@TalkMullins@larryelder Definitely could happen, but CA doesn’t use AccuVote; error rates (misreading folds as marked vote targets) for other scanner/tabulators hasn’t been explored AFAIK. Also, in NH, big difference in error rates depending on whether fold was “in” or “out.”@HarriHursti@philipbstark
The 2-days speaker track schedule of @VotingVillageDC@DEFCON is out!
Physical Village building day is Thursday. If you are in Vegas and volunteering to help, please to Village area around noon. We have all kinds of work needing to be done.
#ElectionIntegrity#ElectionSecurity
Department of Justice has issued clarifications how federal laws restrict post-election audits and especially how the governance of the election material has to be organized. Very much needed document. #ElectionSecurity#ElectionIntegrity
7/Critics say “But look at all the ballots that ARE checked!” They don’t matter. It is only the hacked but undetected ballots that matter. BTW even if you ignore steps 3&4, the math doesn’t change much. The adversary still has an overwhelming advantage. Only the margin changes.
6/ a single report of a changed ballot is not enough to shut down the voting (otherwise, adversaries could easily mount a denial of service attack), which means that the other 99 incorrect ballots will be counted along with all the other correct ballots.
1/ The math behind this report is unforgiving & brings the risk of universal-use BMDs into focus: If an adversary changes at most 10% of the ballots in a 1000 voter precinct, with near certainty all those 100 fraudulent ballots will be cast unnoticed.
https://t.co/qVQziOKmuR
We have been educating stakeholders why we need to invest into security and take this seriously to make sure that vulnerabilities of the election system are mitigated and fixed. Being vulnerable is no evidence that it was hacked, every steps should be taken to protect our system.
@BarbaraGlassman Many NH jurisdictions hand count (don’t use machines), but those should also audit. NH could use “ballot-polling” RLAs today, but they require large samples when margins are small. Current NH equipment doesn’t support ballot-level comparison RLAs, the most efficient type of RLA.
@InfoGuru16 The NH absentee ballots have “score lines” that weaken the paper where it’s supposed to be folded. Hand folds generally (but not always, esp in governor’s race) followed the score lines. Machine folds didn’t get in state rep race.
@InfoGuru16@AngryFleas The issue was not the weight of the paper but rather the locations of the folds. The ballots were designed to be folded elsewhere; the machine instead folded them through vote targets.
BREAKING NEWS: @FSFP & @philipbstark have sued @EACgov for unlawfully weakening proposed federal voting system guidelines after repeatedly meeting privately and improperly w/the voting system vendors. https://t.co/qxSjAEsDTw
Many people are asking questions about timing marks alignment. See page 56. We superimposed all ballots and the timing marks aligning. We superimposed the ballots in smaller groups to root out small number of bad scans. Timing marks are good. @WAuditors
https://t.co/GA9CCFLkb2
@MRSRedVoteR This was not a RLA: outcome known. This was root-cause analysis of machine v handcount discrepancies. Number of sign-ins was checked. Number of absentee affidavits checked.