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To your attempts at answering the challenges, see the following replies. Your answers are just the same errors repeated with different words, but let me explain it challenge by challenge:
6a.1:
You talked of a "real principle of action” that is possessed by your sole, actual referent (“man not building at T1”). I wanted to know how the principle is “real” given the denial of the action it is supposed to be the principle of.
You don’t define your use of the word “real”, instead you introduce another term, “grounded”, and say the real principle is grounded in the referent’s “skills and operative powers”. Finally, you challenge whether the “absence of an operation entails the absence of its principle”. I take it you are denying that a "principle of action" necessitates the "action" it is the "principle" of.
So, to summarise your answer: (A) the "principle of action" is subsumed by the referent, and (B) you deny the need to posit the "action" despite positing the “principle" of the action.
The answer commits the same errors I’ve been hammering you on. It is not a “principle of action” if there is no action it is a principle of, for to say otherwise is to say there IS what IS NOT! The “is” that “is not” is the action, which is referenced by its “principle” yet denied by you. It is like pointing at something, and denying there is something pointed at. If the principle does not point at the act of the man building, but rather "nowhere" or elsewhere, then it is not really the principle of the act of the man building.
Your answer is demonstrably incoherent due to two violations of identity. First, it says there “is what is not”, which can also be rendered as “there is something that is not what it is” (the act of building is “non-existent” and hence not what it is). Second, as applied to your sole referent (man not building at T1), the principle is wholly subsumed in T1/by the referent, and so may be termed a principle of “"man not building at T1” is not “man not building at T1”" (simply put: a principle of denying identity).
You keep committing the exact same errors I've been calling you out on, only with new language and phrasing. The solution is to listen to the Megarians: posit what the principle references, as it must be there to be referenced (for otherwise the principle is vacuous/irrelevant), and be more careful about observing the identity of “man not building”.
6a. 2:
Your answer is largely non-responsive. I asked you what “real” means if it does not mean “actual”. You don’t even mention the word “real” here. Are you conceding that your “real” is a synonym for actual? In which case you do conflate potential and actual, for you say the real can be idle, as is easily demonstrated:
“a real principle of action under suitable conditions, even when idle".
If “idle” applies to “real principle of action”, then what you called actual is called potential. If “idle” applies to the future action of which the principle is of (see 6a.1), then the principle is not of an actual, or the actual is being called potential. You are left with contradictions and a principle that is of potential/idleness. It is not the principle of the man building, but rather some vacuous non-actual.
To the extent you say anything, I see violations of identity (due to conflation of real/idle, actual/potential, or whatever pair you pick next). Further, the principle is at best that of potential/idleness, the actual having been denied, so it neutered. No action, no principle of action, just vacuous metaphysical jargon that has already been refuted.
6b. 3:
See 6a.1. It looks like you’re trying to deny that a “principle of action” needs the “action” of which it is a “principle”. Only this time you admit that you need to posit the “act” (building) but simultaneously deny any instance of it anywhere. So again, Aristotelianism is vacuous: here is a “principle” of an “action”, but the “action” for which it is a “principle” is nowhere/not-actual/idle/whatever new term you come up with. See 6a.1 &2.
6b 4:
Non-responsive, same problem as 6a2. You don’t define your use of the terms “act” and “not occur”, just as you didn’t do so in 6a for “real” and “idle”. As for what you do say, you repeat yourself; the answer has been given in this tweet.
Bonus 1:
If the permit issuance is not sufficient for building, then what are you even talking about here? Actually, why do we even care about removing impediments, is this supposed to lead up to a mythical moment where “man not building” is “man exercising the principle of action of building”? There are so many things wrong with this model, as explained above and in this thread.
I mean, are you supposing that if all the impediments are absent from some actual moment, the action of the “principle” can be summoned through its “exercise”? This is a complete non-starter for reasons given; if I must say more, just consider (A) you deny actual T2, so when you posit this other “impediment free moment” where the action is exercised, you say that there is what there is not; and (B) The ultimate impediment to “exercising principle of building” will always be the simple fact that “man not building” is “man not building”, per identity! And you put the principle in "man not building"! and (C) so long as an entity is not performing an act you will just be describing non-action while pretending it contains action (oh he doesn’t have a permit, he’s tired, but he has the “principle” of the (non-existent) “action”). As I said, there's no substitution for the genuine article.
I'm going to stop listing the many problems on this one, it's a red herring and it's already clear that Aristotelianism is an absolute dog's breakfast of a metaphysical system.
Bonus 2:
Your answer is either a direct denial of identity for “man not building”, or irrelevant because what you need to include in that identity is denied, or beyond, the referent.
For the first option: “man not building” is “man not building”, no more no less. That is its exact identity. So yes, “man not building” is exhaustive of “man not building”, just as A = A.
Yet, “man not building” can be considered the title we gave the referent, and one may fairly say the referent's identity subsumes many details, such as its fingers. So, if that is what you’re saying, let’s dig a little deeper.
For the second option: We need to do 2 things, (A) determine what you’re looking for, and (B) determine whether the referent, “man not building”, subsumes that.
For (A), you are seeking the “real principle” of the action (building). That apparently involves “skills” and “operative powers”. (6a1)
For (B), we can place the skills in him, no doubt he has professional knowledge of buildings and tools. However, the “operative power” of the act is where the attempt fails. This is readily demonstrated:
If you place a vacuous “operative power” (one that does not refer to its action), nothing is achieved by this, there is no act for it to be an “operative power” of (see 6a). If you place a meaningful “operative power”, in this case an "operative power" of building, then you also need to posit that which it is the "operative power" of, on pain of it being rendered vacuous and/or violation identity by saying there is what is not. To posit the action of building, we must posit it in or beyond the identity of the referent.
If (i) you place the action in him, you violate identity because “man not building” is not “man not building”, and furthermore, the action will be at T1 not T2. If (ii) you place the action beyond him/beyond T1, despite denying the other actual moments, you say there is what is not (or, if the action is in T1 but not him specifically, you have switched to a different actor/referent).
So your account is vacuous and/or incoherent, but again this was established already in 6a1 and the thread generally.
Bonus 3:
Non-responsive. I didn’t ask for a definition of what a permit is, or what the law has to say about one. To the extent you deny that if one points at an act then there is an act that is pointed at, it has been exhaustively answered above and in this thread.
To what is old, as I said, the thread speaks for itself. People can read it as needed, your false characterisations are pointless. I have explained, in this tweet and in the highly repetitive thread, how Aristotelianism demonstrably violates identity. The Megarian objection is fatal to the Aristotelian metaphysical project.
Re: the builder's "actual art" and its "exercise", you both distinguished and did not distinguish them. See above: when you separate them, you only use the empty and irrelevant use of "art". When you join them, you illicitly reference what you simultaneously deny (T2). This illicit joinder of art and its exercise answers your request for an instance where you posited actual building at T2, btw. I've exposed this move repeatedly already, though; I should not have repeated myself.
Actually, after reviewing the rest of what you wrote, I see you failed to respond to the errors I flagged. Answer the objections made if you want to resolve matters:
6a:
1. You said the "principle for action" is "real", how is it real given the absence of its action? (for you lack actual T2, hence the "principle" is empty/fake)
2. What does real mean here, if you say it is not equivalent to actual? (For if it is equivalent, saying the "real" is "idle" is saying that an actual is a potential)
6b:
3. What & where is the "act" that the "capacity" is ordered towards?
4. See challenge 6a, 2, only now it is "act" and "not occur" instead of "real" and "idle", which themselves were in place of "actual" and "potential". Same error committed repeatedly with different words.
I read your builder example and it just exposes problems with your use of "sufficient conditions". So here's some bonus objection (although the above are already sufficient):
1. How can anything be a sufficient condition of the builder building, other than the builder building? That's the only condition that satisfies building. He has permits? He is full of energy? He has all his tools? Great, still insufficient, there's no building. There's no substitute for the genuine article, but Aristotelianism lacks it.
2. How could the "real principle" justify the act if the "man not building" does have a permit? The "real principle" is subsumed in "man not building", which is the only actuality you have. So "man not building" has a permit and per identity is what it is, "man not building", so what are we even doing here?? Totally vacuous metaphysics.
3. How can an (in)sufficient condition, like possessing a permit, refer to a further act? For the act is not at T1, or whenever the permit is granted, and that's the only actual datapoint for you. So again, you affirm and deny the same actuality: you posit "sufficient condition" for the act, but the act itself is simultaneously denied.
Alternatively, just keep hiding from these challenges. But 8~ back to back tweets that all miss the point? Pointless! I have my conclusion: the violation of identity has been repeatedly exposed.
@iosantonius@metathomist The response I gave was "light" because my conclusion has already been established. I only address what new information/positions you provide, the rest has been repeatedly resolved and the errors exposed for anyone to see.
To the little you add + your scenario, see following:
6a. You now say that "capacity" is "a real principle of action under suitable conditions, even when idle". So where is the "real" part, and how can action be idle?
The "real" is absent because you deny the real T2. If you do not have a man building you do not have a man building; there's nothing real about building in T1 (only "man not building").
Similarly, action cannot be idle, that is just conflating potential with actual again. You've just raised two new words, "real" and "idle", and they're clearly just illicit attempts to conflate actual with potential. If "capacity" or "art" refers to something real/actual at T1, it is what it is at T1, where there really is no building, and there's really nowhere else to point, either!
6b. You now perform an about-face and say "capacity" does tie T1 to T2, for "capacity is ordered toward an act, but doesn't require that act to occur." Where is the act that it is ordered towards, then? You deny it because you deny actual T2! So it turns out that what it is ordered towards is not there to be ordered towards by it! If you do posit what it is ordered towards, as is necessitated by your claim, you get Megarianism.
Indeed, saying that you can have an act that doesn't occur is just conflating potential with actual again. An act is... wait for it... actual. It is what it is, the act, which is building.
Honestly, you just deny and affirm the same thing over and over again. It's like there's two holes in a sinking ship, and the Aristotelian response is just to desperately move one plug back and forth. It's hopeless, abandon ship!
@iosantonius@metathomist I'll make this quick as you only offer one new detail: you FINALLY try to make "capacity" relevant (6a, b). See the following tweet for why your attempt is a failure.
The refutations have landed cleanly. Those who espouse Aristotelianism are deeply & demonstrably confused.
@iosantonius@metathomist 6b. You failed to answer the challenge. "Capacity" has been reduced to the point where it offers no tie to a future actual, it adds nothing to the metaphysical dispute, just a deceptive byword for "knowledge". The system is dead in the water at this point.
@iosantonius@metathomist 6a. Not an answer. What meaning does "capacity" offer on this metaphysical point? You've apparently got no answer to that challenge, you need to reconsider your broken metaphysics and ditch the Aristotelian nonsense.
@iosantonius@metathomist 6. I did so, and here's where we're at: (A) the Aristotelian use of "can" has been exposed as meaningless (you won't answer that challenge); and (b) Aristotelians refuse to admit the consequence of having said that potential is not actual, instead conflating the two as needed.
@iosantonius@metathomist 5. You don't have one subject that occupies actual T1 and actual T2, because you deny actual T2. I do not deny actual T2, so I do not commit your Aristotelian error. You have one subject that is simply "man not building at T1" and say it is what it is not.