O ΔΗΣΥ είναι όπως τη σύναξη του Βατικανού που εκλέγουν οι καρδινάλιοι τον Πάπα !
Όταν τελειώσουν,γιατί τώρα είμαστε ακόμα στα προκαταρκτικά του νεκατώματος του ξεκαθαρίσματος λογαριασμών των καρδιναλίων ,θα δούμε άσπρο καπνό να ανεβαίνει από τη Πινδάρου !
Κρις-Διονύσης αποφασίσαν η Αννίτα να διεκδικήσει Προεδρία.
Ο Αβέρωφ τους έχει στο χέρι.
Αποσύρει πανικοβλημένη. Δεν εκβιάστηκε λαλεί.
Ο Διονύσης γράφει ότι εκβιάστηκε από Κουλέρμο.
Ο Κουλέρμος λεέι ότι εκείνη τον κάλεσε.
Ο Παμπορίδης ξέρει ότι θα ρεζιλευτεί.
Ψεύτες συντονιστείτε
The 4th CyFood B2B Forum is connecting #Cypriot production with the market and is co-organised by the Larnaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the #LarnakaTourism Board and the #CyprusChefsAssociation (Σύνδεσμος Αρχιμαγείρων Κύπρου).
November 12, 2026.
1/1
#CyFoodForum
So if Russia ever invades Estonia, will we also have an “extensive discussion with our Russian colleagues” to politely explain that their actions “infringe upon the sovereign rights of third states”?
This is the EU’s High Representative.
Ετοιμάζεσαι για ταξίδι; Τα αεροπορικά εισιτήρια μπορεί να γίνουν πολύ πιο ακριβά!
Ο CEO της Ryanair προειδοποιεί για αυξήσεις έως και 20% το 2027, καθώς ο πόλεμος στη Μέση Ανατολή και οι τιμές του πετρελαίου εκτοξεύουν το κόστος των αεροπορικών εταιρειών.
Θα γίνει το αεροπορικό ταξίδι πολυτέλεια;
Η Κύπρος έχει τη χειρότερη και πιο ακριβή εκπαίδευση στον κόσμο. Μπράβο μας!
Ας ξεχάσουμε την κατάκτηση του διαστήματος και της τεχνητής νοημοσύνης, και ας επικεντρωθούμε στη διόρθωση της εκπαίδευσης, καθιστώντας την παράλληλα οικονομικά αποδοτική.
“Everything you wanted to know about exclusive economic zone (EEZ) disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean based on claims of involved countries (Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Libya, Egypt).” — A thread 🧵 by @Iosif_Lazaridis
Short conclusion:
On the core legal questions—whether inhabited islands generate EEZ and continental shelf rights, and whether boundaries must account for all relevant coasts rather than “mainlands only”—international law (UNCLOS Art. 121 and customary law, as confirmed by ICJ practice) aligns with Greece and Cyprus.
Final lines require agreement or adjudication starting from a provisional median line that normally gives islands full effect; Greece has offered to go to court, while Turkey has not.
The Turkey–Libya MoU does not bind third states
"Libya and Turkey somehow want you to suspend belief and be convinced that their maritime borders touch each other..."
@Zemenides doesn't hold back on "EZ Notes", slamming #Turkey's bizarre and illegal maritime claims in the East Med.
Tune in: https://t.co/wvGX3g3kXA
A special day at the Embassy: five ancient Cypriot artefacts entrusted to us for repatriation. Grateful to the Widehag family as well as to Thomas Rydén for making it possible.
@CyprusMFA@DepMinCultureCy@SweMFA#Sweden#Cyprus
Τζον Χριστοδούλου: Επιβεβαιώνει επαφές με κόμματα για τις προεδρικές εκλογές, αρχές του 2027 η απόφασή του - «Νομίζω μπορώ να βρω λύση στο Κυπριακό» https://t.co/R4ATJU52xe
Thank you Your Excellency @KrisztinaLakos for the kind invitation and Congratulations on your Country National Day 🇭🇺celebration in #Cyprus 🇨🇾
Honoured to join !
💥The Libya setback for Greece shows that being a predictable, international-law-focused ally,no longer guarantees results in a transactional Mediterranean.🔥
In a Middle East where alliances are fluid, transactional, and increasingly untethered from old US-centric anchors, the eastern Mediterranean is becoming a test of who can operate in pure interest-driven CHAOS .
Eastern Libya’s ratification of the 2019 Turkey-Libya maritime MoU—long opposed by Greece—marks a clear setback for Athens. As Sean Mathews details in Middle East Eye, Greece’s partnerships with Egypt, the UAE, and Israel proved insufficient to block the move. Egypt and Turkey now converge on multiple fronts (Sudan, Somalia, opposition to Israeli expansion post-2023), the UAE is managing its differences with Ankara while backing Saddam Haftar’s ambitions, and Israel itself has engaged the Haftar camp (including a recent Netanyahu meeting with Saddam in UAE ).
A Turkish role in the east, by some Israeli calculations, may even tighten Greece’s dependence on Jerusalem.
Vassilis Nedos’s reporting aligns: Turkey and the UAE are jointly facilitating efforts to unify Libyan armed forces, while Israel has also sought a foothold in Benghazi. Libya politics remains moving sand.
This is not merely a bilateral Greece-Turkey or Greece-Libya problem. It reflects a broader reordering as the United States is in transition—less willing or able to underwrite regional security architectures. In that vacuum, states prioritize immediate gains (energy claims, political succession in Libya, countering rivals elsewhere) over consistent alignment with Greek or Cypriot maritime interests.
Greece and Cyprus cannot rely on the assumption that shared partners will automatically defend their positions. They must become sharper, more self-reliant actors: consolidate legal and operational control over their own maritime zones (including around Crete), deepen concrete economic and security stakes with WHOEVER delivers results, and treat the region as a competitive environment rather than a fixed alliance map.
🔥Real influence will come from demonstrated capacity to exercise power and selective, reciprocal partnerships—not from counting on yesterday’s alignments.
In a dangerous, multipolar Mediterranean, alertness and strategic autonomy are no longer optional.
💥”Why Greece's alliances failed to prevent eastern Libya's maritime deal with Turkey”
An interesting analysis by @SeanPmathews in @MiddleEastEye highlighting the background behind Eastern Libya approved the Turkey-Libya MoU on maritime zones
@NedosVassilis in @kathimerini_gr has similar analysis in Greek ⬇️
#geopolitics #EastMed
🔥You are failing your core duty, @kajakallas by your post below
You are not a neutral mediator.
Your job is to stand firmly and effectively for the interests of all 27 EU member states — and therefore of Europe.
💥No pleasantries are due to powers that threaten European sovereignty and resources.
A one-line aside that the Turkey–Libya MoU “infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states,” followed by business as usual, is not a defence of EU member states.
That memorandum is an open illegal attempt to carve up Greek and Cypriot maritime space — waters that form part of EU territory under international law — using a failed state and its competing factions as cover.
Treating it as a minor agenda item while you devote the bulk of your energy to Russia sends a clear message: some member states’ borders and rights are negotiable.
The Mediterranean has a clear bully. Turkey is a modern pirate 🏴☠️ state: it does not recognise the Law of the Sea when it is inconvenient, continues illegal activities, and has now secured eastern Libya’s parliament’s ratification of the 2019 MoU.
Your job is to represent all 27 member states, not only the eastern flank.
Passivity and soft language on Europe’s south-eastern maritime borders do not de-escalate; they invite further faits accomplis.
What signal does this give to anyone who disrespects EU territory and international law? That words of regret and a private “I raised it” are enough?
EU High Representative means protecting every member state — not selective outrage.
Greece, Cyprus and the rest of the Mediterranean are watching and don’t think highly of your “diplomacy”!
Serious geopolitical powers give ultimatums to threatening bullies,not socializing with them,leaving members to look outside Europe for Security
#think @vonderleyen@eucopresident@PrimeministerGR@Christodulides