that’s exactly how lido ceremony worked. we all got airgapped machines and they could only talk to each other via animated qr codes. as you can imagine, laptop cameras are not very good, so you could barely transmit at 10 fps, and it still took several loops to read each message.
Publishing the RFC draft of the Lido V3 whitepaper—over a year in the making. It’s a big step toward more modular, expressive, and decentralized staking infrastructure. Retweet to amplify 💙🏝️💧 https://t.co/it0XDlPEWD
@drjasper_eth if the oracle software had a bug leading to a key compromise then yes, this would def increase the chance of an attack. this wasn’t the case here, though.
imo, lido has one of the sturdiest oracle designs out there, with a lot of onchain sanity checks to prevent worst outcomes
@drjasper_eth issues with other operators are not caused by the attacker so they cannot contribute to the oracles potentially reaching a malicious quorum
@drjasper_eth the worst thing that could’ve happened is a stale rebase report due to not reaching a quorum
for an attacker to modify the oracle report (and thus e.g. force an incorrect rebase) they’d need to hack 5 independent oracle operators instead of one
💧New Release: @LidoFinance's Dual Governance
The principal-agent problem is a significant challenge in the industry.
In this quest, discover Lido's proposed solution.
Designed with a scalable and decentralized liquid staking protocol in mind.
https://t.co/SpPiaUhNaI
its unbelievable to me how people still talk about LSTs as a big risk and have been deliberately blind to Eigenlayer for 12+ months. "hello, human resources?" meme in practice
@peter_szilagyi@IsdrsP@PsheEth@dankrad@0xhauru Lido DAO doesn’t have an entity and thus cannot have any legal contracts with node operators. You can find the application and onboarding process described here (spoiler: the decision is fully onchain and can only be enacted by a DAO vote): https://t.co/4m76hNmOlC
I got locked out my Twitter account and need help.
was trying to enter my date of birth and it must have accidentally logged in a wrong decade.
Once I hit "enter" the account was locked "for being under 13 years old at time of account creation".
In 2023 LIDO DAO passed the GOOSE proposal, making security and decentralization their main focus.
Today, I am revisiting that strategy in the light of two important developents in the Ethereum ecosystem: Minimum Viable Issuance (MVI), and Restaking.
https://t.co/KWhvXFnMDM
★ Announcing MVI Grants ★
We are excited to share an update on the MVI Grants program – five stellar teams have been selected by the grants committee @artofkot, @brettpalatiello, @eliasimos.
Why are we funding this research?
Since the proposal to reduce the ETH issuance was suggested, the Ethereum community has been actively discussing its monetary policy.
When considering issuance reduction, there is a trade-off for the network between the amount of ETH spent on rewards and how decentralized its validator set is. In particular, one of the main downside risks of reducing issuance is the potential concentration of staked ETH, especially in the view of the upcoming ETF launch. There are also a variety of other risks and factors associated with issuance reduction: margin compression, the resulting pressures on certain market segments, as well as increasing barriers for innovation.
These factors touch the core values of Ethereum: decentralization and censorship resistance. Hence we believe that an evaluation of these risks is needed, in the form of a deep analysis of how the issuance curve change could affect the validator set composition.
Scope:
(1) Profiling different actors within the staking economy, via interviews and field research, to uncover key data points such as preferences, frictions, supply curves, elasticities, costs, etc.
(2) Gathering, studying and deducing the data above using the historical Beacon Chain and DeFi data sets.
(3) Building out theoretical models, taking into account the data above.
(4) Studying equilibriums & limits, doing simulations, and ultimately understanding & evaluating the risks of how changing issuance may affect the staking ratio & the validator set.
↯ 5 grants teams that we have funded ↯
Cryptecon: Matthias Hafner @MatthiasHafner1, Juan Beccuti @BqJuancho, Thunj Chantramonklasri @tchantramonk, Nicolas Oderbolz, Nicolas Greber, Beatrix Marosvölgyi – economists, mechanism designers and modelers from the https://t.co/WEV51lflyC crypto research group.
Scope focus: (2-4)
20 squares: Philipp Zahn @philipp_m_zahn, Wenxuan Deng @dengwx11, Fabrizio Genovese @fabgenovese, Daniele Palombi @dpl0a – mathematicians, economists and modelers from the https://t.co/uMwqGsrqza crypto research firm.
Scope focus: (2-4)
Franklin DAO: Vivian Zhu @vivzhuu, Otakar Korinek @OtakarKorinek – members of the research committee at https://t.co/D1QYZbEfAK, a DAO formed by students out of UPenn.
Scope focus: (1)
K. Kulkarni @ks_kulk – crypto researcher, finishing CS PhD at Berkeley, working with Gauntlet.
Scope focus: (3-4)
A. Eloranta @antsae_ & S. Helminen @0xSanteri – crypto researchers, worked with Flashbots and Token Terminal.
Scope focus: (2)
Read the full announcement at https://t.co/gnLuv1hszM
The next step of Blast actually doing their own LST and getting the praise as "the multisig pyramid what saved Ethereum from Lido" would be hilarious.
Love the music, really fun song today!
@mrjasonchoi this would incentivise voting with the majority, regardless of whether the current majority vote is good for the dao => it would disincentivise any innovation and cheapen dao capture
any voting incentivisation that’s only tied to the immediate vote outcome has the same issue