenge (counter amphibious assault) beyond the appetizer in CH7 of 3-0? What would it take to get a MTTP at from @USArmyMCCoE ALSSA? @USArmyDoctrine
Despite the severity and urgency of this recognized threat from China, however, the United States, Taiwan, and key partners lack a unifying doctrine to counter an amphibious invasion. https://t.co/q83FBxWIyZ
While we normally talk about the sense/shoot shortfalls that occur btwn DIV and above, we would be very smart to assume US/NATO forces have the same gaps to sense/shoot in the 7-25km from the FLOT. What mitigates ours gaps?
1/ QUICK THREAD on the Russian discussions about the striking gap between "Kalibr" missiles and quadcopters - info from pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, with main points translated below.
@MarshallMcgurk Convinced me. Just bought it! Along w Fleet Tactics, Developing the Naval Mind, and Mastering the Art of Command got to love a good @USNIBooks sale
Fascinating convo @DMPritchardUQ on the impact of democracy on foreign policy OBJ, mil performance, and the interrelationship btwn society & operational art looking at 5th/4th century BCE Athens. Cause for both hope and alarm. @us_sams @MarshallMcgurk @jameskgreer77