A lot of these people regurgitate information heard on Facebook without fact checking, this information is literally in public domain, unfortunately we don’t read and critically analyze to understand
The IMF visited Zambia last week. The press release landed this morning.
The progress is real and it deserves to be named. External debt restructured. Reserves strengthened. Inflation inside the target band for the first time since April 2019. The programme completed. These are years of sustained reform effort across multiple institutions.
Four findings warrant close attention.
On fiscal slippage. Wage bill pressures, agricultural sector support, and election-related expenditures are accumulating. The primary surplus, targeted at 3.8 per cent of GDP, is projected to fall by approximately 1 percentage point absent corrective measures. The Food Reserve Agency is flagged as a quasi-fiscal risk. It is early days. But it is worth watching. We identified election-year fiscal pressure as the dominant execution risk for 2026 as far back as January. The Refinancing Wall note stated it plainly: governments facing elections have a structural tendency toward time inconsistency. The domestic absorption article added the mechanism: suppliers vote, and suppliers employ people who vote.
On the anchor. Substantive programme discussions will begin only after the general elections and after a new government is in place. The Refinancing Wall note made the constraint precise: quantitative performance criteria and parliamentary budget ceilings are not equivalent. A parliamentary ceiling can be revised by the same parliament that approved it. In the absence of an external anchor, timely fiscal data becomes the only signal the market can price. The January 2026 monthly economic indicators have not been published. It is now March. The first month in which the FX revenue compression would appear in the numbers remains invisible. Silence prices as a risk premium.
On the external environment. Rising oil prices and geopolitical tensions are cited as upside risks to inflation and the exchange rate. The royalty arithmetic article mapped the loop in January: FX strength compresses kwacha revenues, revenue shortfalls increase domestic issuance, and the fiscal channel feeds back into inflation and exchange rate conditions. FX strength is not unambiguously positive. It improves inflation optics but can weaken the fiscal base.
On growth. The IMF revised 2025 growth down to 4.5 per cent and 2026 to 5.5 per cent. Mining sector underperformance is cited as a key driver. The royalty article warned that correlation between copper prices and Zambian output can break down when supply constraints dominate. The revenue assumptions in the 2026 budget, VAT at 47 per cent growth against 77 per cent collection efficiency in 2025, grants at 173 per cent, external financing at 844 per cent, were already aggressive before the growth revision. They are more so now.
The hard-won gains are documented. The pressure points are independently confirmed. Whether both hold through August is the question we raised in January. The IMF has now confirmed it is the right question.